- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 520 OF 2025 (DEC/INJ) BETWEEN: 1. SMT. RATHNAMMA W/O LATE POOJAR NINGAPPA, SINCE DEAD BY LRS CHANNAMMA W/O LATE HANUMANTHAPPA SINCE DEAD BY LRS. SHIVAKUMARA S/O HANUMANTHAPPA, AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, 2. AKSHAY KUMAR S/O HANUMANTHAPPA, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, APPELLANTS NO.1 AND 2 BOTH ARE AGRICULTURISTS AND RESIDENTS OF KONDAJJI VILLAGE, HARIHARA TALUK - 577 589. 3. USHA W/O BASAVARAJA D/O HANUMANTHAPPA, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, HOUSE MAKER 4. P. NAGARAJA S/O LATE POOJARI NINGAPPA AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, Digitally signed by SHARADAVANI B Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 AGRICULTURIST APPELLANTS NO.3 AND 4 ARE R/O. SHAMANUR VILLAGE, DAVANAGERE TALUK. 5. P. MEENAKSHI D/O LATE POOJARI NINGAPPA, AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS, HOUSE MAKER R/O K.B. EXTENSION, DAVANAGERE - 577 002 6. P. BASAVARAJAPPA S/O LATE POOJARI NINGAPPA, AGRICULTURIST AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, R/O. SHAMANUR VILLAGE, DAVANAGERE TALUK - 577 004. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. REVANNA BELLARY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. CHAITRA, W/O CHANNABASAPPA, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, HOUSE MAKER, R/O SHAMANUR VILLAGE, DAVANAGERE TALUK - 577 004. 2. S.G. VEDAMURTHY, S/O S.G. PARAMESHWARAPPA, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS, AGRICULTURIST, 3. GIRIJAMMA, W/O HANUMATHAPPA, AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, HOUSE MAKER - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 RESPONDENTS NO.1 TO 3 ARE R/O SHAMANUR VILLAGE, DAVANAGERE TALUK - 577 004. 4. JAYASHEELA, D/O S.G.PARAMESHWARAPPA, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, HOUSE MAKER R/O AJJIHALLI, CHANNAGIRI TALUK - 577 213 DAVANAGERE DISTRICT. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SANATH KUMAR SHETTY, ADVOCATE) THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SEC.100 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 11.02.2025 PASSED IN RA NO.66/2023 ON THE FILE OF III ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, DAVANAGERE., DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER AND DECREE DATED 27.02.2023 PASSED ON IA NO.XV IN OS NO.515/2020 ON THE FILE OF 2ND ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, DAVANAGERE. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA ORAL JUDGMENT Heard Sri.Revanna Bellary, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri.Sanath, learned counsel for caveators/ respondent Nos.2 and 3. 2. Unsuccessful plaintiff is the appellant challenging the rejection of the plaint in O.S.No.515/2010 which was confirmed in RA No.66/2023. 3. Facts in brief which are utmost necessary for disposal of the present appeal are as under: 3.1. A suit for declaration and injunction and cancellation of the sale deed came to be filed in O.S.No.515/2010 challenging the sale deed executed in the year 2002 by the plaintiff and others. 3.2. In the suit, defendant No.2 filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a to d) for rejection of the plaint primarily on the ground of limitation. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 4. Learned Trial Judge after entertaining the objections filed by the plaintiff by order dated 27.02.2023 rejected the plaint inter alia holding in paragraph Nos.11 to 16 as under: “11. The suit schedule property is a temple inam land granted to the deceased Pujari Ningappa, the husband of plaintiff Nof.1 and father of plaintiff No.2 to 4. Hence, for the purpose of selling the said land prior permission of the Deputy Commissioner is mandatory. Since neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants have not obtained permission from the Deputy Commissioner, the sale deeds are illegal. At the time of registration of the sale deed, the plaintiff No.4 was minor. If at all there is necessity to sell the land standing in the name of plaintiff No.4 it is mandatory to obtain the permission from the court. If the defendants are having intention of purchasing the land they could have obtained the permission from the court, which prima facie shows that, the sale deed is nominal for the purpose of security of the loan amount. If at all the defendants get executed the absolute sale deeds, they could have get changed the khata into their names. But till date, the suit schedule properties are standing in the name of plaintiffs, which shows that, the sale deeds are nominal. Because of the suit filed by the divorced wife of Pujari Ningappa when the plaintiffs asked the loan to the defendant No.1 and 2 for repayment of loan obtained for performance of marriage of plaintiff No.3 and 4, the defendant No.1 and 2 asked for execution of the registered sale deeds for the purpose of security. Hence, the sale deeds are nominal one. The plaintiffs being need of money for the repayment of loan and to perform the marriage of plaintiff No.3 in the year 2003, have mortgaged the land by executing the sale deeds on 19/12/2002 by obtaining loan of - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 Rs.6,00,000/-. On the said day itself, the defendant No.1 has executed an agreement in favour of plaintiff No.1, 2 and 4 submitting that, he will reconvey the lands under the said sale deeds after repayment of the loan. The defendants having money and mussel power have caused interference with the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land in the year 2004. Hence, the cause of action arised to the plaintiffs from the date of execution of the nominal sale deeds i.e., 19/12/2002, interference caused by the defendnats in the year 2004 and in the 3rd week of July 2010, when the defendants refused to executison of the reconveyance deed as per the request of the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit is within the limitation. 12. On going through the plaint, it appears that, the plaintiffs have contended that, since the suit properties are temple inam lands granted in favour of the Pujari Ningappa, execution of sale deed without obtianing the prior permission of the Deputy Commissioner is illegal. No doubt, the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 prohibits transfer of regranted land within a period of 15 days from the date of commnecement of Sec.1 and Sec.7(a) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1978, the said provisions have come into effect from 07/8/1978 and the period of 15 years was till the year 1993. But the sale deeds sought for the cancellation by the plaintiffs are Dt:19/12/2002. So as on the date of execution of the alleged sale deeds Sec.5(3) and 7(A) of the said Act was not in force. Further it is hereby clarified that, the said act has been amended in the year 2003 by Act No.22/2003 vide Gazette Notifacation Dt: 9th May 2003. Hence the transfer of regranted lands made from 1993 to 9th May, 2003 are not subjected for prohibition from the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Hence the contention of the plaintiffs in this regard is not sustainable. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 13. Further it is the case of the plaintiffs that, as on the date of execution of the alleged sale deed, the defendant No.4 was the minor and no permission has been obtained from the court to alienate the land fallen to his share. Hence, the sale deeds are liable to be cancelled. It is worth to note here that, the said sale deeds are Dt:19/12/2002 and as per alleged sale deed i.e., Ex.P1 to Ex.P3, the age of plaintiff No.4 as on 19/12/2002 was 17 years. He has attained the majority in the year 2003. As per Article 60(a) of the Limitation Act, the limitation for filing the suit by the minor is 3 years after attaining the majority. Article 60(a) of Limitation Act is reproduced herein: Article 60 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years for setting aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward, by the ward who has attained majority and the period is to be computed from the date when the ward attains majority. 14. So the plaintiff No.4 who attend the majority in the year 2004 ought to have filed the suit within the year 2007. Futher as contended by the plaintiffs themselves the plaintiff No.1, 2 and 4 have filed the suit as against the defendants in OS No.255/2004 for the relief of permanent injunction, which means that, the plaintiff No.4 was having knowledge about the alleged sale deeds in the year 2004 itself. So the contention of the plaintiffs regarding obtaining permission from the concerned court prior to execution of the sale deed in respect of property purchased pertaining to the plaintiff No.4 is not sustainable. 15. Further the contention of the plaintiffs regarding not changing of the khata of the suit lands in the names of defendants is unworthy to accept, because change of khata based on the registered documents is the duty of the revenue authority based on the 'J' form issued by the registering authority. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 16. Further the plaintiffs contended that, the defendant No.1 has executed an agreement acknowleding that the sale deeds are executed as security to the loan amount and he will reconvey the suit schedule properties in favour of the plaintiffs upon repayment of the loan amount of Rs.6,00,000/-. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in RFA No. 828/2009 decided on 20th January 2015 by relying upon the Judgment reported in AIR 1971 S.C 751 held that, the document which varies the essential terms of an existing registered deed must be registered. Further the Hon'ble High Court by referring the case reported (2008) 8 SCC 564 it is held that, if a document inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence. To use such a document to prove a significant term of the transaction would not be using it for a collateral purpose. On going through the above said judgment, it is crystal clear that, the plaintiffs cannot rely upon the unregistered document i.e., Ex.P24 which varies the terms of the registered sale deeds. As per the registered sale deeds the suit lands have been sold and transferred with absolute rights interest and possession. So the Ex.P24 will not come to the aid of the plaintiffs in view of the ratio laid down in the top noted case.” 5. Being aggrieved by the rejection of the plaint, plaintiff filed an appeal before the First Appellate Court in RA No.66/2023. 