1 2025:CGHC:59978 The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full - - -- 12.12.2025 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 335 of 2006 1 - (Abated) Bhupat Lal (Died) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 16-06- 2025 2 - Manikchand Bakliwal S/o Bhawarlal Bakliwal Aged About 60 Years R/o Podibahar, Korba 3 - (Abated) Dhanji Bhai Varu (Died) (As Per Honble Court Order Dated 10-02-2025) 4 - Rajesh Kumar S/o Arjun Das Jain Aged About 47 Years R/o Dalal Building, Railway Road, Rohtak (Hariyana) --- Appellants versus 2 1 - Union of India Through Central Bureau of Investigation, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh. --- Respondent(s) With CRA No. 340 of 2006 1 - Subhash Chand Jain (Abated) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 16-06-2025 2 - P.C. Jain S/o Late P.S. Jain Aged About 53 Years R/o 27-A, New Friends Colony, Delhi ---Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - Union of India, through The Central Investigation Bureau, Jabalpur Madhya Pradesh --- Respondent(s) For Appellants : Mr. B.P. Sharma, along with Mr. M.L. Sakat, Mr. Pushp Kumar Gupta and Mr. Mayur Khandelwal, Advocates For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vaibhav Goverdhan, Advocate Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Judgment on Board 10.12.2025 1. Since both the appeals arise out of a single impugned judgment they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. These appeals under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal 3 Procedure have been preferred assailing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.05.2006 passed by Special Judge, (C.B.I.), Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 40/2004. By the impugned judgment, the appellants have been convicted under Sections 120-B, 420, 468/471 of the IPC and under Section 5 (1)(d) and 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.10,000/- under Section 120-B of the I.P.C., to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs.1 lakh under Section 420 I.P.C., to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs.1 lakh under Section 468/471 I.P.C. and to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each under Section 5 (1)(d) and 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. It was further directed that in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional R.I. for six months under Section 120-B of the I.P.C., to undergo additional RI for one and half years under Section 420 IPC, to undergo further RI for one and half years under Section 468/471 IPC and to undergo additional RI for six months under Section 5(1)(d) and 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 3. During the pendency of this appeal, appellants Dhanji Bhai Varu, Bhupal Lal, and Subhash Chand Jain passed away. Consequently, the appeal, insofar as it related to them stands abated vide orders dated 10.02.2025 and 16.06.2025, respectively. Accordingly, this judgment is being delivered today 4 only in respect of the surviving appellants namely Manikchand Bakliwal, Rajesh Kumar, and P.C. Jain. 4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that during the years 1980 -82, there existed a firm known as M/s Bhilai Motors, which was engaged in the business of Tata trucks and was an authorized dealer of TELCO. The prosecution has alleged that the appellants herein, along with a few other persons, were in charge of the affairs of the said firm and during the relevant period one G.S. Behl was serving as the Branch Manager of Punjab & Sind Bank, Raipur. It is alleged that the appellants and the said Branch Manager conspired to cheat the bank and, in furtherance of their conspiracy, prepared false and fabricated documents. After depositing the margin money for the purchase of four truck chassis, they allegedly caused their loan applications to be forwarded to the Head Office of Punjab & Sind Bank, New Delhi, and ultimately obtained a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs, which subsequently increased to Rs. 55.54 lakhs. Upon receiving information regarding these acts, the prosecuting agency (i.e., the respondent herein) registered Case No. RC 25/85 on 04.04.1985 against various accused persons, including the appellants, for offences punishable under Sections 120B and 468/471 of the IPC read with Section 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellants 5 before the competent Court of the CBI. The learned trial Court thereafter framed charges, which the appellants denied, pleading not guilty and seeking trial. 5. In order to prove the charges against the accused/appellants, the prosecution examined 25 witnesses. The statements of the accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied all incriminating circumstances, asserting their innocence and alleging false implication. In defence, the appellants examined one witness namely Daljeet Singh Tuteja (D.W.-1). 