1 Reserved on 12.11.2025 Pronounced on 10.12.2025 Uploaded on 10.12.2025 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 1482 of 2012 1 - Padmakar Pandey S/o Lt. Shri Anirudh Pandey, Aged About 71 Years R/o Vill. Badebacheli, Near Telephone Exchange, Post Bacheli, Tehsil Dantewada, Distt. Sough Bastar Dantwada C.G., Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of C.G. And Ors S/o Through - Secretary, Deptt. Of Revenue D.K.S. Bhawan, Mantralaya, Raipur C.G., Chhattisgarh 2 - The Commissioner Jagdalpur, Division Bastar C.G. , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3 - The Collector S.S.A. Dantewada, Distt. South Bastar Dantewada C.G., District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 4 - Sub Divisional Officer Revenue Dantewada Distt. South Bastar Dantewada C.G. , District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 5 - Tehsildar Dantewada, Distt. South Bastar Dantewada C.G. , District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 6 - Kamluram S/o Shri Botiram R/o Village Badebacheli, Tehsil Dantewada C.G. , District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Alok Kumar Dewangan, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 5 : Mr. R. K. Gupta, Addl. A. G. For Respondent No.6 : Mr. Deepak Kumar Singh, Advocate Amicus Curie : Mr. Parag Kotecha, Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) C A V Order 1. Challenge in this petition is to an order dated 10.01.2012 passed by the Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, CG in Revision Case No. 59/A-21/ 2010- 11. By the impugned order, the learned Commissioner while exercising suo motu jurisdiction under Section 50 (1) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short “Code of 1959”) has set aside the permission granted by the Collector 2 Dantewada, District Dantewada in Revenue Case No.06/A- 21/ 2009-10 dated 30.10.2009 by which it has granted permission to respondent No.6 to sell the property comprised in piece of Khasra No.94/9, 94/10 area 0.28 Acre (Diverted land) (for short “suit property”) situated at Badebacheli Tahsil Dantewada District Dantewada (CG). 2. Fact of the case which emerges from the pleading is that an application was filed by respondent No.6 before the Collector (respondent No.3) under Section 165 of Code of 1959 on 30.08.2008 for the sale of the suit property to the petitioner. The Sub- Divisional Officer, Revenue / respondent No.4 submitted a report dated 23.01.2009. Respondent No.3/ Collector vide an order dated 30.10.2009 granted permission to sell the suit property to petitioner herein. It appears that later on, a sale deed was also executed on 18.11.2009 in respect of the suit property by respondent No.6 in favour of the petitioner. Respondent No.2 / the Commissioner registered a suo motu case challenging the grant of permission by the Collector/ respondent No.3. By the impugned order in the suo motu case, the said permission was set aside, challenging the same, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a non-tribal and respondent No.6 is a tribal. He submits that respondent No.6 wanted to sell the suit property to the petitioner and therefore, he voluntarily moved an application under Section 165 of the Code of 1959 before the Collector / respondent No.3 for permission to sell the suit property. A due enquiry was conducted by respondent No.4 / Sub Divisional Officer and gave a report in favour of respondent No.6. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the Enquiry report, the Collector/respondent No.3 granted the permission. He submits that the entire sale consideration has been paid by the petitioner to respondent No.6 which was for the benefit of respondent No.6 and there is no illegal transaction between respondent No.6 and the petitioner. He submits that the right of respondent No.6 has been duly protected as proper sale consideration was paid. The learned Commissioner/ respondent No.2 in exercising the suo motu revisional jurisdiction, has committed an 3 error of law and fact when the sale deed had already been executed. He submits that the suit property is a diverted one and falls within the municipal limit, therefore, there was no requirement to seek permission to sell from the Collector, however as an abundant caution, respondent No.6 made an application for grant of such permission. At present also, there is no dispute between the petitioner and respondent No.6 and therefore, impugned order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. He further goes on to submit that of course there is no limitation provided in the statute of Code of 1959 for exercising suo motu revisional power, however the same should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. In the case in hand, the permission to sell the suit property was granted on 30.10.2009, and the suo motu notices were issued on 09.08.2011 after 2-3 years. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. He also placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dinesh Kumar and others passed in Special Leave petition © No.10111 of 2024 dated 08.04.2025. 4. Per contra, Mr. R. K. Gupta, Additional A. G. submits that the suit property is situated in Badebacheli, District Dantewada which is a scheduled area, and there cannot be any transfer of any property either way of sale deed, will or otherwise of the property belonging to an aboriginal tribal to any non-tribal. He invited the attention of this Court to Clause (i) of Sub Section 6 of Section 165 of Code of 1959. He further submits that there is no inordinate delay in exercising the suo motu revisional jurisdiction by the Commissioner and as such when the Collector was not empowered to grant permission in light of the above quoted provision, the permission itself is a nullity and plea of nullity can be raised at any point of time, so the question of limitation would not come in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, this writ petition does not have a merit and liable to be dismissed. 5. Mr. Singh, learned counsel submits that respondent No.6 has no grievance with regard to sale of the suit property and he has already received the entire sale consideration and as such he supports the case of the petitioner. 4 6. Mr. Kotecha learned amicus curie adopts the submission of Mr. R. K. Gupta, Addl. A. G., however, he submits that district Dantewada has been notified as a scheduled area as per the Scheduled Area (State of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh) Order, 2003 which was published in notification No. GSR114 (E) dated 20.02.2003 (for short ‘notification’). In light of Clause (i) of Sub Section 6 of Section 165 of Code of 1959 no transaction can take place between a tribal and a non-tribal. Reliance has been placed on the decision passed by this Court in case of K. S. Sujeeth Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. And other connected matters in WPC No.613 of 2016 dated 13.04.2017. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The first contention of Mr. Dewangan is that as the suit property is diverted one and falls within the municipal limits hence no permission is needed from Collector to sell the suit property. In order to appreciate this argument, it is apt to quote relevant provisions contained in Subsection (6) of Section 165 of Code of 1959 as under:- 6. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the right of Bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe by the State Government by a notification in that behalf, for the whole or part of the area to which this Code applies shall- (i) in such areas as are predominately inhabited by aboriginal tribes and from such date as the State Government may, by notification, specify, not be transferred nor it shall be transferable either by way of sale or otherwise or as a consequence of transaction of loan to a person not belonging to such tribe in the area specified in the notification; (ii) in areas other than those specified in the notification under clause (i), not to be transferred or be transferable either by way of sale or otherwise or as a consequence of transaction of loan to a person not belonging to such tribe without the permission of a Revenue Officer not below the rank of Collector, given for reasons to be recorded in writing.” 9. Perusal of above quoted provision makes it amply clear that area which are specified in Section 165 (6)(i), there is complete restriction on transfer of right of Bhumiswami 5 who belongs to aboriginal tribe to a person who is not an aboriginal tribe in the area specified in the notification. Mr. Kotecha has placed reliance on the notification which clearly demonstrate that Dantewada is notified as scheduled area within the State of Chhattisgarh. Even otherwise none of the parties have disputed that respondent No.6 is an aboriginal tribe and property in question is situated in scheduled area. Almost identical issue fell for consideration in case of Vijay Pandey Vs. State of Chhattisgarh passed in WPC No.3509/ 2011 with 2 connected matter. This case of Vijay Pandey (supra) has also relied by coordinate bench of this Court in case of K. S. Sujeeth (Supra). This Court vide its order dated 07.08.2014 in case of Vijay Pandey (Supra) observed thus in Paragraphs 11, 14, 16 & 17:- “11. The provision creating embargo on transfer of right of Bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be aboriginal tribe in areas, which are predominately inhabited by aboriginal tribes notified as such under Section 165(6)(i) of the Code, is absolute in nature and does not admit of any exception. It is a complete ban. Subject to other provisions contained in Section 165, the embargo does not allow transfer of right of such Bhumiswami in notified areas as referred to hereinabove. Such a stringent provision has been made in order to protect the Bhurniswami’s right of aboriginal tribes in notified areas. The legislative intention is clear that in areas notified as above, rights of Bhumiswami belonging to aboriginal tribe as notified by the government in that behalf, rights shall not be transferred nor it shall be transferable either by way of sale or otherwise or as a consequence of transaction of loan to a person not belonging to such tribe in the area specified in the notification. 