- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO.15580 OF 2024 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: PROF. C.M. THYAGARAJ S/O C. MUNISWAMY NAIDU AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS R/AT VIDHYA SANGAMA N.H.4, P.B. HIGHWAY BELAGAVI – 591 156. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. M. NARAYANA REDDY AND SRI. H.R.SHOWRI, ADVOCATES) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY SIDDAPURA POLICE STATION JAYANAGARA SUB-DIVISION BENGALURU CITY-560 029 REP. BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560 001 2. M.S. SUDARSHAN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR K.S.D.A., OFFICE BANNERGHATTA ROAD BENGALURU-560 029 …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SOWMYA R., HCGP FOR R1; R2 - SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.1391/2024 ON THE FILE OF THE IV ADDL. CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU PRODUCED AS ANNEXURES – C AND D ARISING OUT OF CRIME NO.103/2020 FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 409 AND 420 OF IPC INSOFAR AS PETITIONER IS CONCERNED TO MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR ORAL ORDER In this petition, petitioner – accused No.2 in C.C.No.1391/2024 arising out of Crime No.103/2020 seeks quashing of the impugned proceedings and for other reliefs. 2. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and learned HCGP for respondent No.1 and perused the material on record. The 2nd respondent – defacto complainant having been served with notice of this petition has chosen to remain unrepresented and has not contested the petition. 3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the 2nd respondent – defacto complainant filed the instant complaint dated 24.07.2020 interalia alleging that he was working as - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 Assistant Director in Karnataka Vocational Training and Skill Development Corporation Ltd., (KVTSDCL – earlier KSDC) from 20.07.2019 onwards. It was alleged by him that the petitioner herein who was the Executive Director during the period 2014 - 2015 had illegally made / released payments and issued cheques in favour of others towards training expenses and thereby committed offences punishable under Sections 409 and 420 IPC. The said complaint was registered as an FIR in Crime No.103/2020 by the 1st respondent – police authorities, who conducted investigation and filed the impugned Charge Sheet against seven persons including petitioner by arraigning him as accused No.2, who is before this Court by way of the present petition. 4. A perusal of the impugned Charge Sheet / proceedings will indicate that while the petitioner was arraigned as accused No.2, Sri. Eshwarnaik V.P., Managing Director is arraigned as accused No.1 and the training officer and administrative assistant are arraigned as accused Nos.3 and 4, respectively. The alleged recipients of the alleged amounts / payments are arraigned as accused Nos.5 to 7, respectively as can be seen from the Charge Sheet summary. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 5. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that there is a wholesale variation between the allegations made in the Complaint / FIR and the Charge Sheet, while the Complaint / FIR specifically alleges that the alleged cheques towards payment were signed by the petitioner – accused No.2, the Charge Sheet summary and material alleges that the cheques in fact were not signed by petitioner – accused No.2 but were actually signed by accused No.1 – Managing Director. The Charge Sheet material also does not disclose that the petitioner was guilty of the alleged offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust alleged against him except for the fact that he is alleged to have been the Executive Director of KVTSDCL at that time. The Charge Sheet material also indicates that the alleged payments in favour of accused Nos.5 to 7 were made pursuant to the recommendations of the Committee appointed by the State Government. 6. Further, though the allegations pertain to the period 2014 – 2015 when the petitioner was working as the Executive Director, the impugned Complaint was filed on 24.07.2020 after a long, inordinate and unexplained delay and latches of more than five years. As stated supra, there is complete and total variance - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 between the allegations made in the complaint alleging that the petitioner had signed the cheques which is belied by the Charge Sheet material which indicates that the cheques were not signed by the petitioner but by the Managing Director. It is also pertinent to note that office orders of the year 2014 which also form part of the Charge Sheet material specifically permit release / disbursement of training expenses in favour of accused Nos.5 to 7. Under these circumstances, in the absence of any material to establish the role and involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the alleged offences and without there being any Charge Sheet material to incriminate the petitioner for the alleged offences coupled with the fact that mere alleged dereliction of duty or alleged negligence on the part of the petitioner during the process of disbursement / release of payments cannot be construed or treated as the petitioner having committed or being involved in the alleged offences, I am of the view that the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner – accused No.2 deserve to be quashed. 7. 7. A perusal of the Complaint dated 24.07.2020 will indicate that though the 2nd respondent makes allegations in relation to the period 2014-2015, absolutely no explanation - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 whatsoever is contained in the complaint for the long, inordinate and unexplained delay of more than six years in lodging the complaint, that to after the petitioner was repatriated to his parent department on 22.05.2015 thereby leading to the sole / inescapable conclusion that the delay would vitiate the impugned proceedings as against the petitioner. In the case of Kishan Singh (Dead) through LRs. Vs. Gurpal Singh and others – (2010) 8 SCC 775, the Apex Court held as under: “21. Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the informant with all its vivid details gives an assurance regarding truth of its version. In case there is some delay in filing the FIR, the complainant must give explanation for the same. Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant's case improbable when such delay is properly explained. However, deliberate delay in lodging the complaint is always fatal. (Vide Sahib Singh v. State of Haryana [(1997) 7 SCC 231 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1049 : AIR 1997 SC 3247] .) 22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In the absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the civil court may initiate - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Vide Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh [(1982) 1 SCC 466 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 249 : AIR 1982 SC 1238] ; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] ; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513 : AIR 2000 SC 754] ; and Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P. [(2008) 12 SCC 531 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446] ) 23. The case before us relates to a question of the genuineness of the agreement to sell dated 4-1-1988. The said agreement was between Kishori Lal and the respondents and according to the terms of the said agreement, the sale deed was to be executed by 10-6-1989. As the sale deed was not executed within the said time, suit for specific performance was filed by the other party in 1989 which was decreed in 1996. 24. So far as the present appellants are concerned, agreement to sell dated 22-10-1988 was executed in favour of their father and the sale deed was to be executed by 15-6-1989. No action was taken till 1996 for non-execution of the sale deed. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 The appellants' father approached the court after 7 years by filing Suit No. 81 of 1996 for specific performance. However, by that time, the suit filed by the present respondents stood decreed. The appellants' father filed another Suit No. 1075 of 1996 for setting aside the judgment and decree passed in favour of Respondents 1 to 4. The said suit was dismissed by the Additional District Judge (Senior Division), Khanna on 10-6- 2002. Subsequently, the appellants preferred RFA No. 2488 of 2002 on 15-7-2002 against the aforesaid order, and the said appeal is still pending before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 25. It is to be noted that the appellants' father Kishan Singh lodged FIR No. 144/02 on 23-7-2002 through his attorney Jaswant Singh Mann under Sections 420/323/467/468/471/120- B IPC, against the respondents. The allegations made in the FIR were substantially similar to the allegations made by the appellants in Civil Suit No. 1075 of 1996, which had been decided against them. It is evident that the aforesaid FIR was filed with inordinate delay and there has been no plausible explanation for the same. The appellants lodged the aforesaid FIR only after meeting their Waterloo in the civil court. Thus, it is evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in long and arduous criminal proceedings. We are of the view that such an action on the part of the appellants' father would not be bona fide, and the criminal proceedings initiated by him against the respondents amount to an abuse of the process of law. 26. In view of the above, and to do substantial justice, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the respondents in spite of the fact that the impugned judgment dated 13-2-2009 passed in Criminal Misc. No. 4136 of 2003 is not sustainable in the eye of the law. 27. With these observations, the appeal stands disposed of.” 8. In the case of Chanchalpati Das Vs. State of West Bengal and another – (2023) 20 SCC 120, the Apex Court held as under: “12. Having gone through the pleadings of the parties and the documents on record and having anxiously considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it emerges that according to the respondent complainant, a letter in the form of complaint was written by the Branch Manager of ISKCON, Kolkata, on 30-9-2006 addressed to the Officer-in-charge, Ballygunge Police Station, Kolkata, in respect of an alleged theft of a bus having taken place in 2001, however, no action was taken by the said police station. Though, the complainant had reported the matter to the police station concerned earlier on 22-5-2002, however, no action was taken in that regard. 13. It is pertinent to note that with regard to the said allegations against the police station concerned, there is nothing on record to suggest that either the said report dated 22-5-2002 or the letter dated 30-9-2006 was ever received by the police station concerned or any follow-up action was taken by the respondent complainant in that regard. According to the respondent complainant, since no action - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 was taken on the letter dated 30-9-2006 written to the police station concerned, the complaint was lodged in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore on 10-2-2009, which was registered as CR Case No. 747 of 2009, seeking investigation under Section 156(3)CrPC. 14. It is again pertinent to note that, even as per the case of the complainant, the alleged incident of bus theft had taken place in the year 2001, and it was only in 2009 that the substantial complaint was made in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore. It is just not believable that the Ballygunge Police Station concerned, Kolkata would not have taken any action on the report made in 2002 on behalf of the powerful body like ISKCON, Kolkata, or on the letter dated 30-9-2006 written by the Branch Manager of ISKCON, Kolkata. Respondent 2 complainant also did not take any concrete action for getting the said complaint registered with regard to the alleged theft of bus for a long period of eight years, till the complaint in the court was filed in the year 2009. 15. In the opinion of the Court such an inordinate delay of eight years in filing the complaint in the court itself would be a sufficient ground to quash the proceedings. If the luxury bus owned by ISKCON, Kolkata Branch in 1998 was so precious to them, they would not have sat silent for such a long time of eight years. In our opinion, the criminal machinery set into motion by filing the complaint for the alleged incident which had taken place eight years ago, that act itself was nothing but a sheer misuse and abuse of the process of the court. - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 16. That apart, from the bare perusal of the complaint filed before the Court, on the basis of which the FIR was registered at Ballygunge Police Station on 20-2-2009, it is discernible that except bald allegations made in the complaint with regard to the theft of bus in question there was no material or document produced by the complainant to substantiate the allegations against the appellants. Even after the investigation of the said complaint, there was no evidence collected by the investigating officer to prima facie satisfy the ingredients constituting the alleged offences under Sections 468, 471, 406 and 120-BIPC. Even if the allegations made in the complaint as well as in the charge- sheet are taken at their face value none of the ingredients constituting the alleged offences are culled out. The learned Senior Counsel Mr Shyam Divan for the appellants had strenuously urged relying upon the documents pertaining to the transfer of ownership and registration of the said bus, that the said documents were executed by the then authorised persons of ISKCON, Kolkata, in our opinion, the said documents could not be considered in these proceedings, the same being not the part of the charge- sheet papers. 17. In any case, there is nothing to suggest from the other documents on record of the instant appeals that the investigating officer had even bothered to collect any cogent or substantive evidence against the appellants to prosecute them for the alleged offences. There was no expert opinion obtained or scientific evidence collected on the documents allegedly forged to show as to by whom, when and how the - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 theft of vehicle and forgery of documents were committed. Under the circumstances, allowing such prosecution to continue would not only be an empty formality but would be gross wastage of court's precious time. 18. It cannot be gainsaid that the High Courts have power to quash the proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Though the powers under Section 482 should be sparingly exercised and with great caution, the said powers ought to be exercised if a clear case of abuse of process of law is made out by the accused. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404] the Supreme Court had held that the criminal proceedings could be quashed by the High Court under Section 482 if the court is of the opinion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings are to be quashed. 19. This Court, way back in 1992 in the landmark decision State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], after considering relevant provisions more particularly Section 482CrPC and the principles of law enunciated by this Court relating to the exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226, had laid down certain guidelines for the exercise of powers of quashing, which have been followed in umpteen number of cases. The - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 relevant part thereof reads as under : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 20. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] this Court had observed that the court would be justified to quash the proceedings if it finds that initiation or continuance of such proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of court. 21. As regards inordinate delay in filing the complaint it has been recently observed by this Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of T.N. [Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of T.N., (2022) 15 SCC 164 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 632] that though inordinate delay in itself may not be a ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, however unexplained inordinate delay must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor and ground for quashing a criminal complaint. 22. In the light of the aforestated legal position, if the facts of the case are appreciated, there remains no shadow of doubt that the complaint filed by the respondent complainant after an inordinate unexplained delay of eight - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 years was nothing but sheer misuse and abuse of the process of law to settle personal scores with the appellants, and that continuation of such malicious prosecution would also be further abuse and misuse of process of law, more particularly when neither the allegations made in the complaint nor in the charge-sheet, disclose any prima facie case against the appellants. The allegations made against the appellants are so absurd and improbable that no prudent person can ever reach to a conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the appellants- accused. 23. Before parting, a few observations made by this Court with regard to the misuse and abuse of the process of law by filing false and frivolous proceedings in the courts need to be reproduced. In the Court in Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. [Dalip Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 2 SCC 114 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 324] it was observed that : (SCC p. 116, para 1) “1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa” (non- violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice- delivery system which was in vogue in the pre- Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.” - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 24. In Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India [Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 470 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 424 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 712] it was observed as under : (SCC p. 642, para 191) “191. The Indian judicial system is grossly afflicted with frivolous litigation. Ways and means need to be evolved to deter litigants from their compulsive obsession towards senseless and ill-considered claims.” 25. We would like to add that just as bad coins drive out good coins from circulation, bad cases drive out good cases from being heard on time. Because of the proliferation of frivolous cases in the courts, the real and genuine cases have to take a backseat and are not being heard for years together. The party who initiates and continues a frivolous, irresponsible and senseless litigation or who abuses the process of the court must be saddled with exemplary cost, so that others may deter to follow such course. The matter should be viewed more seriously when people who claim themselves and project themselves to be the global spiritual leaders, engage themselves into such kind of frivolous litigations and use the court proceedings as a platform to settle their personal scores or to nurture their personal ego. 26. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case and for the reasons stated hereinabove, we deem it appropriate to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, arising out of FIR No. 33 of 2009 registered at Ballygunge Police Station, and quash the same.” - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 9. As state supra, in the instant case, there is long, inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 6½ years on the part of the 2nd respondent – complainant in lodging the complaint and consequently, I am of the view that the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner – accused No.2 deserve to be quashed. 10. A perusal of the material on record will also indicate that the petitioner has been charged with offences of Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating, which cannot co-exist and are mutually destructive and are an antithesis to one another as held by the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd., and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another – 2024 SCC Online SC 2248, wherein it is held as under: “Difference between criminal breach of trust and cheating 35. This Court in its decision in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar [S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] expounded the difference in the ingredients required for constituting of an offence of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) vis-à-vis the offence of cheating (Section 420). The relevant observations read as under : (SCC p. 246, paras 9-10) “9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal breach of trust are : (i) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property; (ii) that person entrusted : (a) dishonestly misappropriating or converting - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 that property to his own use; or (b) dishonestly using or disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust. 10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are : (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property.” 36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients: In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) (1) There must be entrustment with person for property or dominion over the property, and (2) The person entrusted: (a) Dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or (b) Dishonestly used or disposed of the property or wilfully suffers any other person so to do in violation of: (i) Any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is discharged; or (ii) Legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see : S.W. Palanitkar [S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] ). Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420IPC, the essential ingredients are: - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 (1) Deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or by omission; (2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or (3) The consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit (see : Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 620] ). 37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case of cheating it must be there from the very beginning or inception. 38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to clear a serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405IPC, punishable under Section 406IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415IPC, punishable under Section 420IPC. 39. 39. Every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the person may seek his remedy for damages in civil courts but, any breach of trust with a mens rea, gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. It has been held in Hari Prasad - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha [Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha, (1973) 2 SCC 823 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1082] as under : (SCC p. 824, para 4) “4. We have heard Mr Maheshwari on behalf of the appellant and are of the opinion that no case has been made out against the respondents under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860. For the purpose of the present appeal, we would assume that the various allegations of fact which have been made in the complaint by the appellant are correct. Even after making that allowance, we find that the complaint does not disclose the commission of any offence on the part of the respondents under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the respondent had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs 35,000. There is also nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the appellant to pay them Rs 35,000 by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made by the respondents to him at or before the time he paid the money to them and that at the time the representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false. The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in the month of December might create civil liability for them, but this fact would not be sufficient to fasten criminal liability on the respondents for the offence of cheating.” 40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and dishonest intention starts with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of trust, a person who comes into possession of the movable property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his own use against the terms of the contract, then the question is, in a case like this, whether the retention is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts of each case. 41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of the offence. 42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it. The property in respect of which the offence of breach of trust has been committed must be either the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be of some other person. The accused must hold that property on trust of such other person. Although the offence i.e. the offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention, yet they are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept. 43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. 