2025:HHC:26228 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWPOA No.771 of 2020 Reserved on: 25.07.2025 Date of Decision: 05.08.2025 Mansi Parihar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge Whether approved for reporting? For the petitioner: Mr. Adarsh K. Sharma, Advocate. For the respondents: Ms. Aruna Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, Additional Advocate General, for the respondent- State. Satyen Vaidya, Judge The instant petition has been filed for following reliefs: “a) That the respondent department may kindly be directed to stay Annexure A-1 in which two posts of Data Entry Operator were advertised by respondent no.1. b) That the respondents may kindly be directed to regularize the service of the application at par with other similarly placed person after completion six years of continuous service.” 2 2025:HHC:26228 2. The facts of the case, as have emerged from the pleadings of the parties as also the documents relied upon by them, are as under: (a) The post of Field Assistant-cum-Data Entry Operator was advertised by the Society for Environment Protection and Sustainable Development (for short, “the Society”) vide Advertisement No.1 of 2008. (b) The petitioner was selected and appointed as Field Assistant-cum-Data Entry Operator in the Society in pursuance to interviews held on 15.09.2008. She joined on 03.10.2008. (c) The initial emoluments paid to the petitioner were Rs.5,000/-, which from time to time have been enhanced and the petitioner lastly has been paid Rs.15,200/- as basic pay + grade pay + increment. (d) The petitioner is still working on contract basis in the Society even after 16 years of service. 3. The petitioner is seeking regularization of her services seeking parity with various other similarly situated incumbents, who have been given the benefit of regularization policy of the Government from time to time. 3 2025:HHC:26228 4. On the other hand, the respondents are denying the claim of the petitioner for regularization on the ground that there is no sanctioned post in the Society and the petitioner was appointed against a specific project. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record carefully. 6. The fact that the petitioner has been serving the Society as Field Assistant-cum-Data Entry Operator for more than 16 years is not in dispute. 7. The instant petition was filed by the petitioner in the year 2016, when the 2nd respondent (Department of Environment, Science and Technology) had advertised two posts of Data Entry Operator. The petitioner claimed right to be regularized against one of the advertised posts on the premise that the Society was working under the aegis of 2nd respondent and since in various other similarly situated organizations, the identically situated incumbents were granted the benefit of regularization, the petitioner also was entitled for the same treatment. The petitioner further alleged that the 2nd respondent had merged certain posts under specific projects in the Department in the past. 8. As noticed above, the response of the respondents has been to deny the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the Society was an independent organization and the posts in the 4 2025:HHC:26228 Department could not be filled from the incumbents employed in the Society. In such manner a distinction has been drawn between the Department and the Society. 9. During the pendency of the petition, the petitioner has filed supplementary affidavit detailing therein the various jobs and assignments handed over to her viz assigning her the jobs related to State Bio Diversity Board, attending seminars, conferences, which fact has also not been denied by the respondents. 10. The petitioner has also placed reliance on the recommendations made by the Executive Committee of the Society vide its first meeting held on 09.10.2017, whereby the case was recommended to the Service Committee for creation of two posts of Data Entry Operator in the pay scale of Rs.5910- 20200+1900 grade pay in the Society. 11. The record reveals that the Society has been registered under the Himachal Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2006 on 27.09.2007. The registered office of the Society is office of Director, Environment, Science & Technology with the objectives as under: “OBJECTIVES: (i) To promote environment protection-based knowledge and entrepreneurship in Himachal Pradesh. 5 2025:HHC:26228 (ii) To assist in protecting, harnessing local & natural resources for sustainable & economic development of the State. (iii) To facilitate establishment of environment protection agencies in the State through individuals/autonomous bodies. (iv) To get developed need based protocols in potential areas for environment protection. (v) To promote bio-fertilizers for Agri- horticulture activities in the State. (vi) To ensure the better implementation of Environment Management Plans. 12. The State Government Officials form the entire management of the Society. 13. Though, the respondents have tried to project that the petitioner was appointed against a specific project for limited period, but it has nowhere been suggested or shown that the continuance with the services of the petitioner for long period of 16 years is without any need or requirement. It is also not the case of the respondents that the Society has been created for limited period. Rather, the objectives of the Society make it abundantly clear that the Society has been created as an extended wing of the Government with a purpose to work in specialized field. It is also evidently clear from the material placed on record that the services of the petitioner have been utilized not 6 2025:HHC:26228 only for the objectives of the Society, but she has been deputed from time to time as representative of respondent No.2- Department in various conferences and seminars. The petitioner has been deputed to assist the State Bio Diversity Board in addition to her already assigned responsibilities. The petitioner has also been deputed to handle the work of Himachal Pradesh Environment Fund. Even the responsibility for all kinds of publication related to environment by HIMCOSTE has been delegated to the petitioner. 14. Thus, there cannot be an iota of doubt that neither the Society is running for a temporary objective nor the services of the petitioner are being utilized in provisional mode. 15. The question arises as to whether the petitioner has acquired any right to seek the regularization of her services. The respondents by implied conduct have created circumstances which have inculcated a legitimate expectation in the petitioner that her services would be regularized at par with other Government employees. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand and others Vs Brahmputra Mettalics Ltd. 2020 (13) SCALE 500 has expounded in detail the concept of legitimate expectation in the context of Indian law as under: 7 2025:HHC:26228 “40. Under Indian Law, there is often a conflation between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. This has been described in Jain and Jain's well-known treatise, Principles of Administrative Law: “At times, the expressions ‘legitimate expectation’ and ‘promissory estoppel’ are used interchangeably, but that is not a correct usage because ‘legitimate expectation’ is a concept much broader in scope than ‘promissory estoppel’. … A reading of the relevant Indian cases, however, exhibit some confusion of ideas. It seems that the judicial thinking has not as yet crystallised as regards the nature and scope of the doctrine. At times, it has been referred to as merely a procedural doctrine; at times, it has been treated interchangeably as promissory estoppel. However, both these ideas are incorrect. As stated above, legitimate expectation is a substantive doctrine as well and has much broader scope than promissory estoppel. … In Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has observed in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation: 8 2025:HHC:26228 “the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted as part of our law and that the decision maker can normally be compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the expectation based on previous practice or past conduct unless some overriding public interest comes in the way Reliance must have been placed on the said representation and the representee must have thereby suffered detriment.” It is suggested that this formulation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation is not correct as it makes “legitimate expectation” practically synonymous with promissory estoppel. Legitimate expectation may arise from conduct of the authority; a promise is not always necessary for the purpose.” 41. While this doctrinal confusion has the unfortunate consequence of making the law unclear, citizens have been the victims. Representations by public authorities need to be held to scrupulous standards, since citizens continue to live their lives based on the trust they repose in the State. In the commercial world also, certainty and consistency are essential to planning the affairs of business. When public authorities fail to adhere to their representations without providing an adequate reason to the citizens for this failure, it violates the trust 9 2025:HHC:26228 reposed by citizens in the State. The generation of a business friendly climate for investment and trade is conditioned by the faith which can be reposed in government to fulfill the expectations which it generates. Professors Jain and Deshpande characterize the consequences of this doctrinal confusion in the following terms: “Thus, in India, the characterization of legitimate expectations is on a weaker footing, than in jurisdictions like UK where the courts are now willing to recognize the capacity of public law to absorb the moral values underlying the notion of estoppel in the light of the evolution of doctrines like LE [Legitimate Expectations] and abuse of power. If the Supreme Court of India has shown its creativity in transforming the notion of promissory estoppel from the limitations of private law, then it does not stand to reason as to why it should also not articulate and evolve the doctrine of LE for judicial review of resilement of administrative authorities from policies and longstanding practices. If such a notion of LE is adopted, then not only would the Court be able to do away with the artificial hierarchy between promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, but, it would also be able to hold the administrative authorities to account on the footing of public law outside the zone of promises on a stronger and 10 2025:HHC:26228 principled anvil. Presently, in the absence of a like doctrine to that of promissory estoppel outside the promissory zone, the administrative law adjudication of resilement of policies stands on a shaky public law foundation.” 42. We shall therefore attempt to provide a cogent basis for the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which is not merely grounded on analogy with the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The need for this doctrine to have an independent existence was articulated by Justice Frankfurter of the United State Supreme Court in Vitarelli v. Seton: “An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.” 43. However, before we do this, it is important to clarify the understanding of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in previous judgments of this Court. In National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan (“National 11 2025:HHC:26228 Buildings Construction Corpn.”), a three Judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice S. Saghir Ahmad, held that: “18. The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of “legitimate expectation” was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. But claims based on “legitimate expectation” have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.” (emphasis supplied) 44. However, it is important to note that this observation was made by this Court while discussing the ambit of the doctrine of legitimate expectation under English Law, as it stood then. As we have discussed earlier, there was a substantial conflation or overlap between the 12 2025:HHC:26228 doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel even under English Law since the former was often invoked as being analogous to the latter. However, since then and since the judgment of this Court in National Buildings Construction Corporation (supra), the English Law in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation has evolved. More specifically, it has actively tried to separate the two doctrines and to situate the doctrine of legitimate expectations on a broader footing. In Regina (Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v. East Sussex County Council30, the House of Lords has held thus: “33 In any case, I think that it is unhelpful to introduce private law concepts of estoppel into planning law. As Lord Scarman pointed out in Newbury District Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] A.C. 578, 616, estoppels bind individuals on the ground that it would be unconscionable for them to deny what they have represented or agreed. But these concepts of private law should not be extended into “the public law of planning control, which binds everyone”. (See also Dyson J in R v. Leicester City Council, Ex p Powergen UK Ltd. [2000] JPL 629, 637.) 34 There is of course an analogy between a private law estoppel and the public law 13 2025:HHC:26228 concept of a legitimate expectation created by a public authority, the denial of which may amount to an abuse of power… But it is no more than an analogy because remedies against public authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public which the authority exists to promote. Public law can also take into account the hierarchy of individual rights which exist under the Human Rights Act 1998, so that, for example, the individual's right to a home is accorded a high degree of protection (see Coughlan's case, at pp 254-255) while ordinary property rights are in general far more limited by considerations of public interest : see R ( Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389. 35 It is true that in early cases such as the Wells case [1967] 1 WLR 1000 and Lever Finance Ltd. v. Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 Q.B. 222, Lord Denning MR used the language of estoppel in relation to planning law. At that time the public law concepts of abuse of power and legitimate expectation were very undeveloped and no doubt the analogy of estoppel seemed useful…..It seems to me that in this area, public law has already absorbed whatever is 14 2025:HHC:26228 useful from the moral values which underlie the private law concept of estoppel and the time has come for it to stand upon its own two feet.” (emphasis supplied) 45. In a concurring opinion in Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India (“Monnet Ispat”), Justice H.L. Gokhale highlighted the different considerations that underlie the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. The learned judge held that for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, there has to be a promise, based on which the promisee has acted to its prejudice. In contrast, while applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the primary considerations are reasonableness and fairness of the State action. He observed thus: “Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations 289. As we have seen earlier, for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel there has to be a promise, and on that basis the party concerned must have acted to its prejudice. In the instant case it was only a proposal, and it was very much made clear that it was to be approved by the Central Government, prior whereto it could not be construed as containing a promise. Besides, equity cannot 15 2025:HHC:26228 be used against a statutory provision or notification. 290…..In any case, in the absence of any promise, the Appellants including Aadhunik cannot claim promissory estoppel in the teeth of the notifications issued under the relevant statutory powers. Alternatively, the Appellants are trying to make a case under the doctrine of legitimate expectations. The basis of this doctrine is in reasonableness and fairness. However, it can also not be invoked where the decision of the public authority is founded in a provision of law, and is in consonance with public interest.” (emphasis supplied) 46. In Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary, speaking through Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, the Court discussed the decision in Monnet Ispat (supra) and noted its reliance on the judgment in Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn. It then observed: “This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation 16 2025:HHC:26228 without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.” 47. Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 48. As regards the relationship between Article 14 and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, a three judge Bench in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, speaking through Justice J.S. Verma, held thus: “7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law : A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is ‘fairplay in action’. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non- arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, 17 2025:HHC:26228 necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. 8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public 18 2025:HHC:26228 interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non- arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.” (emphasis supplied) 49. More recently, in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA, a two-judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice B.S. Chauhan, elaborated on this relationship in the following terms: “39. State actions are required to be non- arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of a “democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination”. The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive 19 2025:HHC:26228 of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favoritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. … 41. Power vested by the State in a public authority should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. “Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them.” A decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, “in good faith” means “for legitimate reasons”. It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other...]” (emphasis supplied) 50. As such, we can see that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is one of the ways in which the guarantee of non-arbitrariness enshrined under Article 14 finds concrete expression.” 20 2025:HHC:26228 17. Thus, in my considered view, the legitimate expectation inculcated in the petitioner, in the given facts of the case, has provided a right in her favour to seek regularization. The denial of such right to the petitioner leads to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 18. The conduct of respondents, on the other hand, definitely cannot be said to be confirming to the constitutional mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The purpose of formulation of institutions like Society herein is to decentralize the Governmental functions and Constitutional obligations. Such institutions, thus, cannot be used to serve only certain vested interests. These in fact are extended wings of the Government. Running of such institutions on the shoulders of workers having no certainty of job cannot be said to serve public interest in any manner. 19. It is not in dispute that the State Government since long has been formulating Policies for regularization of its contract employees on completion of specific period of service. The Executive Committee of the Society in its first meeting held on 09.10.2017 has specifically adopted the Rules and Regulations of Government of Himachal Pradesh for the staff of the Society, more particularly, as applicable in the Department of Environment, Science & Technology. Since, the benefit of 21 2025:HHC:26228 regularization policy by the State Government has been made available to all the Departments of the State Government, including respondent No.2-Department, the denial of applicability of such policy to the employees of the Society is not justified. The relevant extract of the first meeting of Executive Committee of the Society is reproduced as under: “2. Adoption of Rules & Regulations of GoHP to staff in SEPSD. The EC approved and allowed adoption of the Rules and Regulations issued by the GoHP from time to time in the SEPSD as applicable in the Department of Environment, Science & Technology under various instructions issued from the Finance Department (FD) and Personal Department from time to time.” 20. In almost an identical fact situation this Court vide judgment dated 17.12.2021 passed in CWP No.3743 of 2021 titled as Vikas Gupta and others vs. State of H.P and others along-with connected matters after considering the factors such as the initial recruitment of petitioners in that case on contract basis, the longevity of their continuous service, permanency of projects, State funding, deep and pervasive control of the State etc. had upheld the right of regularization of contract employees of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) under the regularization policy of the State Government. 22 2025:HHC:26228 21. The judgment in Vikas Gupta supra after having affirmation from Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 66 of 2022 was further tested by the respondents in that case, in SLP 15289/2024 before Hon’ble Supreme Court without success. 22. Thus, the petitioner herein cannot be treated differently or in other words the violation of mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot be allowed to persist indefinitely to her detriment. 23. In light of above discussion, the petition is allowed. Respondents No.2 and 3 are directed to consider the case of petitioner for regularization of the services of the petitioner as Field Assistant-cum-Data Entry Operator in terms of regularization policy applicable on the date of filing of the petition. The petitioner shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits. 24. The petition is accordingly disposed of so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Satyen Vaidya) Judge 05th August, 2025 (vt)