APHC010149482024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADEsSlr/ AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY,THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD WRIT PETITION NO: 7827 OF 2024 O i B o vw Between: M/s Rani Constructions Private Limited., having its corporate office at 203, Navketain Complex, S.D.Raod, Secunderabad -50003 represented by its Director Sri.Galla Gundaiah S/o Late Galla Subbaiah ...PETITIONER AND 1. Andhra Pradesh Road Development Corporation (APRDC) Government of Andhra Pradesh, 5‘^ Floor, State HOC Building, Opposite Indira Gandhi Municipal Stadium, Vijayawada - 520010 CRN and Krishna district, represented by its Chief Engineer (RandB) Managing Director 2. State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Secretary to Government, Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District- TR and B Department, 522503 Andhra Pradesh. 3. State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Special Chief Secretary Government, Finance Department, Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District - 522503. Andhra Pradesh. to ...RESPONDENTS praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India pleased to issue a Writ, Order or Direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring that the inaction of the respondents in the matter of taking an administrative decision to comply with the consent order dated 4.4.2023 passed by the Honourable High Court of Telangana in illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional and consequently direct the respondents to settle the admitted dues payable under the aforesaid order to the petitioner. COMCA No.28 of 2022 as lA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the respondents to take appropriate action in the matter of payment of admitted payments in terms of the order of consent order dated 4.4.2023 passed by the Honourable High Court of Telangana in COMCA No.28 of 2022. Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI S. RAJAN Counsel for the Respondent No.1 :Ms.JHANSI LAKSHMI Counsel for the Respondent No.2: GP FOR ROADS AND BUILDINGS Counsel for the Respondent No.3: SRI P. RAJESH KUMAR, AGP FOR FINANCE AND PLANNING The Court made the following order: I APHC010149482024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) if THURSDAY,THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD WRIT PETITION NO: 7827 OF 2024 Between: 1 M/s Rani Constructions Private Limited,, having its corporate office at 203, Navketain Complex, S.D.Raod, Secunderabad -50003 represented by its Director Sri.Galla Gundaiah S/o Late Galla Subbaiah ...Petitioner AND 1 Andhra Pradesh Road Development Corporation APRDC, Government of Andhra Pradesh, 5th Floor,State HOC Building, Opposite Indira Gandhi Municipal Stadium, Vijayawada - 520010 Krishna district, represented by its Chief Engineer (RandB) CRN and Managing Director 2 State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Secretary to TRandB Department, Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District - 522503 Andhra Pradesh of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Special Chief Secretary to Finance Department, Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District - 3. State Government, 522503 Andhra Prade ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: S RAJAN Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR ROADS BUILDINGS Counsel for RespondentsiGP FOR FINANCE PLANNING Counsel for the Respondents:P SRI RAM the 2 The Court made the following ORDER; Heard Sri S. Rajan, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner, Ms. Jhansi Lakshmi, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 and Sri Panuku Rajesh Kumar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Finance & Planning. 2. The prayer sought in the Writ Petition is as under: “ to issue a Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring that the inaction of the Respondents in the matter of taking an administrative decision to comply with the consent order dated 04.04.2023 passed by the Honourable High Court of Telangana in COMCA No. 28 of 2022 as illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional and conseguently direct the Respondents to settle the admitted dues payable under the aforesaid order to the petitioner immediately and pass such other order or orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice and circumstances of the case”. Submissions of the Writ Petitioner: 3. The facts as projected by Sri S. Rajan, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner are that the Respondent No.1 has issued a Tender Notification for widening and strengthening of Kurnool - Devanakonda Raod from KM 4 + 400 to 65 + 300 in Kurnool District; that the Writ Petitioner was a successful bidder; contractual agreement was reduced into writing on 29.11.2011; that the Writ Petitioner has commenced the work from 12.01.2012; that the differences arose on execution of the contract for sorting out such differences, for which the Writ Petitioner herein has approached the Dispute Resolution Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘DRB’) in terms of the conditions set out in the agreement; that after having considered the plea of the Writ Petitioner, the DRB accorded six months extension for completing the contract in favour of the Writ Petitioner; that, having been aggrieved by the Order passed by the DRB, the Respondent No.1 namely the A.P Road Development Corporation had invoked Arbitration Clause, and Arbitration Proceedings have commenced; that the Respondent No.1, during the interregnum, had terminated the contract between the parties which gave raise to another dispute; that, having been aggrieved by the Order passed by the Respondent 3 No.1 terminating the contract, the Writ Petitioner had once again approached the DRB challenging the termination of contract; that the DRB, after having considered the contentions of both parties had upheld the termination of contract. 4. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner would further submit that due to the dismissal of the Petition challenging the termination by the DRB, the Writ Petitioner has filed the Counter Claim in the same Arbitration Proceeding initiated by the Respondent No.1 under which the Respondent No.1 had challenged the decision of the DRB extending six months time to the Writ Petitioner for completion of the contract. Both the issues were taken up by the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of two retired Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and one Expert Member. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner that by a majority, the Award was passed in favour of the Writ Petitioner on 31.05.2019. The entire Award is not placed on record before this Court, and therefore, this Court is unable to understand whether it is unanimous Judgment or majority Judgment, and if it is a majority Judgment, as to who rendered the dissent); that the Respondent No.1 had challenged the Award before the Commercial Court in C.O.P.No.112 of 2019; that the Commercial Court-cum-Special Court for trial and disposal of Commercial Disputes at Hyderabad, had dismissed the C.O.P.No.112 of 2019 vide Order dated 31.08.2021 by affirming the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal. (This Order passed by the Commercial Court-cum-Special Court for trial and disposal of Commercial Disputes at Hyderabad is also not placed on record). 5. It is further submitted that having been aggrieved by the Order passed by the Commercial Court-cum-Special Court for trial of and disposal of Commercial Disputes at Hyderabad under the Commercial Court, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as Act, 2015’), the Respondent No.1 herein has approached the Hon’ble Division Bench of Telangana by filing Appeal bearing COMCA No.28 of 2022; that the Hon’ble Division Bench of Telangana, having 4 N noted the personal presence of the Managing Director in the Court, namely the Appellant therein (i.e., the A.P Road Development Corporation) have noted that the Counsel appearing for both parties have agreed on all the issues except the rate of interest and that the Counsel for left it to the discretion of the Court to determine both parties have the interest portion of the Award. Having noted the same, the Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court of Telangana had disposed of the COMCA No.28 of 2022 vide Order dated 04.04.2023. The relevant portion of the Order iIS usefully extracted hereunder; 7 Today, the Managing Director of appellant - Corporation and one of the Directors of respondent No. 1 are present In the,r presence we have asked learned counsel appearing for the parties as to whether the matter can be disposed of having regard to the resolution of dispute arrived at on all other aspects except interest and leave it to the Court for determination of interest portion of the Award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. Both counsel with the consent of the parties present have agreed to the suggestion of the Hon’ble Court. 8. Having regard to the dispute involved and facts noted above and since both parties have fairly come to an understanding for resolution of dispute by mutually for compliance of the Award, determine the interest portion, interest portion of the Award, from 9% agreeing and left it to the Court to are inclined to modify the h per annum to 5% per annum to give quietus to the litigation which is going on from the year 2011. we 9. Accordingly, with consent of the disposed of with following directions: parties, the Appeal is 1- As agreed between the appellant shall Rs.12,53,84,192/- partles, the amount of as ordered by the Arbitration Tribunal In paragraph No. 1 of the directions of the final Award. pay the 2. The appellant shall forthwith address letters to the three banks from where advance bank guarantees and performance guarantees were obtained, asking them discharge the mobilization to bank guarantees and y 5 performance guarantees within three (3) weeks, without any conditions. 3. As agreed between the parties, whatever machinery and other equipment standing on the concerned premises, shall be handed over on as is where is basis by jointly drafting the inventory. It Is made clear that respondent No. 1 shall not insist for handing over of the entire material as per original Inventory and which is not available on the premises. 4. The appellant shall comply with the directions issued In paragraph Nos.4 and 5 of the final Award. 5. With reference to the interest portion, we direct the appellant to pay only 5% of interest per annum instead of 9% per annum, as awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal. 6. The principal amount as well as the interest shall be paid within three (3) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. ” 6. The above extract makes it clear that the interest that is awarded as per the Award had been reduced by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Telangana from 9% to 5%. 7. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the subsequent correspondence between the parties indicating the approach of Respondent No.1 intending to comply with the Order passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court of Telangana dated 04.04.2023. It is submitted that, in compliance with the Order dated 04.04.2023 of the Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court of Telangana, the Secretary to Government, TR & B Department, had addressed a letter to the Chief Engineer (R&B) on 19.06.2023 (Ex.P.3) to initiate appropriate Proceedings for release of the Bank Guarantees of three Banks [(i) State Bank of India (ii) Bank of Baroda and (iii) Union Bank of India] and also to handover the machinery under the custody of the Respondent No.1 to the Writ Petitioner herein; that, in pursuance of the / • 6 \ said Order dated 19.06.2023. the Chief Engineer (R&B) had addressed letters on 23.06.2023 to the; (i) State Bank of India (ii) Bank of Baroda Union Bank of India to release the Bank Guarantees three and (iii) Performance Security and Additional Performance Security etc., to the Writ Petitioner (Ex.P.4); and that the Managing Director of Respondent No.1 had also addressed a letter to the Secretary to Government, TR&B Department seeking administrative sanction for making the payment of Rs.15,04,62,147/- to the contractor. on 29.05.2023 (Ex.P.8) The Managing Director of Respondent No.1 had also addressed a similar letter to the same authority namely the Secretary to Government, TR&B Department on 06.02.2024 (Ex.P.7) reminding the said authority that the administrative sanction has not yet been accorded and that an administrative sanction is required for payment of Rs.15,67,37,582/- (which includes the interest calculated upto 31.03.2024). The Writ Petitioner has sent a legal notice to Respondent No.1 on 31.01.2024 (Ex.P.5). for which the a Reply on 06.02.2024 (Ex.P.6) indicating that IS ‘yet to take a decision’ with regard to the administrative Respondent No.1 had issued the Government i sanction. 8. Learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has placed reliance Judgments ; on the following 1. Bhamidipati Annapoorna Bhavani Acquisition Officer, Yeleru Reservoir Project : Lawsuit (AP) 167 (Para No.11). Vs. Land 2005 2. Sukh Dutt Ratra & ANR Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors : 2022 LawSuit (SC) 435 (Para Nos.19 & 24). This Court has gone through the relevant paragraphs that were read out At the outset, this Court is by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner, rather constrained to note that none of the above Judgments have relevance ot the present facts of the case. The legal preposition learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner relies any on which the on is that a Writ Court compelling the Respondent Authorities can issue for payment of directions m- 1 compensation to the Claimants whose land has been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Grant of compensation and recovery of such compensation in Land Acquisition Proceedings stand entirely on a different footing as has been laid down very clearly by the Hon’ble Apex Court and the analogy emanating out of the Land Acquisition Proceedings cannot be applied to the Proceedings in a commercial dispute, which had been considered by the Commercial Court Circuit namely by the Commercial Court-cum-Special Court for Trial and Disposal of CommerciaJ Disputes at Hyderabad and the Appellate Division (Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court of Telangana) under the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (the Commercial Courts Act, 2015). Submissions of the Respondents 9. Ms. Jhansi Lakshmi, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 and Sri Panuku Rajesh Kumar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Finance & Planning have raised preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of present Writ Petition. 10. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Award that had been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal had been considered under the Act, 2015. It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court of Telangana under the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was also pleased to consider and confirm the Award by modifying the interest rate and that the same can be executed only through the process of execution under Order XXI of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC, 1908’), and therefore, the present Writ Petition is not maintainable. 11. Counter-Affidavit was filed on 22.08.2025. Learned Counsel for the Respondents have drawn the attention of this Court to Para Nos. 11 to 15 of the Counter Affidavit. In P&ra 'No.14 of the Counter Affidavit, it has been categorically stated that the present Writ Petition is not maintainable under 8 Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as there is no Public Law element involved in the present 12. ISSUES: case. Having considered the rival contentions, this Court deems it appropriate to frame the following issues : /. Whether the Writ Petitioner can seek a Writ of Mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution to compel the Official Respondents to act on the internal correspondence of India dated 29.05.2023 (Ex.P.8) and 06.02.2024 (Ex.P.7) between the Managing Director of the Respondent No.1 Corporation and the Secretary to Government, TR&B Department? //. Whether the Writ Petition is maintainable for execution of an Award that was affirmed by the Commercial Court (Trial Court) as well as Appellate Division of the Commercial Court under the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016)7 Analysis Issue No.1: Whether the Writ Petitioner can seek a Writ of Mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution to compel the Official Respondents to of India act on the internal correspondence dated 29.05.2023 (Ex.P.8) and 06.02.2024 (Ex.P.7) between the Managing Director of the Respondent No.1 Corporation and the Secretary to Government, TR&B Department? 9 13. Although the prayer in the Writ Petition is to seek a declaration that the inaction on the part of the Respondents in taking administrative decision to comply with the consent Order of the Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court Telangana dated 04.04.2023, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner contends that it would suffice, if this Court directs the Respondent Nos.2 & 3 to act the correspondence made by the Respondent No.1 on 29.05.2023 and 06.02.2024. As it can be seen from the record and the facts which have been narrated herein above, the Proceedings between the Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2 are internal in nature, where the Respondent No.1 was seeking administrative sanction for making payment to the Writ Petitioner and that the final decision is yet to be taken by the Government in this regard. This issue takes the Court to the moot question whether this internal correspondence can be made the basis to issue a Mandamus to Respondent No.2 to grant administrative sanction or to take a decision with regard to the administrative sanction. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in a catena of decisions, categorically held that the internal proceedings or internal correspondence between the various authorities cannot be relied, and thereby, requiring the Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus compelling them to take a decision. 14. In Sethi Auto Service Station and Another Vs. Delhi Development Authority and Others : (2009) 1 SCO 180, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, had held at Para Nos. 13 to 15 as under: of on “13. Thus, the first question arising for consideration is whether the recommendation of the Technical Committee vide minutes dated 17-5-2002 for resitement of the appellants' petrol pumps constitutes an order/decision binding on DDA? 14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for internal use and consideration of the other officials of the department and for the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in the department, gets his an sf 10 approval and the final order is communicated to the person concerned. (Emphasis supplied) 15. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 713], a Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the effect of an order passed by a Minister on a file, which order was not communicated to the person concerned. Referring to Article 166(1) of the Constitution, the Court held that order of the Minister could not amount to an order by the State Government unless it was expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh, as required by the said article and was then communicated to the party concerned. The Court observed that business of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through the agency of a large number of officials and authorities. Before an action is taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh, which formality is a constitutional necessity, nothing done would amount to an order creating rights or casting liabilities to third parties. It is possible, observed the Court, that after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion which may be opposed to the earlier opinion. In such cases, which of the two opinions can be regarded as the “order” of the State Government? It was held that opinion becomes a decision of the Government only when it is communicated to the person concerned. ” (Emphasis supplied) 15. In Jasbir Singh Chhabra and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others ; (2010) 4 SCO 192, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Para No.35 as under: “35. It must always be remembered that in a democratic polity like ours, the functions of the Government are carried out by different individuals at different levels. The issues and policy matters which are required to be decided by the Government are dealt with by several functionaries some of whom may record notings on the files favouring a particular person or group of persons. Someone may suggest a particular line of action, which may not be conducive to public interest and others may suggest adoption of a different mode in larger public interest. However, the final decision is required to be taken by the designated authority keeping in view the larger public interest. The notings recorded in the files cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the ultimate decision taken by the Government is tainted by mala fides or is influenced by extraneous considerations. The Court is duty-bound to carefully take note of the same In this context, reference can usefully be made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [(1974) 4 see 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] In that case, the 11 petitioner, who i/i/as at one time holding the post of Chief Secretary of the State, questioned the decision of the Government to post him as an officer on special duty. One of the grounds on which he attacked the decision of the Government ivas that the Chief Minister of the State, Shri K. Karunanidhi was ill-disposed against him." (Emphasis supplied) 16. In State of Orissa and Others Vs. Mesco Steels Limited and Another: (2013) 4 SCO 340, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has framed the question in Para No. 17.1 and had answered the same in Para Nos. 19 & 20. Therefore, Para No. 17.1 and Para Nos. 19 & 20 are usefully extracted hereunder: “17.1. Whether the writ petition filed by the respondent Company ivas premature, the same having been filed against an inter departmental communication that did not finally determine any right or obligation of the parties? 18. xxxxx 19. It is obvious from a conjoint reading of the letter dated 12- 1-2006 and communication dated 19-9-2006 sent by the Director of Mines in response thereto that a final decision on the subject had yet to be taken by the Government, no matter the Government may have provisionally decided to follow the line of action indicated in its communication dated 12-1-2006 issued under the signature of the Joint Secretary, Department of Steel and Mines. It is noteworthy that there was no challenge to the communication dated 12-1-2006 before the High Court nor was any material placed before us to suggest that any final decision was ever taken by the Government on the question of deduction of the area granted in favour of the respondent so as to render the process of issue of show- cause notice for hearing the respondent Company an exercise in futility. 20. On the contrary, the issue of the show-cause notice setting out the reasons that impelled the Government to claim resumption of a part of the proposed lease area from the respondent Company clearly suggested that the entire process leading up to the issue of the show-cause notice was tentative and no final decision on the subject had been taken at any level. It is only after the Government provisionally decided to resume the area in part or full that a show-cause notice could have been issued. To put the matter beyond any pale of controversy, Mr Lalit made an unequivocal statement at the Bar on behalf of the State Government that no final decision regarding resumption of any part of the lease area has been taken by the State Government so far and all that had transpired till date must necessarily be taken as provisional. Such being the case the High Court was in error in proceeding on an assumption that a final decision had been taken and in quashing what was no more than an inter- r- 12 departmental communication constituting at best a step in the process of taking a final decision by the Government, writ petition in that view was premature and ought to have been disposed of as such. Our answer to Question 1 is accordingly in the affirmative.” The (Emphasis supplied) 17. In Mahadeo and Others Vs. Sevan Devi and 807, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held at Para Nos. 15 to 18 as under: “15. It Others : (2023) 10 SCO well settled that IS . inter-departmental communications are m the process of consideration for appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis to claim any right. This Court examined the said question Kh.nrn ^^Omkar Sinha v. Sahadat Khan [Omkar Sinha v. Sahadat Khan, (2022) 12 SCC 228 ■ on Burner W69 ^rr n m [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 see OnUne Se 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] to hold that merely writing something on the file does not amount to order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government, two things are necessary. First, the order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and second, it has to be commamcated already, indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up, the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. The said Judgment was ... see 277] , and Dyna Technologies (P) I M ^ Greaves Ltd. [Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. V. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1] in an (Emphasis supplied) Bachhittar Singh [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnUne SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] it has been held under: (AIRpp. 397-98, paras 8-9 & 11) cocsider is the effect of the note recorded by the Revenue Minister of Pepsu upon the file We will assume for the purpose of this case that it is an order, question is whether it can be regarded as the order of the State Government which alone, as admitted by the appellant n/as competent to hear and decide an appeal from the order of the Revenue Secretary. Article 166(1) of the Constitution requires that all executive action of Government of a State shall be expressed in the name of the Governor. Clause (2) of Article 166 provides for the authentication of orders and other instruments made and ^J^^cuted in the name of the Governor. Clause (3) of that article enables the Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government for the allocation as the and among the Ministers of the said business. 13 Whdt the eppellant calls an order of the State Government admittedly not expressed to be In the name of the Governor. But with that point we shall deal later. What we must first ascertain is whether the order of the Revenue Minister is an order of the State Government i.e. of the Governor. In this connection we may refer to Rule 25 of the Rules of Business of the Government of Pepsu which reads thus: ‘Except as otherwise provided by any other Rule, cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister in charge who may by means of standing orders give such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in the Department Copies of such standing orders shall be sent to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister. ’ IS According to the learned counsel for the appellant his appeal pertains to the department which was in charge of the Revenue Minister and, therefore, he could deal with it His decision and order would, according to him, be the decision and order of the State Government On behalf of the State reliance was, however, placed on Rule 34 which reguired certain classes of cases to be submitted to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister before the issue of orders. But it conceded during the course of the argument that a case of the kind before us does not fall within that rule. No other provision bearing on the point having been brought to our notice we would, therefore, hold that the Revenue Minister could make an order on behalf of the State Government. 9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an order. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. As long as the matter rested with him the Revenue Minister could well score out his remarks or minutes on the file and write fresh ones. was was ever ■k-k-k 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the remarks or the order of the Revenue Minister, Pepsu are of no avail to the appellant. ” 17. This Court in Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co. [Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co., (2023) 14 see 786 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 376] held that a noting recorded in the file Is merely a noting simpliciterand nothing more. It merely represents expression of an opinion by the particular individual. It was held as under: (SCC paras 16-17) in a judgment In State of Kumar “16. This Court Uttaranchal Sunil Uttaranchal V. Sunil Kumar Vaish, (2011) 8 SCC 670 (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 325 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 542 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 410] held that a noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular Vaish [State of 14 oan''bfujLT '"’^Blnalion, such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government It held as under: (SCO p. 678, para 24) \ v/as (Emphasis supplied) SrS",™°'”7°" **' indLual. By no cTSon Tr r"' '>'= ’^dated o4] , Sethi Auto Service Station v DDA f^efhi a,,in Service Station v. DDA, (2009) 1 scr ism onnlpoolTsCC 7o:T (oTT^'5ScT(Sv^^^^^^^^ 17. Thus, the letter seeking approval of the Government by the Deputy CoZsTsLer i approval granted by him, which cou7J be plaintiff in the court of law. ” as a as be State - IS not the enforced by the written by the sUreta^^i'Tf thlZ%Z7m1fa!^V^ “r dated 19-3-1971 cannot be tre't^ communication aTCrt' " /s allotment, the writ petitioner the basis of such be a letter of could not claim possession terms nf th^ o , after more than 30 years in on (Emphasis supplied) U- V 15 18. In Delhi Development Authority Vs. Hello Home Education Society : (2024) 3 see 148, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, had drawn the analogy from Bachhittar Singh’s case-: 1962 SCO On Line SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395, had held in Para No.19.7 as under; “19.7. The issue relating to internal notings as to whether it would confer any right or not has been adequately dealt with and settled by series ofjudgments of this Court. It is well settled that until and unless the decision taken on file is converted into a final order to be communicated and duly served on the party concerned, no right accrues to the said party. Mere notings and in-principle approvals do not confer a vested right. Relevant extracts from judgments of this Court in this regard are being reproduced hereunder, (a) Bachhittar Singh [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 see OnLine Se 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] : (AIR p. 398, paras 9-10) “9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an order. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. ... 10. ... Thus It is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected by that order before the State and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over again and, therefore, till Its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional In character. ’’ (emphasis supplied) (b) Sethi Auto Service Station [Sethi Auto Service Station V. DDA, (2009) 1 SCC 180] (SCC pp. 185-87, paras 14 & 22) “14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by an officer Is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for internal use and consideration of the other officials of the department and for the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in the department, gets his approval and the final order is [Ed. : The word between two asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.] communicated [Ed. : The ‘ij 16 word between two asterisks has been original as well.] to the person concerned. nf/thT of the Commissioner Vice-Chairman, it is manifest that although there were several notings which recommended fZTTV'!^" relocaZ but finally no official communication n/as addressed to received by the appellants accepting their claim recommendation of the Technical Committee matter was kept pending; in the meanwhile a new policy was formulated and the matter was considered afresh later VirTch^^ proposal i/i/as rejected by the Vice-Chairrnan, the final decision-making authority in the hierarchy. It is, thus, plain that though the propsoals had the recommendations of State Level Coordinator (oll Industty) and the Technical Committee but these did not Ultimately fructify into an order or decision of the dM vTour2ee7 sppellants.Me^e favourable recommendations at some level of the deasion-making process, in our view, are of no consequence and shall not bind d6a wZ are Court ASeV/,r/i agreemenf with the High Court[Sethf Auto Service Station v. DDA 2006 SCC OnUne De/ U2Jtha, m notings in tte ff/e dW „o, confor any right upon the appellants, as long as they remamen as such. We do noUind any fVTmitl iH^Z approach adopted by the learned Single Judge affirmed by the Division .Bench ^ Station v. DDA, 2006 SCC OnUne interference." emphasised in or . After the the entire and [Sethi Auto Service Del 162], warranting (emphasis supplied) (c)Mahadeo [Mahadeo V Sovan Devi (2023) in 807], (SCCpp. 813-14. para 15) ^ ^ ^ “15. it is well settled that communications are In the processTcoZTrthon be relied upon as SinhZ I L Z ^ Judgment reported as Omkar waZ otor^H ■' ^ ^ ■ f^eliance was placed on Bachhittar Singh v State OnZjscil^ttlsTsTJlhft '’r«-o StaZ'Z «°"'efA7//7g amounts to an order of the oUZh necessary. First the order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor has to be communicated. >!ls already indicated /noGf,7y/„g the decision of the Revenue up Z%mSrT"'^’‘^- reaZdeZZH cannot, in our opinion, be garded as bound by what ivas stated in the file.” of no (emphasis supplied) 17 19. The above decisions clearly lay down the legal proposition that the Writ Petitioner had no vested right unless a final decision has been taken by the authority and that such vested right would accrue exclusively in a Public Law remedy but not under a Private Law remedy. Admittedly, the present dispute is governed by the Commercial Courts Act as it has arisen out of a Contract, issue No.2: Whether the Writ Petition is maintainable for execution of an Award that was affirmed by the Commercial Court (Trial Court) as well as Appellate Division of the Commercial Court under the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2016)? 20. Admittedly, the disputes which arose between the Writ Petitioner and Respondent No.1 have culminated in an ‘Arbitral Award’ on 31.05.2019; that the said Award came to be challenged by the Respondent No.1 before the Commercial Court-cum-Special Court for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes at Hyderabad, and that it had dismissed the COP No.112 of 2019 vide Order dated 31.08.2021 by affirming the Award dated 31.05.2019. Admittedly, the Respondent No.1 had filed the Appeal under the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court challenging the Award dated 31.05.2019 and the final Judgment and Decree dated 31.08.2021 in COP No.112 of 2019. It is also admitted that the Hon’ble Division Bench in its Commercial Appellate Jurisdiction had disposed of COMCA No.28 of 2022, vide Order 04.04.2023. and the Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court of Telangana had affirmed the Award and reduced the interest rate from 9% to 5% by recording consent of parties. 21. The above Proceeding would clearly indicate that the dispute that subsisted between the Writ Petitioner and Respondent No.1 is a commercial dispute. Parties have resorted to arbitration for resolution of this dispute. The Award dated 31.05.2019 was assailed before the Commercial Court-cum- 18 Special Court for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes at Hyderabad by filing COP No.112 of 2019; that the COP No.112 of 2019 came to be disposed vide Order dated 31.08.2021 affirming the Award and the Appellate Division (Hon’ble Division Bench, High Court of Telangana) under the Act, 2015 had affirmed the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal and the Trial Court vide Order dated 04.04.2023. Unequivocally, these proceedings are civil in nature, inasmuch as the Act, 2015 had carved out a fast track procedure for resolution of disputes coming before the Commercial Courts by enacting certain provisions which are a deviation from the provisions of the CPC, 1908. They relate to not only the trial and disposal of the cases that come before the Commercial Courts but also with regard to execution of the Decrees. This implies that the parties have to fall back upon the provisions of the CPC, 1908 read with the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 for execution of the Final Orders arising from the Commercial Courts^ It is a settled law that the Commercial Courts are also carved out from the regular Civil Courts and the proceedings which are brought before such Commercial Courts are, by their very nature, private disputes. The parties in the present case cannot deny the fact that the dispute before the Commercial Court is a private dispute, pure and simple, although the Respondent No.1 is a public institution. 22. Under these circumstances, the moot question arises as to whether the contractor could resort to civil proceedings under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 upto a particular stage and thereafter abandon the logical statutory process for execution and file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a Writ of Mandamus for recovery of the dues which emanate out of a commercial Award. 23. It is a settled law that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly either. The legal position is also well settled that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 had been carved out with special provisions but that such proceedings would be undertaken only by a designated Civil Court with a view to fast track certain procedures so that the final verdict be rendered within a 19 However, it is amply clear from the provisions of the fixed time span. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 that Parliament has not created similar fast track procedures for execution of the final verdict; therefore, the Decree holders have to fall back on the regular provisions of the CPC, 1908 read with provisions of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 for executing the same before the Commercial Courts and recourse to a Writ Court is absolutely not same countenanced under this statutory Scheme. This view of the Court is fortified by the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Limited Vs. K.S. Infraspace and another ; (2020) 15 SCC 585, Enterprises wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court had expounded the object of the Act, 2015 as corresponding amendments made to the CPC, 1908 in its application commercial disputes at Para No.33 to 36 & 42, which are usefully extracted well as to hereunder: Fast Track Procedure for deciding the commercial disputes 33. As per Section 16 of the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended under the Act, shall apply in the trial of suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a specified value. Section 16 of the Act reads as under. “16 Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (1) The in its application to commercial disputes, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a specified value, stand amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule. (2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a specified value. (3) Where any provision of any rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), by the State Government is in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Act shall prevail. 34. The Schedule to the Commercial Courts Act amends various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and thereby makes significant departure from the Code. After ‘ ■ “Summary Order 13 of the Code, Order 13-A Judgment’’ has been inserted. Order 13-A contains the scope and classes of suits to which Order 13-A applies, grounds for summary judgment, procedure to be followed, 20 evidence for hearing of summary judgment, orders that may be made by Court in such proceedings for summary judgment, etc. After Order 15 of the Code, Order 15-A— “Case Management Hearing” has been inserted. Order 15-A provides for first case management hearing (Rule 1); recording of oral evidence on a day-to-day basis (Rule 4); powers of the court in a case management hearing (Rule 6); adjournment of case management hearing (Rule 7); conseguences of non-compliance with orders (Rule 8). By way of amendment, several rules have been incorporated to make the matters of commercial disputes on fast track. In Order 20 of the Code — “Judgment”, Rule 1 has been substituted that within ninety days of the conclusion of arguments, Division/Commercial Appellate Division to pronounce the judgment and copies thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute through electronic mail or otherwise. 35. Various provisions of the Act, namely, management hearing and other provisions makes the court to adopt a pro-active approach in resolving the commercial dispute. A new approach for carrying out case management and strict guidelines for completion of the process has been introduced so that the adjudicatory process is not delayed. I have referred to the various provisions of the Act and the Schedule bringing in amendments brought to the Civil Procedure Code to deal with the commercial disputes, only to highlight that the trial of the commercial dispute suits is put on fast track for disposal of the suits expeditiously. Various provisions of the Act referred to above and the amendments inserted to the Civil Procedure Code by the Schedule is to ensure speedy resolution of the commercial disputes in a time bound manner. The Intent of the legislature seems to be to have a procedure which expedites the disposal of commercial disputes and thus creates a positive environment for Investment and development and make India an attractive place to do business. 36. A perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code and insertion of new rules to the Code applicable to suits of commercial disputes show that It has been enacted for the purpose of providing an early disposal of high value commercial disputes. A purposive interpretation of the Statement of Objects and Reasons and various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code leaves no room for doubt that the provisions of the Act reguire to be strictly construed. If the provisions are given a liberal interpretation, the object behind constitution of Commercial Division of Courts viz. putting the matter on fast track and speedy resolution of commercial disputes, will be defeated. If we take a closer look at the Statement of Objects and Reasons, words such as “early” and “speedy” have been incorporated and the Commercial Court/Commercial case 1 21 reiterated. The object shall be fulfilled only if the provisions of the Act are interpreted in a narrow sense and not hampered by the usual procedural delays plaguing our traditional legal system. 42. The object and purpose of the establishment of Commercial Courts, Commercial Divisions and Commercial Appellate Divisions of the High Court is to ensure that the cases involved in commercial disputes are disposed of expeditiously, fairly and at reasonable cost to the litigants. Keeping In view the object and purpose of the establishment of the Commercial Courts and fast tracking procedure provided under the Act, the statutory provisions of the Act and the words incorporated thereon are to be meaningfully Interpreted for quick disposal of commercial litigations so as to benefit the litigants especially those who are engaged in trade and commerce which in turn will further economic growth of the country. On the above reasonings, I agree with the conclusion arrived at by my esteemed Brother A. S. Bopanna, J. ” 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jaycee Housing Private Limited and Others Vs. Registrar (General), Orissa High Court, Cuttack and Others ; (2023) 1 see 549 had also spelt out the objects and reasons of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 at Para No.24 and relevant Para Nos.27 to 29 are usefully extracted hereunder: “24. Thus, the Objects and Reasons of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is to provide for speedy disposal of the commercial disputes which includes the arbitration proceedings. To achieve the said Objects, the legislature in its wisdom has specifically conferred the jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters as per Section 10 of the 2015 Act. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the 2015 Act is the Act later in time and therefore when the 2015 Act has been enacted, more particularly Sections 3 & 10, there was already a provision contained in Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act. As per settled position of law, it is to be presumed that while enacting the subsequent law, the legislature is conscious of the provisions of the Act prior in time and therefore the later Act shall prevail. 27. If the submission on behalf of the appellants that all applications/appeals arising out of arbitration under the provisions of the 1996 Act, other than the International commercial arbitration, shall lie before the Principal Civil Court of a district, in that case, not only the Objects and Reasons of enactment of the 2015 Act and establishment of Commercial Courts shall be frustrated, even Sections 3, 10 & 15 shall become otiose and nugatory. 22 28. If the submission on behalf of the appellants is accepted, in that case, though with respect to other commercial disputes, the applications or appeals shall lie before the Commercial Courts established and ^^nsMuted under Section 3 of the 2015 Act, with respect the applications or appeals Pr/A7c/pa/ Civil Court of a district There cannot be two fora with respect to different commercial 29. Under the circumstances . - notification issued by the State of Odisha issued in consultation with the High Court the Court of learned rnJff designated as Commercial Court to decide the applications or appeals arising out of arbitration under the provisions of the 1996 Act cannot be said to be illegal and bad in law. On the contrary the same can be said to be absolutely in consonance with Sections 3 & 10 of the 2015 Act. M/e are in complete Ifreejnen the view [Jaycee Housing (R) 3R33uJu n t On 3833] taken by the High Court holding so. 25. Learned Single Judge of the High Court Represented by its Managing Partner, ‘ Kumar Agarwal; 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 1612 two Judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Division Court of Delhi and Hon’ble High Court of ‘ the final decrees emanating from the Commercial executed by resorting Section 47 and Order XXI i " & 23 of the said Judgment are usefully extracted hereunder; of Kerala in Karthik Exports, S. Vijayan and Others Vs. Krishna while placing the reliance on Bench that is Hon’ble High Gujarat had categorically held that Court circuit can only be of CPC, 1908. Para Nos. 19 19. In Delhi Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. V. Him Girt Realtors Pvt. Ltd, [2021 SCC OnLine a similar issue came before the Division Bench Bench held as follows: Pvt. Del 3603], and the Division "35. "Dispute" is defined as a disagreement or argument between two people. "Application" is defined as a formal written request. 36. It is not as if on adjudication of a dispute, resulting h a judgment/decree of a Court or award of Tribunal, the "dispute" between the end or nothing remains to be adjudicated between parties in an Arbitral parties comes to an the Section 47 of the CPC, Execution" itself in this respect provides that all in Part-ll titled 23 questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. It is evident therefrom that a judgment or a decree of the Court or the award of an Arbitral Tribunal, do not put an end to the “dispute” between the parties and it is not as if execution is merely an administrative task, with no adjudication involved. It would be incongruous to hold that the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions extends only to the adjudication of commercial disputes till the stage of adjudication and not to adjudication of commercial disputes arising in the course of execution. Once it is so, the word “dispute” in Section 2(1)(c) would extend to adjudication of disputes arising during execution of arbitral awards subject whereof falls within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts Act and the Commercial Court and Commercial Division would also have jurisdiction over the. applications for execution of arbitral awards of a specified value, subject matter whereof lA/as a commercial dispute. 37. There is another aspect. A claimant in a dispute is not interested merely in adjudication thereof The claimant is interested In delivery to him, of what he claims to be due and what has been adjudicated to be due to him from the opposite party. The Commercial Courts Act, as laid down in HPL (India) Ltd. supra also, was enacted to provide for speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes and their early resolution. The resolution of a commercial dispute is not complete, till the fruit thereof is in the hands of whosoever is found to be entitled thereto. Supreme Court also recently in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 341 has lamented on the troubles of the decree holder, in not being able to enjoy the fruits of litigation on account of inordinate delay caused during the process of execution of the decree and has referred to the observations in a judgment of 1872 vintage of the Privy Council in the General Manager of the Raja Durbhungav. Maharaja Coomar Ramaput Singh, 1872 SCC OnLine PC 16, that the actual difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a decree. 24 This being the state of affairs, to hold that the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Division does extend to execution but ends with adjudication, would defeat the very purpose and object of the Commercial Courts Act i.e. of speedy disposal and resolution commercial disputes of a specified value. To hold that the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions would have jurisdiction over applications for execution judgment or decree or for enforcement of an arbitral award, subject matter whereof dispute, would in our opinion sound the death knell for the objective behind setting up of the Commercial Courts and the Commercial Divisions. 38. One of us (Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.) sitting singly, in Bayer Laboratories Ltd, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7410 also held that if the decree is of a Commercial Court, its execution will lie in a Commercial Court only and would not lie in an Ordinary Civil Court which has jurisdiction to entertain suits of a non-commercial nature and that an application or execution of a decree in a commercial suit would lie in a Commercial Court only. not of not of a was a commercial Intellectual Property GMBH V. Symed 39. Order XXI Rule 11(2) of the CPC provides that application’ for execution of a decree shall be in writing, signed and verified. Thus the CPC, in accordance wherewith an arbitral award is to be executed/enforced, envisages such execution to be by way of an ‘application’ and since the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions extends vide Sections 6 and 7 of the Commercial Courts Act extends, besides over suits, also over applications relating to commercial disputes, such jurisdiction would also every extend over execution applications. Similarly, in respect of arbitration matters subject matter whereof is a commercial dispute, the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions, vide Section 10(2) extends to ...all applications ....arising out of such arbitration”. Since “dispute” does not come to an end till what has been found due in arbitration to the claimant is in the hands of the claimant, an application for enforcement of the arbitral award arises from arbitration, within the meaning of Section 10(2) of the Commercial Courts Act Section 36 of the Arbitration Act provides for enforcement of the ■iV 25 arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the CPC, in the same manner as if It were a decree of the Court. Execution of a decree of the Court, per Section 38 of the CPC, has to be by the same Court which passed the decree. Since the jurisdiction over arbitrations subject matter whereof is a commercial dispute, is of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions, applying Section 38 of the CPC, the jurisdiction for enforcement of awards of arbitration subject matter whereof is a commercial dispute, has to be of the Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions. 40. The argument of the senior counsels for the judgment debtors, that Commercial Courts/Commercial Divisions do not have jurisdiction over executions because there is no specified value of the execution applications also stands negated vide Section 38 of the CPC which provides for jurisdiction for execution to be of the same Court which passed the decree. The “specified value” has been defined in Section 2(i) of the Commercial Courts Act, of the commercial dispute and an application for execution, as aforesaid, arises therefrom. 41. We are thus unable to accept the arguments of the senior counsels for the judgment debtors that the application for execution of an arbitral award subject matter whereof was a commercial dispute does not lie before the Commercial Court or the Commercial Division and lies before the ordinary original civil court and this appeal would thus not be governed by the provisions of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act.” 23. A Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Ultrabulk A/S; 2022 SCC OnLine Guj 2767; AIR 2022 Guj 69, held that the commercial courts have the jurisdiction to try and decide the execution application arising from the judgment and decree passed by the commercial courts. The relevant paragraphs read as follows: “6.6 When the execution is filed from the decree of commercial court, the ‘commercial dispute’ continues to exists. In the execution proceedings initiated to execute the decree of the commercial court, the characteristics of the ‘commercial dispute’ is not lost, ■. 26 rather the dispute continues in the same nature, that is the ‘commercial dispute’. 6.7 The jurisdiction of the commercial court under Section 6 of the Commercial Courts Act extend to try all suits and applications relating to commercial dispute of specified value. The word ‘specified value’ has been defined under Section 2(i) of the Commercial Courts Act. The word ‘applications’ under Section 6 would include execution applications and also proceedings relating to commercial dispute of specified value. The jurisdiction of the commercial court therefore necessarily extends to the execution application arising from the judgment and decree of the commercial court. 6.8 There remains hardly any substance in the submission that since the provisions relating to execution were not amended while amending certain provisions of CPC as per the Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act, the commercial court does not have the jurisdiction to try and decide the execution petitions. Merely because there is no provisions provisions to the amendment in relation to the execution brought about and certain other of CPC were amended to be applied commercial suits. It would not mean or imply that the commercial court does not have the execute. power to 6.9 In Morlays (B'Ham) Limited v. Roshanlal Ramsahai [AIR 1961 Bom 156], the Bombay High Court considered the words ‘as if’ used in Sub section (1) of Section 44A, CPC to observe that the words ‘as if are used to make the whole scheme of Order XXI applicable in respect of the execution of decrees of foreign court mentioned in Sub section (1). In other words, it can be said that when foreign decree is sought to Section 44A, CPC, the be executed under provisions relating to execution in CPC shall have a play together to be applied. Merely because while amending certain provisions of CPC as per the Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act, the provisions regarding execution are not touched, it would not mean or imply Vi 27 that the commercial court does not have the power to execute. 7, For the foregoing reasons and discussion, a clear position of law emerges that commercial court does have the jurisdiction to try and decide the execution applications arising from the judgment and decree passed by the commercial court. ” 26. In Ghan Shyam Das Gupta and Another Vs. Anant Kumar Sinha and Others : (1991) 4 SCO 379, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had made it clear that the Decree holders can only resort to execution under Order XXI of the CPC, 1908. Para No.8 is usefully extracted hereunder; 8. The principle as to when the High Court should exercise its special jurisdiction under Article 226 and when to refuse to do so on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy has been settled by a long line of cases. The remedy provided under Article 226 is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief before a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. As was observed in State of A.P. V. Chitra Venkata Rao[(1975) 2 SCC 557 : 1975 see (L&S) 349 : (1976) 1 SCR 521] the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory in nature and is not meant for correcting errors like an appellate court. In Thansingh Nathmal \/. A. Mazid, Supdt. of Taxes [(1964} 6 SCR 654 : AIR 1964 SC 1419] a case dealing with liability to pay sales tax, the appellants without following the statutory remedy under the Sales Tax Act, moved the High Court under Article 226 on the ground that the Act was ultra vires. The challenge was rejected. Another contention, namely, that the finding of the Commissioner that the goods were actually within the State at the time of the contract was based on no evidence and was purely speculative, was also raised. This ground also failed before the High Court and the writ petition was dismissed. Approving the decision, this Court observed that if the appellants had pursued the statutory remedy under the Act and the guestion had been referred to the High Court, the Court could have appropriately advised the Commissioner, but not having done so, the High Court could not be asked to assume the role of an appellate court over the decision of the Commissioner either on a question of fact or even of law. Again when a learned Single Judge of the High Court and on appeal a Division Bench proceeded to examine the correctness of an order in relation to grant of a permit to ply a vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, it was observed by this Court In M. Naina Mohammed v. K.A. Natarajan [(1975) 2 28 hnhfhfr in nature and the Judges at fatal errnZf clipped into the subtle but the nZt^ ^ ^ of appellate review. So far ctj PrZedZeTnT^^'‘'^^ ^ concerned, the provisions fZ Z l^ Z" elaborate and exhaustive provisions for dealing with it in all its asoert^ Th^ nurnerous rules of Order XXI of the Code different situations, providing effective remedies not onlv to judgment-debtors and decree-holdpr<i hut a/o / clein^ent objectors as tbe caseZy bfZan eLeZnal case where prowsions are rendeZ incapZZofTZg relief to an aggrieved party in adequate measure and cZZneVrZ'^ = 4«/a. s~e Z court. The remedy under the Civil Procedure Code /9 nf uZeZoClZf^ ^ SeneZnyZlZ do heuer. t, will be. therefore. dmcZl finZa ZZehTeef ZnTlTrlZSy lleZtl take care of on 27. In the above premise, this Court i IS constrained ot hold that no direction consent Order can be given to the Official Respondents dated 04.04.2023 in COMCA No.28 of 2022 basing correspondence dated 23.05.2023 (Ex.P.8) the Managing Director of Respondent No to comply with the on the Inter-departmental and 06.02.2024 (Ex.P.7) between .1 and Respondent No.2. This Court a Decree rendered by the Commercial IS also constrained to hold that Court, can only be executed by a Decree Court under Section 38 and Order XXI even if it were to be a consensual decree, holder by approaching the Commercial of the CPC, 1908. 28. in View of the aforesaid findings, this Court is of the opinion that the present Writ Pet,t,on ,s devoid of any merit. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed. No Order as to Costs. f 29 29. Before parting this case, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court deems it appropriate to grant liberty to the Writ Petitioner to approach appropriate Forum. This Court further holds that the Writ Petitioner would be entitled for condonation of delay from the date of filing of the present Writ Petition till the date of uploading the copy of this Order on the Website of this Court for the purpose of execution if such Execution Petition is filed within 12 weeks from the date of uploading this Order on the website of this Court. 30. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order. Sd/- K J RAJA BABU ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER One fair copy to the HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD (For His Lordships Kind Perusal) To 1. One CC to Sri S. Rajan, Advocate [OPUC] 2. One CC to Ms. Jhansi Lakshmi, Advocate[OPUC] GP for Roads and Buildings, High Court of Andhra 3. Two CCs to Pradesh [OUT] 4. Two CCs to Pradesh [OUT] 5. 9 LR Copies 6. The Under Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi. 7. The Secretary, A.P. Advocates’ Association Library, High Court Buildings, Amaravathi. 8. Two CD Copies. GP for Finance and Planning, High Court of Andhra ssb HIGH COURT DATED:25/09/2025 ORDER WP No. 7827 OF 2024 g( I 7 OCT 2025 Cq urrentSecti# DISMISSING THE W.P. WITHOUT COSTS