1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 36 of 2015 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Korea, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Ramvilas Sahu And Anr. S/o Ramsharan Sahu Aged About 18 Years R/o Banjaridand P.S. - Khadwawan, District Korea, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - Jagat Singh Gond S/o Maan Singh Aged About 20 Years R/o Banjaridand P.S. - Khadgawan, District Korea, Chhattisgarh, District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Hariom Rai, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Anil Gulati, Advocate Division Bench Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. Judgment on Board 17.12.2025 Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 1. This acquittal appeal preferred by the State arises out of the judgment dated 24.07.2014 passed by the Special Judge (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes [Prevention of Atrocities] Act, 1989), Baikunthpur, District Korea (C.G.) (for short, “the Act, 1989”) in Special Trial No. 22/2012, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted appellant No.1 of the charges under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(g) and 506 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989, and appellant No.2 of the charges under Sections 363, 366, 376 and 506(ii) of the IPC. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 09.05.2012 at about 12:00 midnight, the complainant allegedly went out of her house, at which time the accused-appellants Ramvilas and Jagat Singh were present with a motorcycle. It is alleged that she was forcibly taken on the motorcycle to Chilika Forest, where accused Jagat Singh committed sexual assault upon her, while accused Ramvilas remained present and did not intervene. It is further alleged that the complainant was threatened and thereafter released in the early morning hours. Upon returning home, she narrated the incident to her family members and the village head. Subsequently, a report was lodged at Police Station Khargawan on 11.05.2012, resulting in registration of FIR No. 68/2012 for offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(g), 506(ii) IPC and Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989. During investigation, the accused were medically examined, spot maps 3 were prepared, and relevant articles were seized and sent for forensic examination. 3. After completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the accused persons before the concerned trial Court and the case was committed to the Special Court, Korea, on 23.08.2012, where it was registered as Special Sessions Case No. 22/2012. The accused persons abjured guilt and claimed to be tried. 4. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 23 documents (Exs. P-1 to P-23). The accused persons, though not examining any witness in defence, exhibited three documents, namely Exs. D-1 to D-3. 5. The learned trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused persons of all the charges levelled against them. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the impugned judgment dated 24.07.2014 is perverse, illegal and unsustainable in law, as the learned trial Court grossly misappreciated the evidence on record and ignored settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in cases of sexual offences. It is contended that the trial Court failed to accord due weight to the cogent, consistent and trustworthy testimony of the prosecutrix, which by itself was sufficient to sustain conviction, 4 and erred in discarding the same on trivial discrepancies. It is further submitted that the delay in lodging the FIR was natural and satisfactorily explained, yet was wrongly treated as fatal to the prosecution case. The trial Court also overlooked the medical and circumstantial evidence corroborating the prosecution version and failed to appreciate the active participation and common intention of both accused. It is further argued that the acquittal under the provisions of the Act, 1989 is based on erroneous assumptions. Thus, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents/accused supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence and correctly concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, including the prosecutrix, rendering their testimony unreliable. It is further submitted that the medical evidence does not support the allegation of sexual assault. The injuries, if any, were simple in nature and inconsistent with the manner of assault alleged. The findings of acquittal are reasoned, plausible and do not warrant interference. Hence, the appeal deserves dismissal. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record. 5 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka has held in para 36 as under:- "36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-- inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; 6 (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court." 10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 11. In the matter of Kali Ram vs State of H.P. in (1973) 2 SCC 808, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 25 which reads as under:- 7 “25.Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases where the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence.” 12. From bare perusal of the record, it appears that the trial Court has appreciated the facts that the evidence of the Investigating Officer does not support the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1) or other prosecution witnesses. The prosecutrix materially improved her version in Court by adding facts not stated either in the FIR or in her statement under Section 161 CrPC, which, as settled law, renders her testimony unreliable. The medical evidence of Dr. Madhurima Paikra (PW-10) fully corroborates the absence of any external or internal injuries, signs of force, restraint, or resistance, and establishes that the prosecutrix was habituated to sexual intercourse; the doctor also admitted that forcible rape ordinarily results in bodily injuries, none of which were found in the present case. The prosecution further failed to prove that the prosecutrix was below 16 or 18 years of age at the time of the incident, and the evidence on record indicates that she voluntarily accompanied the accused and consented to the sexual intercourse, thereby negating the offence of rape. Additionally, although the prosecutrix belongs 8 to a Scheduled Tribe and the accused does not, but there is no evidence whatsoever to show that the alleged act was committed on the ground of her caste, a mandatory requirement for attracting Sections 3(1)(12) and 3(2)(5) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The allegation of criminal intimidation is also not substantiated by consistent or cogent evidence. As a result, the accused appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt and were acquitted of the charges levelled against them as the prosecution had utterly failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. Thus, it is evident that the judgment of acquittal is based on a proper appreciation of evidence. The trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the testimony of the prosecutrix was not trustworthy due to material contradictions, omissions and improvements. Several material facts were not disclosed in her statement under Section 161 CrPC but were introduced for the first time before the Court. These discrepancies were neither satisfactorily explained nor rebutted by the State. The trial Court also found that the age of the prosecutrix was not proved to be that of a minor, and the medical evidence did not corroborate the allegation of forcible sexual assault or gang rape. These findings constitute a plausible and reasonable view. 14. In view of these deficiencies, the learned trial Court rightly held that the prosecution failed to prove the charges against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. The view taken by the 9 trial Court is a possible and reasonable one, based on a proper appreciation of the evidence available on record. 15. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment impugned passed by the trial Court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position that in an appeal against acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution and the trial Court taking one view favouring the accused, reversal of the findings of acquittal by the Appellate Court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not permissible in law, we are of considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the accused persons/respondents of the said charges is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 16. Accordingly, this appeal by the State / appellant against the acquittal of the accused persons/respondents herein is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha