1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 400 of 2018 1 - Shivmangal S/o Late Sonsai Aged About 45 Years Cast Gond, R/o Village- Thaggaon (Samargada), Tahsil- Khandganwa, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus 1 - Urmila W/o Ramdin Previous Husband Late Ram Singh, R/o Village- Sous, Tahsil- Khandganwa, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Ram Jatan Singh S/o Moolchand Singh Aged About 29 Years R/o Village- Madanpur, Police Station And Tahsil- Baikunthpur, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Sukhdev Singh S/o Later Ranjit Singh Aged About 22 Years Cast Gond, R/o Village- Madanpur, Police Station And Tahsil- Baikunthpur, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh. 4 - State of Chhattisgarh Through- Collector, Korea, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri Vivek Kumar Tripathi, Advocate. For State : Shri Aman Tamboli, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 26.11.2025 1. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the plaintiff against the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.03.2018 passed by the Additional District Judge (FTC) Korea in Civil Appeal No.6-A/2018 whereby the First Appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 27.08.2015 passed by IInd Civil Judge Class-I Baikunthpur, in Civil Suit No.145-A/2014 has been dismissed and the judgment and decree of trial court has been affirmed. Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2025.12.01 16:49:03 +0530 2 2. For the sake of convenience, the status of parties shown in the Civil Suit are being taken in the present Second Appeal. 3. The plaintiff filed a Civil Suit for declaration of title over the suit land of various Khasra numbers, total area 4.47 Hect. situated at village Amarpur, Tehsil Baikunthpur, District Korea; declaration of possession of plaintiff over the suit land; declaration of registered sale deed dated 28.02.2008 as illegal, null and void; revenue entries in the name of the defendant No.2&3 shall also be declared as null and void, and also for permanent injunction over the suit land. It is pleaded in the plaint that the suit land was owned by one Godhalu Gond who was having two sons namely Ramsingh and Devsingh. The suit lands were joint property of Ramsingh and Devsingh. Devsingh Gond died issuless since 12 years back and therefore the entire property of Godhalu Gond was inherited by Ramsingh. The wife of Ramsingh namely Urmila remarried during the lifetime of Ramsingh with one Ramdin, resident of village Sous. Subsequently, Ramsingh also died since 6 years back. It is also pleaded that after the death of Ramsingh, the entire property was inherited by the plaintiff who is cousin Uncle of late Ramsingh. Since wife of Ramsingh i.e. Urmila already remarried during the lifetime of Ramsingh, her right and title over the suit land was extinguished and plaintiff being the sole surviving heir in the family of their common ancestor Karimal, he inherited the property of late Ramsingh and came into possession of the same. It is also pleaded that the parties are Gond by caste and aboriginal Tribe. They are governed by their own customs and customary law. As per their customs, if the wife of land owner remarry with some other person during the lifetime of her 3 husband, her right over the property of her earlier husband would be extinguished and she would not be a member of joint family. This custom is recognized by the Gond community of Korea and Surguja district. It is also the custom that widow was having a limited right over the property of her husband with respect to maintenance only and she could not be the absolute owner of the property and have no right to alienate the same. In the present case, after death of Ramsingh, the defendant No.1 got mutated her name in the revenue records vide order dated 07.06.2005 passed by the Tehsildar Baikunthpur and alienated the suit land to the defendant No.2&3 through the registered sale deed dated 28.02.2008. The mutation order passed by the Tehsildar was challenged by the plaintiff before the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Baikunthpur which was allowed on 15.02.2010 and mutation of defendant No.1 was cancelled. Thereafter he came to know about the sale transaction dated 28.02.2008 between the defendant No.1 & defendant No.2&3. The said sale transaction was a fraudulent transaction and without payment of any consideration and also during pendency of the revenue proceeding before the SDO(R) Baikunthpur, no right or title would be transferred to defendant No.2&3 by the said sale deed and therefore the plaintiff filed the suit. 4. Contesting the claim of plaintiff, the defendants No.1 to 3 filed their written statement jointly and denied the plaint averment and pleaded that Urmila did not remarry with Ramdin during lifetime of her husband Ramsingh. After death of her husband, since there was no one in her family to take her care, she is residing at village Sous in the house of 4 her Aunt (Bua). The suit property was inherited by Urmila and it is her own property. In the written statement Urmila has specifically denied her remarriage with Ramdin during the lifetime of her husband Ramsingh. It is also submitted in the written statement that although the parties belong to Gond community and aboriginal Tribes, but they are governed by Hindu Succession Act for the purpose of their inheritance. They also denied the customs of the community that if a lady remarried during the lifetime of her husband, her right over the property of her earlier husband would extinguish and she would not be a member of joint family. They also denied that such lady would have the limited interest over the property of her late husband whereas, she would become the absolute owner of the said property after death of her husband. They also denied that plaintiff is in possession of the suit property as he is the nearest relative of defendant No.1. It is also pleaded that after death of Ramsingh, the defendant No.1 has got mutated her name in the revenue record as she was the sole surviving heir of Ramsingh under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and after hearing the parties her name was ordered to be mutated in the revenue records. Since the plaintiff started creating nuisance over the suit property of defendant No.1 and tried to grab her property then she sold the suit property to defendant No.2&3 after obtaining sale consideration and started residing in the house of her Aunt at village Sous. The defendant No.2&3 are the bonafide purchaser and after verifying the revenue records they purchased the same. The defendant No.1 to 3 were not in knowledge of the order dated 15.02.2010 passed 5 by the SDO (R) Baikunthpur and therefore they could not challenge the same before any higher forum, however, they are challenging the order dated 15.02.2010 in the present suit by way of counter claim. The defendant No.1 being Class-I heir of the property of her late husband Ramsingh, was having absolute right and title over the suit property and competent to alienate the same. It was also pleaded that after 13 years of death of Ramsingh, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title which is barred by limitation. 5. Along with the written statement, counter claim was also filed by the defendants No.1 to 3 for declaring the order passed by the SDO Baikunthpur in Revenue Case No.30/A-6/2007-08 as null and void, the defendant No.2&3 be declared as title and possession holder of the suit land 4.47 Hects. and permanent injunction be granted in their favour against the plaintiff. In the counter claim also, they claimed that the defendant No.1 being Class-I heir, her name was duly recorded in the revenue records and under the rightful ownership she alienated the property to defendant No.2&3. Parties are governed by Hindu Succession Act for inheritance and therefore the plaintiff has no right or title over the suit property. 6. The plaintiff has filed the written statement of counter claim filed by the defendant No.1 to 3 similarly in the line of his plaint averment and prayed for dismissal of the counter claim. 7. On the basis of pleadings made by the parties, the trial court framed the following issues: dz- Okkniz’u fu"d"kZ 1- D;k xzke vejiqj rglhy cSdq.Biqj i0g0ua- &8 jk0fu0 e0 lkfcr 6 cSdq.Biqj fLFkr [kljk uEcj 347]416]@1]430] 437]439] 451] 603] 614] 633] 640] 641] dqy 11 jdck dzekad 0-710]0-290] 0-270] 0-150] 0-400] 0-210] 0-130] 0-360] 0-330] 0-100] 1- 520 dqy 4-470 gs0 Hkwfe oknh ds Hkrhts Lo0 nso flga ,oa Lo0 jke flg ds LokfeRo dh lEifRr gS \ 2- D;k Lo0 nso flga fu%larku QkSr gks pwds gS \ lkfcr 3- D;k Lo0 jke flag dh iRuh izfroknh dz-&1 mfeZyk ] jke flag ds thou dky esa gh nwljk fookg jkenhu ls dj yh Fkh \ Lkkfcr ugha 4- D;k oknh] vius Hkrhtas dh laifRr dk ,d ek= Lokeh gS\ Lkkfcr ugha 5- D;k oknh vius Hkrhts Lo0 nso flag o jke flag ds LokfeRo dh laifRr dk ,d ek= thfor mRrjkf/kdkjh gS \ lkfcr ugha 6- D;k izfroknh dz0&1 okn Hkwfe dk ,d ek= Lokeh gS \ lkfcr 7- D;k izfroknh dz01 uas voS/k ukekarj.k djk dj izfroknh dz0&2]3 dks 28-02-2008 iathd`r fodz; i= ds ek/;e ls varfjr fd;k gS] tks voS/k o ’kwU; gS \ lkfcr ugha 8- D;k oknh LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ ugha 9- Lkgk;rk ,oa O;; \ fu.kZ; dh dafMdk 25 ds vuqlkj oknh dk okn vLohdkj fd;k x;k rFkk izfroknhx.k dk izfrnkok Lohdkj fd;k x;ka A 10- D;k U;k;ky; vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh jktLo cSdq.Biqj dk jktLo vihy iz0dz0&30 v&6@2007&08 voS/k o ’kwU; gS \ gka 11- D;k izfroknh dz0&2,oa 3 okn Hkwfe ds LoRokf/kdkjh gS \ lkfcr 12- D;k izfroknh dz0&2 ,oa 3 oknh ds fo:) LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gS \ lkfcr 8. In support of the case of respective parties, the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1, Ramdarshan Singh, PW-2, Somar Sai, PW-3 and relied upon documents Ex.P/1, which is the order dated 15.02.2010 passed by the SDO Baikunthpur, P/2 is a copy of sale deed dated 28.02.2008 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2&3, P/3 to P/6 are the revenue records of suit land, P/7 is the 7 order sheet of Tehsildar, P/8 is the voter list of village Khadgawan. The defendants have examined Urmila as DW-1, Ghurni Bai as DW-2 and have not relied upon any document. 9. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, the trial court has passed the judgment and decree dated 27.08.2015 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff and allowing the counter claim of defendants No.1 to 3 holding that plaintiff could not prove that during the lifetime of Ramsingh his wife Urmila remarried with other person and as per their customary law her right would be extinguished from the property of late Ramsingh and she was not competent to alienate the suit property to defendant No.2&3. The judgment and decree dated 27.08.2015 passed by the trial court was challenged by the plaintiff in First Appeal which was also dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 21.03.2018. Hence this Second Appeal. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that in the present case the parties are Gond and aboriginal Tribes. They are governed by their own customary law and as per the their customs, if a female member of the family remarry during the lifetime of her husband, her right would be extinguished from the property of her husband. In the present case, Urmila remarried with one Ramdin during the lifetime of her husband Ramsingh. Therefore, her right from the property was extinguished and she could not become legal heir of Ramsingh and would not succeed the property. Urmila, DW-1 has also admitted in her cross examination that she has no right over the suit property. In such a situation, the property went back to the legal heir of the father of late Ramsingh and the plaintiff being Class-II heir of late Ramsingh, he 8 succeeded the same. He would also submit that the findings recorded by the trial court as well as the first appellate court that the plaintiff has failed to prove by leading cogent evidence that defendant No.1 remarried during the lifetime of her husband is perverse in view of the evidence available on record and also in view of the order dated 15.02.2010 passed by the SDO Baikunthpur. He would also submit that sub-section (2) of Section 2 of The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides that provisions of Hindu Succession Act would not be applicable to the aboriginal Tribes and there are sufficient evidence that the parties are governed by their own customs and customary law, yet the courts below have held that parties are governed by the Hindu Law and Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, there is substantial question of law involved in the present case for its determination. 11. I have heard the counsel for the appellant, perused the record of trial court and gone through the evidence. 12. In the present case both the courts below have concurrently held that although the parties belong to Gond caste and comes under aboriginal Tribe, however, the plaintiff could not produce sufficient evidence and has not examined any person to prove the customs and customary law in the Gond community. There are number of customs and rituals in the Gond community and which one is applicable to the parties has to be proved by the plaintiff, but there is no evidence in that respect. It is burden of the plaintiff to plead and prove that the provisions of Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to their community and they are governed by their own customary law. The plaintiff Shivmangal, PW-1 has admitted in para 18 that he is a Hindu and he celebrates Holi, 9 Deewali and Ram Navami festival and marriage in his family is being performed as per the Hindu religion and he also owned Hindu religion. From the admission made by the plaintiff, it is clear that plaintiff has also adopted Hindu religion and Hindu law, but to gain benefit of his customary law, he pleaded the same in the civil suit. 13. True it is that the provisions of Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to the aboriginal Tribes, but it is only when the plaintiff pleads and proved that Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to their community and they are governed by their own customary law. In the present case there is no sufficient evidence that parties are governed by their own customary law. The evidence suggest that parties have adopted Hindu Law and governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Relying upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Cherotti Sugathan Vs. Cherotte Bharathi & Others, 2008(2)SCC 610 and Rukman Bai Vs. Sukhman Bai, 2012(4)CGLJ 576, the trial court has rejected the contention of the plaintiff that parties are governed by their own customary law and Urmila Bai would not inherit the property of late Ramsingh. The trial court has also considered that the plaintiff has failed to prove as to when Urmila got remarried with Ramdin and when Ramsingh died. When the plaintiff came with a specific plea that during the lifetime of Ramsingh, his wife Urmila got remarried, the plaintiff was under strict obligation to prove the date on which Urmila remarried with Ramdin and when Ramsingh died. He admitted in his cross examination that he has not filed any documentary evidence with respect to the fact that Urmila remarried with Ramdin during the lifetime Ramsingh. There is no documentary evidence issued by any 10 Gram Panchayat etc. Even the plaintiff failed to call the second husband of Urmila as the witness. Though he relied upon the voter list Ex.P/8, but there is no photograph available in the said voter list and name of Urmila may relates to some other lady also which may be a coincidence. 14. The gist of case revolves around the fact that parties are governed by their own customary law and during the lifetime of Ramsingh his wife Urmila got remarried therefore, her right over the property of Ramsingh was extinguished, however the parties are governed by Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as has been held earlier and the fact that Urmila got remarried during the lifetime of her husband Ramsingh has not been proved by the plaintiff by cogent evidence and under the preponderance of probability the case of the defendants are much stronger than the case of plaintiff. The fact that whether Urmila got remarried during the lifetime of her husband Ramsingh or not has been concurrently held by the courts below that plaintiff has failed to prove the same by leading cogent evidence. Further, the same is the consideration of the courts below while considering the counter claim of defendants No.1 to 3 as the issue involved in the suit as well as counter claim is one and the same. 15. The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv Dayal & Another, 2019(8)SCC 637, has observed in paragraphs 16 & 17 as under: “16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (see observation made by learned Judge Vivian Bose,J. as His Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath 11 Mamidwar & Ors. vs. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar & Ors., AIR 1943 Nagpur 117 Para 43). 17. In our opinion, if any one or more ground, as mentioned above, is made out in an appropriate case on the basis of the pleading and evidence, such ground will constitute substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.” 16. In C. Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) By Legal Representatives & Others Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) By Legal Representatives & Others, 2020(4)SCC 659 in paragraphs 25, 29 and 30 observed as under : “25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E- Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan8, it was held that findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under: “12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu (1996 3 SCC 392), this Court held: "It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty (1996 6 SCC 166), this Court held : "Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. … Even as- suming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material." 15. And again in Secy., Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. (1997 4 SCC 484), this Court held: (SCC p. 486, para 5) "The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording reverse finding of fact which is impermissible. 12 29. The learned High Court has not satisfied the tests laid down in the aforesaid judgements. Both the courts, the trial court and the learned First Appellate Court, have examined the School Leaving Certificate and returned a finding that the date of birth does not stand proved from such certificate. May be the High Court could have taken a different view acting as a trial court but once, two courts have returned a finding which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against any provision of law, and neither can it be said that any judge acting judicially and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then, the High Court cannot be said to have erred. Resultantly, no substantial question of law arose for consideration before the High Court. 30. Thus, we find that the High Court erred in law in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the trial court as affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The findings of fact cannot be interfered with in a second appeal unless, the findings are perverse. The High Court could not have interfered with the findings of the fact.” 17. After having gone through the pleadings of the parties, the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties and the ratio of law laid down in the aforementioned cases, this court does not find any illegality or perversity committed by the courts below. The findings recorded by the courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence and this court does not find any question of law involved in the case for its determination. 18. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed without noticing to other side. The parties shall bear their own cost. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder