1 2025:CGHC:51877-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA(MAT) No. 122 of 2023 Reserved on 17/09/2025 Delivered on 17/10/2025 1 - Smt. Parvati Sahu W/o Shri Sanjay Kumar Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Kosa, Police Station Mulmula, Tehsil Pamgarh, District Janjgir - Champa, Chhattisgarh Present Address - Parvati Sahu, Silai Centre, Crops Colony, Khan Building, In Front Of Cent Marry High School, Jharsugda, District Jharsugda (Orissa) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Sanjay Kumar Sahu S/o Shri Shivnath Sahu Aged About 44 Years R/o Village Kosa, Police Station Mulmula, Tehsil Navagarh, District Janjgir - Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Arpana Verma, Advocate (Division Bench) Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Order Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. ABHIGYA SAXENA Digitally signed by ABHIGYA SAXENA 2 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant-wife, being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 31.03.2023 (Annexure A/1), passed by the Learned Judge, Family Court, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa, (C.G.), in Civil Suit No.10A of 2022 whereby the Trial Court granted a decree of divorce in favor of the respondent-husband, pursuant to the application filed under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 2. In this case, admitted facts are that the parties were married on 22.02.2002 at Village Bodsara in accordance with Hindu customs. Subsequent to the marriage, the parties had two children: a daughter, Kumari Deepali Sahu, born on 26.10.2004, and a son, Deepanshu, born on 16.07.2007. It is also undisputed that the marriage took place in Guravat. Additionally, it is admitted that the applicant’s younger sister, Sarojini Sahu, is married to the non- applicant’s brother, Sudhakar Sahu. 3. Facts of the present case, in brevity, is that the parties to this dispute were lawfully married on 22 February 2002. Following the marriage, the appellant/defendant alleges that the plaintiff/respondent and his family members began subjecting her to harassment and cruelty. The plaintiff was initially unemployed, and upon the appellant’s request, her brother-in-law, Mahaveer Sahu, secured employment for him at Bhushan Power Plant, Jharsugda, where both parties subsequently resided. The appellant’s father had provided her with a stitching machine as a 3 means to earn a livelihood and save for the future of their children; however, it is averred that the plaintiff misappropriated the earnings without informing the appellant. Additionally, the appellant claims that her father-in-law demanded illegal favors and threatened her life. 4. The plaintiff filed a suit for divorce alleging that the marriage was a Guravat marriage, a form of union where the sister of the groom is married to the brother of the bride and vice versa, and raised claims of cruelty on the part of the defendant. He stated that since the appellant refused to reside with his family, he relocated to Jharsugda where he, despite limited income, supported the appellant by facilitating her training in stitching, purchasing materials on loan, and supporting her in running a beauty parlor and a stitching shop. The plaintiff further contended that the defendant neglected household responsibilities and that there had been no cohabitation for three to four years due to her refusal. He alleged that during his hospitalization following an accident in Korba, the defendant neither visited him nor maintained the household, instead moving her belongings to a different residence without informing him. Efforts for reconciliation failed, and an application for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. The plaintiff also noted that the defendant filed a maintenance application under Section 125 of the CrPC. 4 5. Learned Family Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence, the application for divorce filed by the present respondent-husband under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the said application was allowed by the trial Court. However, she contends that the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence properly and passed the impugned judgment and decree without due regard to the materials on record. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the Learned Family Court, whereby the application for divorce filed by the non-applicant has been allowed, is bad in law, illegal, arbitrary, perverse, and contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case and applicable legal principles. 7. The appellant respectfully submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court are liable to be set aside, as the same are based on conjectures and surmises and are contrary to the material evidence available on record. 8. He further stated that the learned Court failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case in their true perspective and erroneously treated the pleadings and assertions of the plaintiff/respondent as gospel truth, despite his failure to discharge the burden of proof or establish his case on a preponderance of probabilities. The appellant and the respondent were lawfully 5 married on 22 February 2002. However, following the marriage, the appellant was subjected to consistent harassment and cruelty by the respondent and his family members. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant further avers that the respondent, who was initially unemployed, was provided employment by the appellant’s brother-in-law at Bhushan Power Plant, Jharsugda, where the parties thereafter resided. The appellant’s father had given her a stitching machine to enable her to earn a livelihood, but the respondent misappropriated her earnings without informing her. 10. Furthermore, it is alleged that the appellant’s father-in-law made illegal demands and issued threats to her life. While the respondent filed a suit for divorce alleging cruelty and non- cohabitation, the appellant denied all such allegations and brought forth her version, which was not duly considered by the learned Court below. 11. It was also specifically pleaded that the WhatsApp messages relied upon by the respondent were fabricated, as they were sent from a number not belonging to the appellant, and no effort was made to verify their authenticity. Moreover, the conduct of the respondent, including his refusal to fulfill marital obligations and his acts of cruelty, clearly disentitled him to any relief. Despite this, and the dismissal of his application for restitution of conjugal 6 rights, the learned Court erred in granting a decree in his favour. The appellant submits that the impugned judgment reflects a complete misappreciation of the evidence and law applicable, and hence, calls for interference by this Hon’ble Court. 