Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2025:CGHC:58554
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR W.P(S) No.4354 of 2020 Smt. Satyabhama Chauhan W/o Ant Ram Chouhan, Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Salhejhariya, Janpad Panchayat, Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Panchayat Avam Gramin Vikas Vibhag, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - The Collector, Mahasamund District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 3 - The Additional Commissioner, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh 4 - Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh SISTLA NEELIMA VISHNU PRIYA Digitally signed by SISTLA NEELIMA VISHNU PRIYA Date: 2025.12.04 13:57:35 +0530
2 5 - Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh
... Respondents For Petitioner : Shri Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate. For State/Respondents : Shri Rajeev Bharat, G.A. For Respondent No.4 : Shri Yash Raj Verma on behalf of Shri Amrito Das, Advocates. Hon'ble Shri Justice
Deepak Kumar Tiwari
Order on Board 03.12.2025
1. This Petition has been filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs”-
“10.1. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly call for the entire record relating to the case of the petitioner.
10.2. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly issue a writ or writs/order/or orders to quash the order dated 24.01.2020 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Collector, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (CG) in Panchayat Appeal Case No.14A/89/2018-19 and further be pleased to allow the petitioner on the post of Rojgar Sahayak at Village Salhejhariya, Janpad Panchayat Basna, District : Mahasamund (CG).
10.3. That, any other relief, this Hon’ble Court deem fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.”
2. The Petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Rojgar Sahayak at Gram Panchayat, Salhejhariya, District Mahasamund by Respondent No.4 on 24.05.2008 (Annexure P-4) under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
3 (MGNREGA) for a period of one year and thereafter, her services were extended from time to time.
3. By the present Writ Petition, the Petitioner is questioning the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 24.01.2020 (Annexure P-1) whereby, Respondent No.2 has rejected the Appeal filed by the Petitioner and affirmed the order dated 27.10.2017 (Annexure P-2) whereby, Respondent No.4 has removed/terminated the services of the Petitioner from the post of Rojgar Sahayak on account of committing irregularities in the handling of governmental funds allocated for construction activities.
4. Shri Patel, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that there is clear violation of principle of natural justice as no departmental enuqiry was conducted before passing the impugned
order and a stigmatic termination order has been passed by the Respondent/Authorities and placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the matter of Swati Priyadarshani vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2139 to submit that the termination of service of the employee for alleged negligence, misconduct or other disqualification would harm their future career, therefore, proper enquiry before termination is mandatory, however, no such procedure has been followed in this case. He further submits that said principle has been reiterated by the co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Praveen Goyal vs. State
4 of CG and Ors ; 2025: CGHC:17021 [WPS No.2515/2024] and also in the case of Rakesh Roshan Soj vs. State of CG and Ors; 2025:CGHC:42212 [WPS No.9269/2023]. He lastly submits that the impugned order is not sustainable, which deserves to be set- aside/quashed and prays that the Petition may be allowed and the Petitioner may be granted all consequential benefits along with back wages.
5. Alternatively, learned Counsel for the Respondents support the impugned order and submit that as the Petitioner was found negligent in carrying out the work assigned to her, therefore, she was duly terminated in terms of Rule 11 (5) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Sewa (Samvida Niyukti) Niyam, Rules 2012 and as such, the
order impugned is just and proper and the same does not warrant any interference. 6. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as also the documents annexed with the Petition with utmost care. 7. Undisputedly, the order of termination casts a stigma on the delinquent employee and adversely affects his future career. In the present case, the impugned order dated 24.01.2020 (Annexure P- 1) has been passed on account of committing irregularities in the handling of governmental funds allocated for construction activities. 5 Admittedly, no departmental enquiry was conducted against the Petitioner before her removal from service. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swati Priyadarshini (Supra) categorically held that even for contractual employee, if any stigmatic order is to be passed, it is to be passed after holding proper enquiry and after giving due opportunity of hearing to the concerned delinquent/employee. For the sake of brevity relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder :-
"34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
“28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows : Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420 : 1953 SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v.State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572 : (1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules.
It is true that the misconduct,
negligence,
inefficiency
or
other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh V. Union of India, [58 Bom LR 673 : AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil
6 consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank.
If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rankwill not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way ofpunishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore
7 referred to?
If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.” (emphasis supplied)
9. Further, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the matter of Praveen Goyal (referred to above) and Rakesh Roshan Soj (referred to above), has considered the similar issue and concluded that the principle of natural justice mandates that before taking any adverse action, especially termination, the affected party must be given a real and meaningful opportunity to be heard and also that in order to pass a stigmatic or cumulative order, the concerned Authorities are required to hold a departmental enquiry after giving due opportunity of hearing to delinquent/employee. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in light of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Swati Priyadarshini and also considering the view taken in the cases of Praveen Goyal and Rakesh Roshan Soj (referred to above), this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order has been passed without following the principles of natural justice and proper procedure has also not been followed by the Authorities before passing such order. Hence, the impugned order dated 24.01.2020 (Annexure P-1) is unsustainable and the same is
8 hereby quashed/set-aside. However, the Respondent Authorities are at liberty to hold proper enquiry/take suitable steps in accordance with law. 11. Consequently, the Writ Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Priya