1 2025:CGHC:17575 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 483 of 2025 1 - Omprakash Patel S/o Barat Ram Patel Aged About 49 Years R/o Timarlaga, Police Station Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh The Applicants Are At Present Even On The Date Of Incident Were Residing At Kotra Road, Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh 2 - Jaiprakash Patel S/o Barat Ram Patel Aged About 44 Years R/o Timarlaga, Police Station Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh The Applicants Are At Present Even On The Date Of Incident Were Residing At Kotra Road, Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Sarangarh, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh 2 - Anil Kumar Sahu S/o Shankarlal Sahu Aged About 45 Years Assistant Mining Officer, Office Of Collectorate (Mining Branch), District Raigarh Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Neeraj Sharma, Dy. A.G. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 16/04/2025 1. The present criminal revision under Section 438 read with Section 442 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (in short “BNSS”) is filed by the petitioners against the order dated 28.03.2025 passed by the learned SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2025.06.09 15:14:40 +0530 2 Sessions Judge, Raigarh, in Special Criminal Case (under the Mines and Minerals) No. 17/2025, whereby the charge under Section 379 read with section 34 of IPC and Section 4, 21 read with Section 53 of the Mines and Minerals ( Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, and Chhattisgarh Minor Mineral Rules, 1996 and also under Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, have been framed against the petitioners. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioners are accused persons in Special Criminal Case (Mines and Minerals) No. 17/2025 pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Raigarh. The said criminal case is arising out of a report made by the complainant Anil Kumar Sahu, who is the Assistant Mining Officer, Raigarh, with the allegation that on patrolling, it was found that illegal mining and transporting of limestone from the land of Khasra No. 992 (divided in 992/1, 992/2, 992/3 and 992/4), Area- 0.534 Hec. situated at Village- Timarlaga, Tahsil- Sarangarh, situated on the left side of Gudeli- Chandrapur, Highway No. 153, which was owned by Jay Prakash and Om Prakash. The illegal mining and transporting of limestone were without any government license or permission. The machine used for illegal mining has been seized, the mined limestone of about 500 tons, and a truck bearing No. CG 13 W 7357, loaded with about 15 tons of limestone, has been seized. Statement of the persons who were present was recorded and found that a total of 515 tons of limestone was illegally excavated, amounting to Rs. 1,49,350/- and therefore, a report has been lodged by them. The Police has registered the offence of Crime No. 477 of 2018 on 02.08.2018 for the offence under Section 379 of IPC against two named accused persons, Baratu Ram Sidar and Amrit Patel, and also against the owners of the land. After the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against four accused persons including the present petitioners before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh, for the offence under Section 379/34 of IPC, 4, 21 of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, Section 69 and 71 of the 3 Chhattisgarh Minor Mineral Act, 2015 and Section 3/5 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. 3. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the petitioners vide order dated 28.03.2025 for the offence under Section 379 read with section 34 of IPC and Section 4, 21 read with Section 53 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, and Chhattisgarh Minor Mineral Rules, 1996 and also under Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, have been framed which is under challenge in the present petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the learned trial court has failed to consider that no prima facie case against the petitioners is made out from the material produced by the prosecution along with the charge sheet. The petitioners have no role in the matter of illegal excavation of the limestone. They have been accused only on the ground that they are the owners of the subject land. The petitioners were not present on the spot when the search was conducted. No presumption can be drawn against the petitioners that the illegal excavation was being carried out on their instance. There is no evidence on record that the petitioners have engaged in the illegal mining of limestone in any manner. They are the resident of Village- Timarlaga, which is situated at a distance of about 35-40 Kms from the place of illegal mining. He would further submit that from the statement of the witnesses, it is quite clear that the illegal excavation and mining of the limestone were being done by Baratu Sidar and Amrit Patel. In the absence of any cogent and clinching material with respect to the involvement of the petitioners, no charge can be framed, and they are entitled to their discharge. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the state opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and has submitted that although, the present petitioners were not found present on the spot but it cannot be said that without their permission the other accused persons 4 Baratu Ram and Amrit Sidar were excavating the limestone. Such a huge quantity of limestone of 515 tons, has already been excavated, in which sufficient time is being taken, and the petitioners cannot remain silent by saying that they are not in knowledge of the illegal mining of limestone in their land. Setting up the mining process and fixing the machines for mining cannot be carried out without the permission of the land owner or their knowledge. Therefore, there is sufficient material on record to frame charges against the petitioners and to proceed with the trial of the case. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material produced along with the petition. 7. At the stage of framing of charge, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for "presuming" that the accused had committed the offence: (Chitreth Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 613, para 25) "25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the 5 existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction" 17. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused of there is ground for "presuming that the offence has been committed. G.P. Mathur. J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10) "9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under:- '14. Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquity in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evadentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime." 10. The High Court, did not at all apply the relevant text, namely whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed as offence. If the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that 'as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit and further observing that the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt 6 that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 8. In the matter of Captain Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf and Others 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgment that:- 12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197- 98, para 11) "11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to f sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526) '25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The 7 parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22, para 20) "29....... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have the offence on t committed the the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge, though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." " 9. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgment that:- 21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms: (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) "12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-42) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in 8 that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which.... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is 9 so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.' 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan wherein it was held as under. (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) '10... ..If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact. It is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter of into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the 9 evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him." 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar, this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) '19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 10 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. 11 (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face valuc disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.' " 10. The Hon’ble supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- "12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima- facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial." 11. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 12 12.In the present case, it is not in dispute that the present petitioners are the owners of the land bearing Khasra No. 992 (992/1, 992/2, 992/3 and 992/4) total area- 0.534 Hec. and Khasra No. 1043/1, Area 0.388 Hec. at Village- Timarlaga, Tahsil- Sarangarh, Dist- Raigarh, which is the subject land from which the illegal mining is carried out. A total of about 515 tons of limestone was found excavated, and a truck loaded with the limestone and a machine used for the excavation of limestone were seized by the Officer of the mining department. There is prima facie evidence regarding the ownership of the subject land with the present petitioners, and they have not denied that they are not the owners of the subject land. Their submission would be that they are not aware of illegal mining on their land, and they have not permitted anyone for illegal mining of limestone from their land. They are the resident of Village- Timarlaga, which is about the distance of 40-45 Kms from the place of illegal mining, and there is no material that on their instance the other co- accused persons, Baratu Ram and Amrit Patel, were excavating the limestone. Since the petitioners were the owners of the land in which such a huge quantity of limestone of 515 tons was excavated can be considered that sufficient time is being taken to excavate the limestone which was within the knowledge of the present petitioners. Though their presence is not there on the spot but but their conduct clearly demonstrates that the present petitioners, along with the other co-accused persons, shared the common intention to excavate the limestone illegally and without any license from the government department and started excavation. The petitioners have not shown any action taken by them when they came to know about the illegal mining on their land against the person concerned. Whether the co-accused persons Baratu Sidar and Amrit Patel were indulged in illegal mining of limestone on the instance of the present petitioners or on their instance the said illegal act was conducted by them, whether the present petitioners were in knowledge of illegal mining from their land or not and their involvement in 13 the offence in question are disputed questions of fact which are to be decided after recording evidence of the witnesses. 13.After considering the material annexed with the charge sheet and evidence available on record, the trial court rightly comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient grounds for framing the charge and to proceed with the trial and has framed the charge under Section 379 read with section 34 of IPC and Section 4, 21 read with Section 53 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, and Chhattisgarh Minor Mineral Rules, 1996 and also under Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 which cannot be said to be either perverse or contrary to the facts of the case calling for an interference invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 438 and 442 of BNSS conferred upon this court. 14.In the result, the petition does not have any merit. The same is liable to and hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Sagrika