14. Even if it were assumed that the subject land is situated in an area which is new brought within the local limits of the Municipal Corporation, Jagdalpur, seminal question arising for consideration is whether the embargo on transfer of rights of Bhumiswami covered by the provisions contained in Section 165(6)(i) is taken away or to say, ceases to' apply. On a plain reading of the provision contained in Section165(6) or any other sub sections or any other provisions contained in the Land Revenue Code, it nowhere expressly or by necessary implication removes the embargo on transfer of right of Bhumiswami belonging to aboriginal tribe in the area notified under Section 165(6)(i) of the Code. Therefore, this Court is unable to hold that in cases, where land is diverted from agricultural purpose to residential purpose and 6 included in urban area, restriction on transfer of right of a Bhumiswami belonging to aboriginal tribe in notified area will ceases to apply. In other words, irrespective of Whether the land is diverted one and/or situated within the limits of a Municipal Corporation and therefore, in an urban area, the embargo on transfer of right as referred to above continues unhindered. 16. Thus, diversion of land for non—agricultural purpose, inclusion in the urban area or grant of colonizer license or land use specified to be residential under development plan do not in any manner operate to whittle down the rigor of provision contained in Section 165(6)(i) of the Code, which seek to protect the interest of aboriginal tribes in notified area, that rights of Bhumiswami belonging to such aboriginal tribe shall not be transferred to any person except those belonging to such aboriginal tribe. 17. Reliance placed on the judgment of the Division Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Aildas Versus Board of Revenue and others1 Harjesh Rai Versus Smt. Jyoti Bai and others2 and Kamal Singh Narre Versus State of M.P. and others3 is misconceived. In the case of Aildas (supra), it was held that the provisions contained in sub section 5 & 7 of Section 165 of the Code will not apply in case of Najul land situated in urban area. It is not a case here. Other judgments relate to house sites.” 10. Thus, in light of above preposition of law laid down by this Court the contention of Mr. Dewangan that the property falls within the Municipal Limit is liable to be rejected. 11. The next contention of Mr. Dewangan is that the Board of Revenue has exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 50 of Code of 1959 after a considerable delay hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside. To buttress his submission he has placed reliance on the judgment on Dinesh Kumar (Supra). The Collector/ respondent No.3 granted the permission to sell on 30.10.2009. The Commissioner /respondent No.2 started suo motu revisional proceedings under Section 50 of Code of 1959 on 09.08.2011 as reflected from the original record. It appears that the said proceedings started about 2 years from the date of permission of the Collector /respondent No.3. From the original records it appears that the respondent No.6 made an application to sell of the suit property to the Collector/ respondent No.3. 1 1973 JLJ 117 2 1997 Revenue Nirnay 155 3 2013 Revenue Nirnay 122 7 Thereafter, a case was registered and report was called and after recording the statement of parties the permission was granted by Collector /respondent No.3. It does not appear from the record that the Collector has taken note of Section 165 (6) (i) of Code of 1959. The entire proceedings appears to have carried out on the premise of Section 165 (6)(ii) of Code of 1959. When Section 165 (6)(i) of Code of 1959 puts a total ban on transfer of Bhumiswami rights, the Collector /respondent No.3 could have not granted permission in view of Section 165 (6)(ii) of Code of 1959. The permission so granted to sell the suit property is without any authority of law and is void ab initio. Thus, if the permission granted by Collector /respondent No.3 is nullity from the inception, the period of limitation would not be fatal to the order passed by Commissioner /respondent No.2. The learned Commissioner /respondent No.2 has extensively dealt with this issue and set aside the permission granted by Collector /respondent No.3. The case law cited by learned counsel for petitioner with due respect does not come to rescue the submission of petitioner in the given facts and circumstances of this case. It is distinguishable on fact as application of Section 165 (6)(i) of Code of 1959 was not an issue in the case law cited. 12. Thus from the above analysis, this Court does not find any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order. The writ petition sans merits and is hereby dismissed. Before parting, this Court appreciates the valuable assistance of learned amicus curie Mr. Kotecha. 13. No cost. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) JUDGE Parul PARUL MITTAL Digitally signed by PARUL MITTAL Date: 2025.12.10 17:29:37 +0530