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2025 DAILYLAW 54956 (CHH)

SMT. YOGMAYA v. SMT. SHIVKUMARI CHOUBAY

MA/209/2025 · 2025-10-28

Shri Deepak Kumar Tiwari

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:52733 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MA No. 209 of 2025 1 - Smt. Yogmaya W/o Ramesh Shukla Aged About 52 Years R/o Rama Life, District- Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ...Appellant versus 1 - Smt. Shivkumari Choubay D/o Lt. Delu Prasad W/o Lt. Fakanlal Aged About 71 Years R/o Village Kargi Tehsil Kota, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 2 - Smt. Devkumari Tiwari D/o Lt. Delu Prasad W/o Lt. Ram Krishna Tiwari Aged About 70 Years R/o Changorbhata, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Naresh Kumar Tiwari S/o Late Sarju Prasad Tiwari Aged About 65 Years R/o Smriti Nagar, Bhilai District- Durg (C.G.) 4 - Alok Kumar Tiwari S/o Late Sarju Prasad Tiwari Aged About 63 Years R/o Smriti Nagar, Bhilai District- Durg (C.G.) 5 - Rajesh Kumar Tiwari S/o Late Sarju Prasad Tiwari Aged About 57 Years R/o Abhishek Vihar Mangala District- Bilaspur (C.G.) PRIYANKA VERMA Digitally signed by PRIYANKA VERMA Date: 2025.10.29 16:38:20 +0530 2 6 - Rakesh Kumar Tiwari S/o Lt. Sarju Prasad Tiwari Aged About 55 Years R/o Balmukund School, Talapara, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 7 - Satyanarayan Tiwari S/o Lt. Sarju Prasad Tiwari Aged About 53 Years R/o Abhishek Vihar Mangala District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 8 - Girish Tiwari S/o Lt. Sarju Prasad Tiwari Aged About 51 Years R/o Village Saida, Tehsil And Police Station Sakri District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 9 - Harish Tiwari S/o Lt. Sarju Prasad Tiwari Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Saida, Tehsil And Police Station Sakri District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 10 - Sanjay Kumar S/o Lt. Pawan Kumar Dwivedi Aged About 48 Years R/o Kargikala, Tehsil Kota District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 11 - Sanat Kumar S/o Lt. Pawan Kumar Dwivedi Aged About 48 Years R/o Kargikala, Tehsil - Kota, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 12 - Smt. Purnima S/o Lt. Pawan Kumar W/o Rakesh Dubey Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Kharod, Tehsil- Shivrinarayan District- Janjgir- Champa (C.G.) 13 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Its Mr. District- Magistrate, Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Anand Shukla and Mr. Waquar Naiyer, Advocates For Respondent/State : Mr. Rajeev Bharat, GA 3 Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Order On Board 29/10/2025 1. This Miscellaneous Appeal has been preferred assailing the order dated 18.09.2025 passed in Civil Suit No.48-A/2025 by the 12th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur (inadvertently mentioned as 10th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in the prayer clause), whereby the application filed by the respondents/plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC was allowed. 2. Necessary facts of the case are that plaintiff No.1- Smt. Shivkumari, plaintiff No.2- Devkumari & mother of plaintiffs No.3 to 9- Smt. Ram Kumari, and Defendant No.1 to 3 & Defendant No.4/appellant, who are the children of Late Pawan Kumar Dwivedi have had the common ancestor, namely Delu Prasad. Plaintiffs/sisters filed a civil suit on 16.04.2025 for declaration of title, partition, separate possession and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property, which is undisputedly the ancestral property of the parties. In the said civil suit, it was averred in the written statement that the plaintiffs being the daughters of Late Delu Prasad had already relinquished their rights on 10.10.1989 by executing a document on a stamp paper of Rs.5/- and thereafter, mutation was effected in favour of the son, namely Pawan Kumar Dwivedi and the mother- Purain Bai. Earlier, a civil suit was filed by the sons of Late Pawan Kumar Dwivedi, namely Sanjay Dwivedi and Sanat Dwivedi arraying their sisters- appellant herein, 4 Yogmaya and another sister, Purnima Dubey by instituting Civil Suit No.153-A/2024 on 10.05.2024 before the 4th Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bilaspur by making an averment inter alia that their sisters had no right over the suit property. An application for injunction filed therein was, however, dismissed by order dated 07.12.2024, whereby the 4th Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bilaspur held that the appellant, being the daughter of Late Pawan Kumar Dwivedi, had a good case in her favour, as the suit property is ancestral in nature and she has an inheritable right therein. 3. When a query has been put to learned counsel for the appellant, he fairly admits that the said civil suit is still pending. Upon a further query as to whether any application has been moved in the subsequent Civil Suit No.48-A/2025, he fairly submits that the subject property, admittedly held by the appellant, is the same and that in the earlier suit, the present plaintiffs were not arrayed as party. In the subsequent civil suit, an application was preferred by the daughters of Late Delu Prasad/plaintiffs seeking restrain from effecting any partition in respect of the property in order to avoid multiplicity of the judicial proceedings and the said application was allowed by the impugned order. Hence, this Appeal. 4. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the law in this regard is well settled that no injunction can be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to it from which the injunction is sought, so there is a patent or inherent lack of jurisdiction while passing the impugned order and the said order has been passed in the teeth of Section 41(b) of the Specific 5 Relief Act, 1963 (henceforth “the Act, 1963”). The said provision has been further explained in the matter of Cotton Corporation of India Limited vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and others1, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 7 as under:- “7......… "41. An injunction cannot be granted :- (a) .............… (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; ....................