1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 323 of 2015 Judgment Reserved on: 24.9.2025 Judgment Delivered on: 12.11.2025 • Rup Lal S/o Shri Laloo Singh Khairwar Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Baserakhurd, Police Station Tirikunda, District Balrampur- Ramanujganj C.G. , Chhattisgarh --- Appellant(s) versus • State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Tirikunda, District Balrampur Ramanujganj C.G. , Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) CRA No. 486 of 2015 • Sharawan Singh S/o Shri Man Sai Singh Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Marma, Bajanapara, Police Station Tirikunda, District Balrampur - Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh. ---Appellant(s) Versus RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 • State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Tirikunda, District Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Shahid Ahmed Ansari, Advocate. For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Ankur Kashyap, Dy. G.A. Division Bench Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. C A V Judgment Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The present are two criminal appeals under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C. CRA No. 323/2015 has been filed by Rup Lal and CRA No. 486/2015 has been filed by Sharawan Singh. 2. Since these appeals have arisen out of the same impugned judgment passed by the trial Court and the question of law and facts also being similar in these appeals, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Challenge in the present appeals is to the legality, validity and correctness of the judgment and order dated 27.1.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Session Judge, Prevention of Sexual Offences to the Boy, Ambikapur, 3 (Surguja), C.G. in Sessions Trial No. 113/2013 by which appellants have been convicted and sentence in the following manner:- Conviction of appellant- Rup Lal Sentence U/s 368 of Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, additional R.I. for one month. U/s 342 of Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for one year with fine of Rs 1,000/-and in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. All the sentences shall run concurrently. Conviction of appellant- Sharawan Singh Sentence U/s 341 of Indian Penal Code Simple Imprisonment for one month with fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine amount, additional S.I. for one week. U/s 342 of Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for one year with fine of Rs 1,000/-and in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. U/s 363 of Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for seven year with fine of Rs 1,000/-and in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. U/s 366 of Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for ten years with fine of Rs 1,000/-and in default of 4 payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. U/s 376 (1) of Indian Penal Code Rigorous Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. U/s 376 (2) (d) of Indian Penal Code Rigorous Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. U/s 3 (a)/04 of Special Act Rigorous Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. U/s 5 (th)/ 06 of Special Act Rigorous Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one month. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 4. Brief facts of the case, is that, on 01.02.2013, the prosecutrix/victim (PW6) was returning home from school when she reached near Bajnapara Nala at about 4:00 p.m., accused Sharawan Singh suddenly emerged from the bushes near the drain, blocked her way, and prevented her from going home. He then caught hold of her, threatened her, and took her into the bushes near the drain, where he committed rape upon her. Subsequently, on 02.02.2013, the accused Sharawan Singh took her to the forest and thereafter to his brother-in-law, accused 5 Ruplal’s house, situated at Basera, Kashinagar. Both accused locked her inside the house. Later, Shrawan Singh took her on his motorcycle to Kameshwar Nagar, where he kept her overnight in a straw shed belonging to someone. The next day, on 03.02.2013, her brother Rajendra Yadav and uncle Shridhar arrived there, upon which the accused fled, and the prosecutrix/victim returned home with her brother and uncle. She narrated the entire incident to her mother, brother, and Shridhar. When her father returned on 05.02.2013, he was also informed about the incident. Thereafter, he went to the police station and lodged a report, on the basis of which T. Yadav, Assistant Sub- Inspector (PW-8), registered the offence as per Ex.P-9. During the investigation on 05.02.2013, T. Yadav, Assistant Sub- Inspector (PW-8), obtained the consent of the prosecutrix (PW-6) and her father for her medical examination as per Ex.P/10 and Ex.P/15, and sent Tahrir Ex.P/14 to the SDM, Ramanujganj, obtaining permission for conducting the private part examination. Tahrir Ex.P-3A was thereafter sent to the Community Health Centre, Ramanujganj, where Dr. A. Kachhap (PW-3) conducted the medical examination. On the same day, Yadav (ASI) seized a salwar and undergarment produced by the prosecutrix in the presence of witnesses as per seizure memo Ex.P-5 and sent Tahrir Ex.P-4A to the Community Health Centre, Bariyon, for 