[2025:RJ-JP:19598] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2717/2014 1. Bhaktawar S/o Ramji Lal, R/o Chuha Ki Dhani Tan, Bagdawa, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, District Sikar Raj. 2. Kumari Rajesh D/o Bhaktawar, R/o Chuha Ki Dhani Tan, Bagdawa, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, District Sikar Raj. 3. Pradeep S/o Bhaktawar, R/o Chuha Ki Dhani Tan, Bagdawa, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, District Sikar Raj. 4. Sunil S/o Bhaktawar, Claimant No. 4 Is Minor Through His Natural Guardian Bhaktawar, R/o Chuha Ki Dhani Tan, Bagdawa, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, District Sikar Raj. ----Appellants Versus 1. Icici Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd., Bhagwati Bhawan, Second Floor, Government Hostel Crossing, M.I. Road, Jaipur Insurance Company. 2. Amit Kumar S/o Brijesh Kumar, House No. 42, Saraswati Enclave, M.D. Road, Gopal Nagar, New Delhi- 110048 Registered Owner. 3. Juber S/o Eliyas, R/o Jaisinghpura, Police Station Mooh, District Mewat, Hariyana Driver Of Vehicle. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Yogesh Kumar Jatav on behalf of Mr. D.D. Khandelwal For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 09/05/2025 S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Application No.223/2015: 1. The present appeal has been filed by the claimants/appellants with a delay of 795 days. [2025:RJ-JP:19598] (2 of 4) [CMA-2717/2014] 2. In the application for condonation of the delay, they stated that they were waiting for the lawyer's opinion. Immediately after the appellants were advised to file the appeal, the appeal was presented. 3. Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 4. The bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that the claim petition was allowed on 07.02.2012. The appellants were awarded a compensation of Rs. 6,69,000/- in the presence of the counsel for the appellants, and the same was disburse to them. If the appellants believed that compensation awarded was inadequate then why the appeal was not present within time, in the application filed by the appellants neither name of the local counsel nor the date of receiving of the alleged opinion is mentioned, the reason assigned by the appellants in their application is very vague, general and flimsy explanation which is insufficient to indicate sufficient cause to justify the inordinate delay of 795 days. 5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Esha Bhattacharjee v. Committee of Raghunatpur Nafar Academy and others" reported in [(2013) 12 SCC 649] held as under: "21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration of a few days, for the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted, whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants a strict approach, whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. [2025:RJ-JP:19598] (3 of 4) [CMA-2717/2014] 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour, and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties, and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of a liberal approach" 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 860", has held as under: "That law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims." 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. vs. Ved Prakash" reported in 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 1101, has held as under: It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or [2025:RJ-JP:19598] (4 of 4) [CMA-2717/2014] negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. 8. In view of the above legal proposition of law and facts stated above, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is hereby dismissed for want of any sufficient cause mentioned in the application. 9. Accordingly, the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed as being devoid of merits. 10. The present civil miscellaneous appeal has also been dismissed. 11. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J AMIT/40 Whether Reportable : Yes/No