1 2025:CGHC:20472 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1359 of 2025 • Ramavtar Sahu S/o Thandaram Sahu Aged About 53 Years Resident Of Choice Tailors Parsabhantha, Balco Nagar, Korba, Tahsil And District Korba (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus • Gulab Chand S/o Late Shri Chaitram Kurrey Aged About 42 Years Resident Of Nawadha Chowk, Belgiri Basti, Parsabhantha, Balco Nagar, Korba, Tahsil And District Korba (C.G.) ... Respondent For Petitioner : Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Order On Board 05/05/2025 1. Heard. 2. The appellant has filed this Petition under Section 419(4) of the BNSS, 2023 for grant of special leave to Appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 18.02.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korba, District Korba (C.G.) in Criminal Case No.269/2023, whereby PRIYANKA VERMA Digitally signed by PRIYANKA VERMA Date: 2025.05.07 14:20:22 +0530 2 the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, “the NI Act”). 3. As per the averments in the complaint, the complainant and the respondent/accused were acquainted with each other. It has been averred that the complainant runs a business in the name of Choice Tailors at Balco Nagar, Korba and for domestic purposes he has given loan to the respondent/accused in cash on 11.08.2019 of Rs.70,000/-, on 08.06.2020 of Rs.1,00,000/-, and further given a cash loan of Rs.1,55,000/-, in aggregate he has given Rs.3,25,000/-. Thereafter, for repayment of the aforesaid amount, the respondent/accused issued a cheque dated 19.12.2022 of Rs.3,25,000/- (Ex-P/1). However, when the said cheque was presented for encashment, the same got dishonoured vide Ex-P/2. Thereafter, a legal notice (Ex-P/6) was sent. However, even after the said notice, payment was not made by the respondent. Hence, the complaint was filed. 4. Learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence available on record, acquitted the respondent/accused. Hence, this Petition has been filed for grant of leave. 5. At the outset, learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant submits that the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective, though there is a legal presumption under Sections 139 & 118 of the NI Act. 6. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 3 7. In the matter of Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 9 SCC 731], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a matter of Appeal against acquittal, the High Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court is a more probable one. However, while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, it is free to consider the entire evidence on record so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. It is also entitled to consider as to whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court has failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and has taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. 8. Further, in the matter of V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala, (2006) 10 SCC 617, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court said that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. It is further held that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is 4 ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. It was also observed that the principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 9. In the matter of Rajesh Jain vs. Ajay Singh, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 148, the law relating to the effect of legal presumption as per Section 118 and Section 139 of the NI Act has been clarified. As per Section 118 of the NI Act it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and as per Section 139 of the Act “unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability. Both the presumptions are rebuttable in nature. 10.Reverting back to the facts of the present case, the complainant has categorically admitted that at the time of giving loans on 11.08.2019 of Rs.70,000/-, on 08.06.2020 of Rs.1,00,000/- and subsequent loan of Rs.1,55,000/-, no document or receipt has been obtained from the respondent/accused. The respondent/accused has taken a specific defence that he has obtained only a cash loan of Rs.70,000/- on 11.08.2019 and he has already repaid more than Rs.1,00,000/- to the 5 complainant in installments and that the complainant has executed an agreement of sale of malama of his house situated at Belgiri Basti, Balco Nagar, Korba on 23.08.2019 vide Ex-P/5 for consideration of Rs.70,000/-. From the evidence on record, it appears that the said transaction i.e. Ex-P/5 is a mortgage transaction and not a loan transaction. When the complainant executed a document (Ex-P/5) at the time of the initial loan, there was no reason for advancing a larger amount of cash loan. The appellant also fails to establish as to why he has not obtained any cash receipt and not executed any document in his favour. In such circumstances, the whole transaction appears to be dubious, consequent to which, a finding of acquittal has been recorded. 11.For the foregoing, this Court is of the view that no case is made out for grant of leave and the view taken by the trial Court is a possible one. 12.Resultantly, the Petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Priyanka