6 testing the seized article. He also seized the prosecutrix’s Class 10th mark sheet in the presence of witnesses as per seizure memo Ex.P-7. On 08.02.2013, the spot was inspected and a site plan Ex.P-11 was prepared on the basis of witness statements. The statements of the prosecution witnesses were duly recorded. On 06.02.2013, the memorandum statement of accused Shravan Singh was recorded as per Ex.P-6, pursuant to which he produced a box hidden behind the straw in a barn, which was seized as per memo Ex.P-5. A motorcycle presented by the accused was also seized as per Ex.P-16. On 08.02.2013, lady constable Aruna Bisen produced two sealed packets given by the doctor after examination, which were seized as per Ex.P-17. Both accused were arrested on 06.02.2013 as per arrest memos Ex.P- 18 and Ex.P-19, and information regarding their arrest was sent to their family members as per Ex.P-20. On 07.02.2013, Tahrir Ex.P-1A was sent to the Community Health Centre, Ramanujganj, for the medical examination of accused Sharawan Singh. The seized property was forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, through the Superintendent of Police for chemical examination, with the receipt of deposit marked as Ex.P-21. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused before the competent court. 7 5. In order to establish the charge against the appellants, the prosecution has examined as many as 8 witnesses and 22 Exhibits. Statements of the appellants under Section 313 CrPC have also been recorded in which they denied the material appearing against them and pleaded innocence and has submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the case. 6. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellants and sentenced them as mentioned above of this judgment and the present appellants being aggrieved by the said order preferred instant appeal, hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the conviction of the appellants is wholly unsustainable in law, in as much as the prosecution has failed to discharge its primary burden of proving that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date and time of the alleged incident. He further submits that the essential ingredients of abduction, whether for the purpose of marriage or for illicit intercourse have not been established. Despite the absence of cogent and reliable evidence, the appellants have been convicted He emphasizes that the prosecution has completely failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt, a fundamental principle in criminal jurisprudence. Counsel further contends that the trial court erred in convicting the appellants based on the 8 presumption that the prosecutrix or victim was a minor, as the prosecution did not satisfactorily prove her minority. The evidence presented was insufficient and inconclusive regarding the age of the prosecutrix, thereby undermining a critical element of the offence. Moreover, the nature of the evidence suggests that the prosecutrix was of majority age and appeared to be a consenting party, which further challenges the validity of the conviction. Counsel submits that the trial court’s judgment and the resultant sentence are manifestly perverse and cannot be upheld in the face of such deficiencies. Additionally, the testimony of the prosecutrix lacks credibility and appears exaggerated, without any corroborative evidence to support her claims. The quality of her evidence is neither reliable nor compelling enough to justify a conviction. Therefore, the benefit of doubt must ensure to the appellants in support of his submissions, counsel has placed reliance upon authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely Alamelu v. State (2011) 2 SCC 385, Manoj v. State of Haryana (2022) 6 SCC 187, Vinod Katara v. State of U.P. (2023) 15 SCC 210 and Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit (1988) AIR (SC) 1796, wherein it has been consistently held that when the prosecution fails to prove the minority of the prosecutrix beyond reasonable doubt and when 9 material contradictions and infirmities appear in the evidence, the conviction cannot be sustained. 8. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has brought home the offence against the appellants and has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and thus, the appellants have rightly been convicted and sentenced for the aforesaid offences. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. From the perusal of the record the first and foremost question which has to be considered by this Court is whether the prosecutrix/victim was minor at the time of commission of offence. 11. For this the evidence in respect of age is required to be considered. 12. In order to consider the age of the prosecutrix/victim we have examined the evidence available on record produced by the prosecution. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the 12th Marksheet issued by Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education, Raipur in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix/victim is recorded as 12.8.1995. 13. PW-5, who is the brother of the prosecutrix (victim), has stated that at the time the offence occurred, his sister was aged about 10 seven years and four to five months old. However, he admits that no formal seizure or evidence collection took place in his presence. Despite this, he provided the marksheet, which has been admitted into evidence as Exhibit P/8. Furthermore, PW-5 clarified that he did not submit the prosecutrix’s birth certificate to the investigating police authorities. 