- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 100335 OF 2019 (PAR) BETWEEN: RAJU S/O. FAKIRAPPA KONAPPANAVAR AGE: 44 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: TADAKOD VILLAGE, TQ AND DIST: DHARWAD 581105 …APPELLANT (BY SRI. R.H. ANGADI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. FAKKIRAPPA S/O. ANDANAPPA KONANNAVAR (DIED DURING THE PENDENCY OF O.S. HIS LEGAL HEIRS ARE RESPONDENT NOS.1 TO 3) MANJULA D/O. FAKKIRAPPA KONANNAVAR @ MANJULA W/O. PRAKASH POVOJI AGE: 36 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK R/O: TADAKOD VILLAGE TQ AND DIST: DHARWAD 581105. Digitally signed by MALLIKARJUN RUDRAYYA KALMATH Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 2. JAYASHRI D/O. FAKKIRAPPA KONANNAVAR AGE: 33 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: TADAKOD VILLAGE, TQ AND DIST: DHARWAD 581105. 3. MALLAVVA W/O. FAKKIRAPPA KONANNAVAR AGE: 74 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: TADAKOD VILLAGE, TQ AND DIST: DHARWAD 581105. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. K.S. KORISHETTAR, SMT. ROOPA CHINIWAR & SRI. S.B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 READ WITH ORDER XLI RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 08.04.2019 PASSED IN O.S. NO.304/2013 ON THE FILE OF THE I ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, DHARWAD, DISMISSING THE SUIT FILED FOR PARTITION AND SEPARATE POSSESSION. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) The captioned appeal is by the plaintiff assailing the dismissal decree passed by the Court in O.S. No.304/2013 which was filed seeking relief of partition and separate possession. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court. 3. The family tree is as under: Andaneppa (dead) Basappa Irappa Hanamantppa Fakkirappa (Def.No.1) (dead) Janavva Kashavva Savavva Raju Manjula Jayashree (Plaintiff) (Def.No.2) (Derf.No.3) 4. The plaintiff, who is the eldest son of defendant No.1/Fakkirappa filed a suit for partition and separate possession by contending that both the suit schedule properties are joint family ancestral properties. Plaintiff - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 filed the suit seeking relief of partition feeling aggrieved by the gift deed executed by the father – defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 under a registered gift deed dated 12.09.2013. Plaintiff contended that defendant No.1 had no authority to gift the properties to defendant Nos.2 and 3 and therefore contended that gift deed is a concocted document and even otherwise since defendant Nos.2 and 3 have not accepted the gift deed, the gift deed is not concluded. Hence, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking the relief of partition and separate possession. 5. Defendant No.1, Fakkirappa, who is the father of the plaintiff, has filed his written statement wherein he has categorically denied all the allegations and averments made in the plaint. In his defense, Defendant No.1 has asserted that the suit schedule properties are his self- acquired properties and not ancestral in nature. On this basis, he has sought for the dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff. - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 6. In the written statement, Defendant No.1 has further contended that the plaintiff is addicted to various vices and has exhibited irresponsible behavior. Due to this, Defendant No.1 claims to have had a reasonable apprehension that the rights and interests of his daughters would not be safeguarded if the plaintiff were to assert control over the suit properties. To protect his daughters' future and ensure equitable treatment, Defendant No.1 states that he was compelled to execute a gift deed in their favor with respect to Item No.2 of the suit schedule property, which is an agricultural land bearing Block No.44, measuring 5 acres and 21 guntas. 7. Moreover, Defendant No.1 has alleged that the plaintiff, under the influence of intoxicants, frequently used abusive language and issued threats. It is specifically pleaded that the plaintiff threatened to sell the lands if Defendant No.1 failed to allot him a share, thereby creating a hostile and unsafe environment. Defendant No.1 also refers to an incident where he was allegedly - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 assaulted by the plaintiff, as a result of which he was compelled to lodge a formal complaint at the Garag Police Station. 8. On the strength of these circumstances including the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct, threats, and the need to protect the interests of his daughters Defendant No.1 has prayed for the outright dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff. 9. Plaintiff and defendants to substantiate their respective claim, let in oral and documentary evidence. 10. The trial Court having examined the rebuttal evidence let in by the defendant No.1, proceeded to dismiss the suit on the ground that the agricultural land bearing block No.44 measuring 5 acres 21 guntas is a self acquired property of defendant No.1. Assailing the dismissal of decree, the plaintiff has filed a suit. 11. Heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff and perused the records. - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 12. We have given our anxious consideration to the pleadings in the plaint and in the written statement filed by defendant No.1. We have also given our anxious consideration to the sale deed obtained by defendant No.1 along with his brothers on 15.05.1982 insofar as schedule ‘B’ property bearing Block No.44 measuring 5 acres 21 guntas. Apart from this, the records reveal that family of the plaintiff and the defendants owns residential houses. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff and the learned counsel for the defendants. The following points would arise for our consideration: 1) Whether the trial court was justified in dismissing the suit in entirety having come to the conclusion that schedule ‘B’ property bearing Block No.44 is self-acquired property of defendant No.1? 2) Whether the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff has failed to prove that gift deed executed by defendant No.1/father in favour of defendant - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 Nos.2 and 3 is not binding on the plaintiff’s share, is perverse and palpably erroneous? Finding on point No.1: 14. Upon meticulous examination of the records placed on file, it becomes evidently clear that the property described in Schedule ‘B’, being agricultural land bearing Block No.44, was unequivocally purchased by defendant No.1—Fakirappa along with his three brothers, namely Hanamantappa, Irappa, and Basappa, under a registered sale deed dated 17.05.1982, which has been duly marked as Exhibit D1. A thorough perusal of this sale deed clearly indicates that the contention raised by the plaintiff that the said property is ancestral and forms part of the joint family estate is wholly without merit and legally unsustainable. 15. The plaintiff’s assertion that Block No.44 constitutes joint family ancestral property hinges on the assumption that there existed a joint family nucleus from which the property could have been acquired. However, there is no material on record to establish the existence of - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 such a nucleus at the time of the purchase. It is an admitted fact that the family did not possess any nucleus of ancestral income or property which could have contributed to the acquisition of the said land. The burden lies heavily on the plaintiff to prove that the family had sufficient ancestral assets or income at the relevant time to facilitate this purchase, but no such evidence either oral or documentary has been brought on record. 16. The plaintiff made a vague and unsupported attempt to assert that, in a family partition allegedly held in the year 1985, his father, Fakirappa, was allotted the Schedule ‘B’ property, while other ancestral properties were purportedly allotted to the plaintiff’s uncles. However, this plea is not only absent in the plaint but also remains unsubstantiated by any cogent documentary evidence. The plaintiff has failed to produce any material to demonstrate that there existed any ancestral property originally belonging to the alleged propositus of the family, one Andanappa, or that the suit schedule properties were - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 derived from such ancestral assets. In the absence of proof of a pre-existing ancestral nucleus or any substantive link between the suit property and ancestral lineage, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not succeeded in discharging the burden of proving that the Schedule ‘B’ property constitutes joint family ancestral property. 17. Moreover, the sale deed marked at Exhibit D1 decisively establishes that the agricultural land in question was purchased through the collective contribution of sale consideration made jointly by Fakirappa and his brothers. Therefore, this transaction was one of co-ownership among siblings rather than an acquisition from joint family ancestral funds. As such, the plaintiff’s contention that the property is ancestral is found to be misconceived and unsupported by the material on record. 18. However, the Court is inclined to take a different view with respect to Schedule ‘A’ property, which is a residential house. It is not in dispute that Fakirappa, - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 the original defendant No.1 and the father of the plaintiff, passed away during the pendency of the present suit. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Fakirappa died intestate, i.e., without executing any Will or testamentary disposition in respect of his properties. It is also pertinent to note that Schedule ‘A’ property does not form part of the gift deed relied upon by the defendants, and therefore remains outside the ambit of any alienation or disposition by Fakirappa. 19. In the absence of any gift or testamentary instrument and upon the intestate death of Fakirappa, the plaintiff, being his Class I legal heir under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is legally entitled to a rightful share in the residential property described in Schedule ‘A’. Consequently, this Court finds merit in the plaintiff’s claim to a share in Schedule ‘A’ property. 20. Accordingly, the issue framed as Point No.1 is answered partly in the affirmative to the extent of the plaintiff's entitlement in Schedule ‘A’ property and partly in - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 the negative insofar as the plaintiff's claim over Schedule ‘B’ property is concerned. 21. The plaintiff is entitled for share in schedule ‘A’ property, which is a residential house bearing No.938/2 of Tadkod village of Dharwad Taluk. However, he is not entitled for any share in schedule ‘B’ property, which was self-acquired property of defendant No.1/Fakirappa and having executed the gift deed, this property is not available for partition. Finding on point No.2: 22. In paragraph 8 of the plaint, the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that defendant No.1, Fakirappa, lacked the legal competence to execute a gift deed in respect of Schedule ‘B’ property, namely, Block No.44, in favour of his daughters-defendant Nos.2 and 3 on the premise that the said property is joint family ancestral property. However, as already discussed and concluded under Point No.1, this Court has held that the Schedule ‘B’ property is not joint family ancestral property but is the self-acquired - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 property of defendant No.1. Therefore, the foundational basis of the plaintiff’s objection to the gift namely, the lack of competency of Fakirappa to gift joint family property is found to be misconceived and legally untenable. 23. Alternatively, learned counsel for the plaintiff has advanced a second limb of argument, contending that even if the property is considered self-acquired, the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 is void and inoperative, as there is no express recital in the gift deed evidencing acceptance of the gift by the donees defendant Nos.2 and 3. It is argued that in the absence of such an express recital, the essential condition of a valid gift under law, namely acceptance by the donee during the lifetime of the donor, has not been fulfilled. 24. This contention has been carefully considered in the light of the material on record. Upon meticulous examination of the recitals in the gift deed, this Court is of the considered opinion that the gift deed itself bears - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 sufficient evidence to establish acceptance of the gift by the donees. Notably, defendant Nos.2 and 3 have affixed their signatures to the gift deed, which unequivocally signifies their acceptance. It is a settled position in law that acceptance of a gift need not be made in any particular form or by any formal declaration; rather, the totality of circumstances surrounding the execution of the document may adequately establish acceptance. 25. Further, the gift deed contains photographs of the donees and includes a categorical recital indicating that the gift made by Fakirappa was accepted by his daughters. The relevant portion of the recital, written in Kannada, reads: “§gÉzÀÄPÉÆnÖzÁÝV M¦àgÀÄvÁÛgÉ” 26. This phrase translates to a clear statement of acceptance by the donees. The presence of such a recital, combined with their signatures and photographs within the deed, strongly supports the inference of valid acceptance. Thus, the essential requirement under Section 122 of the - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 Transfer of Property Act, 1882 that the gift must be accepted during the lifetime of the donor is duly satisfied in this case. 27. The law relating to acceptance of a gift emphasizes that it need not be explicit or formally recorded in any particular manner. Acceptance can be inferred from the conduct and surrounding circumstances, such as the donee taking possession of the property or engaging in acts that indicate ownership. In the present case, during the lifetime of defendant No.1, Fakirappa had acknowledged the execution and conveyance of the property through the registered gift deed. Furthermore, the donees defendant Nos.2 and 3 acted upon the gift deed, and their names were reportedly entered in the revenue records (RTC) following the execution of the gift deed. Although certified copies of the RTC entries have not been formally produced in evidence, the fact that such mutation took place has not been seriously disputed. - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 These subsequent developments further affirm the act of acceptance and the operational validity of the gift deed. 28. In addition, the cross-examination of the plaintiff himself lends further support to the defendants’ case. During the course of his testimony, a significant and unequivocal admission was elicited from P.W.1 (the plaintiff), which effectively settles the issue relating to the validity of the gift transaction. Given the relevance and conclusiveness of this admission, it is deemed appropriate by this Court to extract and reproduce the relevant portion of the cross-examination of P.W.1, which reads as follows: “£ÀªÀÄä PÀÄlÄA§PÉÌ £À£Àß vÀAzÉ UÀ½¹zÀAvÀºÀ MlÄÖ £Á®ÄÌ ¹ÜgÀ ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ½zÀÝgÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ ¸ÀvÀå ¸ÀAUÀwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ ªÀÄgɪÀiÁa zÁªÁ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ¼À°è PÉêÀ® JgÀqÀÄ LlAUÀ¼À ¸ÀévÀÛ£ÀÄß GzÉÝñÀ¥ÀǪÀðPÀªÁV vÉÆÃj¹gÀÄvÉÛÃ£É JAzÀ°è £À£ÀUÉ UÉÆwÛgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ D JgÀqÀÄ ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀiÁvÀæ. £À£Àß vÀAzÉ vÀ£Àß fëvÀ PÁ®zÀ°è ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¸ÀASÉå 2 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 3 EªÀgÀÄ £À£Àß vÀAVAiÀÄgÁUÀ¨ÉÃPÀÄ CªÀgÀ ºÉ¸ÀjUÉ MAzÀÄ zÁ£À¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß eÁåj ªÀiÁrPÉÆnÖzÀÝgÀÄ JAzÀgÉ EzÀÄ ¸Àj F «µÀAiÀÄ UÉÆwÛzÉÝ £Á£ÀÄ ¥Àæ¸ÀÄÛvÀ zÁªÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß zÁR°¹gÀÄvÉÛãÉ.” 29. It is indeed unfortunate that the plaintiff, who has no semblance of legal right, title, or interest in - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 Schedule ‘B’ property, namely Block No.44, has chosen to initiate and continue litigation before this Court, disputing not only the validity of the gift deed but also the possession of defendant Nos.2 and 3 over the said property. This claim is found to be entirely unsubstantiated, especially in light of the findings already recorded by this Court that the property in question is the self-acquired property of defendant No.1, Fakirappa. 30. The records clearly reveal that defendant No.1, in the recitals of the registered gift deed, has provided a detailed explanation and justification for executing the gift in favour of his daughters defendant Nos.2 and 3. He has expressly stated that he was compelled to make such a disposition in view of the vulnerable and delicate circumstances in which his daughters were placed. The gift deed reflects his concern for their well-being, particularly emphasizing that their health was unstable and that they required security and support through ownership of immovable property. These assertions in the gift deed are - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 not merely narrative but are indicative of the donor’s intention to make a voluntary and thoughtful disposition of his property in favour of his daughters. 31. The plaintiff’s contention that he continues to be in exclusive possession of Block No.44 is not only self- serving but also stands in stark contradiction to the recitals contained in the gift deed. It is a settled position in law that, in the absence of compelling contrary evidence, the recitals in a registered document carry significant evidentiary weight and must be given due regard by the Court. In this case, the gift deed clearly records that possession of the property was handed over by defendant No.1 to defendant Nos.2 and 3 simultaneously with the execution of the gift. This recital, being part of a solemn registered document, cannot be lightly ignored or disbelieved, particularly when the plaintiff has failed to produce any credible material to dislodge its contents. - 19 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 32. The relevant portion of the gift deed, which supports the factum of delivery of possession, is culled out as follows: “4) F §Që¸ï ¥ÀvÀæzÀ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ MAzÀ£É ¥ÀPÀëzÀªÀgÀÄ ¸ÀzÀgÉ C¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß EAzÀÄ JgÀqÀ£É ¥ÀPÀëzÀªÀjUÉ zÀ¸ÀÛ£ÉÆAzÀ ªÀiÁrPÉÆqÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ EA¢¤AzÀ ¸ÀzÀgÀ D¹ÛAiÀÄ°è MAzÀ£É ¥ÀPÀëzÀªÀjUÉ EgÀvÀPÀÌ AiÀiÁªÀvÀÆÛ ºÀPÀÄÌ, »vÀ¸ÀA§AzÀ EvÁå¢UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ©lÄÖPÉÆqÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ ¥ÀævÀåPÀë PÀ¨ÁÓªÀ£ÀÆß ¸ÀºÀ EAzÉà ©lÄÖ PÉÆnÖgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. 5) CzÉà ¥ÀæPÁgÀ MAzÀ£É ¥ÀPÀëzÀªÀgÀ SÁ¸À ªÀÄPÀ̼ÁzÀ ¸ÀzÀj JgÀqÀ£É ¥ÀPÀëzÀªÀgÀÄ ¸ÀzÀgÀ §Që¸ï ¥ÀvÀæzÀ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ¥ÀqÉzÀ D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß vÀªÀÄä vÁ¨ÁPÉÌ ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ C£ÀĨsÀ«¸À®Ä ªÀåªÀºÀj¸À®Ä ¸ÀA¥ÀÇtð ºÀPÀÄÌ »vÀ¸ÀA§AzsÀ G¼ÀîªÀjgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. F ¥ÀæPÁgÀ ªÀiÁrzÀ §Që¸ï ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°èAiÀÄ D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¹éÃPÁgÀªÀiÁqÀ®Ä M¦àPÉÆArzÀÄÝ EzÀPÉÌ ¥ÀæwAiÀiÁV AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ¥Àæw¥sÀ®zÀ gÀÆ¥ÀzÀ°è JgÀqÀ£É ¥ÀPÀëªÀgÀÄ MAzÀ£É ¥ÀPÀëzÀªÀjAzÀ K£À£ÀÆß ¥ÀqÉ¢gÀĪÀÅ¢¯Áè.” 33. When a registered gift deed contains an unequivocal recital stating that possession of the property has been handed over to the donee, and when such a deed is duly accepted by the donee, a legal presumption arises that both title and possession have validly transferred to the donee. It is a well-established principle under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, that a gift becomes complete only upon its acceptance during the - 20 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 lifetime of the donor. Upon such acceptance, the title passes immediately to the donee. In such circumstances, unless rebutted by strong and cogent evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that possession of the gifted property also passes along with the title. 34. In the present case, the donor defendant No.1, Fakirappa executed a registered gift deed in favour of his two daughters, defendant Nos.2 and 3. The gift deed clearly reflects that both donees accepted the gift, as evidenced by their signatures, photographs, and the explicit recital of acceptance contained therein. As such, in the absence of any credible evidence to disprove these facts, it must be presumed that not only the ownership, but also possession of the property was transferred to defendant Nos.2 and 3 pursuant to the execution and acceptance of the gift. 35. Moreover, the very nature and object of the gift to secure the welfare of the daughters, who were stated to be in vulnerable health conditions further substantiates the - 21 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 donor’s intention to vest them with absolute title and exclusive possession. Therefore, defendant Nos.2 and 3 must be deemed to have acquired absolute ownership over Schedule ‘B’ property, namely Block No.44, and are in lawful, exclusive possession of the same. 36. In light of this, the plaintiff who has neither any legal right, title, nor possessory interest in the Schedule ‘B’ property cannot lay any claim over the said property. His assertion of right is not only devoid of legal foundation but also contrary to the well-established principles governing the law of gift. Accordingly, the issue framed as Point No.2 is answered in the negative. 37. In view of the findings rendered in the discussion on Point No.1, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court committed an error in law by denying the plaintiff his rightful share in Schedule ‘A’ property, which comprises a residential house bearing No.938/2 situated at Tadkod village in Dharwad Taluk. As noted earlier, defendant No.1, Fakirappa, died intestate - 22 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 during the pendency of the suit. The said residential house was not the subject matter of the gift deed and remained in the name of the deceased until his demise. 38. Being the son of Fakirappa and a Class I legal heir under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiff is legally entitled to a share in the Schedule ‘A’ property, which devolves by intestate succession. The trial court, however, failed to properly appreciate this aspect and erred in denying the plaintiff’s claim over the said property. 39. Therefore, to this limited extent, the judgment and decree of the trial court require interference and modification. The plaintiff is held entitled to his legitimate share in Schedule ‘A’ property in accordance with law, and the decree of the trial court stands reversed to that extent alone. Conclusion and Reasons for Reversal: 40. Upon a comprehensive reappraisal of the pleadings, documentary evidence, and the legal - 23 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 submissions made by both sides, the following conclusions emerge clearly: Schedule ‘B’ Property – Block No.44: 41. The registered sale deed marked as Ex.D1 unambiguously establishes that Schedule ‘B’ property was purchased jointly by defendant No.1 Fakirappa and his three brothers in the year 1982, through pooled consideration. 42. There is no pleading or documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of any joint family nucleus or ancestral source of funds. 43. The plaintiff’s contention that the said property is joint family ancestral property is unsupported and has been rightly rejected. 44. The gift deed executed by Fakirappa in favour of his daughters (defendant Nos.2 and 3) is valid and complete, with due acceptance evidenced by their signatures, photographs, and recitals in the deed. - 24 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 Possession is presumed to have passed upon execution and acceptance of the gift. The claim of exclusive possession by the plaintiff is contradicted by the very terms of the registered document. Schedule ‘A’ Property – Residential House No.938/2: 45. The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff his rightful share in the Schedule ‘A’ property. Fakirappa died intestate, and Schedule ‘A’ property is not subject to the gift deed or any alienation. Being a Class I legal heir, the plaintiff is entitled to a share by succession. 46. The trial court failed to appreciate that the gift deed only concerned Schedule ‘B’ property, and there was no legal bar to the plaintiff succeeding to his father's undivided interest in the residential house. 47. For the forgoing reasons, we proceed to pass the following: ORDER i) The appeal is allowed in part. - 25 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5632-DB RFA No. 100335 of 2019 ii) The suit is decreed insofar as schedule ‘A’ property bearing No.938/2 of Tadkod village of Dharwad Taluk is concerned. iii) However, the suit is dismissed insofar as schedule ‘B’ (Block No.44) is concerned. Draw decree accordingly. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE Sd/- (G BASAVARAJA) JUDGE RSH & MBS / CT-CMU LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 23