…" The predecessor of Sec. 41 (b), Sec. 56 (b) of the Specific Relief Act of 1887 repealed by 1963 Act read as under : "56. Injunction cannot be granted :- (a) ..................… (b) to stay proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought," A glance at the two provisions, the existing and the repealed would reveal the legislative response to judicial interpretation. Under Sec. 56 (b) of the repealed Act, the Court was precluded by its injunction to grant stay of proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction was sought. In other words, the Court could stay by its injunction a proceeding in a court subordinate to the court granting injunction. The injunction granting stay of proceeding was directed to the Court and the Court has to be the 1 AIR 1983 SC 1272 6 Court subordinate to the one granting the injunction. This is postulated on the well recognised principle that the superior court can regulate proceedings in a court subordinate to it. It is implicit in this assumption and the language used in Sec. 56 (b) that the court could not grant injunction under Sec. 56 (b) of the repealed Act to stay proceeding in a court superior in hierarchy to the Court from which injunction is sought. But by judicial interpretation, a consensus was reached that as injunction acts in personum while the Court by its injunction cannot stay proceedings in a Court of superior jurisdiction; it could certainly by an injunction restrain a party before it from further prosecuting the proceeding in other courts may be superior or inferior in the hierarchy of courts. To some extent this approach not only effectively circumvented the provision contained in Sec. 56 of the repealed Act but denuded it of its content. The Legislature took notice of this judicial interpretation and materially altered the language of the succeeding provision enacted in Sec. 41 (b) replacing Sec. 56 (b) of the repealed Act while enacting Specific Relief Act of 1963. The Legislture manifestly expressed its mind by enacting Sec. 41 (b) in such clear and unambiguous language that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person, the language takes care of injunction acting in personum, from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which injunction is sought. Sec. 41(b) denies to the court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction 7 restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court which is not subordinate to the court from which the injunction is sought. In other words, the court can still grant an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court which is subordinate to the court from which the injunction is sought. As a necessary corollary, it would follow that the court is precluded from granting an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction. This change in language deliberately adopted by the Legislature after taking note of judicial vacillation has to be given full effect.” 5. Learned counsel would further place reliance on the judgment passed by this Court in the matter of Prakash Narain vs. Sharda Prasad (dead) through Lrs and others2 wherein, after placing reliance in Cotton Corporation (supra), it was categorically held that the Revenue Court (Tahsildar) is not a court subordinate to Civil Court, therefore, no injunction can be granted against Revenue Court. In the circumstances, he prays to allow the Appeal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and also perused the documents annexed with the Appeal carefully. 7. It is well settled that the Revenue Court is not the subordinate Court of the Civil Court and the law is also well settled that no injunction can be granted although the power is discretionary to nullify statutory provision. 2 2018:CGHC:21752 8 Section 41(b) of the Act, 1963, clearly restricts the power of the Civil Court while considering the application of temporary injunction that no injunction can be passed to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which an injunction is sought. 8. It is also well established that any mutation in the Revenue record confers no title and there is only a presumption under Section 117 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter called “the Code”) that the land records shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved. 9. In the instant case, dispute arose when the learned SDO Revenue Kota vide order dated 27.05.2025 dismissed the objection raised by one of the daughters of Late Delu Prasad only on technical ground that the said objection had been raised belatedly after 35 years, as the mutation was effected on 10.10.1989 whereas same was challenged on 31.12.2024. It has been further observed that when a temporary injunction application of the brothers of the appellant was dismissed in another civil suit, the appellant herein was much more interested to get a partition of accounts in terms of Section 178 of the Code. It is always expected from the Revenue Authorities to see whether any order of mutation has been earlier passed in a lawful manner or not and if the said question is debatable, the proviso of Section 178 of the code stipulates that if any question of title is raised, the Tahsildar shall stay the proceeding before him for a period of three months to facilitate the institution of a civil suit for determination of the question of title. 9 10.In the case at hand, the daughters of Late Delu Prasad/plaintiffs have already filed a civil suit even though the rights of the brothers of the appellant have not been conclusively determined and the said civil suit is also pending. In such circumstances, it is always expected from the concerned revenue authorities to maintain the judicial discipline to stay the proceeding unless the rights have been finally concluded by the Civil Court. 11.In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order passed by the trial Court is modified to the extent indicated here-in-above. 12.With the aforesaid observation, the Appeal stands disposed of. 13.It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case with regard to the share or relinquishment of any of the parties, and the concerned Court shall decide the lis strictly on its own merits in accordance with law. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Priyanka