1 2025:CGHC:17579 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 226 of 2025 1 - Shishir Pandey S/o Shivkumar Pandey Aged About 33 Years Police Chowki- Purur, District- Balod (Chhattisgarh) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Balod, District Balod (Chhattisgarh) 2 - Manish Kumar Sahu S/o Chainlal Sahu Aged About 25 Years Resident Of Samta Colony, Balod, Tahsil And District Balod (Chhattisgarh) --- Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate For Respondent/State : Ms. Laxmeen Kashyap, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 16/04/2025 1. The petitioner has filed the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 against the order dated 02.12.2024, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balod, in Criminal Case No. 2651 of 2024, VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2025.07.01 10:48:06 +0530 2 whereby the criminal complaint case against the petitioner for the offence under Sections 294, 325/34 of IPC is registered. The instant petition is also for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding of the aforesaid criminal case pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balod. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a Police Sub- Inspector and was posted at Police Station Balod on 05.06.2021. On that day, when he was on patrolling duty, they found two persons coming on their motorcycle, which was driven by respondent No.2 by rashly and negligently and his friend Rakesh Sahu was pillion rider. They were in drunken state of liquor and raised quarrel with the police personnel and also inflicted injuries to them by hand and fists. They deterred the police personnel from discharging the public duty and then an FIR of Crime No. 168 of 2021, for the offence under Sections 294, 353, 186 and 34 of IPC was registered on 05.06.2021 on the complaint made by the petitioner and the respondent No.2 and his friend Rakesh Sahu are being prosecuted for the said offence. 3. On 21.06.2021, the respondent No.2/complainant made a written complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Balod that the petitioner has brutally assaulted him by exercising his powers of police personnel, took them to police station and beaten them. By the assault made by the petitioner, they received grievous injuries on their body. Their request has not given any heed by the police personnel and they could be released from the police custody by the Court. When no action was 3 taken by the police on the complaint made by him, the respondent No.2 lodged a complaint case before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balod under Section 200 of CRPC on 20.12.2021 against the petitioner and constable Chulendra Kurre for the offence under Sections 294, 324, 325, 427, 34 of IPC. 4. The learned trial Court has recorded the statement of the complainant and his friend Rakesh Sahu and called the police report from the concerned police station. The police report dated 12.12.2023 was submitted before the learned trial Court from Police Station Balod. After hearing the parties and considering the police report submitted by the Police Station Balod, the learned trial Court has passed the order on 02.12.2024 and directed for registration of the complaint case against the petitioner and co-accused Chulendra Kurre for the offence under Sections 294, 325, 34 of IPC, which is under challenge in the present petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the respondent No.2 has filed a complaint case against the petitioner only to harass him, which is a counterblast against the FIR, which has been registered against him. The petitioner in discharge of his official duty, while he was on patrolling, found the respondent No.2 in drunken state and driving the vehicle and when he stopped them, the respondent No.2 started creating nuisance and assaulting him. With the intervention of other constables and persons of the vicinity, he could be saved. The petitioner has not assaulted the respondent No.2, rather 4 in discharge of his official duty, he acted. The respondent No.2 has lodged his complaint after about 15 days of the incident, which itself shows that the same has been lodged with mala fide intention and to save himself from the FIR, which has been registered against him. He would further submit that, the learned trial Court has called a report from the concerned police station, who submitted their report on 12.12.2023, in which it has been clearly mentioned that the respondent No.2 in order to save himself, lodged a false complaint against the petitioner and therefore, no offence is prima facie made out against the petitioner for registration of the complaint case. He would further submit that in the present criminal miscellaneous petition, reply has been filed by the State supported by an affidavit of Mr. Ravishankar Pandey, Station House Officer, Police Station Balod, who also submitted the inquiry report dated 12.12.2023 before the learned trial Court. In the inquiry report submitted by him, he found no offence committed by the petitioner, whereas in the reply, he supported the case of the respondent No.2, which itself is contradictory. It is also submitted by him that in the MLC report of the respondent No.2, he was found in drunken state, which further supports the allegation that the respondent No.2 was found driving the vehicle in drunken state in rashly and negligently. He would also submit that the petitioner was discharging his official duty and entitled for protection as provided under Section 197 of the CRPC and without prior sanction for prosecution, the complaint case cannot be registered, therefore, the 5 impugned order dated 02.12.2024 and the entire criminal proceedings is liable to be quashed. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposed the prayer made by the petitioner and submitted that there is sufficient prima facie evidence against the petitioner for registration of the offence. The allegation against the petitioner involved various aspects of the factual issue, which needs evidence. The learned trial Court after considering the discrepancies in the police report as well as in the complaint and the statement of the respondent No.2 ordered for registration of the complaint case, in which there is no illegality. She would further submit that the allegation of assault upon the respondent No.2 is leveled against the petitioner, which does not come under the discharging of public duty and therefore, protection under Section 197 of CRPC is not available to the petitioner. There is no infirmity or illegality in registration of the complaint case, and therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 8. From perusal of the documents annexed with the petition and the complaint dated 21.06.2021 made by the complainant to the Superintendent of Police, Balod (Annexure P/2), it reveals that the respondent No.2 has made allegation against the petitioner that by using the power of his police force, he stopped him on the mid of the road, started misbehaving him and brutally assaulted him by hand and 6 fists. When his brother Rakesh Sahu intervened, he too was being assaulted by him. It is also alleged that by the assault made by the petitioner, he received grievous injuries on his body and they were kept in police lockup, where other police persons have also assaulted him and they were subjected to police atrocities. Since the petitioner is the Police Sub-Inspector of the same police station, his complaint has not been heard and the FIR has been registered against him. It is also alleged that the petitioner was not in his uniform, when he was being stopped by them. The complainant/respondent No.2 reiterated his complaint and the act of the petitioner in his statement made before the learned trial Court in the complaint case, which has been supported by his brother Rakesh Sahu, who is also one of the victims. Though in the police report dated 12.12.2023, it is reported that the respondent No.2 has filed the complaint case in order to save himself from the police report, but in view of the fact that the petitioner is a Sub-Inspector posted at the same police station, the genuineness of the report is required to be tested during the examination of the witnesses. 9. From perusal of the reply filed by the State, it reflects that the concerned Station House Officer has made statement on the basis of the material available on record and supported the order passed by the learned trial Court, as the same is a judicial order. Even if, the respondent No.2 was found to be in drunken state and driving the vehicle in such condition, the allegation of assault and injuries on his body cannot be said to be the discharge of the official duty of the 7 petitioner subject to rebuttal in cross-examination of the complainant. In the MLC report of the respondent No.2, injuries have been found on his body, which supported the allegation made by him against the petitioner and this Court finds that there is sufficient prima facie material available on record to register the complaint case and to proceed with the trial. 10. Whether or not, the petitioner is discharging his official duty and he is entitled for protection under Section 197 of CRPC, has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of Orissa, through- Kumar Raghvendra Singh and others v. Ganesh Chandra Jew” 2004 (8) SCC 40 and held in para 7 that:- “7. The protection given under Section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the 8 objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit 9 the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty, if the answer to his question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case.” 11. In the matter of “Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh” 2013 (15) SCC 624, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- “54. A careful reading of the above would show that protection against prosecution will be available only if the following ingredients are satisfied: (i) The person concerned is or was a Judge or Magistrate or public servant. (ii) Such person is not removable from his office save by the sanction of the Government. (iii) Such person is accused of commission of an offence. (iv) Such offence is committed while the person concerned was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. 10 55. There is in the instant case no dispute that the first three of the four e requirements set out above are satisfied inasmuch as the respondent public servant was not removable from the office held by him save by or with the sanction of the Government and that he is accused of the commission of offences punishable under the Penal Code. What constituted the essence of the forensic debate at the Bar was whether the offences allegedly committed by the respondents were committed while he was "acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty". The words "acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" appearing in Section 197 are critical not only in the case at hand but in every other case where the accused invokes the protection of that provision. What is the true and correct interpretation of that provision is no longer res integra. The provision has fallen for consideration on several occasions before this Court. Reference to all those decisions may be unnecessary for the law has been succinctly summed up in the few decisions to which we shall presently refer. But before we do so we may point out that the expression "official duty" appearing in Section 197 has not been defined. The dictionary meaning of the expression would, therefore, be useful for understanding the expression both literally and contextually. 