Page No.1 of 7 IN CRR-1518-2025 2026:CGHC:22580-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Criminal Revision No. 1518 of 2025 Najma Begum W/o Mushtaq Ali Aged About 52 Years R/o Arjun Nagar, Rickshaw Colony, Near Rai Kirana Stores, Ward No. 19, Police Station Supela, Bhilai, District Bhilai Chhattisgarh ... Applicant Versus 1 - Raghunath Prasad S/o Late Shri Balak Prasad Aged About 72 Years R/o Anand Chowk, 5 Rasta Ward No. 6, Supela, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Collector Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh ... Non-applicants [Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Applicant : Mr. Jitendra Gupta, Advocate For Respondent-State : Dr. S.K. Dewangan, Panel Lawyer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal Order on Board (12.05.2026) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J 1. Heard on IA No.01, which is an application seeking condonation of delay in filing this revision. 2. For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed. Delay of 495 days in filing this revision is hereby condoned. 3. Heard on admission. SAIFAN KHAN Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Page No.2 of 7 IN CRR-1518-2025 4. In this revision, the applicant is challenging order dated 26.04.2024, passed by the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Durg, in Cr. Appeal No.125/2023, whereby the appeal preferred by the applicant against order dt. 22.03.2023, passed by the learned JMFC, Durg in Complaint Case No.25840/2012, has been dismissed and the order of learned JMFC dt. 22.03.2023, by which the accused/respondent No.01 herein has been acquitted from the the charges under Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 of IPC, has been affirmed. 5. Facts of the case, in short, are that the applicant herein filed a complaint against the respondent No.01 herein before the Court of learned JMFC, Durg, inter-alia, stating that the respondent No.01 herein/accused has firstly encroached upon her land illegally and, thereafter, constructed a house on it and has also prepared a forged sale agreement with regard to the said land. Thereafter, the learned JMFC though firstly took cognizance of the matter, but after conducting full-fledged trial acquitted the accused/respondent No.01 herein vide order dated 22.03.2023 on the ground that no charges under Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 of IPC were found proved against him. Against which, the applicant herein preferred appeal before the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Durg, which was also dismissed vide impugned order dated 26.04.2024. Feeling aggrieved by the said orders, this revision has been filed before this Court. Page No.3 of 7 IN CRR-1518-2025 6. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that both the Courts below were absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused/respondents for the aforesaid offences by recording findings which are perverse and contrary to the record and, therefore, the same are liable to be set aside. Thus, this revision be allowed. 7. Learned counsel for the State supported the impugned orders and prays for dismissal of this revision. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. At the very outset, it would be profitable to notice relevant decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 1 , whereby in Para-11 & 12 it has been held that the scope of interference in an order of acquittal is very limited and observed as under: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar 1 2025 INSC 114 Page No.4 of 7 IN CRR-1518-2025 [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come Page No.5 of 7 IN CRR-1518-2025 to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however,must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; Page No.6 of 7 IN CRR-1518-2025 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 10. In the case at hand, a careful perusal of the record would show that that the learned trial Court after conducting full-fledged trial, Page No.7 of 7 IN CRR-1518-2025 came to the conclusion that though the complainant/applicant has alleged that the accused has encroached upon her land illegally, constructed a house on it and has also prepared a false sale-deed with respect to the said land, but neither any document nor any witness has been be led by her in support of her allegation. Consequently, in absence of any evidence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent No.01 for the aforesaid offences, which findings have also been affirmed by the learned appellate Court vide impugned order dated 26.04.2024. Even otherwise, it is settled that the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate Court may be the more probable one, and unless the view taken by the trial Court is perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The concurrent findings recorded by tbe two Courts below are neither perverse nor contrary to the record. As such, we do not find any merit in this revision and same is liable to be dismissed. 11. In view of aforesaid discussion, we do not find any good ground to invoke our revisional jurisdiction against the impugned orders. Accordingly, this revision is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost. sd/- sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge s@if