1 / 19 2025:CGHC:52777 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1990 of 2025 Ansh Kumar Panika S/o Late Shri Rajkumar Panika Aged About 19 Years R/o Pandari, Police Station Surajpur, District- Surajpur (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The Police of Police Station Patna, District- Koriya (C.G.) ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, Advocate appears on behalf of Mr. Anil Kumar Gulati, Advocate For State : Ms. Sunita Manikpuri, Dy. GA Hon’ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Judgment on Board 29/10/2025 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. The appellant has filed the instant criminal appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 questioning the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23/08/2025 passed by the Special Judge (under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012) Baikunthpur, District Korea, C.G. in Special Criminal Case No.35/2024, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- ASHUTOSH MISHRA Digitally signed by ASHUTOSH MISHRA Date: 2025.11.01 14:10:01 +0530 2 / 19 Conviction Sentence Under Section 12 of POCSO Act R.I. for 02 years and fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine additional S.I. for 02 months Fine amount has already been deposited before the learned trial Court. 3. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the victim and the accused, who belonged to the same caste, began chatting on Instagram and exchanged mobile numbers. The next day, the accused called the victim over mobile. They both liked each other and wanted to get married, but the victim refused to marry because the accused used to drink too much alcohol, leading to the accused posting obscene videos and photos of the victim on Instagram. Thereafter, the crime was registered and the investigation started. On 08.11.2024, the accused was arrested and sent on judicial remand. After the entire investigation was completed, a charge sheet was prepared and presented in the court as there was sufficient evidence of the crime against the accused. When charges were framed against the accused under sections 78 (2) BNS, 66 (c), 67 (a) of the Information Technology Act and section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 the same were read out to him, he denied the charges and requested for trial. The accused, on being examined under Section 351 of the Indian Penal Code, pleaded his innocence and did not lead any evidence in his defence. 4. On behalf of the prosecution, the victim (PW-1), the victim's mother (PW- 2), Sub-Inspector Jayalakshmi (PW-3), Head Constable Brijesh Kumar 3 / 19 Singh (PW-4), Sajal Jaiswal (PW-5), Inspector Vinod Paswan (PW-6) and Head Master Sumant Kumar Rajwade (PW-7) have been examined. 5. Complaint of the victim made before the Station House Officer regarding uplading of photos and videos on Instagram by the prosecution Ex.P.1, First Information Report Ex.P.2, Crime Details Form Ex.P.3, Property Seizure Memo Ex.P.4,7, statement of the victim under Section 183 B.N.S.S. Ex.P.5, original mark sheet of the victim in Class 10th Ex.P.6, application to the Sub-Inspector for recording the statement of the victim Ex.P.8, First Information Report Ex.P.9, certificate under Section 65 (b) regarding admissibility of electronic documents Ex.P.10, certificate under Section 63 (4) (c) Ex.P.11, Arrest Memo Ex.P.13, Arrest Intimation Ex.P.14, application to the Judicial Magistrate for providing a copy of the statement of the victim under Section 183 B.N.S.S. Ex.P. 15, Application Ex.P 16 to Cyber Cell for providing test report of seized mobile and certificate under section 65B and Application Ex.P 17 to Head Teacher for providing attested copy of Dakhil Kharij Register of the victim, certified copy of Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex. P/18C), Certificate Ex. P/19, Seizure Memo Ex. P/20, and the screenshot of the photos uploaded on the instagram ID Article 1 were produced by the prosecution. 6. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant sentenced him as mentioned in para -1 of this judgment, hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that there are major contradictions and omissions in the statement of the prosecution 4 / 19 witnesses. He would next contend that the victim is a tutored witness as in para 12 of her cross-examination she admitted the fact that she has been brought to the Court by a woman Constable and the said Constable informed her that you have to give statement as per the report, therefore, the testimony of the victim is not credible. He would next contend that the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim was minor on the date of incident as the Prosecution witness PW-7 has deposed that he is not the person who made entry in the school record and he is also not in a position to state that on what basis the date of birth has been registered in the Dakhil Kharik Register. He would next contend that the the victim in her statement has not stated anything regarding commission of rape by the appellant, therefore, the offence under Section 12 of the POCSO is not made out against the appellant. It is, therefore, contended that the prosecution has failed to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt and conviction of the appellant is contrary to the rule of prudence and in the light of the evidence available on record conviction of the appellant is bad in the eye of law. It is, therefore most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Court may kindly be pleased to allow this appeal and set aside the conviction passed by the learned trial court and the appellant may kindly be acquitted from the charges. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and submit that on the date of incident the victim was minor and below 18 years of age which is proved by the Dakhilkharij Register in which the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 25/12/2006. She being the minor girl and the appellant uploaded her 5 / 19 obscene video/photographs has committed the offence defined under the provisions of POCSO Act. Therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the finding of learned trial Court and the impugned judgment of the Court below needs no interference. 9. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the record of the trial Court and other material available on record with utmost circumspection. 10. In order to consider the age of prosecutrix, we have to examine the evidence/material placed on record by the prosecution. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the Admission Discharge Register of Ex. P-18C, wherein date of birth of prosecutrix is mentioned as 25/12/2006. 11. The mother of the prosecutrix has been examined as PW-2 and she in her cross-examination at para 04 has stated that her marriage was solemnized prior to 20-22 years back from today and after 1-1.5 years of marriage child was born i.e. the prosecutrix. 12. The prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated in her cross- examination (Para -13) that she has stated her date of birth which is recorded in her mark-sheet and she do not know her actual date of birth. 13. Sumant Kumar Rajwade (PW-07), stated (in Para-1) that he was posted as Headmaster at the Primary School, Bardiya, from December 2022 to the present. He further stated that a complaint was received from the Station House Officer, Patna, regarding providing a certified copy of the Dakhil 6 / 19 Kharij (Registration) for the victim's birth certificate in Crime No. 309/2024. Upon receiving the complaint, he provided a certified copy of the Dakhil Kharij Register of the Primary School, Bardiya, for the year 2012. As recorded in admission number 1440 of the Dakhil Kharij Register, the victim's date of birth is 25.12.2006. Today, he has brought with him the original copy of the Dakhil Kharij Register of the Primary School, Bardiya, which contains the entry relating to the victim's birth, Ex.P.18, the certified copy of which is Ex.P.18C. He further in his cross examination at para 2 has stated that it is correct to say that he did not make the entry in the Dakhil Kharij Register. It is correct to say that the there is no mention in the Dakhil Kharij about any document regarding birth. It is correct to say that when parents submit a birth certificate for their child, a brief note is made in the Dakhil kharij register. The witness voluntarily states that the same is being accepted now but earlier it was not being taken. 14. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for presumption and determination of age. The same reads as under : “94. Presumption and determination of age.— (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and 7 / 19 proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining— (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person. 8 / 19 15. In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2)SCC-385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 16. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “ 40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person,who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.- 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- 9 / 19 "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 10 / 19 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 17. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 11 / 19 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3) (a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub- section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 12 / 19 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the courtshould lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 18. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the 13 / 19 school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15.In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. the court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or 14 / 19 equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three- judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed 15 / 19 age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 19. Now, reverting to the facts of the present case. From the statement of the prosecutrix (PW-1), it is evident that she has stated in her cross- examination that she does not know her actual date of birth and has only disclosed the date as recorded in her mark-sheet. The mother of the prosecutrix (PW-2) has, in her cross-examination, deposed that her marriage took place about 20-22 years prior to her deposition and that after about 1-1½ years of marriage, the prosecutrix was born. Further, the Headmaster of the Primary School, Bajridh (PW-7), has produced a certificate Ex.P/19 and the Dakhil Kharij Register Ex.P/18C, showing the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 25.12.2006. However, in his cross- examination, the said witness has admitted that he did not make the entry in the register, no supporting document regarding the date of birth was available, and that at the relevant time birth certificates were not necessarily verified or taken when entries were made in the school register. He has further admitted that no mention of any supporting document for proof of date of birth is recorded in the school register. 20. In view of the above evidence, the date of birth mentioned in the school record cannot be treated as conclusive proof of age. The testimony of the prosecutrix and her mother, taken together, also does not provide any definite or reliable basis to determine the exact age. On the contrary, their statements indicate that the prosecutrix was born about 19-20 years prior to the date of incident (01.05.2023), which would make her a major 16 / 19 at the relevant time. Accordingly, it cannot be presumed that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the incident. The prosecution has failed to produce cogent and reliable evidence to conclusively establish that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the relevant time. 21. After considering the evidence collected by the prosecution and in the light of the aforesaid judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, I find that no clinching and legally admissible evidence has been brought by the prosecution to prove the fact that the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident, despite the fact that the trial court in the impugned judgment has held the prosecutrix minor. Accordingly, I set aside the findings given by the trial court that on the date of incident, the victim was minor as the same has not been proved by the prosecution by leading cogent and clinching evidence. 22. In order to consider whether the appellant has committed the offence under Section 12 of the POCSO Act, I have to examine the evidence/material placed on record by the prosecution. 23. Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012 reads as under;- 12. Punishment for sexual harassment.— Whoever, commits sexual harassment upon a child shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 17 / 19 24. The prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated in her examination-in-chief (Para -1) that know the accused. She has studied till class 12th. Her date of birth is 25.12.2006. She uses a mobile phone and have downloaded and used the Instagram app. She liked the accused's posts and photos on Instagram. She came to know from Instagram that the accused belongs to her caste. They shared their ID and password. She received a call from the accused on her mobile phone and she talked to him. While talking on the phone, they fell in love and started meeting each other. Later, when she came to know that the accused drinks alcohol, she refused to marry him. She further in her cross-examination at para 7 has stated that it is correct to say that they used Instagram and became friends after seeing photos on it. It is correct to say that the accused and she started liking each other after seeing each other. She further at para 8 has stated that it is correct to say that she wanted to marry the accused, but when she came to know that the appellant was an alcoholic, she refused to marry him. It is also correct to say that her family also wanted to marry her with the accused, but when they came to know that he is an alcoholic, they too refused to marry him. 25. Mother of the prosecutrix PW-2 has stated that she knows the victim who is her daughter. She knows the accused. She has three children. The victim is her elder daughter. The victim has studied till class 12th and her date of birth is 25.12.2006. The victim currently lives at home. Her maternal home is Pandri police station Surajpur. Her mother and her brother live in her maternal home. The victim and the accused were talking about marriage. The accused is a resident of her maternal village 18 / 19 Pandri. The accused and the victim got acquainted on Instagram. The marriage talks were going on through Instagram. When the victim came to know that the accused drinks a lot of alcohol, then the victim refused to marry him. 26. The evidence shows that the victim came into contact with the appellant through Instagram and since both of them belong to the same caste they exchanged their mobile numbers and started liking each other and both of them wanted to perform marriage but when the victim came to know about the drinking habit of the appellant she refused to perform the marriage. Feeling aggrieved with the same the appellant uploaded the photographs /videos of the prosecutrix but during the trial it has not been proved that the appellant has uploaded any video or photograph of the victim/prosecutrix, therefore, the trial Court has already acquitted the accused under Section 66 ( C) and 67-A of the Information Technology Act. The trial Court has convicted the appellant under Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 27. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the Court on the veracity of the victim’s evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 19 / 19 28. Since there is an affair between the victim and the accused and prosecution has failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix to be below 18 years and also failed to prove the fact that the appellant has uploaded the obscene video /photograph of the victim through mobile phone. Thus, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case particularly the evidence with regard to the age and conduct of the prosecutrix, her evidence that she was in love affair with the appellant and nothing has been deposed regarding commission of rape and the prosecution has failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix to be below 18 years, therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, offence as alleged against the appellant would not be made out. 29. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23/08/2025 is hereby set aside. Appellant stands acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds shall remain operative for a period of 06 months in view of Section 437A of CrPC (now Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). 30. The lower court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. SD/- SD/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge ashu