1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 87 of 2022 Reserved On 11/11/2025 Delivered On 17/12/2025 1 - Prabeer Kumar Rautray S/o Ratnakar Rautray, Aged About 57 Years R/o Qtr. No. 179/5, Railway Bangla Yard Colony, Bilaspur, Tahsil And, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Nalini Ranjan Mishra, S/o Brajmohan Mishra, Aged About 55 Years R/o Qtr. No. 104/1, Railway Colony, Raigarh, Tahsil And, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Kranti Singh W/o Shyam Narayan Singh Aged About 63 Years R/o Qtr. No. 927/b, New Construction Railway Colony, Tarbahar, Bilaspur, Tahsil And, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Smt. Dashmat Bai W/o Late Garib Das @ Surit Ram Chauhan, Aged About 76 Years R/o Opp. Paramount School, Lalkhhadan Road, Bilaspur, Tahsil And, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Ganga Bai W/o Late Lalla Singh Chauhan, Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Pousara, Tahsil And, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 3 - Dhannu, S/o Late Lalla Singh Chauhan, Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Pousara, Tahsil And, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Dhananjaya, S/o Late Lalla Singh Chauhan, Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Pousara, Tahsil And, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Dheeraj S/o Late Lalla Singh Chauhan Aged About 18 Years R/o Village Pousara, Tahsil And, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 6 - Palak, D/o Late Lalla Singh Chauhan Aged About 16 Years Minor, Through Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Ganga Bai, W/o Late Lalla Singh Chauhan, R/o Village Pousara, Tahsil And, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 7 - Shivendra Singh S/o Krishna Kumar Singh Aged About 49 Years Caste- Kshatri, R/o Village And Post Nariyara, P.S. Pamgarh, Tahsil Akaltara,, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 8 - Bihari Singh Chauhan, S/o Bedu Singh Chauhan Aged About 44 Years R/o Village Konargarh, Tahsil Pamgarh, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 9 - Sanjay Chauhan, S/o Pardeshi Chauhan Aged About 49 Years R/o Near Krishi Upaj Mandi, Bhatapara, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 10 - Mangal Singh, S/o Ganaram Satnami, Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Murlidih, Tahsil Akaltara,, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 11 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) 3 For Petitioner(s) : Mr. B. P. Sharma, Advocate and Mr. Vivek Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 6 : Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate. For Respondent Nos.8 & 9 : Mr. Virendra Verma, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent No.10 : Ms. Priyanka Rai, Advocate on behalf of Ms. Supriya Upasne, Advocate For Respondent No.11 : Mr. R. S. Marhas, Additional Advocate General (Division Bench) Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Order Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This matter was reserved on 11.11.2025 for order on I. A. No.01/2022 – an application for grant of leave to prefer appeal by the aggrieved persons. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submit that appellants persons are aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Learned Trial Court. The details of the suit property purchased by the appellants are as follows:- Sn. Name of the Appellant Date of sale deed Khasra No. Area (Portion of suit land) 01 Prabeer Kumar Rautray 04.02.2021 From 1156/1 0.05 Acres (2303 Sq. ft.) 02 Nalini Ranjan Mishra 04.02.2011 From 1156/1 0.11 Acres (4819 Sq. ft.) 4 03 Smt. Kranti Singh 17.06.2011 From 1156/1 1981 Sq. ft. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants respectfully submit that after the purchase of their respective portions of the suit land, their names were duly mutated in the revenue records and they have remained in continuous possession thereof. The plaintiffs had earlier executed a power of attorney dated 02.01.2010 in favour of Respondent No.8/defendant No.2, a close relative, who, acting as their lawful attorney, executed a registered sale deed dated 29.01.2010 in favour of Respondent No.7/defendant no.1, pursuant to which the latter’s name was also duly mutated without objection and he entered into possession. 4. Thereafter, Respondent No.7/defendant no. 1 validly sold different portions of the suit property, being parts of Khasra No. 1156/1, to the present appellants through registered sale deeds dated 04.02.2011, 04.02.2011 and 17.06.2011, and upon due mutation, new Khasra numbers 1156/4, 1156/5 and 1156/6 were recorded in the names of the appellants, who have since been in peaceful possession and have also developed the land by constructing houses/boundaries after its diversion. However, despite being fully aware that the suit property had been sold in separate parcels to various purchasers including the appellants, the plaintiffs/Respondents Nos.1 to 6 instituted Civil Suit No. 22-A/2018 on 19.02.2018 seeking a declaration that the sale deed 5 dated 29.01.2010 was null and void, but deliberately omitted to implead the appellants, who are necessary and affected parties. The plaintiffs filed the suit relying only on old revenue records, and Respondent Nos.7 to 9/defendants Nos.1 to 3, acting in collusion, suppressed the material fact of subsequent transfers and failed to take proper defence, resulting in an ex-parte decree dated 23.03.2020 being passed behind the appellants’ back. 5. The appellants remained unaware of the decree until January 2022, when the Tahsildar issued notices pursuant to an application filed by the plaintiffs for correction of revenue records in furtherance of the said decree, whereupon the appellants inspected the relevant records, obtained certified copies, and promptly approached this Court after obtaining legal advice. The respondents are now attempting to take forcible possession of the land on the strength of the impugned decree, causing serious prejudice to the appellants who have acquired valid title upon payment of full consideration. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hardevinder Singh v. Paramjit Singh & Ors. , (2013) 9 SCC 261 , which authoritatively holds that a person who is adversely affected by a decree may file an appeal even if not a party to the original suit. In the present case, the impugned decree gravely affects the appellants’ rights, title, and possession, and the conduct of Respondent No.7 to 9/defendants Nos. 1 to 3 clearly demonstrates collusion. Thus, the appellants, 6 being aggrieved persons, are entitled to challenge the decree to protect their legal and constitutional rights, failing which irreparable loss would be caused and multiplicity of litigation encouraged. 6. Therefore, leaned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants most humbly pray that this Court kindly be pleased to grant leave to file the accompanying first appeal against the judgment and decree dated 23.03.2020 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 22-A/2018, in the interest of justice. 7. To further fortify their submissions, learned counsel for the appellants have placed reliance upon several pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. They have drawn attention to Amit Kumar Shaw & Anr. Vs. Farida Khatoon & Anr. reported in (2005) 11 SCC 403; Swami Shankaranand (dead) by Lrs. Vs. Mahant Sri Sadguru Sarnanand & Ors. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 642; V.N Krishna Murthy & nrs. Vs. Ravikumar & Ors. reported in (2020) 9 SCC 501 and lastly, reliance is placed upon Gian Chand And Brothers & Anr. Vs. Rattan lal Alias Rattan Singh reported in (2013) 2 SCC 606. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents No. 1 to 6 respectfully submits that the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants challenging the judgment and decree dated 7 23.03.2020 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 22-A/2018. The appellants have also moved an application seeking leave of this Hon’ble Court to prefer the appeal on the ground that they had purchased portions of the suit property from Respondent No. 7, Shivendra Singh, who, in turn, had purportedly purchased the very same property from defendant Bihari Singh on the basis of a Power of Attorney alleged to have been executed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had instituted the original suit seeking a declaration that the Power of Attorney dated 02.01.2010 and the consequential sale deed dated 29.01.2010 executed in favour of Respondent No. 7 were null and void. Upon due appreciation of evidence, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit on 23.03.2020. The appellants contend that they had purchased the property from Shivendra Singh prior to institution of the suit, that their names were duly mutated in the revenue records, and that since they were not impleaded as defendants in the suit, they could neither defend their interest nor resist the decree. They further allege that the other defendants acted in collusion with the plaintiffs, enabling the decree to be passed behind their back. 9. Respondents No. 1 to 6 submit that the appellants’ reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hardevinder Singh v. Paramjit Singh & Ors. , (2013) 9 SCC 261 , is wholly misplaced and distinguishable on facts as well as in law. The present suit 8 specifically pertained to a declaration that the Power of Attorney dated 02.01.2010 was obtained by fraud. It was the categorical case of the plaintiffs that defendant No. 2, Bihari Singh, deceitfully procured the signature of plaintiff Dashmat Bai under the pretext of preparing a ration card, and instead fabricated a forged Power of Attorney on the strength of which the subsequent sale deed dated 29.01.2010 in favour of Respondent No. 7 was executed. The learned Trial Court, after analysing the entire evidence, rightly held that the Power of Attorney had been procured by fraud and was a forged and fabricated document, and therefore non est in the eye of law. Once the authority itself was void, the consequential sale deed dated 29.01.2010 was rendered wholly illegal and incapable of conferring any title upon Shivendra Singh. Thus, the foundation of the appellants’ alleged claim stands demolished. 10. The appellants have pleaded that they purchased the property from Shivendra Singh and that their names were mutated in the revenue records. However, the documents appended by them as Annexure A-2 fail to establish their claim. The mutation orders filed pertain only to appellants Prabir Kumar Rautray and Smt. Nalini Ranjan Mishra, dated 09.12.2016, whereas no mutation order pertaining to appellant Smt. Kranti Singh has been filed. The revenue record placed on record shows that the mutation in favour of Smt. Kranti Singh was passed only on 04.01.2019, 9 thereby creating material inconsistencies in the appellants’ claim. The documents relied upon by the appellants thus fall far short of substantiating their assertion of valid title or long-standing possession. 11. It is further submitted that the appellants’ contention that the impugned judgment and decree were passed behind their back is untenable in law. The basis of their alleged title itself is the sale deed dated 29.01.2010, which has already been declared void by a competent Court. Once the root of title is extinguished, no right, title, or interest survives in favour of any subsequent purchaser claiming through such void deed. It is well settled that a person cannot acquire a better title than that of his vendor, and since Shivendra Singh was held to possess no title, he could not have conveyed anything to the appellants. The decree dated 23.03.2020 has attained finality between the parties to the suit, none of whom have chosen to challenge it. The appellants, being strangers to the title and claiming under a void document, possess no statutory right to assail the well-reasoned decree of the learned Trial Court. 12. The allegation of collusion between defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and the plaintiffs is equally devoid of merit. No such plea was ever raised or adjudicated before the learned Trial Court, nor does any judicial finding support this belated allegation. A bald assertion, made for the first time in appellate proceedings, cannot be 10 accepted in the absence of specific pleadings, documentary support, or any finding by the Court of first instance. 13. The appellants’ further contention that denial of leave to appeal would deprive them of their legal rights and lead to multiplicity of proceedings also lacks substance. They may be entitled, if so advised, to pursue any independent remedy available under law, but they cannot maintain the present appeal against a decree which does not bind them and in which they have no recognized locus to challenge the findings on title. The present attempt to reopen a decree passed on cogent findings is nothing but an impermissible collateral attack under the guise of seeking leave to appeal. He further places reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of R. Rathinavel Chettiar & Anr. Vs. Sivaraman & Ors. decided on 31.03.1999. 14. In light of the above submissions, it is respectfully submitted that the application filed by the appellants seeking leave to prefer the present appeal is wholly devoid of merit, misconceived in law, and deserves to be dismissed with costs. 15. We have listened to the learned counsel representing the parties and scrutinized the documents placed on record with careful attention. 11 16. In the aforesaid suit, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant No.1/respondent No.7, Shivendra Singh, had procured a power of attorney by committing fraud upon them, and upon discovering the said fraud, they cancelled the power of attorney which had been fraudulently obtained. It was further pleaded that respondent No.7/defendant No.1 had no lawful authority to execute the sale deed dated 29.01.2010 in his own favour, as the power of attorney dated 02.01.2010 had already been revoked. Though Shivendra Singh was impleaded as a party to the civil suit, he chose not to appear and was proceeded ex parte. Upon due appreciation of evidence, the Trial Court concluded that defendant No.2 had executed a forged power of attorney and that the subsequent sale deed dated 29.01.2010 executed in favour of respondent No.7/defendant No.1 was based on an invalid and unlawful power of attorney. Accordingly, the Trial Court held that both the power of attorney dated 02.01.2010 and the sale deed dated 29.01.2010 were not in accordance with law. 17. The present appellants were not parties to the proceedings before the Trial Court. They contend that they have purchased the suit property from defendant No.1/respondent No.7 and have constructed residential houses thereon. However, as they were neither impleaded nor afforded an opportunity of hearing, they assert that they are necessary and proper parties whose rights stand directly affected by the findings of the Trial Court. They have 12 therefore preferred the present appeal along with an application seeking leave, submitting that the matter ought to be remitted to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication after granting them an opportunity to be heard and after considering the pleadings and evidence of all concerned parties. 18. Upon consideration, it is noted that respondent No.7 was a party before the Trial Court, as was Virendra Singh Chouhan, who purportedly executed the sale deed in favour of respondent No.7 on the strength of the disputed power of attorney. For reasons best known to respondent No.7/defendant No.1, he remained absent and was proceeded ex parte during the trial. 19. Defendant No.2, Bihari Singh Chouhan, filed his written statement and adduced evidence; however, during trial it emerged that the power of attorney in question was not duly executed and appeared to be a concocted document. Since defendant No.1/respondent No.7 elected not to contest the proceedings, the subsequent purchasers claiming through him cannot be placed in a position superior to that of Shivendra Singh himself. 20. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri V. N. Krishna Murthy & Anr. v. Sri Ravi Kumar & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 2701– 2704 of 2020, decided on 21 August 2020, has categorically held that a judgment rendered in an appeal in which a person was not a party is not binding upon such non-party, and a mere assertion 13 that their rights are prejudicially affected is insufficient to confer appellate rights. In the present case, the appellants’ vendor elected not to appear before the Trial Court and allowed the matter to proceed ex parte. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court is not a decree in rem, but one binding only between the plaintiffs and the defendants to the suit. 21. The present appellants, who were admittedly not parties before the Trial Court, are at liberty to initiate independent legal proceedings to safeguard their interests. As they neither participated in the suit nor filed any written statement, granting leave to appeal would serve no useful purpose. The proper course available to them is to institute a separate suit before the competent Trial Court. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of V. N. Krishna Murty & Anr. Vs. Ravikumar & Ors. reported in (2020) 9 SCC 501 has held and relevant paragraphs are as under :- “10. The High Court while dismissing the application made by the appellants seeking leave to appeal has observed that: (Karnataka Khadi Gramodyog case [Karnataka Khadi Gramodyog v. Ravi Kumar, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3086] , SCC OnLine Kar para 7) “7. It is true that the trial court has granted a very peculiar declaratory relief which in my opinion the plaintiffs in the suit 14 could have set up by way of defence, had they been sued by the Housing Society for specific performance. Be that as it may, all the applicants/appellants claim to be in possession of their respective sites on the strength of the sale deeds executed by the general power-of-attorney holders of the owners of the lands. What is stated is that the agreements of sale were executed in favour of the Housing Society and that power of attorney was executed in favour of some persons who are office-bearers of the Housing Society. If this is the position, I think that the applicants/appellants do have an independent right which they appear to have derived on the basis of the sale deeds executed by the owners of the land. It may be a fact that the sale deeds were executed by the power-of-attorney holders of the owners, but in reality those sale deeds were executed by the owners of the land and, therefore, it can be said that the nature of declaratory relief granted by the trial court in the suits does not affect the interest of the applicants/appellants.” The High Court further went on to observe that: (SCC OnLine Kar para 7) “7. if they are in possession of the sites purchased by them, they have to protect their possession by filing independent suits. I do not think they have a remedy by filing an appeal challenging the judgment in the suit.” 15 11. The learned counsel for the appellants argues before us that the interest of the appellants is directly involved in the subject-matter of the suit. They have become absolute owners of the sites in question on the basis of sale deeds. The judgment of the trial court holding the sale agreements time-barred and granting a decree of permanent injunction actually affects their interests as they are in possession of the suit property. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that the claim of the appellants herein is based on the sale deeds executed on the strength of the general power of attorney executed by the recorded owners of the suit property. There is neither any reference of the sale deeds in the suit nor the sale deeds refer to any agreement to sell. Therefore, the relief claimed, if any, by the appellants based on sale deeds in their favour is entirely different, and there is no locus to challenge the decree passed by the trial court and their application for leave to appeal has rightly been dismissed. 13. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 14. In the backdrop of above facts, the question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the appellants held the locus to question the judgment and decree passed 16 by the trial court and whether the High Court was justified in rejecting their leave to appeal. 15. Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal, respectively. The aforesaid provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court. Reference be made to the observation of this Court in Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd. [Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 573] : (SCC p. 575, para 3) “3. … It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment.” 16. This Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh [State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 70] while dealing with the maintainability of appeal by a person who is not party to a suit has observed thus: (SCC p. 104, para 83) 17 “83. Firstly, there is a catena of authorities which, following the dictum of Lindley, L.J., Securities Insurance Co., In re [Securities Insurance Co., In re, (1894) 2 Ch 410 (CA)] have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it.” 17. In Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma [Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma, (2003) 1 SCC 34] , this Court held that an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, would be maintainable only at the instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree. While dealing with the concept of person aggrieved, it was observed in para 15 as under: (SCC pp. 39-40) “15. … A person aggrieved to file an appeal must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned.” 18. In A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P. [A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., (2011) 7 SCC 616 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 851 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 267] this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 628-29, para 25) “25. … The expression “aggrieved person” denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within 18 the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which the contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and the extent of the complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.” 19. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised (vide Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York [Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387] and State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592] ). 20. In K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. State of Madras [K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. State of Madras, 1952 SCC OnLine Mad 300 : (1953) 66 LW 136] , this Court laid down the test to find out when it would be proper to grant leave to appeal to a person not a party to a proceeding against the decree or judgment passed in such proceedings in the following words: (SCC OnLine Mad) “Now, what is the test to find out when it would be proper to grant leave to appeal to a person not a party to a 19 proceeding against the decree or judgment in such proceedings? We think it would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment. We think that ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.” 21. Applying the above tests, we are of the considered opinion that the appellants can neither be said to be aggrieved persons nor bound by the judgment and decree of the trial court in any manner. The relief claimed in the suit was cancellation of agreement to sell. On the other hand, the sale deeds which were the basis of the claim of the appellants were executed on the basis of general power of attorney, and had nothing to do with the agreement to sell which was subject-matter of the suit. The judgment and decree of the trial court is in no sense a judgment in rem and it is binding only as between the plaintiffs and the defendants of the suit, and not upon the appellants.” 23. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in H. Anjanappa & Others v. A. Prabhakar & Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 183, has observed in paragraph 43 as follows, which is reproduced herein below: 20 "43. The principles governing the grant of leave to appeal may be summarised as under: i. Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC respectively provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or decree in appeal respectively; ii. The said provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal; iii. However, it a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the court that he falls within the category of an aggrieved person; iv. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the court; v. A person aggrieved, to file an appeal, must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned; vi. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; vii. It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment; and viii. Ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.” 24. In light of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the present appellants, who have filed the application for grant of leave, were not parties before the concerned Trial Court. They did not participate in the suit proceedings and did not file any written statement; consequently, the impugned judgment is not binding upon them. 21 They are not bound by the judgment and decree passed in the said proceedings and are not precluded from challenging its correctness in any other appropriate proceedings. They are, therefore, entitled to initiate separate proceedings for the redressal of their grievances. 25. In view of the foregoing discussion, no merit is found in the application seeking leave to appeal. Consequently, I.A. No. 01/2022 — an application for grant of leave to prefer an appeal by the proposed appellants, is hereby dismissed. 26. Accordingly, in view of the above nothing is required for further adjudication. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Saxena The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website. 11/11/2025 17/12/2025 Operative Full 17/12/2025 17/12/2025 ABHIGYA SAXENA Digitally signed by ABHIGYA SAXENA