56. The term "official" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as under: 11 "official. (1) Of or relating to an office or position of trust or authority <official duties>." The term "office" is defined in the same dictionary as under: "office. (1) A position of duty, trust, or authority, esp. one conferred by a governmental authority for a public purpose <the office of attorney general>." 57. Law Lexicon also gives a similar meaning to the expressions "official" and "office" as under: "Official.... As adjective, belonging to an officer: of a public officer; in relation to the duties of office." "office.- ...." The word 'office' refers to the place where business is transacted….” 58. The term "duty" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary in the following words: "duty. (1) A legal obligation that is owed or due to another and that needs to be satisfied; an obligation for which somebody else has a corresponding right." 59. The expression "official duty" would in the absence of any statutory definition, therefore, denote a duty that arises by reason of an office or position of trust or authority held by a person. It follows that in 12 every case where the question whether the accused was acting in discharge of his official duty or purporting to act in the discharge of such a duty arises for consideration, the court will first examine whether the accused was holding an office and, if so, what was the nature of duties cast upon him as holder of any such office. It is only when there is a direct and reasonable nexus between the nature of the duties cast upon the public servant and the act constituting an offence that the protection under Section 197 CrPC may be available and not otherwise. Just because the accused is a public servant is not enough. A reasonable connection between his duties as a public servant and the acts complained of is what will determine whether he was acting in discharge of his official duties or purporting to do so, even if the acts were in excess of what was enjoined upon him as a public servant within the meaning of that expression under Section 197 of the Code. 66. Public functionaries cannot under the cloak of purported discharge of official duties resort to harassment and humiliation of the citizens on the pretext of a complaint having been received by them, especially when the same does not disclose the commission of any offence triable by the Executive Magistrate or cognizable by the police; nor was there any other proceeding in connection with which such conduct could be justified in law. The plea of the 13 respondent that the prosecution was barred under Section 197 CrPC has, therefore, to be rejected.” 12. Further, in the matter of “D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain” 2020 (7) SCC 695, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 67, 72 and 73 has held that:- “67. Every offence committed by a police officer does not attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. The protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act has its limitations. The protection is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and official duty is not merely a cloak for the objectionable act. An offence committed entirely outside the scope of the duty of the police officer, would certainly not require sanction. ……... 72. On the question of the stage at which the Trial Court has to examine whether sanction has been obtained and if not whether the criminal proceedings should be nipped in the bud, there are diverse decisions of this Court. 73. While this Court has, in D.T. Virupakshappa (supra) held that the High Court had erred in not setting aside an order of the Trial Court taking cognizance of a complaint, in exercise of the power 14 under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, in Matajog Dobey (supra) this Court held it is not always necessary that the need for sanction under Section 197 is to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. The complainant may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty and/or under colour of duty. However the facts subsequently coming to light in course of the trial or upon police or judicial enquiry may establish the necessity for sanction. Thus, whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined at any stage of the proceedings.” 13. It is the case of the complainant that on the date of incident, the petitioner/accused have brutally assaulted him and his companion Rakesh Sahu, by which they received injuries. The injuries on the body of the complainant have been supported by their MLC reports. The complainant allegation that by using the powers, the petitioner/accused took them to police station, humiliated, abused and assaulted them. Though the complainant was found in drunken state and driving the vehicle, the petitioner had already taken action against them, but assaulting the complainant and his companion in the police station and humiliating them, as alleged by the complainant are not under the discharging of the official duty and the same requires trial. 15 14. From the aforesaid considerations, this Court do not find any illegality or perversity in the order impugned, by which the complaint case filed by the respondent No.2 has been registered. The allegation against the petitioner contains with various factual aspects of the case, which needs evidence and at this stage, it cannot be said that a false allegation has been leveled by the complainant against the petitioner. 15. Accordingly, the present petition being devoid of merits, liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved