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2025 DAILYLAW 5305 (HP)

PIAR CHAND DECESED THROUGH LRS ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS v. SURESH KUMAR AND ANOTHER

RSA/202/2025 · 2025-09-04

Bipin Chander Negi

body2025

Judgment text

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.202/2025 Date of Decision: 04th September, 2025. Piar Chand (Deceased) through LRs .....Appellants Versus Suresh Kumar and Another …..Respondents. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellants: Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra, Advocate. For the Respondents: Nemo. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). The Appellant, by filing this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, CPC), has assailed the judgement and decree dated 18.10.2023, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Dehra, District Kangra, HP in Civil Appeal No. 103/G/XIII/2023/2015, affirming the judgement and decree dated 31.01.2015, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dehra, District Kangra, HP, in Civil Suit No. 18/2010. 2. The parties herein shall be referred to in the same manner as they were referred to before the learned trial Court and in the impugned judgment and decree, for the sake of convenience. The facts giving rise to the present second appeal are that the respondents (plaintiffs) filed a suit seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the appellants (defendants) from raising construction or digging on a specific portion (shown as ABCD in the site plan) of the suit land, which 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES 2 was jointly owned by the parties along with other co-sharers and recorded as Gair-Mumkin-Abadi. 3. The plaintiffs pleaded that the defendants, who already had a house on the land, were threatening to construct on the vacant part, thereby attempting to encroach beyond their share. They further averred that despite two prior compromises brokered by the Gram Panchayat on 10.09.2009 and 20.05.2010, where the defendants agreed to pursue partition and desist from construction, the defendants had breached these terms and commenced building activity. 4. The defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement, raising preliminary objections regarding maintainability, estoppel, locus standi, and improper valuation. On merits, they asserted their ownership and possession, claiming the vacant land was their courtyard used for storage. They denied the existence of any valid compromises and stated their intention was only to build a small kitchen (3x3 metres) for necessary use within their possessory area. 5. The learned trial Court framed following issues on 26.10.2010:- 1. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of injunction, as prayed for ? ...OPP 2. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of mandatory injunction, in the alternative, as alleged? ...OPP 3. Whether suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the present form? ...OPD. 4. Whether plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit by their act and conduct, as prayed for? ...OPD. 5. Relief. 3 6. The suit filed by the plaintiff was partly decreed and the defendant was restrained from raising construction on the suit land. 7. Aggrieved by the trial Court's judgment and decree, the defendants preferred a first appeal. Before the First Appellate Court, the defendants argued that the impugned judgment was contrary to law and facts, based on conjectures and surmises. They contended that the plaintiffs had failed to plead or prove their specific possession over the area ABCD and had not adduced cogent evidence to prove their title. It was argued that the evidence on record established that the plaintiffs were neither in possession nor held a title that entitled them to injunction against the true possessors, the defendants. The defendants further challenged the validity of the compromise documents (Ex.PW-1/A and Ex.PW-2/B), contending they were not proved in accordance with law and were forged and manipulated in connivance with official witnesses, a fact allegedly supported by one plaintiff's employment as a Chowkidar in the Panchayat. Lastly, it was urged that the trial Court erroneously preferred the inconsistent and untrustworthy evidence of the plaintiffs over the consistent and truthful testimony of the defendants. The First Appellate Court, upon reappraisal, upheld the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Therefore, the present second appeal. 4 8. Heard Counsels for the appellants and perused the impugned judgements. 9. The core finding of the trial court, upheld in first appeal, was that the parties are co-sharers in the joint Abadi land, a fact conclusively established by the defendants’ own admission in their written statement and, more significantly, by the statement of defendant No. 1 (Piar Chand) recorded on 26.06.2010 in the application for interim injunction. In that statement, defendant No. 1 expressly acknowledged the joint nature of the property, sought permission to build only a kitchen, and gave an undertaking that if this construction was later found to exceed his share upon partition, he would demolish it at his own expense. This admission is fatal to the defendants’ present case and binds them. The pedigree table (Ex.P-3) further corroborates that the parties are descendants of a common ancestor, Kihru, and in the absence of any evidence of a separate, exclusive acquisition by the appellants, their claim of exclusivity is untenable. 10. The two compromises (Ex.PW-1/A and Ex.PW-2/B) brokered by the Gram Panchayat, which the defendants now deny, further reinforce the finding of a joint status and the defendants’ agreement not to construct until partition. The law is well-settled that in a suit for injunction between co-sharers, the proper course is to restrain any construction that would 5 alter the status quo until a final partition is effected, which is precisely the relief granted by the courts below. 11. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, there arises no question of law, much-less a substantial question of law for consideration of the Court, therefore, the appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 04th September, 2025 (Gaurav Rawat/TB)