6. Learned Judge in the First Appellate Court after securing the records, heard the arguments of the parties in detail and reappreciated the material on record in the - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 light of the appeal grounds and by judgment dated 11.02.2025, dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs and confirmed the order of rejection of the plaint inter alia holding in paragraph Nos.18 to 23 as under: “18. It is settled preposition of law that, while deciding the application under Order VII Rule Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court can look into the averments made in the plaint and also documents referred in the plaint by the plaintiffs. Further, the plea taken by the defendant in written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on merits would be irrelevant and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. In the plaint itself, the plaintiffs have categorically averred that, the defendants are trying to interfere with their possession in respect to suit schedule properties in the year 2004, accordingly they have filed suit in O.S No.255/2004 before the learned Civil Judge. In the said suit, the plaintiff No.1 and 2 have categorically avered the Registered Sale deeds dated 19/12/2002, said to have been executed by them along with plaintiff No.4 herein in favour of defendant No.1. 19. Therefore, it appears the plaintiff No. 1 and 2 had knowledge about the Registered Sale deeds dated 19/12/2002, said to have been executed by them in favour of defendant No.1 in the year 2004 itself. Further, in the written statement filed by defendant No.1 & 2 in the said suit, they have categorically taken a contention that, the plaintiffs have already executed Registered Sale deeds in their favour. Based on the said contention, the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit filed by plaintiffs by relying on the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anathulla Sudhakar V/s P. Buchireddy (deceased) his legal heirs. In the - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 said decision, their lordship have clearly observed that, when defendants have raised cloud over the title of the plaintiffs by producing title deeds in respect to suit property, mere suit for permanent injunction without seeking declaration of title or possession is not maintainable. Despite, the defendant No.1 and 2 have categorically denied the title of the plaintiffs in respect to suit schedule properties by relying title deeds in their favour, the plaintiffs did not made any attempt either to amend the relief or withdraw the said suit by filing a comprehensive suit for declaration of ownership and injunction till 2010 i.e., the filing of present suit. 20. If the prayer portion of the plaint is read, it becomes evident that, the plaintiffs have sought for a declaration of ownership and cancellation of sale deeds dated 19/12/2002. No doubt, as on the date of Sale deeds the plaintiff No.4 was minor and aged about 17 years. Admittedly, the Sale deeds dated 19/12/2002 and plaintiff No.4 might have attained majority in the year 2003. The question here is whether Article 60 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable?. From a plain reading of the plaint, it becomes evident that, the absolute Sale deeds were executed in favour of the defendant No.1 in the year 2002 itself. The facts clearly show that, the interest of the plaintiffs were involved in the suit schedule properties in the year 2002 itself. No doubt, the plaintiff No.4 was minor in the year 2002. Though, the mother was the natural guardian of plaintiff No.4 has executed Sale deed in favour of defendant No.1. Therefore, the Sale involved not only her share but of her minor son also. If a Sale made by mother is sought to be voided by the son i.e., plaintiff No.4 after a lapse of many years, a question as regard limitation would obviously arise. In that event, which article of the Limitation Act is applicable? Is it Article 60 or Article 113? - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 21. Is it possible to say that, limitation has to be reckoned from date of knowledge. Article 60 of the Limitation Act, state that, suit is to be filed within 3 years from the date of minor attaining majority. Article 113 states suit has to be filed within three years from the date of accrual of right to sue. Both Articles do not speak of knowledge. Since, the learned counsel for appellants emphasized that, Article 113 is applicable, reference to Section 6 of the Limitation Act is necessary. According to this section, a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for execution of a decree is a minor or insane or idiot, he can institute a suit or make an application within the same period after the disability ceases. ‘Within the period’ means period prescribed by other articles of the Limitation Act, for institution of suits or making applications. It cannot be understood that, Right to sue accrues from the date of knowledge. Only a few articles of the Limitation Act, provide for initiation of legal action within a certain time from date ofknowledge, barring these articles there is no scope for having the legal action from the date of knowledge. 22. In the present case, the plaintiff No.4 might have attained majority in the year 2003. Sale made by his mother, that Sale was voidable, not void. She had every right to sell the property including the plaintiff No.4 interest being a natural guardian. Therefore, the suit should have been filed within three years from the date of attaining majority by plaintiff No.4. Even if Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applied, the suit should be filed within three years from the date of accrual of right, it is impossible to hold date of knowledge comes to one’s aid. In this context, it may useful to refer to a few decided cases by the Hon’ble Apex Court and also Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka. 9.1. The Supreme Court in the case of Utha Moidu Haji (supra) has held that a suit filed 17 years after execution of the sale deed and 6 years after - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 plaintiff attained majority, Article 60 is applicable and suit was time barred. 9.2. A co-ordinate Bench of this court in the case of H.M.Rudraradhya (supra) has taken the following view:- 13.…..Admittedly, the sale of the suit property in favour of the 1st defendant was on 04/06/1987. The suit instituted by the plaintiff is not within 3 years of her attaining the age of majority. Therefore, in view of the provisions of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, the suit was barred by time. Though a contention is taken up by learned counsel for the respondents that the plaintiff has not prayed for the relief of setting aside the sale transaction and he contends that on this ground that Article 60 of the Limitation Act provides for 3 years to set aside the sale, he would submit that in the absence of the relief for setting aside the sale, this Article itself is not applicable. When the sale transaction is voidable transaction and it is for the plaintiff, to sue for possession of the property and it is incumbent upon him to pray for such a relief. Even otherwise, the plaintiff has prayed for a declaration that the Sale Deed is not binding on her interest in the suit property and this relief is similar to setting aside the sale, which is contemplated under Article 60 of the Limitation At and in the absence of the said relief, the suit itself cannot be maintained. So, from whatsover angle, if the facts and circumstances are looked into, it is Article 60 of the Limitation Act, which is applicable to the dispute and not Article 109 or 110 of the Limitation Act”. 23. The next point to be dealt with is about framing of an issue as regards limitation. According to the appellants, limitation is a mixed question of law and facts and hence without raising an issue in that regard, plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. If the above contention taken by the - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 appellants have to be accepted, has I opine, it is to a case where the plean taken by the plaintiffs with regard to cause of action is disputed by the defendants, and it is not possible to take an apparent opinion as regards the starting point of limitation. But on plain reading of the plaint above, if it is possible to arrive at a definite opinion that, the suit is time barred, framing of an issue is not not necessary and Court can exercise power under Order VII Rule 11 C.PC., for rejection of plaint. In this contest, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hardesh Ores (P) Limited vs Hede and Company [(2007) 5 SCC 614] can be referred to. It is held :- “25. The language or Order VII Rule 11 CPC is quite clear and unambiguous. The plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation only where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Mr. Nariman did not dispute that “law” within the meaning of clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 must include the law of limitation as well. It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint if taken to be correct in their entirety a decree would be passed. The averments made in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading ha to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. As obsered earlier, the language of clause (d) is quite clear but if any authority is required, on may usefully refer to the judgments of this court in Liverpool & - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 London S.P. & I Association Ltd. Vs. M.V. Sea Success I and another : (2004) 9 SCC 512 and Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association: (2005) 7 SCC 510”. 7. Being further aggrieved by the same, plaintiff is before this Court, in this appeal on the following grounds and substantial questions of law: GROUNDS Both courts have not properly looked into about Katha was not get from S.G.Channabasappa who lend the loan amount and at taken sale deeds as security and it clearly goes to show that the Ex.P1 to P3 sale deeds are nominal one and required to reconvey sale deeds in favour of Appellants and not reonveyed even receipt of loan and interest thereon from appellants to defeat rights and ownership over suit properties. Both courts below have not been considered about prior permission to be taken from D.C. Davanagere which is mandatory from Appellants to execute any kind of sale deeds at Ex.P1 to P3 in favour of S.G.Channabasappa as the suit properties have been granted as inam land to deceased Poojari Ningappa who is husband of Rathnamma, father of Appellant No.3 to 6. - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 Both courts below have not been appreciated on 19.12.2002, the Appellant No.6 is minor and on behalf of him and his rights, the minor guardian Smt. Rathnamma have to be obtained permission in G&WC Case in any competent court to sell the suit properties on behalf of minor, Appellant No.6 to safe guard his interest and it is not obtained and on this ground, the impugned orders of courts below are liable to be set aside. Both Courts below have not appreciated Ex.P24 Oppige Kararu Pathra 19.12.2002 evidencing that S.G.Channabasappa have to reconvey the suit properties in on favour of Vendors Rathnamma and Appellant No.3 to 6 and not treated the sale deeds at Ex.P1 to P3 are nominal one; Both courts below have not appreciated the Village Office Abolition Act and made wrong applicable of article 60(a) of Limitation Act and Apex Court Judgments which are not applicable to the case in hand to the provision Order VII Rule 11 (a) to (d) of CPC and much less have not been discussed about cause of action. The I Appellate Court has rightly come to conclusion that the appellants have required to file suit O.S.No.515/2010 seeking relief of Specific Performance of Contract and for this relief, it is - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 necessary to order for remand this matter to the trial court for amendment to plaint seeking relief against Respondent No.1. The 1 Appellate court has wrongly considered section 114 of Indian Evidence Act, Article 60. Article 113. Article 6 of Limitation Act and wrongly made applicable in the Apex Court. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW i) Whether Both Courts in justifying allowing IA-15 U/o VII Rule 11(a) to (d) of CPC without answering to Order VII R.11(b) & (c) of CPC about court fee and in reasonings is held that valuation is made proper? ii) Whether Both Courts in justifying passing orders respectively Judgment and Orders without considering the Vendors Appellants have no rights to execute any sale deeds in favour of S.G.Channabasppa without prior permission of Deputy Commissioner Davanagere as the suit lands are inam lands granted to Poojari Ningappa. iii) Whether Both Courts in justifying in allowing IA-15 and dismissing the Appeal without appreciating Rathnamma, Appellant No.3 to 6 have no rights to sell suit properties without prior permission in Guardian - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 and Wards Act on behalf of Appellant No.6 who was minor on 19.12.2002? iv) Whether Both Courts in justifying in allowing IA-15 and dismissing the Appeal without appreciating that the Appellants have limitation or Appellant No.6 have rights to file suit up to 12 years as because Katha of suit properties is not taken from S.G.Channabasappa and Respondents and the suit O.S.no.515/2010 is to be filed on or before 2014 and therefore, it is 2010 is in time as per Article 58 & 59 of Limitation Act? v) It is required to pray for Specific Performance of Contract on Ex.P24 in favour of Appellants from Respondent No.1 by remanding this matter to trial court permitting to amendment to plaint of this relief? 8. Learned counsel for the appellant reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memorandum vehemently contended that both the Courts have not recorded the cause of action nor the insufficiency of the Court fee or for that matter the jurisdictional issue and only on the mixed question of law and limitation, rejecting the plaint of the plaintiff has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice and - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 sought for admitting the appeal on the aforesaid substantial questions of law. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supports the impugned judgments and further contended that in every case, limitation is not a mixed question of law and fact. 10. He would further contend that in a given case, apparently if the suit is barred by limitation just by mathematical calculation having regard to the provisions of limitation Act, plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation as well. 11. Therefore, impugned orders are just and proper which requires no interference in this appeal and sought for dismissal of the appeal. 12. Having heard the parties in detail, this Court perused the material on record meticulously. 13. On such perusal of the material on record, it is crystal clear that the suit came to be filed in the year 2010 - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 seeking cancellation of the sale deed executed in the year 2002. 14. One of the prime contentions that is urged on behalf of the appellant is that one of the executants of the sale deed was a minor namely plaintiff No.4 – Basavarajappa who was aged about 17 years as on the date of execution of the sale and without obtaining necessary permission, the sale affected by the mother in favour of respondent No.1 – S.G.Chennabsappa has resulted in not conveying the right, title and interest to the extent of Basavarajjappa’s share in the suit property which has been ignored by both the Courts. 15. However, if the same is taken into consideration for the purpose of limitation as well, said Basavarajappa attained majority in the year 2003. 16. As per the provision of the limitation Act, a minor attaining the majority has got three years time to challenge the alienation made by his/her guardian. Even - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 that is taken into consideration, suit should have been filed by Basavarajappa in The Year 2006. 17. Pertinent to note that Ratnamma, Nagaraja, Meenakshi were majors and they did not choose to file the suit challenging the sale deed executed in the year 2002 and Basavarajappa did not challenge the alienation in the year 2006 and all of them joined together and filed the suit in the year 2010. 18. Taking note of the same, rejection of the plaint on the ground of suit is barred by limitation, patently time fixed under the statue has elapsed atleast in the year 2006 insofar as defendant No.4 – Basavarajappa, is thus just and proper. 19. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal memorandum do not merit for further consideration. 20. Hence, the following: - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35227 RSA No. 520 of 2025 ORDER i. Appeal is meritless and hereby dismissed. ii. No order as to costs. Sd/- (V SRISHANANDA) JUDGE KAV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 67