1 Judgment reserved on 25.08.2025 Judgment pronounced on 16.10.2025 Judgment uploaded on 16.10.2025 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 391 of 2024 State Of Chhattisgarh through Police Station Kuakonda, Distt. Dantewada (C.G.) ... Appellant versus Amit @ Avinash Tiwari S/o Kashi Prasad Tiwari Aged About 23 Years R/o Shanti Nagar, Jagdalpur, Police Station Bodhghat, Distt. Bastar (C.G.) ... Respondent For appellant : Shri HAPS Bhatia, Panel Lawyer For Respondent : Shri Rajendra Patel, Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) C A V judgment This appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 11.08.2017 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dantewada, District Dantewada, CG passed in Criminal Case No. 74/2016 acquitting the respondent/accused of the charge under Sections 304-A IPC and Sections 146/196, 130(3)/177 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. The facts in short: On 08.04.2014 at about 1:00 afternoon when complainant Joga Tati (PW-3) along with his niece Ku. Sukko (hereinafter 2 referred to as”deceased”) and her mother Baghari Tati (PW-2) were going to jungle for collecting firewood, respondent/accused came there riding motorcycle No. CG-03-1049 rashly and negligently and hit the deceased from behind causing injuries on her both feet, hands and chest. After this, deceased was taken to Kuankonda hospital for treatment. From there, she was referred to District Hospital, Dantewada where she breathed her last during treatment. FIR (Ex.P-3) came to be registered on the same day at the instance of PW-3 for the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC. After investigation, charge sheet was filed for the same offence as in the FIR. Charge however was framed under Sections 304-A IPC and Sections 146/196, 130(3)/177 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The respondent/accused denied the charges and claimed trial. 3. Prosecution examined 11 witnesses in support of its case. Statement of the respondent/accused under Section 313 CrPC was also recorded where he pleaded his innocence and false implication in the case. 4. Learned trial Court however by the impugned judgment acquitted the respondent/accused of the charge levelled against him. Hence this appeal by the State. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that though the scope of interference with the judgment of acquittal is very limited yet if the finding of the trial Court is perverse and not based on the proper appreciation of the evidence, the interference with the acquittal order can very well be made by this Court. He submits that the finding of acquittal in this case is quite erroneous as there are eyewitnesses to the incident who have spoken about the respondent/accused riding the offending motorcycle rashly and negligently causing an accident leading to the death of the deceased. He 3 submitted that the contradictions and omissions pointed out by the trial Court are minor in nature and therefore they cannot be made a basis for acquittal of the respondent/accused. It is thus submitted that looking to the evidence on record which eloquently speaks about the respondent/accused being responsible for causing the death of the deceased, the appeal may be allowed and the finding of acquittal may be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/accused supports the judgment impugned and submits that learned trial Court has arrived at the conclusion of acquittal after going through the evidence on record minutely, and being so, the well merited finding need not be interfered with. He further submits that it is a settled legal position that if the material available on record suggests two plausible views, the one favouring the accused has to be preferred, and being this also, the well reasoned judgment under challenge is not required to be interfered with. 7. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the evidence on record cautiously. 8. It has come in the evidence of Masaram (PW-1) who has stated that he knew the respondent/accused by face and by name. He has stated that riding the offending motorcycle rashly and negligently the respondent/accused had hit the deceased causing injuries to her which eventually resulted in her death in the hospital during treatment. He has further stated that the accused was under the influence of liquor and that in the offending motorcycle also the liquor was found to be kept. In cross examination, this witness is stated to have seen the incident from a distance of 50 meters and after that he had rushed to the spot. This witness is also stated to have accompanied the deceased to the hospital. Badhari Tati (PW-2) – the mother of the victim has 4 also stated that the accused driving the motorcycle at an excessively high speed and in a rash and negligent manner, came and hit the victim causing injuries on head and other parts of the body, who succumbed to the same during the course of treatment. Sukhram (PW-4) though is stated to have not seen the accident yet he had accompanied the victim to the hospital, and described the injuries on her body. According to this witness also, the respondent/accused was under the influence of liquor. He has stated that at the relevant time he was about 10-15 meter away from the spot and rushed thereto immediately after the accident had taken place. Bhima (PW-5) has also made almost similar statement as PW-4. Dr. D.R. Khoonte (PW-9) is the witness who conducted postmortem examination on the body of the victim and gave his report Ex. P-13 detailing the injuries on head, fracture of knee etc. Cause of death according to this witness was the head injury. Suraj Chouhan (PW-6) is the motor mechanic who had examined the motorcycle ridden by the accused/respondent and caused the accident in question. Vasudev Tiwari (PW-10) is the investigating officer who has duly supported the case of the prosecution. 9. The evidence discussed above thus goes to show that on the date of incident the respondent/accused was riding the motorcycle rashly and negligently and at an excessively high speed hitting the victim who was going to jungle on foot to collect the firewood. The impact of the accident was such that the victim suffered injuries on various parts of her body including head, which led to her death while taking treatment in the hospital. There is nothing on record that the accident occurred on account of any mechanical fault, rather it has come in the evidence of the witnesses that the accused was sway-riding the motorcycle. The finding of the trial Court that the prosecution 5 has not proved as to whether it was the respondent/accused who was riding the motorcycle, is absolutely misconceived and perverse because PW-1, PW- 2 and PW-3 and even other witnesses have stated that at the relevant time it was the accused who was riding the offending motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner. Likewise, the finding that the motorcycle has not been proved to be registered in the name of the accused is an absurd one particularly when it is established that it is the accused/respondent who was riding the motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner which caused the accident claiming the life of an innocent pedestrian. 10. Of course, the law as regards interference with the order of acquittal where the material on record gives rise to two plausible views is well settled that in such a situation the view favouring the accused has to be given preference, but what to do when the situation is just the reverse is the moot issue herein. The evidence on record in this case clearly goes to show that the respondent/accused was riding the motorcycle rashly and negligently. It is also evident that the deceased suffered number of injuries on her head, shoulders, cheek, knee etc. including fracture and succumbed to the same little later. Witnesses have stated that at the relevant time the deceased was going to the jungle on foot with her mother to collect firewood and at that time the accused/respondent came riding the motorcycle at an excessive speed and hit her causing injuries on various parts of her body. Thus there is ample material to show that the respondent/accused was rash and negligent while riding the motorcycle hitting the victim and causing injuries to her. Thus looking to the evidence on record, the finding of acquittal appears to be absolutely perverse. 11. The scope of interference with the order of acquittal has been dealt 6 with by the Supreme Court in the matter of Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1987 SC 1083 where it has been held that if the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is manifestly perverse, the same can be interfered with in appeal. Relevant portion of the said decision reads as under:- “6…What the High Court has done is to make an independent reappraisal of the evidence on its own and to set aside the acquittal merely on the ground that as a result of such re-appreciation, the High Court was inclined to reach a conclusion different from the one recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterized as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.” 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2023) 5 SCC 350 has considered the power of Appellate Court to interfere in the concurrent finding of fact and has held as under:- 7 “Normally, we do not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below. We step in only in exceptional cases or where gross errors are committed, overlooking crying circumstances and well established principles of criminal jurisprudence leading to miscarriage of justice. Hence it becomes our bounden duty to correct such findings in view of the principles enunciated in Ramaphupala Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1970) 3 SCC 474, Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 and Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat,(1983) 3 SCC 217.” 13. Thus from the above analysis it is evident that the acquittal of the respondent/accused from the charge under Section 304(A) IPC is not based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and is not a correct finding. Hence it is set aside. He is convicted for charge under Section 304 (A) of IPC. 14. So far as acquittal of accused respondent from charges under Sections 46/196 and 130(3)/177 of the Motor Vehicles Act is concerned, record reflect that a license was seized by the police. It is not reflect that a demand of insurance of motorcycle was made by the investigating officer or any effort was made by him to seized. His statement is also silent on this. Therefore, the acquittal of respondent/accused from the charges under Motor Vehicles Act is upheld. 15. Now the question is as to what would be the appropriate sentence which can be imposed on the respondent/accused. The record shows that the accused at the relevant time was in his early twenties, that throughout he remained on bail during trial and is not reported to have misused the liberty, that even after acquittal nothing adverse is reported to have been there against him. The objective of sentencing, as has been held by the Supreme Court on more than one occasions, should be reformative, curative and 8 rehabilitative enabling him to stand in the mainstream of the society, and not harsh, retributive having the element of avenge. The Supreme Court in the matter of Mohammad Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1977 SC 1926 has held as under:- “Western jurisdiction and socialists, from their own angle have struck a like note. Sir Samual Romily, critical of the brutal penalties in then Britain, said in 1817 : “The laws of England are written in blood”. Alfieri has suggested : ‘society prepares the crime, the criminal commits it. George Micodotis, Director of Criminological Research Centre, Athens, Greece, maintains that ‘Crime is the result of the lack of the right kind of education.’ It is the result of the lack of the right kind of education. It is thus plain that crime is a pathological aberration, that the criminal can ordinarily be redeemed, that the State has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The sub-culture that leads to anti-social behaviour has to be countered not by undue cruelty but by reculturisation. Therefore, the focus of interest in penology is individual, and goal is salvaging him for society. The infliction of harsh and savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times. The human today views sentencing as a process of reshaping a person who has deteriorated into criminality and the modern community has a primary stake in the rehabilitation of the offender as a means of social defense. We, therefore consider a therapeutic, rather than an in ‘terrorem’ outlook , should prevail in our criminal courts, since brutal incarceration of the person merely produces laceration of his mind. In the words of George Bernard Shaw : ‘ If you are to punish a man retributively, you must injure him. If you are not improved by injuries’. We may permit ourselves the liberty to quote from Judge Sir Jeoffrey Streatfield : ‘If you are going to have anything to do with the criminal courts, you should see for yourself the conditions under which prisoners serve their sentences.’” 16 Further, in the matter of Deo Narain Mandal v. State of UP reported in (2004) 7 SCC 257 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:- 9 “8. This brings us to the next question in regard to the reduction of sentence made by the High Court. In criminal cases awarding of sentence is not a mere formality. Where the statute has given the court a choice of sentence with maximum and minimum limit presented then an element of discretion is vested with the court. This discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily or whimsically. It will have to be exercised taking into consideration the gravity of offence, the manner in which it is committed, the age,the sex of the accused, in other words, the sentence to be awarded will have to be considered in the background of the fact of each case and the court while doing so should bear in mind the principle of proportionality. The sentence awarded should be neither excessively harsh nor ridiculously law.” 17. While determining the quantum of punishment various factors needs to be consider. Nature and gravity of offence, penalty provided for the offence, manner of commission of offence, proportionality between crime & punishment, character of the offender, age and sex of the offender, antecedents if any, possibility of reforms, impact of crime on society etc are some of the relevant consideration in determining the quantum of punishment. Court has to strike a balance between crime and punishment. Possibility of reform is an important mitigating factor while imposing appropriate sentence. Undue sympathy should not be given only because of long drawn pendency of criminal proceedings. 18. Having thus considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the fact that being in his early twenties at the time of incident the respondent/accused by now by now must be in the age loaded with liabilities, bearing the burden of family responsibilities, that during trial all throughout he remained on bail and not reportedly breached the said benefit, that even after acquittal by the trial Court nothing adverse against him has brought on record, and considering the fact that no minimum sentence has been 10 prescribed for the offence the accused has been convicted for, that statutorily the sentence of fine alone can serve the purpose, and keeping in mind the aforesaid judicial guidelines on sentence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the interest of justice would be met if the respondent/accused is imposed the sentence of fine alone. Being so, it is directed that the respondent/accused shall pay fine of Rs. 25,000/-, on default of which the respondent/accused shall undergo RI for one month and out of that Rs. 20,000/- shall be disbursed to the mother of the deceased namely Baghari Tati. 90 days time granted to respondent/accused to deposit the fine amount as awarded. 19. With this, the appeal thus stands partly allowed as indicated above. 20. Records of the trial Court be sent back along with copy of this judgment forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Jyotishi/pawan PAWAN KUMAR Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR Date: 2025.10.16 16:31:42 +0530