1 2025:CGHC:20323 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 272 of 2014 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary Department Of Public Health And Family Welfare, Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya Naya Raipur Cg, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Dean Medical College Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Joint Director And Superintendent Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Medical College Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - The President, Chhattisgarh Karmachari Congress In Front Of Sapre School, Budhapara Raipur Ps. City Kotwali Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, Chhattisgarh 2 - Suresh Sahu S/o Anil Kumar Sahu Aged About 31 Years Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Mukesh Kumar Nirmalkar S/o Lt. Uday Singh Nirmalkar Aged About 31 Years Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Bhimrao Sinha S/o Dayalu Aged About 35 Years Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Rajendra Sena S/o Lt. Dha Singh Sena Aged About 31 Years Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 6 - Govind Sidar S/o Samaru Lal Sidar Aged About 39 Years Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh -2- 7 - Umendra Kumar Sahu S/o Subelal Sahu Aged About 35 Years Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 8 - Manoj Kumar Sahu S/o Khamman Lal Sahu Aged About 33 Years Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 9 - Bhupendra Manikpuri S/o Lt. Madhusudan Manikpuri Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 10 - Kuleshwar Nath Dukhu Ram Sahu Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 11 - Ghanshyam Banjare S/o Nodadhuram Banjare Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 12 - Sanjay Verma S/o Tukaram Verma Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 13 - Bhuprendra Sen S/o Kaliram Sen Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 14 - Mahesh Yadav S/o Basant Kumar Yadav Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 15 - Om Prakash Tiwari S/o Hridya Nand Tiwari Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 16 - Nand Kumar Thakur S/o Man Singh Thakur Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 17 - Puna Chand Sena S/o Lt. Dhan Singh Sena Occupation Daily Wager, R/o Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital Raipur Ps. Mohadapara Tah. And Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 18 - Chitra Kumar Sahu (since Dead) Represented Through Lr Smt Sita Devi Sahu Age 26 Yrs Wd/o Chitra Kumar Sahu R/o Vill. Tolrla Ps. Pateva Mahasamund Cg, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 19 - The Labour Court Dist. Raipur Cg, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents 3 For Petitioners : Ms. Shailja Shukla, Dy. G.A. for the State For Respondents : Mr. Trivikram Nayak, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 02.05.2025 1. The petitioners have filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1.That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the impugned order dated 03/05/2012 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned Judge, Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court, Raipur in Case No. 40/I.D.Act Ref/12 parties being "The President, Chhattisgarh Karmachari Congress Vs. The Dean, Medical College and another" consequentially resulting in the dismissal of the application / claim of the respondents, in the interest of justice. 10.2. Any other relief, including the cost of this petition, as it appears to be fit and appropriate to this Hon'ble Court.” 2. The facts of the present case are as under:- (i) Respondents No.2 to 18 were working at Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Medical College, Raipur (C.G.) as Safai Karmachari and Suraksha Karmachari between the years 1995 and 1999 on a contract basis. (ii) A fresh contract was awarded to M/s. Safeguard and the respondents were provided with their respective jobs again from the year 1999 till 14.03.2002. (iii) On 15.03.2002, the respondents were employed as daily rated employees under the above-stated institution. The respondents are still working but respondent No.18 has passed away. -4- (iv) In the year 2003, respondent No.1 filed a statement of claim before the learned Labour Court, Raipur claiming therein regularization of the respondents. It was pleaded that out of 128 daily rated employees deployed with the Hospital, only 17 are left for regularization and the services of the other employees have already been regularized. (v) On 05.12.2003, the learned Labour Court passed an order of status quo with regard to the services of respondents No. 2 to 18 in Case No.49/I.D.Act-Ref/2003. (vi) The said order was challenged by the petitioners by filing Writ Petition No.1653 of 2004 which was disposed of and the order passed by the learned Labour Court was maintained as out of 128 employees, the services of 92 were regularized by the petitioners. (vii) On 03.05.2012, an award was passed by the learned Labour Court and the petitioners were directed to regularize the services of respondents No. 2 to 18 with effect from 31.07.2009. (viii) The petitioners filed this petition challenging the order dated 03.05.2012 on 13.11.2014. 3. Ms. Shukla, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the petitioners/State would submit that the respondents were engaged as daily rated employees, contractual employees, and temporary/ad-hoc employees, therefore, they are not at all entitled to regularization. She would further submit that the respondents were not appointed according to the constitutional scheme or policy framed by the State, therefore, they cannot claim 5 regularization as a matter of right. She would contend that pursuant to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Umadevi(3) and others, 2006 (4) SCC 1, the State introduced the policy dated 05.03.2008 for regularization of services of the daily rated/ad-hoc employees. She would further contend that the services of the daily rated employees who were appointed between 01.01.1989 to 31.12.1997 would fall within the zone of consideration according to the said policy. She would also contend that respondents No. 2 to 18 were engaged after 31.12.1997, particularly in the year 2000, therefore, they do not fall within the zone of consideration. She would also submit that the learned Labour Court without appreciating the facts of the case, the material available on record and the applicable law passed an award in favour of the workmen. She would pray to set aside the impugned award dated 03.05.2012. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose the submissions made by Ms. Shukla. He would submit that the learned Labour Court in para 5 has recorded a finding that respondents No.2 to 18 have been working continuously with the establishment as Safai Karmachari and Suraksha Karmachari. He would further submit that in para 6, the learned Labour Court has held that the case of respondents No. 2 to 18 is distinguishable from the facts of the case of Uma Devi (supra). He would contend that in para 7, it is held by the learned Labour Court that more than 90 similarly situated workmen have -6- already been regularized and only 17 employees have been left out and thus, they have been discriminated. Mr. Nayak would also submit that the learned Labour Court categorically held that Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Medical College, Raipur (C.G.) comes within the definition of the Industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’). It is also held that respondents No. 2 to 18 are entitled to regularization of their services under the petitioners with effect from 31.07.2009 within a period of one month. Mr. Nayak would further argue that the petitioners have assailed the order passed by the learned Labour Court after 30 months without explaining the delay. He would also argue that the impugned award has attained finality as the interim order was not passed in favour of the petitioners. It is also stated that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Uma Devi (supra) would not attract in the present case. He would state that the learned Labour Court has the jurisdiction to pass the award once it is found that unfair labour practices are being followed. Mr. Nayak would vehemently submit that the petitioners have regularized the services of more than 92 employees and only 17 are left. He would further state that the action of the petitioners is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He would further contend that the welfare State cannot act in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the judgment passed in the matter of (i) Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan, 2006 (4) SCC 322 to buttress his submission with 7 regard to delay and laches; (ii) So far a Hospital is covered under the Industrial Disputes Act, he placed reliance on the matter of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa, 1978 (2) SCC 213; (iii) the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Uma Devi (supra) is distinguishable as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Maharashtra SRTC V. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmachari Sanghatana, 2009 (8) SCC 556 and the action of the petitioners is discriminatory as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raman Kumar Vs. Union of India, 2023 SCC Online SC 1018. 5. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 6. Admittedly, respondents No. 2 to 18 are still working with the hospital in the posts of Safai Karmachari and Suraksha Karamchari. They claimed regularization before the learned Labour Court on the ground that out of 128 employees, only 17 are left and others have been regularized by the department. Learned Labour Court after scrutinizing the material available on record passed an award in favour of the employees and directed the petitioners to pass orders with regard to regularization of services of respondents No.2 to 18 within a period of one month with effect from 31.07.2009. 7. In the matter of Uma Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not issue directions for absorption, regularization, or -8- permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad hoc employees unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Relevant paras 4, 43 and 45 are reproduced herein below:- “4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is by- passed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the 9 Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten. 43.Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a -10- manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain -- not at arms length -- since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post 11 cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmachari Sanghatana (supra) held that the power conferred with the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30 is very wide. It is further held that casual, temporary and badli employees are working with the institutions/industries for years and they do not get the status and privileges of permanent employees and such a practice is an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer. It is also held that once such unfair labour practice on the part of the employer is established in the complaint, the Industrial and Labour Courts are empowered to issue preventive as well as positive directions to an erring employer. In para 33, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the issue of unfair labour practice and the power of industrial and labour courts were not considered in the matter of Uma Devi (supra). The relevant paragraphs 30, 32, 33, 34, 35 & 36 are reproduced herein below:- “30. The question that arises for consideration is: have the provisions of MRTU & PULP Act denuded of the statutory status by the Constitution Bench decision in Umadevi (supra). In our judgment, it is not. 32. The power given to the Industrial and Labour -12- Courts under Section 30 is very wide and the affirmative action mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. Employing badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years , with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees is an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under item 6 of Schedule IV. Once such unfair labour practice on the part of the employer is established in the complaint, the Industrial and Labour Courts are empowered to issue preventive as well as positive direction to an erring employer. 33. The provisions of MRTU & PULP Act and the powers of Industrial and Labour Courts provided therein were not at all under consideration in the case of Umadevi1. As a matter of fact, the issue like the present one pertaining to unfair labour practice was not at all referred, considered or decided in Umadevi1. Unfair labour practice on the part of the employer in engaging employees as badlies, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees as provided in item 6 of Schedule IV and the power of Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30 of the Act did not fall for adjudication or consideration before the Constitution Bench. 34. It is true that the case of Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees Assn.7 arising out of industrial adjudication has been considered in Umadevi1 and that decision has been held to be not laying down the correct law but a careful and complete reading of decision in Umadevi1 leaves no manner of doubt that what this Court was concerned in Umadevi was the exercise of power by the High Courts under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the matters of public employment where the employees have been engaged as contractual, temporary or casual workers not based on proper selection as recognized by the rules or procedure and yet orders of their regularization and conferring them status of permanency have been passed. 35. Umadevi(supra) is an authoritative pronouncement for the proposition that Supreme Court (Article 32) and High Courts (Article 226) 13 should not issue directions of absorption, regularization or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad- hoc employees unless the recruitment itself was made regularly in terms of constitutional scheme. 36. Umadevi(supra) does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with Section 32 of MRTU & PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victim of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under item 6 of Schedule IV where the posts on which they have been working exists. Umadevi cannot be held to have overridden the powers of Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of MRTU & PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under item 6 of Schedule IV is established.” 9. The expression industry is defined under Section 2(j) of the Act of 1947 and the same is reproduced herein below:- “S.2(j) “industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. 10. In the present case, the employer is the hospital as held by the Labour Court. 11. In the matter of A. Rajappa (supra), in para 140, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with Section 2(j) of the Act of 1947 held as under:- '140. Industry as defined 'in Sec. 2(j) and explained in Banerji's case has a wide import. (a) Where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organized by cooperation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical); (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious, but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large scale prasad or food), prima facie there is an 'industry' in that enterprise. (b) Absence of profit motive or gainful -14- objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector. (c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations. (d) If the Organization is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of philanthropy animating the undertaking.” 12. From a bare reading of the definition of ‘industry’ and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it can safely be held that the hospital is an industry and the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court in this regard require no interference. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmachari Sanghatana (supra) held that in the case of Uma Devi (supra), unfair labour practice and the powers of industrial and labour Courts were not considered whereas the present is a case of unfair labour practice as respondents No.2 to 18 are working with the hospital for years and they have been deprived of the status and privileges of the permanent employees, therefore, the circular issued by the State Government dated 05.03.2008 would not come to the rescue of the petitioners. 14. Present is a case where out of 128 daily rated employees, the claim of 17 employees was not considered for regularization. The petitioners have not assigned any good reason for such discrimination or arbitrary action. 15. The concept of the reasonable classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raman Kumar 15 (supra) while dealing with a similar issue in paras 8 & 13 held thus:- “8. Indisputably, the appellants herein have completed service of more than ten years. Even this Court in the case of Ravi Verma and Others v. Union of India and Others (Civil Appeal No(s).2795-2796 of 2018) decided on 13.03.2018 found that the act of regularizing the services of some employees and not regularizing the services of the others is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 13. The services of the appellants are directed to be regularized from the date on which the services of other 35 employees were regularized and the backwages and other consequential benefits etc., to which the appellants would be entitled to, shall be paid to them within a period of six months from today.” 17. Taking into consideration the facts of the present case, the material available on record and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in my opinion, no case is made out for interference with the award passed by the learned labour Court, thus, the present petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha REKHA SINGH Digitally signed by REKHA SINGH Date: 2025.05.24 14:42:44 +0530