44. At the most, the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate could have issued process for the offence punishable under Section 420IPC i.e. cheating but in any - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 circumstances no case of criminal breach of trust is made out. The reason being that indisputably there is no entrustment of any property in the case at hand. It is not even the case of the complainant that any property was lawfully entrusted to the appellants and that the same has been dishonestly misappropriated. The case of the complainant is plain and simple. He says that the price of the goods sold by him has not been paid. Once there is a sale, Section 406IPC goes out of picture. According to the complainant, the invoices raised by him were not cleared. No case worth the name of cheating is also made out. 45. Even if the Magistrate would have issued process for the offence punishable under Section 420IPC i.e. cheating, the same would have been liable to be quashed and set aside, as none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating are disclosed from the materials on record. 46. It has been held in State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal [State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 58 : AIR 1968 SC 700 : (1968) 2 SCR 408] : (SCC OnLine SC para 8) “8. The term “entrusted” found in Section 405 IPC governs not only the words “with the property” immediately following it but also the words “or with any dominion over the property” occurring thereafter— see Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashtra [Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 185 : AIR 1965 SC 1433 : (1965) 2 SCR 429] . Before there can be any entrustment there must be a trust meaning thereby an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted by him for the benefit of another or of another and the owner. But that does not mean that such an entrustment need conform to all the technicalities of the law of trust — see Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 46 : AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 SCR 483] . The expression “entrustment” carries with it the implication that the person handing over any - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to create a fiduciary relationship between them. A mere transaction of sale cannot amount to an “entrustment”.” 47. Similarly, in CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045] this Court held that the expression “entrusted with property” used in Section 405IPC connotes that the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust can be committed must necessarily be the property of some person other than the accused or that the beneficial interest in or ownership thereof must be in the other person and the offender must hold such property in trust for such other person or for his benefit. The relevant observations read as under : (SCC pp. 607-608, para 27) “27. In the instant case, a serious dispute has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties as to whether on the face of the allegations, an offence of criminal breach of trust is constituted or not. In our view, the expression “entrusted with property” or “with any dominion over property” has been used in a wide sense in Section 405IPC. Such expression includes all cases in which goods are entrusted, that is, voluntarily handed over for a specific purpose and dishonestly disposed of in violation of law or in violation of contract. The expression “entrusted” appearing in Section 405IPC is not necessarily a term of law. It has wide and different implications in different contexts. It is, however, necessary that the ownership or beneficial interest in the ownership of the property entrusted in respect of which offence is alleged to have been committed must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit. The expression “trust” in Section 405IPC is a comprehensive expression and has been used to denote various kinds of relationships like the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, bailor and bailee, master and servant, pledger and pledgee. When some goods are hypothecated by a person to another person, the ownership of the goods still remains with the person who has hypothecated such goods. The property in respect of - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 which criminal breach of trust can be committed must necessarily be the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be in the other person and the offender must hold such property in trust for such other person or for his benefit. In a case of pledge, the pledged article belongs to some other person but the same is kept in trust by the pledgee.” (emphasis supplied) 48. The aforesaid exposition of law makes it clear that there should be some entrustment of property to the accused wherein the ownership is not transferred to the accused. In case of sale of movable property, although the payment may be deferred yet the property in the goods passes on delivery as per Sections 20 and 24, respectively, of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. “20. Specific goods in a deliverable state.—Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made and it is immaterial whether the time of payment of the price or the time of delivery of goods, or both, is postponed. *** 24. Goods sent on approval or “on sale or return”.— When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or “on sale or return” or other similar terms, the property therein passes to the buyer— (a) when he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller or does any other act adopting the transaction; (b) if he does not signify his approval or acceptance to the seller but retains the goods without giving notice of rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return of the goods on the expiration of such time, and, if no time has been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable time.” - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 49. From the aforesaid, there is no manner of any doubt whatsoever that in case of sale of goods, the property passes to the purchaser from the seller when the goods are delivered. Once the property in the goods passes to the purchaser, it cannot be said that the purchaser was entrusted with the property of the seller. Without entrustment of property, there cannot be any criminal breach of trust. Thus, prosecution of cases on charge of criminal breach of trust, for failure to pay the consideration amount in case of sale of goods is flawed to the core. There can be civil remedy for the non-payment of the consideration amount, but no criminal case will be maintainable for it. [See : Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. [Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., (2024) 12 SCC 483 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171] and Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand [Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar 301] .] 50. The case at hand falls in Category 1 as laid in Nagawwa [Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] referred to in para 17 of this judgment. 51. If it is the case of the complainant that a particular amount is due and payable to him then he should have filed a civil suit for recovery of the amount against the appellants herein. But he could not have gone to the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by filing a complaint of cheating and criminal breach of trust. It appears that till this date, the complainant has not filed any civil suit for recovery of the amount which according to him is due and payable to him by the appellants. He seems to have prima facie lost the period of limitation for filing such a civil suit. - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 52. In such circumstances referred to above, the continuation of the criminal proceeding would be nothing but abuse of the process of law. Final conclusion 53. Before we close this matter, we would like to say something as regards the casual approach of the courts below in cases like the one at hand. The Indian Penal Code (IPC) was the official Criminal Code in the Republic of India inherited from British India after Independence. IPC came into force in the sub-continent during the British rule in 1862. IPC remained in force for almost a period of 162 years until it was repealed and replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (“BNS”) in December 2023 which came into effect on 1-7- 2024. It is indeed very sad to note that even after these many years, the courts have not been able to understand the fine distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. 54. When dealing with a private complaint, the law enjoins upon the Magistrate a duty to meticulously examine the contents of the complaint so as to determine whether the offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust as the case may be is made out from the averments made in the complaint. The Magistrate must carefully apply its mind to ascertain whether the allegations, as stated, genuinely constitute these specific offences. In contrast, when a case arises from an FIR, this responsibility is of the police — to thoroughly ascertain whether the allegations levelled by the informant indeed fall under the category of cheating or criminal breach of trust. Unfortunately, it has become a common practice for the police officers to routinely and mechanically proceed to register an FIR for both the offences i.e. criminal breach of trust and cheating on a mere allegation of some dishonesty or fraud, without any proper application of mind. - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 55. It is high time that the police officers across the country are imparted proper training in law so as to understand the fine distinction between the offence of cheating vis-à-vis criminal breach of trust. Both offences are independent and distinct. The two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of facts. They are antithetical to each other. The two provisions of IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot survive without each other. 56. In view of the aforesaid, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. 57. The impugned order [Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine All 4393] passed by the High Court is set aside so also the order passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahar taking cognizance upon the complaint.” 11. In the case of Rishipal Singh Vs. State of U.P.– (2014) 7 SCC 215, the Apex Court held as under: “17. It is no doubt true that the courts have to be very careful while exercising the power under Section 482 CrPC. At the same time we should not allow a litigant to file vexatious complaints to otherwise settle their scores by setting the criminal law into motion, which is a pure abuse of process of law and it has to be interdicted at the threshold. A clear reading of the complaint does not make out any offence against the appellant Branch Manager, much less the offences alleged under Sections 34, 379, 411, 417, 418, 420, 467, 458 and 477 IPC. We are of the view that even assuming that the Branch Manager has violated the instructions in the complaint in letter and spirit, it all amounts - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 to negligence in discharging official work, at the maximum it can be said that it is dereliction of duty. 18. In view of our above discussion, we have come to an irresistible conclusion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant for commission of the alleged offence under Sections 34, 379, 411, 417, 418, 420, 467, 458 and 477 IPC is a pure abuse of process of law and the complaint case deserves to be quashed in the interest of justice. 19. We accordingly allow this appeal setting aside the impugned judgment [Rishipal Singh v. State of U.P., Application u/S. 482 No. 37848 of 2012, decided on 6-11- 2012 (All)] of the High Court by quashing the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant in CC No. 2397 of 2012 under Sections 34, 379, 411, 418, 420, 467, 458 and 477 IPC on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh.” 12. Viewed from this angle also, the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner deserve to be quashed. 13. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments, I am of the view that continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner – accused No.2 would amount abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the present petition. - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:25733 WP No. 15580 of 2024 14. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned Charge Sheet and the entire proceedings in C.C.No.1391/2024 on the file of the IV Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, arising out of Crime No.103/2020, for the offences punishable under Sections 409 and 420 of IPC insofar as petitioner – accused No.2 is hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE PMR / SV List No.: 2 Sl No.: 46