APHC010279742025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3558] TUESDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA WRIT PETITION No.14121 of 2025 Between: 1. M/S.ASSOCIATED AUTO MOTIVES, PRAKASAM ROAD, GOVERNORPET VIJAYAWADA - 520 002 REP.BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE SRI P.D.PRASAD S/O.SRIVARAHALA RAO AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS RESIDING AT GOVERNORPET, VIJAYAWADA ...PETITIONER AND 1. M/S CANARA BANK (FORMERLY SYNDICATE BANK), REP.BY ITS MANAGER, BUCKINGHAM BRANCH, VIJAYAWADA, NTR DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH 2. M/S UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, REP.BY ITS DIVISIONAL MANAGER BANDAR ROAD, VIJAYAWADA NTR DISTRICT, AP. 3. THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL, VISAKHAPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH, REP.BY ITS REGISTRAR. ...RESPONDENT(S): 2 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. S N CHIDAMBARA SASTRY Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. PRUDVI RAJU MUDUNURI 2. V VEERABHADRA CHARY The Court made the following: 3 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA WRIT PETITION No.14121 of 2025 O R D E R: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Cheekati Manavendranath Roy) Aggrieved by the order dated 06.03.2025 passed in O.A.No.725 of 2002 on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, whereby the claim of the applicant therein, which is Canara Bank represented by its Manager, Buckinghampet Branch, Vijayawada, for recovery of a sum of Rs.21,99,270/-, was allowed against defendant Nos.1 to 4 therein and Recovery Certificate was issued for the said sum of Rs.21,99,270/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, while dismissing the claim against defendant No.5, the present writ petition has been filed by defendant No.1 in the said O.A. 2. Heard Mr. S.S. Prasad, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S.N. Chidambara Sastry, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M. Prudvi Raju, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. V. Veerabhadra Chary, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 3. The parties will be referred as they are arrayed in O.A.No.725 of 2002 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal for the sake of convenience. 4. Brief overview of the facts leading to the lis in this writ petition may be stated as follows: (i) The applicant before the Tribunal is Canara Bank represented by its Manager, Buckinghampet Branch, Vijayawada. Defendant No.1 is a partnership firm dealing in sale of Hero Honda motorcycles and automobile spare parts, having its showroom at 4 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 Governorpet, Vijayawada. Defendant Nos.2 to 4 are the partners of defendant No.1-firm. According to the applicant-bank, defendant Nos.2 to 4 approached it for loan facility of Rs.7,50,000/- for the purpose of running the business. The applicant-bank has sanctioned the loan facility of Rs.7,50,000/-. The defendants have hypothecated the stock in trade, which are motorcycles and automobile spare parts stored in the showroom of the 1st defendant, as security for repayment of the overdraft amount and they have executed hypothecation agreement in favour of the bank on 12.09.1988 along with other necessary documents. The stocks hypothecated were covered by insurance policy with the 5th defendant- United India Insurance Company Limited. So, it is stated that the applicant-bank has got first charge in respect of the hypothecated goods and defendant Nos.2 to 4 are jointly and severally liable to pay the said amount due to the applicant-bank under the above overdraft. While so, it is stated that the 2nd defendant informed the bank during January, 1989 that the stocks hypothecated with the applicant-bank were burnt/looted in the riots that took place on 26.12.1988 and requested the bank to forward the claim forms to the 5th defendant-insurance company. The forms were accordingly forwarded to the insurance company by the bank, but the said claim was not settled by the insurance company. It appears that the insurance company has repudiated the claim. (ii) It is the further case of the applicant-bank that defendant Nos.2 to 4 have also availed financial facility of Rs.5,00,000/- under revolving Letter of Credit (LOC) issued by the applicant-bank in favour of M/s. Sri Ram Honda Power Equipments Limited on 14.04.1988, which was valid upto 13.04.1989 and that the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have executed counter guarantee in favour of the applicant-bank apart from individual guarantee. The beneficiary i.e., M/s. Sri Ram Honda 5 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 Power Equipments Limited has drawn a bill dated 29.06.1988 for a sum of Rs.4,98,148/- and defendant Nos.2 to 4 failed to pay the bill amount to the bank as per the terms of the LOC. (iii) It is further pleaded that defendant Nos.2 to 4 have also availed financial facility under irrevocable LOC of Rs.8,00,000/- in favour of M/s. Hero Honda Motors Limited, New Delhi. on 16.07.1986, which was valid upto 13.06.1987, and the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have executed counter guarantee in favour of the applicant-bank and that M/s. Hero Honda Motors Limited has drawn a bill dated 21.12.1988 for Rs.4,32,597.06 ps., and the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have failed to reimburse the amount paid by the applicant-bank relating to the said transaction also. (iv) As the defendant Nos.1 to 4 have not paid the outstanding amounts relating to the aforesaid transactions, the applicant-bank has filed a suit against defendant Nos.1 to 5 before the civil court for recovery of a sum of Rs.21,99,270/- along with interest. (v) Initially, the said suit in O.S.No.582 of 1991 was filed in the Court of Principal Sub Judge, Vijayawada. Defendant Nos.1 to 4 filed written statement in the said suit denying all the material averments pleaded in the plaint. Defendant Nos.1 to 4 have denied that they have executed any such documents as pleaded in the plaint and that they have failed to repay the loan amounts availed by them. While denying the said material averments made in the plaint, it was specifically pleaded in the written statement that defendant No.1 is the customer of the applicant-bank and it has availed some facilities from the applicant-bank and that the applicant-bank has obtained the signatures of defendant Nos.2 to 4 on some blank documents. It is further pleaded that even if there is any liability on the part of 6 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 defendant Nos.1 to 4 to repay any amounts due to the bank relating to the said loan facilities, the same has to be indemnified by the 5th defendant-insurance company as the said hypothecated goods are insured with the 5th defendant-insurance company. Therefore, they denied their liability to pay the suit claim. They have also taken a plea that as the hypothecated stocks were burnt away in the riots that took place in the year 1988, they are not liable to pay any amounts and the bank has to recover the amounts, if any, from the 5th defendant- insurance company. (vi) After the suit was filed in the civil court in the year 1991, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short, „the Act‟) came into force and a special Tribunal, namely the Debts Recovery Tribunal, was constituted under the said special enactment. Therefore, after the advent of the Act, by virtue of Section 31 of the said Act, all the civil suits pending before the civil court immediately before the date of establishment of the Tribunal under the said Act, stood transferred to the Tribunal that was newly constituted. Initially, the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Act was constituted and established in Bangalore. Therefore, the suit was transferred from the Court of Principal Sub Judge, Vijayawada, to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore. In the said Tribunal, the suit was re-numbered as O.A.No.1541 of 1997. Thereafter, the Debts Recovery Tribunal was established in Hyderabad and the said O.A. was transferred on the point of jurisdiction to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad, and it was re-numbered as O.A.No.1309 of 1999. Subsequently, as the Tribunal was established in Visakhapatnam, the O.A. was again transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, and was re-numbered as O.A.No.725 of 2002. 7 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 (vii) After the O.A. was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, the enquiry commenced in the said Tribunal. The bank has filed an application seeking permission of the Tribunal to adduce secondary evidence on the ground that all the documents that were filed by them in the civil court at the time of institution of the suit to substantiate their claim were lost during the transfer of the said suit to the Tribunals after they are established. The said application came to be dismissed by the Tribunal. Aggrieved thereby, the bank has preferred an appeal to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata. The appellate authority has disposed of the said appeal by directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal to cause an enquiry by appointing a competent officer to ascertain whether the bank has filed any original documents to substantiate their claim at the time of filing the suit or in the O.A. proceedings or not and whether they were subsequently lost while they were in the custody of the Court or the Tribunal, so as to consider the request of the bank seeking permission to adduce secondary evidence. Pursuant to the said direction given by the appellate authority, the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal has appointed the Registrar of the Tribunal as an Officer to conduct an enquiry as ordered by the appellate authority. The Registrar has conducted an enquiry and he has submitted his report dated 08.05.2024. In his report, he has categorically stated that his enquiry revealed that the applicant-bank has not filed any original documents along with the suit in O.S.No.582 of 1991 in the Court of Principal Sub Judge, Vijayawada or thereafter in the O.A. proceedings in any of the Debts Recovery Tribunals subsequent to transfer of the suit. (viii) Thereafter, the bank has filed an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, seeking permission to examine the Advocate 8 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 who filed the suit in the Principal Sub Judge‟s Court, Vijayawada, to prove that the original documents were given to him to file them in the Court. The said application was also dismissed by the Tribunal. The said order was not further challenged by the bank in the appellate Tribunal or anywhere. So, it became final. (ix) Thereafter, the bank has filed chief-examination affidavit of its retired Manager, by name K.V. Seshagiri Rao, as A.W.1. But, the said witness did not enter the witness box and he was not subjected to cross-examination. When the bank sought to mark copies of the documents, an objection was taken by the defendants and also the Tribunal. So, the copies of the suit documents could not be marked. Thereafter, the chief-examination affidavit of A.W.2, who is also an officer of the bank, was filed but he also did not enter the witness box and he was not subjected to cross-examination. The evidence on the side of the bank was closed and the matter was posted for arguments. (x) Be it noted here itself that except filing the chief- examination affidavits of A.Ws.1 and 2, they did not enter the witness box and they were not subjected to cross-examination. No documentary evidence whatsoever to substantiate the suit claim was filed. However, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, to our utter surprise, allowed the O.A. as prayed for against the defendant Nos.1 to 4. The O.A. was allowed solely on the basis of the alleged admission said to have been made by the defendants Nos.1 to 4 in the written statement. According to the Tribunal, even though no documents were filed to substantiate the claim of the applicant-bank, the defendant Nos.1 to 4 have admitted the suit claim in the written statement and as such, the applicant-bank is entitled for Recovery Certificate as prayed for. 9 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 (xi) Aggrieved by the impugned order, defendant No.1 has filed the present writ petition as noticed supra, challenging the legal validity of the impugned order. 5. When the writ petition came up for admission before a coordinate bench of this Court on 05.06.2025, it was argued by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute inasmuch as a claim was also made against the insurance company, which is defendant No.5 in the suit, as it has repudiated the claim to pay the suit claim to the bank by indemnifying the owner of the hypothecated goods which were admittedly burnt in the riots that took place in the year 1988, and when they also sought for a decree against the insurance company, the bank has to challenge the same before the appropriate forum and the Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot decide the said lis. Therefore, it was contended that though as per the Act, a right of appeal is provided against the impugned order, the writ petition can be entertained as the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Considering the said contentions and relying on the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Embassy Property Developments Private Limited v. State of Karnataka 1, this Court was inclined to entertain the writ petition on the ground that when the Tribunal or the forum which adjudicated the lis lacks jurisdiction, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be entertained even though alternative remedy by way of preferring an appeal is available to the party. 6. Apart from the said ground taken relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the lis, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner would further supplement the argument for entertaining 1 (2020) 13 SCC 308 10 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 the writ petition, despite the availability of an alternative remedy by way of preferring a statutory appeal, on the ground that when the Tribunal has passed the order without any evidence that was adduced by the bank and when the claim is not supported by any documents or evidence and that the same is allowed, it tantamounts to violation of principles of natural justice and in such cases, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked and the writ petition is maintainable. In support of his contention, he placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Achutananda Baidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen2. At para 10 of the judgment, the Apex Court held as follows: “10. The power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative superintendence only but such power includes within its sweep the power of judicial review. The power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 is essentially to ensure that the courts and tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done what they were required to do. Law is well settled by various decisions of this Court that the High Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material, or resulting in manifest injustice. As regards finding of fact of the inferior court, the High Court should not quash the judgment of the subordinate court merely on the ground that its finding of 2 (1997) 5 SCC 76 11 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 fact was erroneous but it will be open to the High Court in exercise of the powers under Article 227 to interfere with the finding of fact if the subordinate court came to the conclusion without any evidence or upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse.” 7. From the conspectus of law laid down in the above judgment, the legal position is very clear that when the order of the subordinate Court is based on no material and came to the conclusion without any evidence or when it results in manifest injustice, the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, can interfere with the finding of fact if the subordinate Court came to the conclusion without any evidence or upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse. It is that part of the judgment of the Apex Court that is squarely applicable to the present facts of the case. 8. As per the contention that has been vehemently advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner, except making bald assertions in the plaint, the claim of the bank is not supported by any evidence and the bank has miserably failed to substantiate its claim by producing the documents said to have been executed by defendant Nos.2 to 4 in favour of the bank, as pleaded in the plaint. We find considerable force in the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner. Except the plaint, not even a scrap of paper is produced by the bank to substantiate its claim as pleaded in the plaint. The suit documents are not produced before the Civil Court or the Tribunal. The documents said to have been executed by defendant Nos.1 to 4 on the relevant dates that are furnished in the plaint are not produced before the Court. Though it is contended by the learned 12 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 counsel for the bank before us that the suit documents were originally produced along with the plaint in the Civil Court and subsequently, they were lost somewhere either in the Civil Court or in the Tribunal after the transfer of the suit and that even though they sought permission of the Tribunal to adduce secondary evidence, the same was rejected, we are unable to accede to the said contention. It is significant to note that when the application filed by the bank seeking permission to adduce secondary evidence was dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground that they failed to prove that the original documents were produced in the Civil Court and they were lost and when the bank has challenged the said order before the appellate authority, the appellate authority, while declining to allow their prayer, directed the Tribunal to appoint a competent officer to enquire whether the bank has filed any original documents along with the suit either in the Civil Court or before the Tribunal to consider the request of the bank to adduce secondary evidence. Accordingly, the Tribunal has appointed its Registrar to cause an enquiry. The Registrar has conducted the enquiry and submitted his report dated 08.05.2024, wherein he has clearly stated that the bank has not filed the suit documents along with the suit in the Civil Court or subsequently before any Tribunal after the suit was transferred to the Tribunal. Therefore, it is very much evident from the report of the Registrar that the suit documents were not filed along with the plaint either in the Civil Court or subsequently in any of the Tribunals. Therefore, when the original documents were not filed along with the plaint, the question of permitting the bank to adduce secondary evidence on the ground that the said documents were lost while they are in the custody of the Court or the Tribunal does not arise. So, the fact that remains established from the material on record is that the bank has not produced the suit 13 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 documents along with the plaint to substantiate its claim. Not even a single document that is referred to in the pleadings of the plaint is produced as a piece of evidence to prove the case of the bank. 9. In fact, even oral evidence is not there on record. Even though chief-examination affidavits of A.Ws.1 and 2, who are the officers of the bank, were filed before the Tribunal, ultimately, they did not enter the witness box and they were not subjected to cross-examination. So, mere filing of chief-examination affidavits by itself is not sufficient to term them as witnesses examined in the case. Chief-examination, cross-examination and re-examination of a witness together constitute the evidence of a witness. So, when the witnesses did not enter the witness box and they were not subjected to cross-examination, by mere filing of chief-examination affidavits, it cannot be said that even any oral evidence was adduced to substantiate the claim of the bank. Therefore, there is absolutely no oral or documentary evidence worth the name adduced by the bank before the Tribunal to substantiate its claim. As already observed, except the plaint, there is nothing on record to prove the claim of the bank before the Tribunal. 10. However, the Tribunal, as noticed supra, only on the ground that defendant Nos.1 to 4 have admitted the transactions with the bank in their written statement, allowed the O.A. by the impugned order. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is ex facie illegal and unsustainable under law. We have carefully gone through the written statement filed by defendant Nos.1 to 4. In para No.4 of the written statement, they specifically and categorically denied all the averments in the plaint. They denied the execution of the documents that are pleaded in the plaint with specific dates. While specifically denying the plaint averments, they incidentally pleaded that the 1st defendant is the customer of the bank and it has availed certain facilities by 14 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 hypothecating the goods with it which are insured with the 5th defendant- insurance company and the said goods were burnt and lost in the riots that took place. But, they did not specifically, categorically and clearly admitted the suit claim or the suit transactions in the written statement. Mere admitting that the 1st defendant is the customer of the bank and they availed overdraft facility by itself cannot be taken as a clear admission of the suit claim and the suit transactions. In order to decree the suit on the basis of an admission of the claim in the written statement, it is well settled law that the admission must be clear, categorical and specific. The admission in the written statement must be in unambiguous terms, clearly admitting the suit transaction and the suit claim by admitting that the documents which are mentioned in the plaint with reference to the dates given are executed by the defendants and that they are liable to repay the amount of money claimed in the plaint. It is relevant to note here that defendant Nos.1 to 4 have clearly pleaded in the written statement that in the course of the transaction of availing overdraft facility, the bank has taken the signatures of defendant Nos.1 to 4 on some blank documents without disclosing their contents. When that being the clear case pleaded by the defendants in the written statement, it cannot be said under any stretch of reasoning that the defendants have categorically, clearly, specifically and in unambiguous terms admitted the suit claim or suit transaction. 11. Considering Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C. and the nature and scope of the said provision to render a judgment on admission, the Apex Court, in the case of Himani Alloys Limited v. Tata Steel Limited 3 , held that Order XII Rule 6 C.P.C. is only an enabling provision and it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but it is only 3 (2011) 15 SCC 273 15 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 discretionary. It is further held that the Court, on examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant by way of an appeal on merits and, therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. The Apex Court categorically held that the discretion should be used only when there is a clear “admission” which can be acted upon. The Apex Court also held that admission should be categorical and it should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. 