Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2025:CGHC:51676
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No.1102 of 2007
Judgment reserved on : 01.08.2025
Judgment delivered on : 16.10.2025 1 - Sanjay @ Sanju, aged about 25 years, S/o Domarilal, R/o Village Patgawan, PO Pendra, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
Appellant (s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh through Police Station Pendra, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Yogendra Chatuvedi, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Ms. Nand Kumari Kashyap, PL Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey C A V Judgment
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.08.2007 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Pendra Road, Bilaspur (C.G.) in Session Trial No.382/2006, whereby the appellant has been convicted under Sections 304-B & 498-A of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 7 years with fine of Rs.200 and RI for 3 years with fine of Rs.200, respectively, with default Digitally signed by R NIRALA
2 stipulations.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the marriage of the deceased Hemlata was solemnized with the appellant according to Hindu Rites and Rituals. Soon after the marriage, the appellant started torturing the deceased for demand of TV, CD Player, almirah etc. and ultimately on 06.08.2006, Hemlata committed suicide by hanging. After investigation, charge sheet was filed before the Magistrate concerned. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and material available on record, learned trial court convicted the accused/appellant, as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and material available on record. There are also material omissions and contradictions in the statements of the other prosecution witnesses. The appellant has been convicted only on the basis of conjectures and surmises and only tiny quarrel used to take place between the appellant and the deceased, but all these aspects of the matter have been ignored by the learned Trial Court and the appellant has wrongly been convicted for the aforesaid offence. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
4. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned
judgment and submits that the learned Trial Court has minutely appreciated the evidence available on record and has rightly
3 convicted the appellant. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court framed charges under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC and in alternate Section 306 of IPC against the appellant and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 304B and 498A of IPC as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. 7. It is an admitted position before the learned trial Court that the deceased Hemlata was the wife of the appellant and their marriage was solemnized in the year 2003 and within 07 years of their marriage, on 06.08.2006 she committed suicide by hanging. 8. PW/01 Tulsi Das, father of the deceased stated that the appellant tortured his daughter for the demand of T.V., money, etc. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he never lodged any report against the appellant for demand of dowry and he denied his police statement (Ex. D/01) on A to A part of the same. He also admitted this suggestion of defence that in front of him no maarpeet with the deceased was done by the appellant. 9. PW/02 Durgesh Kumar, brother of the deceased, has also stated that the appellant demanded Colour T.V. and C.D. player, but in para 04 of his examination-in-chief, he stated that prior to 15
4 days of incident ,he had gone to the house of the deceased where she told him that the child had fallen down from her, due to which the appellant committed maarpeet with her. In the cross- examination he admitted the suggestion of defence that the appellant and his family members were prosperous and wealthy. He also admitted that prior to the marriage whenever they used to tell anything to his sister, she got annoyed. 10. PW/03 Kamla, aunt (mausi) of the deceased stated that the deceased had told her that the appellant commits maarpeet with her. In her cross-examination she admitted that after the marriage of the deceased with the appellant she never met her, as she was residing somewhere else. 11.
PW/04 Bhimsen Mehra, brother of the deceased has not supported the prosecution case. The prosecution declared him hostile, but he denied all suggestions of the prosecution and stated that her sister did not tell him anything. 12. PW/05 Guddi Bai, sister-in-law (bhabhi) of the deceased stated that the deceased Hemlata used to tell her that the accused commits maarpeet with her and after birth of child, a quarrel took place. She also stated that due to falling down of the child from her, the appellant had beaten her badly. 13. Close scrutiny of statements of all the witnesses, it is clear that the prosecution has proved this fact that the deceased Hemlata committed suicide within 07 years of her marriage, but brother and sister-in-law of the deceased clearly admitted the suggestion
5 of defence that the quarrel took place between the deceased and the appellant due to falling down of the child from the deceased. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Charanjeet Singh vs State of Jharkhand, reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 454, held in para 11 as under:-
“11. The interpretation of Sections 304B and 498A IPC came up for consideration in Baijnath’s case (supra). The opinion was summed up in paras 25 to 27 thereof, which are extracted below:-
“25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are: ( i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances, and (ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and (iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty.
The Explanation to this Section exposits “cruelty” as: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical), or (ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences. 27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences
6 precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two offences.”
15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shoor Singh vs State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2025) 2 SCC 815 (supra) held in paras 12 & 13 as under:-
“12. To constitute a ‘dowry death’, punishable under Section 304- B IPC, following ingredients must be satisfied: i. death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or it must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; ii. such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; iii. soon before such death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and iv. such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with any demand for dowry. The phrase ‘otherwise than under normal circumstances’ is wide enough to encompass a suicidal death. 13.
When all the above ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B8 of the Evidence Act is to be raised against the accused that he has committed the offence of ‘dowry death’. What is important is that the presumption under Section 113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand for dowry, which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of ‘dowry death’. The presumption, however, is in respect of commission of the offence of ‘dowry death’ by the accused when all the essential ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved beyond reasonable doubt by ordinary rule of evidence, which means that to prove the essential ingredients of an offence of ‘dowry death’
7 the burden is on the prosecution.”
16. In the light of above, it is clear that the prosecution has only proved this fact that the deceased died within 07 years of her marriage by committing suicide, but the prosecution has utterly failed to prove this fact that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry. 17. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges under Sections 304B and 498A of IPC. 18. The appellant is reported to be on bail. 19. Keeping in view the provisions of section 481 of BNSS 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- before the court concerned forthwith, which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant
judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
20. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/-
Rajani Dubey
Judge Nirala