6. Upon consideration and evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both sides, the learned trial Court found the prosecution story reliable and by judgment dated 02.05.2006 convicted and sentenced the appellants in the manner stated in para 2 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in the absence of sufficient and clinching evidence on record, the learned trial Court has erred in convicting the appellants. It is argued that no material has been produced to establish that the accused had entered into any criminal conspiracy with each other, nor is there any evidence to show that in furtherance of such alleged conspiracy, they committed cheating upon the Punjab National Bank. It is further contended that the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellants prepared any forged document or used 6 any such document knowing it to be forged. According to the counsel, there is no mens rea attributable to the appellants. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence on record. Despite recording a finding that the appellants were not the beneficiaries of the loan amount, the trial Court has erroneously held them responsible for causing loss to the Bank. It is urged that the loss allegedly suffered by the Bank has already been recovered with interest. The Investigating Officer was not examined before the trial Court, which, according to the appellants, is fatal to the prosecution case and the benefit of this lapse ought to have been extended to them. The learned trial Court, on the same set of facts, acquitted the co-accused Raj Kumar Jain but illegally convicted the present appellants. It is contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and that no independent witness has been examined to substantiate the allegations. Hence, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. It is also submitted that the entire loan amount was deposited by the accused/appellants in the year 2013–2014, and the Bank has settled the dispute. Punjab and Sind Bank issued a letter dated 28.03.2013 discharging the appellants from liability as borrowers and guarantors in various accounts which was filed along with a covering memo dated 10.02.2025. Hence, it is submitted that the appellants are entitled to acquittal. 7 Alternatively, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the incident pertains to the period between 1980 and 1982. After filing of the charge-sheet, the matter remained pending before the CBI Court, Jabalpur (M.P.) from 1986 to 2000 and thereafter it was transferred to the CBI Court, Raipur, (C.G.) indicating that the case has remained pending for nearly 39 years. The present appeal has been pending since 2006. During the pendency of the appeal, appellants Bhupat Lal, Dhanji Bhai Varu and Subhash Chand Jain expired, leading to abatement of the appeal against them. The surviving appellants are senior citizens who have faced prolonged litigation before various courts for nearly four decades and they have already remained in jail for about 4 days. In view of these circumstances, it is prayed that the the appellants may be sentenced to the period already undergone by them by enhancing the fine amount suitably. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Bharthi Devi and another v. State of Telangana and another, AIR 2024 SC 5027; Suresh C. Singal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2025 SC 1909; and the judgment of this Court dated 16.06.2023 rendered in CRA No. 1250 of 1999 (Ramavtar Gupta and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, now Chhattisgarh). 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed 8 by the learned trial Court is legal, proper and fully justified and thus calls for no interference by this Court. It is therefore contended that both the appeals, being devoid of merit are liable to be dismissed. 9. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 10. Before the learned trial Court, it was an admitted position that during the period 1980–1982, accused G.S. Behl was posted as Branch Manager at the Punjab & Sind Bank, Raipur Branch. During his tenure, he sanctioned loans in favour of accused Rajesh Kumar, Bhupatlal Kashinath, and Dhanjibhai, who were partners of M/s Bilaspur Raipur Transport Company, Bhilai Motors, Raipur, M/s United Transport Company, Korba, M/s Bhilai Raipur Transport Company and M/s Jagdalpur Goods Carrier. In all four loan transactions, the guarantor was accused S.C. Jain. 11. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court acquitted co-accused Rajkumar Jain while convicting the remaining accused/appellants for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 420 and 468/471 of the IPC as well as Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 12. In para 53 of judgment dated 02.05.2006, learned trial Court held as under:- “……….. इन न⡍य⼾य⼾ द♃ኋ識त⑋ कᕇ आल㉋ कᕇ े䜰 अभⴿय⼾्䴹 ज᱀. एस. बहल㉋, 9 पत⑋ल㉋ल㉋ परぇख, े䜰भⴿनकᕇचᨂद बकᕇल㉋व㔾ल㉋, धन⡍ቔ咍 ई व㔾रぁ एव㔾 रぇज᱀शकᕇ े䜰रぇ ज᱀(न कᕇ आचᨂरぇण स उनकᕇ भⴿव㔾रあ्䵍 अने䜰न भⴿनकᕇल㉋ ज᱀ सकᕇत⑋ ह(। त⑋थ┾ इन अभⴿय⼾्䴹/ व㕍दरぇ ल㉋ ह कᕇ ई सद ष ल㉋ ቚ媋्䵎भⴿकᕇए ज᱀न कᕇ ቚ媋त⑍य⼾्䵌 सቌ䲚य⼾ न ह भⴿकᕇन⡍त⑋ उनकᕇ कᕇय⼾7 स पज᱀ब एड ि㼺सध ब:कᕇ कᕇ 40,00,000/- रあपय⼾ कᕇ; सद ष हभⴿन पह<चᨂन कᕇ, एव㔾 उनकᕇ स㡍व㔾े䜰 सषचᨂद ज᱀(न कᕇ 40,00,000/- रあपय⼾ कᕇ भⴿव㔾ि㼺ध- भⴿव㔾रぁ्䵍 ल㉋ቚ媋्䵎 ह न कᕇ ቚ媋त⑋ सቌ䲚य⼾ ह( ।" 