1 2025:CGHC:55233 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 520 of 2018 1 - Angeshwar Dhruva S/o Tiharuram Dhruva, Aged About 47 Years, R/o Sadar Dakshin Ward, Tahsil and District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh., District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Ramaiyya Bai W/o Kheduram, Aged About 60 Years, R/o Post Office Ward, Tahsil and District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh. (LR of Kheduram / Plaintiff ), District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh 2 - Kanhaiya S/o Kheduram Sahu, Aged About 39 Years, R/o Post Office Ward, Tahsil and District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh. (LR of Kheduram / Plaintiff ), District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Palash Jha, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Devershi Thakur, Advocate. For Respondents : Ms. Laxmi Gupta, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Adil Minhaj, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 12-11-2025 1. This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( in short ‘the CPC’) has been filed by the defendant against the impugned judgment and decree dated 28-07-2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Dhamtari in Civil Appeal No.39A/2018 whereby the first appeal filed by the defendant has been dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 05-02-2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class I Dhamtari in Civil Suit No.80A/2015 has been affirmed. Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.02.25 13:27:32 +0530 2 2. The status of the parties as referred in the civil suit are being taken in the present appeal. 3. The original plaintiff Khedurm had filed the suit against the defendant for eviction, possession of the suit house situated at village Ranibadi, Gokulpur ward, Dhamtari shown in the map annexed with the plaint and also for arrears of rent and damages. During pendency of the suit the original plaintiff Kheduram died and his LRs. have been substituted vide order dated 03-09- 2015 who are referred as plaintiffs hereinafter. 4. In the plaint the plaintiffs have pleaded that original plaintiff Kheduram was firstly married with Samaribai and he was no issue from her and thereafter he performed second marriage with Ramaiyyabai from whom one son Kanhaiya is born. The original plaintiff Kheduram was employed as watchman at municipal council Dhamtari and resided in the suit house which was purchased by him. The original plaintiff Kheduram kept his second wife Ramaiyya in the house at post office ward, whereas his first wife Samaribai was resided in the suit house. The defendant was the distant relative of Samaribai and often used to come to meet her. Samaribai has died on 14-02- 2003. After death of Samaribai on the request made by the defendant the suit house was rented to him on the monthly rent of Rs.300/- and the tenancy agreement was oral. The tenancy was started from 01-03-2003 and upto 01- 06-2004 the defendant regularly paid the rent of the suit house. When the original plaintiff Kheduram needed further accommodation due to extension of his family he asked the defendant to vacate the suit house and hand over the possession, but the defendant avoided to vacant the suit house and stopped paying rent also. When the defendant has not vacated the plaintiff served a legal notice to him on 23-02-2005 through his counsel, but the defendant neither paid the arrears of rent nor vacated the suit house and then the present suit was filed by the original plaintiff on the ground of his bonafide requirement as well as non-payment of arrears of rent. 3 5. The defendant contested the suit of the plaintiff and filed his written statement denying the plaint averments and pleaded that Samaribai was not married wife of Kheduram, but she was the wife of Punauram Gond and she on her own right and title was in possession of the suit house. The defendant was resided with Samaribai from his childhood and his nurture was taken care by Samaribai and he was her foster son. He never resided in the suit house as tenant of the original plaintiff, but he is the absolute owner of the suit house and his name has already been recorded in the municipal records as the owner of the same. No any notice has been served upon him allegedly sent by the original plaintiff and since there was no relation of landlord and tenant between the original plaintiff and him, the plaintiff is required to file a suit for declaration of his title and therefore, he is not entitled for any decree. It is further pleaded that on 27-02-2006 the plaintiff has obtained ex-parte decree against him by suppressing the material facts, on 02-06-2014 the plaintiff served another notice to the defendant in which he has averred about will, but the said will has been suppressed in the present suit also. The said ex- parte judgment and decree is set aside on 20-07-2015, and he with the collision of revenue authorities got his name mutated in the revenue records. Only from the mutation in the revenue records the plaintiff could not get any title over the suit property. The name of the defendant is recorded in the municipal records and the plaintiff is not the landlord of the defendant. The issue of title is involved in the present suit and therefore, no relief can be granted to the plaintiff and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 6. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court has framed the following issues:- 1- D;k jkuhckM+h xksdqyiqj okMZ /kerjh fLFkr okni= ds lkFk layXu uD’kk vuqlkj v] c] l] n esa nf’kZr edku dks oknh us izfroknh dks 300 #i;s ekfld ekSf[kd fdjk;s ij fn;k Fkk \ 2- D;k izfroknh }kjk oknh dks fnukad 06-01-2004 ls fnukad 23-02-2005 rd dk cdk;k fdjk;k vnk ugha fd;k gS \ 4 3- D;k oknh dks Lo;a ds jgokl gsrq okn edku dh ln~Hkkfod o okLrfod vko’;drk gS \ 4- D;k oknh }kjk izfroknh dks fnukad 23-02-05 fof/kor~ uksfVl Hkstdj edku [kkyh djus o cdk;k fdjk;s dh ekax fd;k x;k \ 5- lgk;rk ,oa O;; \ 7. In the ex-parte proceeding of the case the plaintiff Kheduram Gond has examined himself as PW-1, Prabhakarram Maratha PW-2, Kunwarsingh PW- 3, Mansharam PW-4 and their ex-parte evidence were recorded. The original plaintiff had relied upon the documents Ex.-P/1 which is the legal notice dated 23-02-2005, Ex.-P/2 is the postal receipt, Ex.-P/3 is the acknowledgment, Ex.-P/4 is Patwari Map, Ex.-P/5 is the B1 Kishtbandi, Ex.- P/6 is Khasara Panchshala, Ex.-P/7 is the order dated 30-10-2004 passed by the Tahsildar, Damtari, Ex.-P/8 is the Khasara Panchshala, Ex.-P/9 is Kishtbandi B1 and Ex.-P/10 is Khasara Panchshala. After setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree and substitution of LRs. of the original plaintiff, the plaintiff No.2 Kanhaiyaram has examined himself as PW-1, Mansharam PW-2 and Deepak Pandey PW-3. 8. The defendant has examined Faguram DW-1, Angeshwar Netam (defendant) DW-2 and Bharatlal Ravat DW-3 and the defendant relied upon the documents Ex.-D/1 and Ex.-D/2 which is the tax receipt of municipal council Dhamtari. Ex.-D/3 is the will deed dated 06-02-2003 executed by Samaribai in favour of the defendant Angeshwar Netam, Ex.-D/4 is death certificate of Samaribai, Ex.-D/5 is the legal notice dated 02-06-2004, Ex.-D/6 is the mutation intimation dated 17-07-2012 issued by the municipal council Dhamtari, Ex.-D/7, D/8 and D/9 are the tax receipts of municipal council Dhamtari. Ex.-D/10 is the tax assessment form. Ex.-D/11, D/12, D/13 and D/14 are also the tax receipts of the municipal council Dhamtari. 9. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, the learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 22-07- 2006 ex-parte decreed the suit of the plaintiff for vacant possession and arrears of rent of the suit house. The said ex-parte judgment and decree was 5 challenged by the defendant by filing application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC before the learned trial Court and the said application of the defendant was allowed on 20-07-2015 in MJC No.4/2013 and the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 22-07-2006 was set aside and directed the parties to appear in the case for further proceeding. Thereafter, the evidence of the parties have been recorded and the learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 05-02-2018 again passed the judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff for vacant possession and arrears of rent and also for damages of the suit house. While considering the evidence, the learned trial Court has held that there was a landlord relationship between the original plaintiff and the defendant and the suit house was lent out to the defendant on its monthly rent of Rs.300/-. There was arrears of rent from 01- 06-2004 to 23-02-2005 and the suit house was bonafidely required for own residence of the plaintiff. 10. The judgment and decree dated 05-02-2018 was challenged by the defendant before the learned first appellate Court and the first appeal filed by the defendant has also been dismissed affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Hence, this second appeal. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant would submit that the defendant has denied the title of the plaintiff over the suit house and claimed that he himself is the title and possession holder of the suit house by virtue of will deed dated 06-02-2003 executed by its owner Samaribai. There was no landlord tenant relationship between original plaintiff Kheduram and the defendant. After death of original plaintiff Kheduram the issue of bonafide requirement was rendered infrutuous. Ramaiyyabai is claiming to be second wife of Kheduram having no legal status of his wife and therefore, the plaintiff No.2 Kanhaiyaram is also having no right or title over the property of late Kheduram. They neither inherited the property of late Kheduram nor any possession thereof. The plaintiffs have failed to prove their title over the suit 6 property and except mutation order there is no valid document of their title filed by the plaintiffs. The mutation entry does not confer any title upon the plaintiffs, whereas, the defendant has proved his title obtained through will executed by Samaribai in his favour dated 06-02-2003 which has been proved by its attesting witnesses. From the documents produced by the defendant which are tax receipts of the municipal council Dhamtari it clearly reveals that the defendant was the owner of the suit house and from the documents Ex.-D/1 and D/2 it also transpires that Samaribai W/o Punauram was the owner of the suit house and not the plaintiff. Since the original plaintiff was not the owner of the suit house and there was no landlord tenant relationship between the parties, there is no question of any arrears of rent or bonafide requirement of the suit house. There is material inconsistency in the evidence and pleadings of the plaint with respect to the starting point of tenancy. Since the issue of title is involved in the present suit it cannot be decided in the present form as has been filed by the plaintiff on the ground of bonafide requirement and arrears of rent. The plaintiff is firstly required to prove his title over the suit property and then only he can be entitled for possession of the same, yet the learned trial Court as well as the learned first appellate Court has passed the decree in favour of the plaintiffs which are erroneous and there is substantial question of law involved in the second appeal for its determination. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record of the trial Court as well the first appellate Court. 13. The original plaintiff has filed the present suit with the pleadings that he is the owner of the suit house and the defendant is his tenant. The suit house was required for his personal need bonafidely and there is arrears of rent also against the defendant and claimed vacant possession and arrears of rent from the defendant. The defendant has raised objection that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit house and there is no landlord tenant relationship 7 between them and the defendant is the title and possession holder of the suit house as he is the distant relative of Samaribai and she executed the will in his favour on 06-02-2003, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled for any decree. 14. In the matter of Vinay Eknath Lad Vs. Chiu Mao Chen, reported in (2019) 20 SCC 182 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the proposition that in landlord tenancy suit, the landlord is not required to prove his title in the subject property as in a title suit, when the title is challenged the same has to be established in same form and in para 23 it has been held that:- “23. We have already opined that sufficient material was not there before the first two Courts to establish the original plaintiffs’ claim of ownership of the subject premises on the basis of a family arrangement after dissolution of the firm. The appellant’s attempt to adduce additional documents to establish his stand on that point has been rejected by us at this stage. The ratio of the judgment in the case of S.V. Chandra Pandian [S.V. Chandra Pandian v. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar (1993) 1 SCC 589] cannot be applied in the present proceeding as there is no material before us from which we could conclude that the original plaintiffs’ title to the subject premises came from residue assets of the dissolved firm. In a landlord-tenant suit, the landlord is not required to prove his title in the subject property as in a title-suit. But when the landlord’s derivative title is challenged, the same has to be established in some form. On this point the original plaintiffs have failed before the first two Courts.” 15. In the present case, the plaintiffs have filed the order dated 30-10-2004 passed by the Tahsildar Ex.-P/7, Kishtbandi of the year 2003-04 Ex.-P/9 and Khasra Panchshala Ex.-P/10. In the said Kishtbandi and Khasara Panchshala name of the original plaintiff Kheduram is recorded along with Samaribai D/o Itwari. From the order dated 30-10-2004 Ex.-P/7 it further transpires that the Tahsildar has passed the mutation order in favour of the original plaintiff in which it has been observed that the suit property is self acquired property of Kheduram and his wife Samaribai and after death of Samaribai her name was deleted from the revenue records and it was 8 remained in the name of Kheduram. From the documents Ex.-P/5 and P/6 the name of original plaintiff Kheduram was recorded in the revenue records as the owner of the suit property. 16. The defendant’s evidence is that Samaribai had treated him as her son and she executed the will with respect to the suit property which is Ex.-D/3, though the witness Faguram DW-1 who is the attesting witness of the alleged will has deposed in support of execution of the will, however, the question remains as to whether Samaribai was competent and capable to execute the will or not with respect to subject suit property. There is no document filed by the defendant that the suit property was obtained by Samaribai from her father and there is no source of her title. The DW-1 Faguram has admitted in para 25 of his evidence that he has not seen any document of title of Samaribai over the suit property. Even there is no mention in the will deed Ex.-D/3 as to on what basis the said will deed was prepared. Except the tax receipts and revenue entries in the name of Samaribai there is no any deed of title filed by the defendant. Though the plaintiffs have also not filed any deed of title, but it has been observed in the order dated 30-10-2004 passed by the Tahsildar Ex.-P/7 that it was self acquired property of Kheduram and Samaribai which has been supported by the documents Ex.-P/9 and P/10. When the defendant came with specific plea that the suit property was bequeathed by Samaribai in his favour by will deed dated 06-02-2003 then the defendant was required to prove the title of Samaribai by producing sufficient documentary evidence of acquisition of her title over the suit property obtained through her father. 17. After detailed consideration on the evidence produced by the parties, the learned trial Court as well as the learned first appellate Court comes into conclusion that plaintiff Kheduram was the owner of the suit house and the defendant has failed to prove his ownership. Though detailed enquiry of their respective title cannot be entertained in the present suit, however, from the 9 evidence it has been found that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. So far as the existence of relationship of landlord and tenancy between the parties is concerned, it is the pleading and evidence of the plaintiff that when no issue was procured from Samaribai original plaintiff Kheduram performed second marriage with Ramaiyyabai. He kept Ramaiyyabai in another house at post office ward and Samaribai was resided in the suit house. The defendant used to come to meet Samaribai as he was her distant relative and after death of Samaribai on 14-02-2003 on the request of the defendant the plaintiff lent the suit house to him for a monthly rent of Rs.300/-. The defendant paid the rent upto 01-06-2004 and when the plaintiff required the suit house for his own use and asked the defendant to vacate the suit house he stopped paying rent and started threatening to the plaintiff that he will not vacate the suit house and he can do whatever he want to do. Thereafter, he served a legal notice to the defendant on 23-02-2005, but the defendant neither paid arrears of rent nor vacated the suit house. Though, there no written agreement with respect to tenancy of the suit house is filed by the plaintiff, but there is no requirement that tenancy should be in writing and the tenancy agreement can also be oral and there is no bar in it as has been stated by the plaintiff that the defendant is the distant relative of Samaribai who used to come to meet her and after her death he asked for tenancy of the suit house and the plaintiff lent out the suit house to him. The relationship between the parties would be considerable factor with respect to requirement of tenancy agreement. The evidence of plaintiff PW-1, Mansharam PW-2 and Deepak Pandey PW-3 have not been substantially rebutted by the defendant that the suit house was not lent out to him on monthly rent of Rs.300/-. Further, from the legal notice Ex.-P/1 it has also transpired that the plaintiff served a notice to the defendant for arrears of rent and hand over vacant possession of the suit house which was served upon the defendant on 02-03- 2005 which the defendant admitted in para 29 of his evidence and thus, from 10 the evidence produced by the plaintiffs the learned Courts below have also held that there exists tenancy agreement between the parties. 18. The original plaintiff Kheduram was required the suit house bonafidely for his own use as defined under Section 12(1)(f) of C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. It is the evidence of the plaintiff that when he asked the defendant to vacate the suit house and to pay arrears of rent he started threatening him and has not vacated the suit house, then a legal notice was served upon him which remained unanswered. It is also the evidence of the plaintiff that the family of the plaintiff was expanding as the family members are increasing and the available accommodation was very small and they required the suit house bonafidely for their own residence. The landlord is judge of his own requirement and he can ask for vacation of the suit house from his tenant which required bonafidely for him. 19. In the matter of Prativa Devi (Smt) Vs. T.V. Krishnan, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 353, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 2 that:- “2. The proven facts are that the appellant who is a widow, since the demise of her husband late Shiv Nath Mukherjee, has been staying as a guest with Shri N.C. Chatterjee who was a family friend of her late husband, at B-4/20, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi. There is nothing to show that she has any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of Shri Chatterjee. On the other hand, she is there merely by sufferance. The reason given by the High Court that the appellant is an old lady aged about 70 years and has no one to look after her and therefore she should continue to live with Shri Chatterjee, was hardly a ground sufficient for interference. The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. Now, that is a lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the 11 beneficial enjoyment of his property. We accordingly reverse the finding reached by the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller that the appellant had established her bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her personal use and occupation, which finding was based on a proper appreciation of the h evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” 20. Even otherwise the bonafide requirement of the landlord is the question of facts which has been categorically decided by the learned trial Court as well as the learned first appellate Court in favour of the plaintiffs as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rishi Kumar Govil Vs. Maqsoodan and others, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 465 wherein in para 19 of the judgment it has been held that:- “19. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679, it was held that it is the choice of the landlord to choose the place for the business which is most suitable for him. He has complete freedom in the matter. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604, it was held that the need of the landlord is to be seen on the date of application for release. In Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353, it was held that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and Courts have no concern to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should live. The bona fide personal need is a question of fact and should not be normally interfered with. The High Court noted that when the prescribed authority passed the order the son of the respondent-landlady was 20 years old and the shop was sought to be released for the purpose of settling him in business. More than 20 years have elapsed and the son has become more than 40 years of age and she has not been able to establish him as she has still to get the possession of the shop and the litigation of the dispute is still subsisting. The licence for repairing firearms can only be obtained when there is a vacant shop available and in the absence of any vacant shop, licence cannot be obtained by him. Therefore, the High Court came to the conclusion concurring with that of the prescribed authority and the Appellate Authority that the need of the landlady is bona fide and genuine. Considering the factual findings recorded by the prescribed authority, the Appellate Authority and analysed by the High 12 Court, there is no scope for any interference in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. However, considering the period for which the premises in question was in the occupation of the appellant, time is granted till 31-12-2007 to vacate the premises subject to filing of an undertaking before the prescribed authority within a period of 2 weeks to deliver the vacant possession on or before the stipulated date. There will be no order as to costs.” 21. Another submission made by learned counsel for the appellant/defendant is that during pendency of the suit the original plaintiff Kheduram has died and the bonafide requirement is ceased. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant to this effect does not impress upon this Court in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gaya Prasad Vs. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604 in which it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that bonafide requirement on the date of filing of the suit is relevant consideration to decide the issue and subsequent development cannot cease the bonafide requirement of the landlord. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another Judgment in the case of Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal and Others, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 252 at Paragraph-7 held as follows:- "7. In the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand [(2004) 8 SCC 490] it was held that the bona fide requirement of the landlord has to be seen on the date of the petition and the subsequent events intervening due to protracted litigation will not be relevant. It was held that the crucial date is the date of petition. Their Lordships further observed that the normal rule is that the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined on the date of the petition and that subsequent events can be taken into consideration for moulding the reliefs provided such events had a material impact on those rights and obligations. It was further observed by Their Lordships that it is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. Therefore, the courts have to take a very pragmatic approach of the matter. It is common experience in our country that specially landlord- 13 tenant litigation prolongs for a long period. It is true that neither can the person who has started the litigation sit idle nor can the development of the events be stopped by him. Therefore, the crucial event should be taken as on the date when the suit for eviction was filed unless the subsequent event materially changed the ground of relief." 23. The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv Dayal & Another, 2019(8)SCC 637, has observed in paragraphs 16 & 17 as under: “16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (see observation made by learned Judge Vivian Bose,J. as His Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar & Ors. vs. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar & Ors., AIR 1943 Nagpur 117 Para 43). 17. In our opinion, if any one or more ground, as mentioned above, is made out in an appropriate case on the basis of the pleading and evidence, such ground will constitute substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.” 24. In C. Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) By Legal Representatives & Others Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) By Legal Representatives & Others, 2020(4)SCC 659 in paragraphs 25, 29 and 30 observed as under : “25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E- Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan8, it was held that findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under: “12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu (1996 3 SCC 392), this Court held: "It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty (1996 6 SCC 166), this Court held : "Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. … Even as- suming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material." 15. And again in Secy., Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. (1997 4 SCC 484), this Court held: (SCC p. 486, para 5) "The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording reverse finding of fact which is impermissible. 29. The learned High Court has not satisfied the tests laid down in the aforesaid judgements. Both the courts, the trial court and the learned First Appellate Court, have examined the School Leaving Certificate and returned a finding that the date of birth does not stand proved from such certificate. May be the High Court could have taken a different view acting as a trial court but once, two courts have returned a finding which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against any provision of law, and neither can it be said that any judge acting judicially and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then, the High Court cannot be said to have erred. Resultantly, no substantial question of law arose for consideration before the High Court. 30. Thus, we find that the High Court erred in law in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the trial court as affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The findings of fact cannot be interfered with in a second appeal unless, the findings are perverse. The High Court could not have interfered with the findings of the fact.” 25. After having gone through the pleadings of the parties and the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, this court does not find any illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below. The findings recorded by the courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence and this court does not find any substantial question of law involved in the case for its determination. 26. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the admission stage. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil