1 2025:CGHC:20591-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 187 of 2024 1 - Naya Raipur Atal Nagar Vikas Pradhikaran Through Assistant Manager (Land), New Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Sumeet Kumar Agarwal S/o Ramchandra Agarwal Aged About 41 Years 2 - Vineet Agarwal S/o Ramchandra Agarwal Aged About 39 Years 3 - Smt. Nirmala Agrawal Wd/o Late Ramchandra Agrawal 4 - Neha Agarwal D/o Ramchandra Agarwal All R/o- 55, Nagar Nigam Colony, Bhais Sthan, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Collector, Raipur District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 6 - Land Acquisition Officer/sub Divisional Officer(R) Arang, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Nirnay Gupta, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 4 : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate For respondents No.5 & 6 Mr. Ajay Pandey, G. A. DB: Hon’ble Smt Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput Judgment On Board Per, Rajani Dubey, Judge 06.05.2025 1. Heard on I. A. No.2/2024, application for condonation of delay in filing of instant appeal. 2. Mr. Nirnay Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the 2 appellant has preferred this first appeal under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short “Act of 2013”) against the judgment and decree dated 19.07.2023 passed by the learned tribunal. After passing the impugned award dated 19.07.2023, the appellant/ Naya Raipur Atal Nagar Vikas Pradhikaran had filed a writ petition bearing WPC No.2516 of 2024 before this Court which was subsequently withdrawn, upon realizing that it was not the correct legal remedy available under the statute. The instant appeal filed by the appellant is barred by limitation and there is a delay of 291 days in filing of this appeal. The diligent efforts were made by the appellant to scrutinize the land registry documents. This process is crucial and required substantial time and efforts for discovery of significant discrepancy, particularly regarding stamp duties. The appellant is a Government instrumentality who is burdened with the departmental work and also having responsibilities of public welfare and therefore, it was not able to present the instant appeal within limitation period. It is further submitted that the appellant being a Government institution has to follow the necessary procedure to challenging the impugned order and also before authorizing to any person to move an appeal and due to this lengthy procedure there has been an inevitable delay in filing the instant appeal for which the appellant is sincerely apologetic and prays that this Court may condone the same. He further submits that huge public money is involved in this case, therefore, delay of 291 days is liable to be condoned. Reliance is placed on Hon’ble Apex Court decision dated 23.04.2025 passed in SLP (C) No.670/22 in the case of Suresh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. And other connect matters. 3. Learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 4 strongly opposes the prayer made by learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the appellant has filed the instant appeal under Section 74 of Act of 2013 challenging the judgment and decree dated 19.07.2023, this appeal has been filed on 15.07.2024 after delay of 3 291 days and no proper and satisfactory explanation has been given for the delay so caused. The appellant is taking the benefit of writ petition before this Court but that writ petition was filed on 03.05.2024 and the same was withdrawn on 25.06.2024 with liberty to file better constituted petition, no liberty was sought for filing the appeal under Section 74 of Act of 2013 and it appears from record that about 10 months from the date of passing of the award the said writ petition was filed. The admitted position in this case is that the award was passed on 13.01.2015, against this award preference was made by the respondents before the Tribunal on 05.04.2018 and the learned tribunal passed impugned award on 19.07.2023 against which, the instant appeal has been filed by the appellant on 04.07.2024 which is after about one year and looking to the provisions of Section 74 of Act of 2013 and guidelines issued by Apex Court and this Court, this application as well as the appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. 4. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court dated 03.09.2024 in the matter of State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Smt. Omlata Agrawal passed in FAM No.9 of 2024 and the case of Bombay High Court in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. Anusaya Sitaram Devrukhkar and Others reported in 2025 SCC Online Bom 36. 5. Learned counsel for State strongly opposes the prayer made by learned counsel for the appellant and submits that there is delay of 291 days in filing the instant appeal and no proper and satisfactory explanation has been given for the delay so caused. Therefore, in absence of sufficient cause, the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal deserves to be rejected. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record including the judgment impugned. 7. It is an admitted position in this case that the award was passed on 13.01.2015, against this award reference was made by the respondent before the Tribunal on 05.04.2018 and the learned tribunal passed the award on 19.07.2023 and this appeal is filed by the appellant on 04.07.2024. 4 8. Section 74 of Act of 2013 is reproduced herein-below:- “74. Appeal to High Court- (1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of the Award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is situated. 9. It is clear from this provision that the appeal can be preferred before the High Court within a period of 60 days from the date of award. It is further mentioned therein that the appellant was presented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period allowed it to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days. The legislature has provided specific time period for filing an appeal and it is also therein that the delay of further period of 60 days can be considered if there is a sufficient reason. This Court has also observed in FAM No.9/2024 in paras 9, 10, 11 & 15 as under:- “9. Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in the matter of State of Kerala Vs. Kool Foam Pvt. Ltd.; 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 863 observed in para 2 as under:- “2. Proviso to Section 74(1) of the Act is clear as to the maximum time, within which an appeal can be entertained by the High Court. Section 74(1) of the Act states that an appeal has to be filed within 60 days from the date of the award. Proviso states that the High Court may entertain the appeal if there is sufficient cause is shown beyond 60 days, provided, the appeal is filed within a further period of 60 days. That means, the maximum period, within which the appeal can be entertained by the High Court, is 120 days. Any appeal filed beyond. 120 days from the date of award cannot be entertained by the High Court as the High Court has no power to condone the delay 5 beyond 60 days after the expiry of 60 days reckoned from the date of award.” 10.Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others reported in (2010) 5 SCC 23 held in paras 24, 25, 26, 29 and 32 as under:- “24. Sections 111(1) and (2) lay down that any person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer or an appropriate Commission under this Act may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of 45 days from the date on which a copy of the order made by an adjudicating officer or the appropriate Commission is received by him. Section 111(5) mandates that the Tribunal shall deal with the appeal as expeditiously as possible and b endeavour to dispose of the same finally within 180 days from the date of receipt thereof. If the appeal is not disposed of within 180 days, the Tribunal is required to record reasons in writing for not doing so. 25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression "within a further period of not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. 26. The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate Commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Sections 111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Section 145) qua an 6 order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction. 29.Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is substantially similar to Section 125 of the Electricity Act came to be interpreted in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co; (2001) 8 SCC 470. The precise question considered in that case was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two-Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions in Mangu Ram v. MCD; (1976) 1 SCC 392, Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel; AIR 1964 SC 1099, Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra; (1974) 2 SCC 133, Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai; (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held: (Popular Construction Co. case2, SCC pp. 474-76, paras 12 & 16) "12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter’ used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. * * * 16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award ‘in accordance with’ sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application 'in accordance with’ that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that: ‘36. Enforcement- Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in 7 the same manner as if it were a decree of the court." This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to 'proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow' (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." (emphasis supplied) 32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory.” 11. This Court in the matter of The Superintendent Engineer Vs. ECI- Keystone passed in ARBA No. 51 of 2023 dated 10.06.2024 observed in paras 11 to 14 as under:- 11. For the sake of brevity the relevant part of Sections 31 (5) and 34(3) of the Act, 1996 are reproduced hereinunder:- 31. Form and contents of arbitral award.- XXX XXX XXX (5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.- XXX XXX XXX (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was 8 prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. 15.In light of above, it is clear that merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. Section 74 (1) of the Act provides maximum time period therefore, any appeal beyond 60 days from the date of award without reasonable cause for such delay cannot be entertained by the High Court as High Court has no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 60 days from the date of passing of the impugned award in absence of reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay.” 10. The award under challenge in this appeal was passed on 19.07.2023, thereafter instead of filing this appeal, the appellant herein challenged the said award by way of writ petition No.2516 of 2024 which however was subsequently withdrawn on 25.06.2024 with liberty to file better constituted petition. Since the award was passed on 19.07.2023 and this appeal has been filed on 04.07.2024, there appears to be a huge delay of 291 days. The appellant has also failed to satisfactorily explain as to why this inordinate delay occasioned in filing the appeal. In these circumstances, this Court does not find any ground to condone the delay and I. A. No.2, application for condonation of delay is hereby rejected. Consequently, the appeal also is liable for dismissal and it is held accordingly. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Judge Parul PARUL MITTAL Digitally signed by PARUL MITTAL Date: 2025.05.09 17:36:41 +0530