12. On the other hand the non-applicant respectfully submits that according to the non-applicant, the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 22.02.2002 in the village of Bodsara according to Hindu rites, resulting in the birth of two children, a daughter, Kumari Deepali, born on 26.10.2004, and a son, Deepanshu, born on 16.07.2007. The non-applicant claims that the applicant refused to live with his family, which led to the non-applicant relocating with the applicant to Jharsuguda. It is further alleged by the non-applicant that the applicant did not perform any household duties and that the non-applicant bore the responsibility of raising the children almost single-handedly. The non-applicant’s father, who suffers from hearing loss, informed the non-applicant about his need for ear surgery, and upon conveying this to the applicant, the latter allegedly abused the non-applicant and his family verbally, including the use of abusive language against the non- applicant’s father over the phone. The non-applicant states that while he was in Janjgir visiting his father and subsequently in Korba for domestic work in 2017, he met with an accident resulting in a fractured left leg. Despite knowledge of this, the applicant did not visit him but instead took possession of all her 7 belongings, as well as the children’s belongings and household effects, and rented a house on Hospital Road in the name of Yadav. 13. The non-applicant further asserts that counseling was provided twice at the Family Counseling Center, but the applicant persistently demanded a divorce. In consequence, the non- applicant filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The non-applicant also contends that the applicant abused him and his family members through WhatsApp messages. Given that the parties have been unable to maintain any marital relationship for nearly five years, therefore, he further submits that the trial after appreciating all documentary and oral evidence has rightly passed the decree of divorce in favour of the non- applicant/husband. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 15. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 22.02.2002 in the village of Bodsara according to Hindu rites, resulting in the birth of two children, a daughter, Kumari Deepali, born on 26.10.2004, and a son, Deepanshu, born on 16.07.2007. 8 16. The husband has filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of the marriage and a decree of divorce on the grounds that the wife has subjected him to both mental and physical cruelty. Additionally, it is contended that the wife has deserted the husband for a continuous period of five years. To substantiate these allegations, the husband has specifically pleaded that both parties have been residing in Jharsuguda, Odisha. After their relocation to Jharsuguda, the husband took efforts to support the wife by arranging for her to receive training in stitching and tailoring. Considerable expenses were incurred, including a loan taken to purchase a cloth stitching machine and related materials. The wife further expressed a desire to get training in beauty parlour services, for which the husband also provided assistance. He has further taken care of the children during this period. However, despite his support, when the husband sought to provide financial assistance for the treatment of the husband’s father, the wife reacted adversely, engaging in a quarrel, refusing to give money, and verbally abusing the husband’s father. In 2017, the husband suffered a fracture in his left leg, resulting in a permanent disability. Throughout this period, the wife neither visited nor provided any support to her husband. Furthermore, she took possession of all household furniture and other articles, relocating to a rented accommodation. Given the husband’s physical incapacity to manage household affairs, it is evident that the wife 9 abandoned him and removed all stridhan belongings. The husband has made every sincere effort to sustain the marriage and resolve disputes amicably; however, all attempts at reconciliation have failed. 17. The husband has also filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights. In her statement, the wife has categorically stated her unwillingness to live with the husband. It is an undisputed fact that the parties have been living separately for a period of five years, during which no physical or matrimonial relationship subsisted between them. The wife has filed multiple applications for maintenance during this period of separation. The husband, on the other hand, is physically incapacitated and unable to adequately earn a livelihood, whereas the wife is successfully operating a beauty parlour, generating sufficient income for her maintenance. Though the wife has denied the husband’s allegations, the evidence on record, including the testimonies of the parties, clearly demonstrates that the wife has been residing separately for five years without any matrimonial or physical relationship. PW-2, the father-in-law of the wife and father of the husband, has categorically denied the wife’s allegations concerning dowry demands, physical assault, and improper behavior. The wife herself, along with NA-1, has admitted that she has not been supported financially by the husband and that he is dependent on 10 her for all expenses. She further alleged that the father-in-law cast an evil eye upon her, which led to her leaving the matrimonial home and taking her ornaments with her. 18. During cross-examination, the wife admitted that she refused restitution of conjugal rights and expressed a desire for divorce. Photographs of the beauty parlour shop were produced, showing that she had purchased the premises; however, she denied ownership, claiming it belonged to a friend. No complaints were made by her regarding any misconduct or evil eye from the father- in-law, despite earlier assertions. She also acknowledged having returned a receipt of stridhan belongings. The wife consistently denied any wish to live with the husband. The daughter of the parties, Kum. Deepali Sahu, aged 19 years, was examined and stated that while her mother had told her that the father abused her, she herself had never witnessed any such incidents. The daughter admitted that her mother was trained in tailoring and stitching and had not produced any evidence to substantiate claims of abuse by the father.The mother-in-law, Amol Bai, also testified but did not support the wife’s allegations of cruelty or misconduct. She denied any occurrence of the alleged evil eye by the father-in-law and did not submit any documentary evidence to support the wife’s claims. 11 19. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Sanat Kumar Agarwal Vs. Smt. Nandini Agarwal; reported in AIR 1990 SC 594 held in para 7 as under:- “7. It is further important to note that the petition for divorce was filed on 6-2-1982 i.e. more than three years of leaving the matrimonial home by the respondent w.e.f. 9-12-1978. There is not an iota of evidence placed on record by the respondent nor any averment to show that any effort was made by her to go and join the matrimonial home with the appellant at Bhopal. Now it is more than ten years that the parties are living separately. Admittedly the respondent after passing B.Ed. examination has joined an employment as a school teacher and has an independent income and both the parties have now adjusted to their new mode of life for more than a decade.” 20. In reference to the cruelty the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of V. Bhagat Vs. D. Bhagat 1 , Suman Kapur Vs. Sudhir Kapur 2 and lastly in the matter of Joydeep Majumdar Vs. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar 3 ; the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the issue of cruelty and held that, although the term "cruelty" has not been specifically defined, it has been consistently used in the context of human conduct or behavior. The Court observed that 1 (1994) 1 SCC 337 2 (2009) 1 SCC 422 3 (2021) 3 SCC 742 12 cruelty must be assessed in relation to matrimonial duties and obligations. If such conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious for the spouses to continue living together, then cruelty is deemed to be established. 21. In the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sivasankaran v. Santhimeenal, reported in (2022) 15 SCC 742, has specifically held in paragraph 22.1 as under: “21.1. The respondent has resorted to filing multiple cases in courts against the appellant. It may be noticed that such repeated filing of cases itself has been held in judicial pronouncements to amount to mental cruelty.” 22. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter Debananda Tamuli Vs. Kakumoni Kataky reported in (2022) 5 SCC 549 relevant paras are reflected as under :- “7. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, (1964) 4 SCR 331 : AIR 1964 SC 40] which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid 13 down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by this Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus: “13.Divorce.—(1) * * * Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.” 14 10. The perusal of the respondent's evidence does not disclose any effort made by her to resume the matrimonial relationship. She has not filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. As can be seen from the evidence on record, the appellant is carrying on business at Tezpur. The respondent is working as a Lecturer in University Law College at Gauhati. There is no dispute that from 1-7-2009 till date, they are staying separately. 11. Merely because on account of the death of the appellant's mother, the respondent visited her matrimonial home in December 2009 and stayed there only for one day, it cannot be said that there was a resumption of cohabitation. She has not stated that she came to her matrimonial home on 21-12-2009 with the intention to resume cohabitation. The intention on the part of the respondent to resume cohabitation is not established. Thus, in the facts of the case, the factum of separation has been proved. From the evidence on record, an inference can be drawn that there was animus deserendi on the part of the respondent. She has not pleaded and established any reasonable cause for remaining away from her matrimonial home. 12. Thus, in our considered view, the ground of desertion under clause (i-b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the HM 15 Act has been made out as the desertion for a continuous period of more than two years before the institution of the petition was established in the facts of the case. But, after having carefully perused the evidence on record, we find that no case is made out to disturb the findings recorded by the courts on the issue of cruelty.” 23. In addition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. Nirmal Singh Panesar Vs. Paramjit Kaur Panesar Alias Ajinder Kaur reported in (2025) 3 SCC 790 relevant paras as under :- “12. Similarly, the law is also well settled as to what could be said to be “desertion” in the divorce proceedings filed under Section 13 of the said Act. The expression “desertion” had come up under the judicial scrutiny of this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati [Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 15 : AIR 1957 SC 176] , which was again considered in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40] . This Court collating the observations made in the earlier decisions, stated its view as under : (Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani case [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40] , SCC OnLine SC para 40) 16 “40. … Collating the aforesaid observations, the view of this Court may be stated thus : Heavy burden lies upon a petitioner who seeks divorce on the ground of desertion to prove four essential conditions, namely, (1) the factum of separation; (2) animus deserendi; (3) absence of his or her consent; and (4) absence of his or her conduct giving reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home.” 13. Recently, in Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky [Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 82] , the Court referring the decision in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40] observed as under : (Debananda Tamuli case [Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 82] , SCC p. 462, paras 7-8) “7. We have given careful consideration to her submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue of desertion. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani [Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 32 : AIR 1964 SC 40] which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently 17 laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by this Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub- section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus: ‘13.Divorce.—(1) * * * Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its 18 grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.’ 8. The reasons for a dispute between husband and wife are always very complex. Every matrimonial dispute is different from another. Whether a case of desertion is established or not will depend on the peculiar facts of each case. It is a matter of drawing an inference based on the facts brought on record by way of evidence.” 24. The evidence on record reveals that the wife has committed acts of cruelty towards the husband. The learned trial court, in its order, explicitly held that the cruelty was committed by the wife and that during the counseling proceedings, she expressed an unequivocal unwillingness to continue the marriage. Therefore, the trial court rightly concluded that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and declined to interfere in the matter. This Court finds no grounds to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court, which is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rinku Baheti Vs. Sandesh Sharda reported in (2025) 3 SCC 686 the paragraphs relevant are as under :- 19 “77. The dispute with respect to the amount of alimony is generally the most contentious point between the parties in such marital proceedings, supplemented by a plethora of accusations to remove the cover from the opposite party's income and assets. The judicial dicta in this context could be discussed as under: 77.1. In the order passed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shakti v. Anita [Shakti v. Anita, (2025) 3 SCC 728] , it was observed as under : (SCC paras 13-14) “13. That brings us to the aspect of permanent alimony over which the real dispute is. We looked to the offer of the appellant as also the desire of the respondent. There is undoubtedly a mismatch! 14. As often happens the claim of the respondent is based on what is stated to be a large number of properties of the family of the appellant, though nothing is placed on record of anything in his name.” 77.2. The law with respect to deciding the amount of permanent alimony was summarised by a Bench of this Court recently in Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel [Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel, (2024) 13 SCC 66 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1724] , wherein this Court speaking 20 through Vikram Nath, J. has touched upon the question of one-time settlement and the factors that should be taken into consideration while determining fair amount of permanent alimony. It was also observed as under : (SCC para 25) “25. The status of the parties is a significant factor, encompassing their social standing, lifestyle, and financial background. The reasonable needs of the wife and dependant children must be assessed, including costs for food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical expenses. The applicant's educational and professional qualifications, as well as their employment history, play a crucial role in evaluating their potential for self-sufficiency. If the applicant has any independent source of income or owns property, this will also be taken into account to determine if it is sufficient to maintain the same standard of living experienced during the marriage. Additionally, the court considers whether the applicant had to sacrifice employment opportunities for family responsibilities, such as child-rearing or caring for elderly family members, which may have impacted their career prospects.” 21 77.3. In Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar [Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar, (2011) 13 SCC 112 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 290 : (2011) 9 SCR 371] , this Court held that there cannot be a fixed formula or a straitjacket rubric for fixing the amount of permanent alimony and only broad principles can be laid down. The question of maintenance is subjective to each case and depends on various factors and circumstances as presented in individual cases. This Court in the above judgment stated that the courts shall consider the following broad factors while determining permanent alimony — income and properties of both the parties, respectively, conduct of the parties, status, social and financial, of the parties, their respective personal needs, capacity and duty to maintain others dependent on them, husband's own expenses, wife's comfort considering her status and the mode of life she was used to during the subsistence of the marriage, among other supplementary factors. 77.4. This was further reiterated by this Court in Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal [Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 224 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 347] , while observing that permanent alimony is to be granted after considering 22 largely the social status, conduct of the parties, the parties' lifestyle, and other such ancillary factors. 78. Earlier, a two-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Indu Malhotra, J. in Rajnesh v. Neha [Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 : (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 220 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 749] (“Rajnesh”), elaborated upon the broad criteria and the factors to be considered for determining the quantum of maintenance. This Court emphasises that there is no fixed formula for calculating maintenance amount; instead, it should be based on a balanced consideration of various factors. These factors include and are illustrative but are not limited or exhaustive, they are adumbrated as under: (i) Status of the parties, social and financial. (ii) Reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children. (iii) Qualifications and employment status of the parties. (iv) Independent income or assets owned by the parties. (v) Maintain standard of living as in the matrimonial home. (vi) Any employment sacrifices made for family responsibilities. 23 (vii) Reasonable litigation costs for a non-working wife. (viii) Financial capacity of husband, his income, maintenance obligations, and liabilities.” 26. In consideration of the wife's financial independence and the fact that she is engaged in a successful business, it is evident that she is not financially dependent on the husband for her maintenance. However, taking into account the overall facts and circumstances of the case we are of the considered opinion that the Learned Trial Court has found it just and appropriate to award a sum of ₹3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs only) as permanent alimony to the wife. The said amount is deemed sufficient for the purpose of her maintenance. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Saxena