IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI THURSDAY, THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SREENIVASA REDDY CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 553 OF 2008 Appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C., aggrieved by the calendar and judgment dated 31.12.2007 in C.C.No.117 of 2006 on the file of the Court of the learned II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Repalle thereby acquitting the 2"'^ Respondent/Accused. Between: Aradula Srinivasa Rao, S/o Satyanarayana, age 36 years, R/o 16th Ward, Isukapalli, Repalle, Repalle (M), Guntur District. ...Appellant/Complainant AND 1. State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad. ...Respondent 2. Tirumalasetti Koteswara Rao, S/o Bikshapathi, age 52 years. Employee in Fire Station Repalle, Repalle Mandal, Guntur District. ...Respondent/Accused Counsel for the Appellant: Sri Nimmagadda Satyanarayana Counsel for the Respondent No.1: Public Prosecutor Counsel for the Respondent No.2: Dr Challa Srinivasa Reddy The Court made the following: 1 APHC010787112017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY ,THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SREENIVASA REDDY CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 553 OF 2008 [3327] Between: 1. Aradula Srinivasa Rao, S/o Satyanarayana, R/o 16th Ward, Isukapalli, Repalle, Repalle (M), Guntur Dist. AND 1. The State of A.P., rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad. 2. TirumalasettiKoteswaraRao,, S/o Bikshapathi, Employee in Fire Station Repalle, Repalle Mandal, Guntur Dist. Counsel for the Appellant: 1.SRI NIMMAGADDASATYANARAYANA ...APELLANT(S) ...RESPODENTS Counsel for the Respondent: 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 2. Dr. CHALLA SRINIVASA REDDY The Court made the followingJUDGMENT: The present Criminal Appeal has been filed by the appellant/ complainant, as against the Judgment dated 31.12.2007, passed in C.C.No.117 of 2006 on the file of the II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Repalle, whereunder and whereby the respondent No.2/accused was found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and accordingly he was acquitted of the said offence. 2- The complainant lodged a The accused borrowed complainant on 15.04.2004 for his same with interest at 24% complaint alleging as follows, an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- from the family expenses agreeing to repay tbe p a., and executed a demand promissory note After several demands, - on 12.11.2005 drawn on the same day in favour of the oomplainant. the accused issued a cheque for Rs.75,000/ Branch towards on Andhra Bank, Brodipet, Guntur part payment of the pronote debt. The complainant the same presented the cheque for collection as insufficient funds but was returned vide Memo dated issued a registered notice 03.12.2005. 20.12.2005 to the The complainant got i dated accused failed to pay the amount accused, but as the covered under the dishonoured Cheque, the present complaint came to be lodged. 3. The trial Court furnished coor accused, and when the accused he pleaded not guilty and claimed copies of the documents to the was examined under Section 251 CrPC to be tried. 4. During trial, on behalf of the examined and Exs.P1 to P7 complainant, P.W.1 After closure of the was examined under Section appearing against him in The accused denied the was adduced on behalf of the was were got marked, the accused complainant side evidence 313 CrPC explaining the incriminating material the evidence of the complainant witnesses, same. No oral or documentary evidence 3 defence. The trial Court, upon considering the evidence on record, found the accused not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Nl Act and accordingly acquitted him. Challenging the same, the present Criminal Appeal came to be filed by the complainant. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that from the evidence of P.W.1, coupled with the recitals in Exs.P1 to P7, it is clear that there is legally enforceable debt owed by the accused to the complainant, and the cheque issued by the accused in discharge of the said debt was dishonoured, when presented by the complainant, and therefore, the accused is liable for punishment for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Nl Act, but the trial Court has not considered these aspects in right perspective and erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, he prays to allow the Criminal Appeal and convict the accused. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2/ accused contended that the accused successfully rebutted the presumption and is able to establish that there is no legally enforceable debt or liability, proving that P.W.1 filled Ex.PI-cheque without consent of the accused, and as such, the trial Court rightly acquitted the accused and there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment. Now, the point for consideration is whether the complainant is able to bring home the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable 6. 7. 4 under Section 138 of the Nl Act and whether the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court needs any interference by this Court ? This is an appeal against an Order of acquittal. There is a presumption available under law that an accused is presumed to be • innocent unless contrary is proved. That presumption of innocence is further strengthened by an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. In dealing with the appeals against acquittal, though this Court has full power to re-appreciate the evidence, at the same time, it would be slow in interfering with the order of acquittal because presumption available under law is further strengthened by the order of acquittal. Unless there are substantial or compelling reasons, this Court will not ordinarily disturb the findings of the trial Court. If the trial Court has given any perverse finding, then it can be a ground to interfere with the order of acquittal. Similarly, if admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration inadmissible evidence has been looked into for the purpose of arriving at a particular finding, then also it can be said to be a compelling reason to interfere with the same. 8. or 9. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision in Harbans Singh & another v. the State of Punjab\ wherein it was held as follows: (para 8) “The question as regards the correct principles to be applied by a Court hearing an appeal against acquittal of a person has ^ AIR 1962 SC 439 5 engaged the attention of this Court from the very beginning. In many cases, especially the earlier ones, the Court has in laying down such principles emphasized the necessity of interference with an order of acquittal being based only on ‘compelling and substantial reasons’ and has expressed the view that unless such reasons are present in an Appeal, Court should not interfere with order of acquittal (Vide Suraj Pal Singh v. The State, 1952 SCR 193: (AIR 1952 SC 52); Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab, 1953 SCR 418: (AIR 1953 SC 459). The use of the words, ‘compelling reasons’ embarrassed some of the High Courts in exercising their jurisdiction in appeals against acquittals and difficulties occasionally arose as to what this Court had, meant by the words ‘compelling reasons’. In later years the Court has often avoided emphasis on ‘compelling reasons’ but nonetheless adhered to the view expressed earlier that before interfering in appeal with an order of acquittal a Court must examine not only questions of law and fact in all their aspects but must also closely and carefully examine the reasons which impelled the lower courts to acquit the accused and should interfere only if satisfied, after such examination that the conclusion reached by the lower court that the guilt of the person has not been proved is unreasonable.” an 10. It is the case of the complainant that the accused borrowed an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- from him on 15.04.2004 for his family expenses, agreeing to repay the same with interest at 24% p.a. and executed a demand promissory note on the same day in his favour, and issued Ex.P1-cheque for Rs.75,000/- on 12.11.2005 drawn on Andhra Bank, Brodipet, Guntur Branch towards part payment of the pronote debt. When the complainant presented the cheque for collection, the same was 6 returned as insufficient funds vide Memo dated 03. statutory notice dated 20.12.2005 issued to the failed to pay the amount covered under present complaint came to be lodged. 12.2005. After getting accused, as the accused the dishonoured cheque, the 11. PW-1 is the complainant. In his examination-in-chief, he Ex.PI is the dishonoured reiterated the averments in the complaint, cheque. Ex.P2 is the cheque return memo. Ex.P3 is pay-in-slip issued by the Bank dated 12.11.2005. Ex.P4 is promissory note. No doubt, when Signature on a cheque is admitted, then a presumption can be drawn under Section 118 of the Nl Act regards the date. But, it is rebuttable presumption. as regards the consideration and as 12. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the that the writing on the subject cheque does not beiong to the accused and a blank cheque was obtained by the complainant was filled up by the complainant to suit his accused and thereafter it convenience without the consent of the accused, and that a blank cheque cannot be enforced in respect of a legally enforceable debt or liability. It Is the case of the accused that he gave a blank cheque to the complainant by putting his signature at the time of borrowing amount from the even complainant on 15.4.2004 and subsequently the complainant filled up the amount in the cheque the presented it for collection on 12.11.2005. The same was suggested to P.W.1 in cross-examination, but the same is denied.In 7 support of his contention, the learned counsel for the accused relied decision in Avon Organics Limited v. Poineer Products Limited & others, 2003 (2) ALD (CRL.) 219 (AP), wherein it is held thus: on a “Whenever blank cheques are filled up and presented, a presumption can be drawn under Section 139 of the Act. It is a rebuttable presumption. The question is whether the accused is able to rebut the presumption. I am of the considered view that he has rebutted the presumption in this case as he has not given consent to fill up the cheque for a particular amount in figures and words and the date portion. It constitutes alteration of the cheque. It cannot be done without the consent of the party who issued the cheque. I also state that it was issued for the legally enforceable liability, namely, towards the amount due under the invoices. But the instrument issued without mentioning the figures and words and date portion in the cheque do not amount a cheque or a bill of exchange at the time of its issuing. Subsequently, it can be altered only with the consent of the party, who has issued the cheque. Otherwise, it amounts to material alteration. When it does not constitute a cheque and the same is filled up and presented to the bank, it cannot be said that the accused has committed an offence. No doubt, morally the accused is not justified in issuing the cheque, when he is not having sufficient funds in the bank. But, the legality has to be judged in this case. The person who accepts the blank cheque certainly has to take it along with the risks to be faced under law. It is not open to him to complain subsequently when the amount has not been realised, etc. I am of considered view that the cheque issued without mentioning the amount for which it is drawn is not a cheque at all. It is not a bill of exchange at all as it is not drawn for a certain amount. When such is the thing, the question of invoking Section 138 of the Act does not arise. May be there is lacuna in Section 138 of the Act. It cannot be said that it covers invalid cheques also. Such an interpretation cannot be put on to it. It is for the Legislature to look at the lacuna found. The lower court has elaborately discussed and ultimately come to the conclusion that the complainant failed to establish the relevant ingredients that are to be established under Section 138 of the Act. The relevant ingredients that have to be established have already been 8 mentioned by the Supreme Court in the decision in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. V. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. If the facts are judged. I of the considered view that the learned conclusion that the ingredients under Section established. In that view of the matter, there i am magistrate has rightly come to the 138 of the Act are not IS no perversity in the judgment under appeal. The judgment rendered by the learn^d in C. C. No. 858 of 1997 is liable to be confirmed and it i confirmed. magistrate is. accordingly. 10. The criminal appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.” 13. A perusal of writings in Ex.PI-cheque and Ex.P3-pay-in-slip goes to show that the hand-writing in Ex.PI and Ex.P3 Signature of the accused on Ex.P1 cheque is with a different ink. Ex.P1 is in possession of P.W.1, it is for him to explain reason for it. explanation is offered by P.W.1 therefor. From the above are similar. Since No an inference can be drawn that the contents of Ex.Pt-cheque were filled up by the complainant at a later stage without consent of the accused. Furthermore, the complainant has not filed any civil suit for recovery of amount due under Ex.P4-promissory note, and the complainant has not examined either scribe or attestor of the promissory note to support his version.In the absence of the said same and in the light of the difference in hand-writing and ink in the rest of the body of the cheque and the signature of the accused thereon, and as writing in Ex.P1 does not belong to the accused, it can be inferred that P.W.1 obtained cheque and thereafter filled up contents thereof without knowledge of the accused. In view of the above, it can be held that the blank consent or 9 accused rebutted the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act did not give consent to fill and words and also the date portion, came to a conclusion that there is as he up the cheque for a particular amount in figures The learned Magistrate rightly no legally enforceable debt and accordingly acquitted the accused of the aforesaid impugned judgment passed by the learned Magistrate is on correct lines and there are no compelling or substantial reasons to interfere with the Order of acquittai passed by the triai Court, devord of merit and the same is liabie to be dismissed. offence. The The Criminal Appeal is 14. Accordingiy, the Criminai Appeai is dismissed, confirming the Judgment dated 31.12.2007, passed in C.C.No.117 of 2006 on the file of the II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Repalle. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Criminal Appeal shall stand closed. Sd/- M. RAMESH BABU iGlSTRAR DEPUTY / //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To. 1. The II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Repalle, Guntur District. 2. One CC to Sri Nimmagadda Satyanarayana, Advocate [ 3. One CC to Dr Challa Srinivasa Reddy, Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CC's to The Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Amaravati [OUT] 5. The Section Officer, Criminal Section Amaravati. 6. Two CD Copies [OPUC] Pradesh at High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Sam RAM HIGH COURT DATED;24/04/2025 JUDGMENT CRLA.No.553 of 2008 S’ V 5 2 0 SEP 2025 m *9, DISMISSING THE CRLA