- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 01ST DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S. INDIRESH REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.1069 OF 2015 (SP) BETWEEN: SRI. NARASIMHAMURTHY S/O LATE LAKKAIAH, AGED ABOUT 65 YERAS, R/O DODDASARANGI PALYA VILLAGE, GULUR HOBALI, TUMAKURU TALUK, TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 227. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. M.S. NAGARAJA, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SRI. NARASAIAH S/O LATE NARASIMHAIAH, AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, R/AT DODDASARANGIPALYA, GULUR HOBLI, TUMAKURU TALUK, TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 227. 2. SRI. LAKSHMAIAH S/O LATE NARASIMHAIAH, AGED BOUT 65 YEARS, R/AT GULHAREVI VILLAGE, TUMAKURU TALUK, TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 227. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. D.C. JAGADEESH, ADVOCATE) Digitally signed by SHARMA ANAND CHAYA Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DATED 03RD MARCH, 2015 PASSED IN REGULAR APPEAL NO.107 OF 2012 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC., TUMAKURU, ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DATED 31ST AUGUST, 2012 PASSED IN ORIGINAL SUIT NO.415 OF 1997 ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE, TUMAKURU. THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, E.S. INDIRESH J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S. INDIRESH ORAL JUDGMENT This Regular Second Appeal is filed by the plaintiff, challenging the judgment and decree dated 03rd March, 2015 passed in Regular Appeal No.107 of 2012 on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC., Tumakuru (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'First Appellate Court'), allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 31st August, 2012 passed in Original Suit No.415 of 1997 on the file of the III Additional Civil Judge, Tumakuru (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'Trial Court'), wherein the suit of the plaintiff came to be decreed against the defendants. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 2. For the sake of convenience, parties in this appeal are referred to as per their ranking before the Trial Court. 3. It is the case of the plaintiff that, the defendants are the absolute owners of the suit schedule property and have entered into a Sale Agreement with the plaintiff on 15th July, 1985, agreeing to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration of Rs.3,500/-. The defendants have received the entire sale consideration amount and delivered the possession of the suit schedule property to the plaintiff. It is further averred in the plaint that, since there was a bar for sale of land under the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1966 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'Fragmentation Act'), defendants have postponed the execution of the registered Sale Deed with a condition to execute the registered Sale Deed only after the amendment made to the Fragmentation Act. It is further stated in the plaint that the plaintiff made a request for execution of the registered Sale Deed, however, the same was not accepted by the defendants and as such, the plaintiff has field instant suit seeking relief of specific performance of the Sale Agreement dated 15th July, 1985. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 4. After service of notice, the defendants entered appearance and filed detailed written statement. The specific contention of the defendants in the written statement is that the claim made by the plaintiff is based on a concocted agreement and that apart, the suit is liable to be dismissed as the same is barred by limitation. It is also stated that the defendants have filed suit in Original Suit No.368 of 1997 before the Trial Court, seeking relief of injunction against the plaintiff and accordingly, defendants are in possession of suit schedule property. Accordingly, sought for dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff in Original Suit No.415 of 1997. 5. The Trial Court based on the pleadings on record, formulated the issues for its consideration. 6. In order to establish their case, the plaintiff has examined 4 witnesses as PW1 to PW4 and marked 4 documents as Exhibits P1 to P4. On the other hand, defendants examined 2 witnesses as DW1 and DW2 and marked 3 documents as Exhibits D1 to D3. 7. The Trial Court, after considering the material on record, by its judgment and decree dated 31st August, 2012, - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 decreed the suit of the plaintiff and directed the defendants to execute the registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property as per the terms of the Sale Agreement dated 15th July, 1985. Being aggrieved by the same, defendant No.1 has preferred Regular Appeal No.107 of 2012 before the First Appellate Court and same was resisted by the plaintiff and the defendant No.2. The First Appellate Court, after re-appreciating the material on record, by its judgment and decree dated 03rd March, 2015, allowed the appeal and as such, set-aside the judgment and decree dated 31st August, 2012 passed by the Trial Court. Being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred the present appeal. 8. This Court, by order dated 22nd August, 2024, formulated the following substantial questions of law: "1) Whether the plaintiff proves that impugned judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MUNISHAMAPPA vs. M. RAMAREDDY AND OTHERS made in Civil Appeal No.10327/2011? - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 2) Whether the First Appellate Court is justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court?" 9. I have heard Sri. M.S. Nagaraja, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri. D.C. Jagadeesh, learned counsel appearing for respondents. 10. Sri. M.S. Nagaraja, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the plaintiff has proved the execution of Agreement of Sale dated 15th July, 1985 and the said agreement was subject to the withdrawal of the Fragmentation Act by the competent authority in respect of the suit schedule property, which aspect has been discussed during the time of entering into an agreement of sale with the defendants. He further contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of MUNISHAMAPPA Vs. M. RAMAREDDY AND OTHERS made in Civil Appeal No.10327 of 2011 disposed of on 02nd November, 2023 held that, the agreement to sell is not a conveyance and therefore, there is no impediment for the defendants to execute the registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, further submitted that the Trial Court, after appreciating the material on record, rightly decreed the suit, however, the same was erroneously interfered with by the First Appellate Court, holding that, the Sale Agreement is void contract. 12. It is further argued by Sri. M.S. Nagaraja, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the defendant No.1 has questioned the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court before the First Appellate Court only on the ground of application of the Fragmentation Act to the agreement of sale and the same is void and therefore, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, there is no impediment for this Court, to decree the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, he sought for interference of this Court. 13. Per contra, Sri. D.C. Jagadeesh, learned counsel appearing for respondents submitted that, since there was a prohibition under the Fragmentation Act, the agreement of sale is invalid and that apart, the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the material on record. By referring to the judgment and decree passed in Original Suit No.368 of 1997, - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 learned counsel appearing for respondents argued that, the relief sought for by the respondent No.1 herein is for permanent injunction against the appellant/plaintiff and in this regard, he contended that the defendant/respondent No.1 is in possession of the suit schedule property. Accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the appeal. 14. In the light of the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties, I have carefully examined the material on record. On perusal of the record would indicate that, Exhibit P1-Sale Agreement dated 15th July, 1985 was entered into between the plaintiff and defendants, wherein the defendants agreed to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration of Rs.3,500/-. The defendants have disputed the execution of the agreement of sale. In this regard, the plaintiff examined PW3-Narasegowda, who is one of the witnesses to the said agreement of sale deposed about the execution of the sale agreement. In cross- examination, the PW1 deposed about the execution of the Sale Agreement dated 15th July, 1985 (Exhibit-P1). It is also forthcoming from the finding recorded by the Trial Court that the defendant No.1 filed Original Suit No.368 of 1997 and he - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 has not taken any plea with regard to execution of the Sale Agreement. The plaintiff examined three independent witnesses as PW2 to PW4 and their evidence makes it clear that agreement of sale is executed and payment of entire sale consideration amount by the plaintiff to the defendants is made. 15. It is also forthcoming from the agreement of sale that the defendants agreed to execute the registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff, however, on account Fragmentation Act was in force at the time of execution of the agreement of sale and the said Act prohibits the transfer of fragmented land, the execution of registered sale deed was postponed and in this regard, the finding recorded by the Trial Court answering issue No.1 is just and proper. 16. Though, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents refers to the Exhibit D3-certified copy of the judgment and decree passed in Original Suit No.368 of 1997, however, in this regard, the Trial Court, after appreciating the material on record, particularly referring to the deposition of PW2 and PW3, held that the defendants have parted with the - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 possession of the suit schedule property. On perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal in Regular Appeal No.107 of 2012, the same would indicate that the defendant No.1 has challenged the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court before the First Appellate Court, only on the ground of application of the Fragmentation Act and he has not raised any other ground to substantiate his case for non performance of contract. In that view of the matter, as I have arrived at a conclusion that the Trial Court, after appreciating the material on record rightly decreed the suit, having taken note of the ingredients of granting relief of specific performance, I am of the view that, no interference be called for in the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. It is also to be noted that the recitals in the Agreement of Sale dated 15th July, 1985 stipulates the execution of the registered sale deed only after the revocation of the Fragmentation Act and therefore, I find force in the submission made by learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff. The First Appellate Court had interfered with the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and reversed in the Regular Appeal only on the ground that the Sale Agreement is barred under the Fragmentation Act and it was in - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 force. In this regard, it is relevant to extract Paragraph No.10 in the case of MUNISHAMAPPA (supra), which reads as under: "10. The Agreement to Sell is not a conveyance; it does not transfer ownership rights or confers any title. What is prohibited or barred under the Fragmentation Act was the lease/sale/conveyance or transfer of rights. Therefore, the Agreement to Sell cannot be said to be barred under the Fragmentation Act. The appellant filed the suit for specific performance after the repeal of the Fragmentation Act. The suit could have been decreed without there being any violation to the law once the Fragmentation Act itself had been repealed in February 1991. Further, the High Court did not hold that the suit was barred by Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The First Appeal Court had considered this aspect and having decided the said issue in favour of the appellant, we need not go into that question at this stage. What is further noticeable is that the respondents received the full consideration and had also transferred the possession of the property in question, as such other defences may not be available to them. Even the issue of readiness and willingness on the part of the appellant would not be relevant." 17. Following the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of MUNISHAMAPPA (supra), I am of the view that the First Appellate Court has committed an error in - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34085 RSA NO.1069 OF 2015 arriving at a conclusion that the agreement of sale is void ab initio. In that view of the matter, the substantial question of law framed above favours the appellant/plaintiff. Accordingly, I pass the following: O R D E R i) Regular Second Appeal allowed. ii) Judgment and decree dated 03rd March, 2015 passed in Regular Appeal No.107 of 2012 on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC., Tumakuru, is hereby set aside; iii) Judgment and decree dated 31st August, 2012 passed in Original Suit No.415 of 1997 on the file of the III Additional Civil Judge, Tumakuru is hereby confirmed; iv) The suit of the plaintiff in Original Suit No.415 of 1997 is herby decreed. Sd/- (E.S.INDIRESH) JUDGE ARK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 60