13. In the matter of Suresh C. Singal (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court held in paras 20 and 21 as under:- “20. Now coming to the case in hand, we have already observed that the dispute involved in primarily of civil nature The aggrieved party, if any, would have been the Bank which has no grievance against the Appellants. Further, no loss has been caused to the Bank as is apparent from the calculations presented by the appellants before this Court. Not only the principal amount has been returned but an amount over and above thereto, on the basis of the settlement, has been received by the Bank. The case is at the very initial stage with the chargesheet having been filed Keeping in view the observations made by this court in Narinder Singh (supra), in the facts of this case, it can safely be said that the criminal case which has been sought to be projected and proceeded with against the Appellants has an overwhelming and pre-dominant civil character arising out of pure commercial transaction where the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst 10 themselves. 21. In the light of the fact that the allegations against the Bank Manager relating to his involvement in the commission of offences, which has been alleged against the Appellants, having not been substantiated, the possibility of conviction of the appellants is remote and bleak Continuation of these criminal proceedings would put the Appellants to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to them by not quashing the criminal proceedings. It would not be out of place to mention here that, in the present case, the proceeding for settlement was not only initiated but the finalization thereof in the form of settlement took place prior to the filing of the chargesheet against the Appellants by the CBI.” 14. The appellants filed a copy of the Bank’s letter dated 14.03.2013 issued by Punjab & Sind Bank to Shri Prabhash Jain, Shri Siddharth Jain and the legal heirs of Shri Siddharth Jain. The relevant portion of the said letter reads as under:- “…….Reg: Your proposal for settlement under OTS-176 accounts of RC Jain Group. With reference to your offer letter dated 22.09.12 for one time settlement of group accounts and sanction thereof conveyed vide letter dated 20.11.2012. In compliance to one of the terms of settlement, Rs. 200 lacs were to be deposited by you. We acknowledge the receipt of Rs. 200 lac as per settlement terms. You may collect the title documents of 11 mortgaged properties (Faridabad and Ludhiana) kept in the account of M/S.P.S. Jain Motor Co. Pb. from Bo H- Block Con. Cir. New Delhi. Title documents of Jalandhar property will be released to Sh. Sarvjit Singh Samra as per Tripartite Agreement. Further, You stand discharged from liabilities towards bank as borrower and as guarantor in various accounts at Sr. No. 1 to 145 at pages 1 to 4 and at Sr. no. 1 to 15 at pages 5 and 6 of the enclosed list. It may be noted that you shall withdraw all proceedings, complaints, if any, initiated against the bank and pending in any Court of Law or Judicial fora. Further please note that amount received in one of the terms of settlement is in respect of Civil Recovery Matters only and the Criminal proceedings, if any, shall continue ill its logical end.” 15. Thus, it is evident that the aggrieved party Punjab & Sind Bank has no subsisting grievance against the appellants. The Bank has already recovered its dues and has released all sureties and other liabilities pertaining to the appellants. 16. A minute examination of the entire oral as well as documentary evidence on record reveals that the loans in question were sanctioned to the firms of the appellants. Upon due appreciation of the evidence, the learned trial Court rightly convicted the appellants for the alleged offences. This Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellants is affirmed. 17. It is further noted that public servant G.S. Behl, Subhash Chand 12 Jain and Dhanjibhai Baru passed away during the pendency of the appeal. 18. In the matter of Ramavtar Gupta (supra) held in paras from 13 to 16 as under:- “13. The Supreme Court in T.M. Joseph (supra) has held as under: "4. Now coming to the question of sentence, there are certain circumstances which have to be taken into consideration. The occurrence took place on 6-10-75. It is nearly 16 years ago since then the accused was out of the job and has undergone the trial for number of years. It is also submitted that up till now he has not received his pension and he has a large family to maintain. Further, he is aged about 65 years. In similar circumstances; this Court in B.C. Goswami v. Delhi Administration, has observed that "appellant suffered agony and the harassment of the proceedings for over seven years and that he is also going to lose his job and has to earn for himself and his family members and for those dependent on him and, therefore, to meet the ends of justice the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone." 14. The Supreme Court in Munnilal Mochi (supra) has held thus: "13. It is not in dispute that the occurrence related to period 1982-83. Even on 01.10.2003, he retired from the post of Deputy Collector, Nalanda and stood convicted 13 by the trial Court as aforesaid only in 2004, i.e., after a long period of 21 years. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Nagendra Rai, he had undergone the ordeal of facing trial anticipating uncertainty about the nature of conviction for such a long period. It is true that the appellant was not named in the FIR. However, after a period of 5 years, when the prosecution filed a chargesheet, he was shown as 3rd accused. 14. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Rai, the appellant had reeled under the threat of being convicted and sentenced for all these 21 years. Even the High Court had taken more than 6 years to dispose of the appeal. As on date, the appellant is 71 years of age and has already undergone 6 months imprisonment. If we consider the date of occurrence, 29 years have been passed now. There is no record to show that the appellant was involved in other criminal case. Considering the case of the prosecution, namely, several illegalities and irregularities in execution of NREP which is a Scheme formulated by the Government of India, the fact that the occurrence relates to the year 1982-83, the trial went for 21 years and ended in conviction in 2004, the appellant retired from service even before conviction and his appeal was kept pending in the High Court for nearly 6 years, taking note of his present age, namely, 71 years and undergone 6 months imprisonment, we 14 feel that ends of justice would be met by modifying the sentence to the period already undergone." 15. The Supreme Court in V.K. Verma (supra) has held as follows: “8. The long delay before the courts in taking a final decision with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the accused is one of the mitigating factors for the superior courts to take into consideration while taking a decision on the quantum of sentence. As we have noted above, the FIR was registered by the CBI in 1984. The matter came before the sessions court only in 1994. The sessions court took almost ten years to conclude the trial and pronounce the judgment. Before the High Court, it took another ten years. Thus, it is a litigation of almost three decades in a simple trap case and that too involving a petty amount. 12. The appellant is now aged 76. We are informed that he is otherwise not keeping in good health, having had also cardio vascular problems. The offence is of the year 1984. It is almost three decades now. The accused has already undergone physical incarceration for three months and mental incarceration for about thirty years. Whether at this age and stage, it would not be economically wasteful, and a liability to the State to keep the appellant in prison, is the question we have to address. Having given thoughtful consideration to all the aspects of the matter, we are of the view that the facts mentioned above would certainly be 15 special reasons for reducing the substantive sentence but enhancing the fine, while maintaining the conviction." 16. The Supreme Court in Ambi Ram (supra) has held as under: "14. Reading of Section 5(2) of the PC Act shows that it provides that any public servant, who commits criminal misconduct, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. The proviso then empowers the Court to impose sentence of imprisonment of less than one year provided any special reasons are recorded in writing in support of imposing such reduce sentence of less than one year. 15. It is, therefore, clear that the Court is empowered to impose a sentence, which may vary from 1 year to 7 years with fine. However, in a particular case, the Court finds that there are some special reasons in favour of the accused then the Court is empowered to impose imprisonment of less than one year provided those special reasons are set out in writing in support of imposing sentence less than one year. So far as imposing of fine is concerned, it is mandatory while imposing any jail sentence. How much fine should be imposed depend upon the facts of each case. 16. In the case of K.P. Singh Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 15 SCC 497, this Court on somewhat similar 16 facts considered the question as to what factors/circumstances should be taken into consideration for reducing the jail sentence. 17. In his concurring opinion, Justice T.S Thakur (as his Lordship then was and later CJI) in his distinctive style of writing in detail examined this question in the light of law laid down by this Court in earlier cases on the subject and held as under: "10. Determining the adequacy of sentence to be awarded in a given case is not an easy task, just as evolving a uniform sentencing policy is a tough call. That is because the quantum of sentence that may be awarded depends upon a variety of factors including mitigating circumstances peculiar to a given case. The courts generally enjoy considerable amount of discretion in the matter of determining the quantum of sentence. In doing so, the courts are influenced in varying degrees by the reformative, deterrent and punitive aspects of punishment, delay in the conclusion of the trial and legal proceedings, the age of the accused, his physical/health condition, the nature of the offence, the weapon used and in the cases of illegal gratification the amount of bribe, loss of job and Family obligations of the accused are also some of the considerations that weigh heavily 17 with the courts while determining the sentence to be awarded. The courts have not attempted to exhaustively enumerate the considerations that go into determination of the quantum of sentence nor have the courts attempted to lay down the weight that each one of these considerations carry. That is because any such exercise is neither easy nor advisable given the myriad situations in which the question may fall for determination. Broadly speaking, the courts have recognised the factors mentioned earlier as being relevant to the question of determining the sentence. The decisions of this Court on the subject are a legion. Reference to some only should, however, suffice. 19. Given the fact that the trial and appeal proceedings have in the case at hand continued for nearly 17 years by now causing immense trauma, mental incarnation (sic incarceration) and anguish to the appellant and also given the fact that the bribe amount was just about Rs 700 and that the appellant has already undergone 71/2 months imprisonment against the statutory minimum of 6 months imprisonment, the reduction of the sentence as proposed by my esteemed Brother appears to be perfectly in order. I, therefore, concur with the view taken by his Lordship." 18 18. Keeping in view the aforementioned statement of law laid down by this Court when we examine the facts of the case at hand, we find that Firstly, the incident is of the year 1985; Secondly, this case is pending for the last 34 years; Thirdly, the appellant has now reached to the age of 78 years, Fourthly, he is suffering from heart ailment, as stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, and is also not keeping well, Fifthly, he has so far, during the trial and after suffering conviction, undergone total jail sentence of one month and 10 days, Sixthly, he has been on bail throughout for the last 34 years and did not indulge in any criminal activities nor breached any conditions of the bail granted to him, Seventhly, the bribe amount was Rs.1200/; and lastly, in the last 34 years, he has suffered immense trauma, mental agony and anguish. 19. The aforesaid 8 reasons which, in our view, are the special reasons satisfy the requirements of proviso to Section 5(2) of the PC Act. This Court, therefore, invoke the powers under proviso to Section 5(2) fo the PC Act and accordingly alter the jail sentence imposed on the appellant by the two Courts below and reduce it to "what is already undergone by the appellant", i.e., 1 month and 10 days." 19. In light of the above, in the present case also, the alleged 19 incident occurred between the years 1980 and 1982. The charge- sheet was filed in the year 1986. The matter remained pending before the learned Trial Court at Jabalpur, (M.P.) from 1986 to 2000 and thereafter before the learned Trial Court at Raipur, (C.G.). Following the impugned judgment of conviction, the present appeals have been pending before this Court since 2006. At the time of filing of the charge-sheet, the appellants Manikchand Bakliwal, Rajesh Kumar and P.C. Jain were aged about 60 years, 47 years and 53 years respectively, and as of now, all of them are senior citizens. They have already deposited the fine amount as imposed by the Trial Court and, after a lapse of about 39 years, have undergone approximately four days of incarceration. In these circumstances, it would not be appropriate to send them back to jail to undergo the remaining sentences imposed upon them. 20. This Court is of the considered view that the ends of justice would be met if, while upholding the conviction of the appellants, the substantive jail sentences awarded to them are reduced to the period already undergone, subject to enhancement of the fine amount. It is further directed that in place of the fine of Rs. 10,000/-, the appellants shall now pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- for the offence under Section 120-B IPC. The appellants have already deposited a sum of Rs. 2,20,000/- before the learned Trial Court. In addition thereto, they are directed to deposit a further sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- within two months from the date of receipt 20 of a copy of this judgment, failing which they shall undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for six months. Any amount already deposited towards fine shall be adjusted against the enhanced fine imposed today. 21. Consequently, both the appeals are partly allowed to the extent indicated above. 22. The appellants are reported to be on bail in both the appeals, therefore, their bail bonds shall remain in operation for a period of six months from today in view of provision of Section 481 of BNSS, 2023. 23. Let the record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith along with a copy of this judgment for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) JUDGE Ruchi RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHI YADAV