1 2025:CGHC:20693-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ARBA No. 22 of 2025 Chhattisgarh Mineral Development Corporation Through Its Managing Director, Having Its Registered Office At Section-724, Office Complex, Block- 7A, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, (C.G.). ... Appellant versus Bharat Aluminum Company Limited (BALCO) Balco Nagar, Korba Having Its Registered Office At Aluminum Sadan, Core-6, Scope Office Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi Through Its Chief Executive Officer And Whole Time Director, Balco Nagar, P.S.- Balco Nagar, District- Korba, 495684, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondent For Appellant : Shri Sharad Mishra, Advocate For Respondent : Shri Manoj Paranjape, Advocate appears along with Shri Anshul Tiwari, Advocate Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Order on Board. 06.05.2025 Per Sanjay S. Agrawal, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant- Chhattisgarh Mineral Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Corporation’) questioning the legality and propriety of the order dated 14.08.2024 SUNITA GOSWAMI Digitally signed by SUNITA GOSWAMI Date: 2025.05.07 10:39:10 +0530 2 passed by the Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Raipur (CG), in Arbitration MJC No.48 of 2024, whereby, the application preferred by the Corporation under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1996’), has been rejected. 2. From perusal of the record, it appears that an award was passed by the Sole Arbitrator on 29.10.2023 and, being aggrieved with the same, an application under Section 34 (3) of the Act, 1996 was made by the Corporation on 05.08.2024. It is an undisputed fact that the copy of the award, delivered on 29.10.2023, was received on the same day by the Corporation and, therefore, the limitation of three months as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996 would commence from the date when the copy of the same was received by the Corporation, i.e. 29.10.2023. However, the alleged application was made by the Corporation on 05.08.2024. It was, thus, delayed by more than 9 months from the date of receiving the copy of the said Award, dated 29.10.2023. In view of the provision prescribed under sub- section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the statutory period of three months would, therefore, come to an end on 28th January, 2024 and, by virtue of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34, the reasons for delay in filing the said application could be considered at the most for the further period of 30 days after the expiry of the said statutory period of three months, “but not thereafter”, as provided under the said proviso. Since the application was made on 05.08.2024, i.e. much beyond the further period of 30 days after the expiry of the three months statutory period provided under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of 3 the Act, 1996, therefore, in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Simplex Infrastructure Limited Vs. Union of India, reported in (2019) 2 SCC 455, the alleged delay cannot be considered, as while interpreting the said provision, it was held at paragraph 18 as under :- “18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate”. 3. Similar is the view taken recently by the Supreme Court in the matter of My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. And Another Vs. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 70, where at paragraph 37, it has been held as under :- 4 “37. Conclusion : For the reasons set forth above, the application preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of the ACA stands dismissed as it was filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days, which conclusively and absolutely expired on 28.06.2022”. 4. In view of the facts involved in the matter and in view of the principles laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the above referred matters, we, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order impugned passed by the Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Raipur in Arbitration MJC No.48 of 2024, rejecting the application of the Corporation made under Section 34 (3) of the Act, 1996 for the condonation of delay in filing the same, so as to call for any interference in this appeal. 5. The appeal being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed at the admission stage itself. No order as to costs) Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge sunita