1 2025:CGHC:20537 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1533 of 2025 1 - Ramkumar @ Kali Rai S/o Shri Late Chhatilal Rai ( C.L. Rai) Aged About 48 Years R/o Quarter No.- 4/a, Road No.-20, Sector-7, Bhilai, P.S., - Bhilai Nagar Kotwali, Sector-6, Tahsil And District - Durg (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its District Magistrate Durg, By P.S. Incharge Utai District - Durg (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Suresh Kumar Pandey, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Ms. Laxmeen Kashyap, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 05/05/2025 1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 528 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNSS”) for quashing of the entire proceedings of the Criminal Case No. RCC 7528/2023 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, for the offence under Sections 420, 406, 120-B and 34 of IPC. The petitioner made the following prayer in the petition:- "It is therefore kindly prayed that may please This Hon'ble Court be kind enough to allow the instant CRMP and further be pleased to quashed the entire proceedings against the 2 Petitioner got pending before Hon'ble JMFC Durg District Durg (C.G.)., presided by Smt. Sweta Patel captioned case as State of Chhattisgarh Vesus Ramkumar @Kali, punishable under Section 420,406,120(B),34 IPC as per Criminal Case R.C.C. No. 7528/2023 arising out of the Crime No. 428/2018, with its all ancilliary effects, by set assiding the order impugned passed by both the Court below passed in the Application for discharging and further the order passed in the Criminal Revision, in the interest of justice." 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is one of the accused persons in the case. On the complaint made by the complainant Sayra Begam, Branch Manager, Dena Bank, Indira Market Branch, Durg, an FIR of Crime No. 428/2018 was registered against the petitioner and another co- accused Archi Bold Morries for the offences under Sections 420, 406, 120-B and 34 of IPC. It is alleged in the complaint that the proprietor of Rama Talkies, namely Smt. Ramabai Deshlahre was granted a term loan of Rs. 2 lakh in the year 1994 and Rs. 5 lakhs on 22.06.2002, and he kept her land of Khasra No. 383/6 Area 0.20 Hec. situated at Village- Utai, Tahsil and Dist- Durg, as a security for the loan. Since she has failed to repay the amount of the loan, on 09.12.2006, the Bank has taken possession of the said land under the SARFAESI Act. The co-accused Archi Bold Morries, who is the purchaser of the said land, without paying the bank loan, introduced Lakhan Lal Deshlahre as guarantor and made a complaint with respect to the missing Rin Pustika of the land and obtained a duplicate Rin Pustika and the purchaser Archi Bold Morries obtained a loan of Rs. 2 lakhs in the year 1998 by mortgaging the said land of Khasra No. 383/6, Area 0.20 Hec. Archi Bold Morries and the present petitioner, Ram Kumar Rai, have got the sale deed registered in his name with respect to the mortgaged property of Khasra No. 383/6, Area 0.20 Hec. whereas the original documents of the said land are still with the Bank. On the report, the FIR has been registered and after the investigation charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, 3 First Class, Durg against the petitioner Ram Kumar Rai and two other co- accused persons who have already died. 3. During the proceedings of the criminal case, on 24.07.2024, the petitioner filed an application under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. for his discharge from the case. In the application, he submitted that the land which has been purchased by the petitioner is of Khasra No. 1008, which is the new number of the land, and the old Khasra No. of the land was 383/8. From the document annexed with the petitioner Annexure-A/1 to A/4 it clearly reveals that the old Khasra No. 383/8 is renumbered as 1008 whereas the old Khasra No. 383/6 (subject land) is renumbered as Khasra No. 1009 and therefore, a false allegation have been leveled against the petitioner and the subject property is different than the property purchase by the petitioner. The said application filed by the petitioner under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. was rejected by the learned trial Court vide its order dated 13.09.2024, holding that the grounds raised by the petitioner are the subject matter of the evidence. 4. The order dated 13.09.2024 was challenged by the petitioner by filing Criminal Revision No. 267/2024 before the learned Sessions Judge, Durg. After hearing the parties, the criminal revision filed by the petitioner has been dismissed vide order dated 13.01.2025, which is under challenge in the present petition. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the learned Trial Court as well as the Revisional Court has failed to consider that no prima facie case against the petitioner is made out from the material produced by the prosecution along with the charge-sheet. He would further submit that even if the uncontroverted allegations made in the charge-sheet are taken as it is, no offence either of cheating or conspiracy is made out against him. From the revenue documents, it is established that the petitioner has purchased the land of Khasra No. 1008 and its old Khasra No. was 4 383/8, whereas the subject land in the present case is the Khasra No. 383/6, which has been renumbered as Khasra No. 1009 and thus, it is established that the petitioner has not purchased any mortgaged land and therefore, the entire proceeding of the criminal case against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would oppose the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submit that there is an allegation of conspiracy between the accused persons that the co-accused Archi Bold Morries produced Lakhan Lal Deshlahre as guarantor and after making a complaint of the missing of the Rin Pustika of Lakhan Lal with respect to Khasra No. 383/6, Area 0.20 Hec., obtained duplicate Rin Pushtika and mortgaged with the Bank in the year 1998 and obtained loan of Rs. 2 lakhs and thereafter, Archi Bold Morries and the present petitioner Ram Kumar Rai have got the sale deed registered of the said land of Khasra No. 383/6, Area- 0.20 Hec. in the name of the present petitioner. The renumbering of the land, mortgage of the subject land of the bank, obtaining the duplicating Rin Pushtika by Lakhan Lal, and ownership of the land are disputed questions of fact which are to be decided after recording evidence of witnesses. There is sufficient evidence in the charge-sheet against the petitioner with respect to conspiracy and cheating, and the proceedings of the criminal case are not liable to be quashed. The learned trial Court as well as the Revisional Court have rightly passed the order and rejected the application filed by the petitioner, which needs no interference. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 8. From the complaint made by the complainant Bank, it reveals that the land of Khasra No. 383/6, Area 0.20 Hec was mortgaged with the Bank and the Bank has taken possession of the said land on 09.12.2006 under the SARFAESI Act, and the co-accused Archi Bold Morries produced Lakhan Lal 5 Deshlahre as guarantor and obtained a loan of Rs. 2 lakh by making a complaint of missing the Rin Pustika and obtaining duplicate Rin Pustika and thereafter sold the land to the present petitioner. As per the allegation made by the Bank, the subject land is still in the possession of the Bank, and it was the mortgage property having the original document with them. The renumbering of the old Khasra number into the new Khasra number, the identification of the land, obtaining the duplicate Rin Pustika, mortgaging the subject land with the Bank, and the execution of the sale deed with respect to the subject land are disputed questions of fact. Though the details of renumbering are shown in the revenue documents, which are annexed with the petition also but the same requires evidence to prove the identity of the land that has actually been purchased by the petitioner or mortgaged with the Bank. 9. In the case of N. Sundaram Vs. P.K. Pounraj and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 616, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 13, has held that: “13. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any court and to secure the ends of justice. [See State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal] The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC. [See MCD Vs. Ram Kishann Rohtagi] An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance.” [See Vinod Raghuvanshi Vs. Ajay Arora] 10. In the matter of Captain Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf and Others 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgment that:- 12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) 6 "11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to f sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526) '25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22, para 20) "29....... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have the offence on t committed the the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge, though 7 for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." " 11. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgment that:- 21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms: (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) "12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-42) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which.... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot 8 show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.' 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan wherein it was held as under. (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) '10... ..If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact. It is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter of into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the 9 evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him." 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar, this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) '19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 9 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face valuc disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. 10 (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.' " 12. In the present case, there are allegations against the petitioner that he conspired with the other accused persons and got the sale deed registered of the subject land in his favour, which was the mortgaged property with the Bank. From the statement of Naresh Kumar Deshlahre, Smt. Rama Bai, Sayra Begam (Branch Manager of the Bank), Smt. Padmani Meshram (Branch Manager of Bhilai Nagrik Sahkari Maryadit Bank, Sector-6, Bhilai Nagar), there is sufficient evidence against the petitioner in the charge-sheet to proceed with the trial of the case and to frame the charge. The learned trial Court as well as the revisional Court have also considered the evidence available on the record and rejected the application for discharge filed by the petitioner. 13. After having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, material annexed with the petition as well as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with respect to the framing of charge and continuation of the proceedings of the criminal case, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order to interfere with the same while invoking the inherent powers of this Court and to quash the entire proceeding of the criminal case. 14. Accordingly, the present Cr.M.P. lacks merit, liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Sagrika SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2025.06.03 11:05:18 +0530