12. Recently, the Apex Court, in another judgment rendered in the case of Rajesh Mitra alias Rajesh Kumar Mitra and another v. Karnani Properties Limited4, also held that what has to be kept in mind is that Order XII Rule 6 C.P.C. is an enabling provision conferring wide discretionary powers on the Courts which cannot be claimed by any party as a matter of right and that the Courts can invoke Order XII Rule 6 C.P.C. only in cases where admissions are unconditional, unequivocal and unambiguous or when admission is based upon undisputed inferences. In arriving at the said conclusion, the Apex Court relied on the earlier precedents rendered on the point in the cases of Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt) 5, Raveesh Chand Jain v. Raj Rani Jain6 and Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India7. 4 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2607 5 (2005) 11 SCC 279 6 (2015) 8 SCC 428 7 (2000) 7 SCC 120 16 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 13. Thus, from the analogy of law enunciated in the above referred judgments of the Apex Court, the legal position is very clear that when the admission is not clear, categorical and unambiguous or when it is vague, the same cannot be made as basis for decreeing the suit. In the instant case, no clear, categorical and unambiguous admissions are made. Mere stating that the defendant firm is the customer of the bank and that it has an account with the bank by itself cannot be taken as a clear and categorical admission for the purpose of decreeing the claim of the bank. The bank has miserably failed to prove the amounts actually sanctioned by it to defendant Nos.1 to 4 towards loan or cash credit facility or how they have committed default in repayment of the same. The relevant accounts relating to the said loan transaction maintained by the bank are not produced to substantiate its claim. A claim cannot be decreed merely on the basis of pleadings in the plaint when there is absolutely no oral or documentary evidence whatsoever adduced to substantiate the claim. 14. Learned counsel for the bank has invoked Order VIII Rule 5 of C.P.C. contending that the denial must be specific or by necessary implication and if the denial is not specific, then it shall be taken to be admitted. In the instant case, we have already noticed supra that specific denial of the plaint averments has been clearly made in para No.4 of the written statement. Therefore, it cannot be said that the denial is not specific as required under Order VIII Rule 5 C.P.C. Further, proviso to Order VIII Rule 5 C.P.C. also mandates that the Court may, in its discretion, require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. Therefore, even if there is no such specific denial and if a fact is specifically admitted in the written statement, still it is within the discretion of the Court, as per the said proviso, requiring the plaintiff to prove the said fact also. Upon 17 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 considering the written statement, we are not satisfied that any fact is clearly admitted by the defendant Nos.1 to 4, as pleaded in the plaint. So, prudence requires the Court to insist for proof of the fact as pleaded in the plaint for the purpose of passing a decree against the defendants. Such proof is miserably lacking in this case. A suit cannot be decreed merely on the basis of plaint averments and on the ground that the claim is admitted in the written statement, when the admissions are not specific, clear and categorical. The suit claim sans evidence in proof of the same cannot be decreed. Therefore, the Tribunal grossly erred in passing a decree against the defendants only on the basis of mere plaint averments and on the basis of the alleged vague admissions said to have been made by defendant Nos.1 to 4 in the written statement. 15. Learned counsel for the bank further contended that as per Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof in a suit lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all was given on either side and he invoked the illustration (b) to Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act. In our considered view, the said illustration (b) has no application to the present facts of the case. It is only when the execution of the documents is admitted, then it applies. In the instant case, the execution of the documents pleaded in the plaint with reference to the dates furnished is not clearly admitted in the written statement. Therefore, illustration (b) to Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be invoked to decree the suit. So, none of the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the bank is tenable to uphold the impugned order of the Tribunal. 16. Therefore, as the impugned order of the Tribunal suffers from patent illegality and manifest error of law as it is based on no evidence and the conclusions are reached without any evidence which can be 18 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 otherwise termed as perverse, the impugned order of the Tribunal is clearly unsustainable under law and the same is liable to be set aside. 17. In fine, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 06.03.2025 passed in O.A.No.725 of 2002 by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, is hereby set aside. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, in this case shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs. ________________________________________ JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY ______________________________________ JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA Date: 23.12.2025 IBL 19 CMR,J & GTK,J W.P.No.14121 of 2025 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA WRIT PETITION No.14121 of 2025 Dt: 23.12.2025 IBL