14. PW-6 is the prosecutrix/victim in this case, and with respect to her age, she has stated that she is 17 years old. She has unequivocally admitted this fact during her testimony, despite possessing a birth certificate that presumably verifies her age; however, this birth certificate has not been submitted to or produced before the police authorities as part of the investigation or evidence. 15. PW-7, who is the father of the prosecutrix/victim, has presented the marksheet marked as Exhibit P/12, which indicates the date of birth of the prosecutrix/victim as August 12, 1995. However, during cross-examination, he admitted that he is unaware of who was responsible for admitting the prosecutrix/victim to the school and also does not know who officially registered her date of birth. This admission highlights his limited knowledge regarding the administrative details of the prosecutrix/victim’s schooling and birth registration, despite being her father. 11 16. Admittedly, neither the birth certificate nor the admission register has been produced as evidence, nor has their authenticity or existence been satisfactorily established during the course of the trial. 17. With regard to the question of the prosecutrix’s age, she is relying primarily on the 12th-grade marksheet, marked as Exhibit P/12C, which explicitly states her date of birth as August 12, 1995. This document was duly issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education, Raipur, and serves as the foundational evidence submitted to establish her age in the present matter. 18. To accurately establish the date of birth as recorded either in the admission register or on the school certificate, it is imperative that there be clear and convincing evidence supporting the stated date. This evidence must be reliable, credible, and sufficient to verify the authenticity of the date mentioned, ensuring that the information is not based solely on assumptions or informal declarations but is backed by documented proof or corroborated testimony that can withstand scrutiny. Without such cogent evidence, the stated date of birth cannot be accepted as definitive or authoritative. 19. Upon a thorough examination of the records and the evidence presented, it appears that although the birth certificate is reportedly available, it has not been submitted for consideration. 12 Furthermore, critical documents such as the admission register or the Kotwari register have also not been produced, thereby limiting the scope of verification. Additionally, no ossification test or any other reliable medical examination has been conducted to ascertain the precise age of the prosecutrix or victim, which is a significant oversight in establishing the facts relevant to the case. This absence of key documentary and medical evidence raises concerns regarding the completeness and reliability of the proof presented. 20. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs State of UP and Others reported in 2006 (5) SCC 584 Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the following in Para 26: “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much 13 evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 21. In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a 14 Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined….Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the 15 documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- 16 "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue". 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a 17 minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 22. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2022) 8 SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:- “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of 18 the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 19 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 23. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer 20 certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C- 1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; 21 (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 22 24. In case of Manoj vs. State of Haryana, (2022) 6 SCC 187, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “18. Hence, it cannot be reasonably expected to formulate a unifrom standard for determination of the age of the union of epiphysis on factors affecting the people of the different States of India. 19. Furthermore, this Court in a judgment in Jyoti Prakash Rai v a person has never been considered by courts of law as also by the medical scientist to be conclusive in nature… 20. The Court held as under (Jyoti Prakash Rai case. SCC pp. 228-29, paras 12-13) “12………………………… 13. A medical report determining the age of a person has never been considered by the courts of law as also by the medical scientists to be conclusive in nature. After a certain age it is difficult to determine the exact age of the person concerned on the basis of ossification test or other tests. This Court in Vishnu v State of Maharashtras opined (SCC p. 290 para 20) 23 20.It is urged before us by Mr Lalit that the determination of the age of the prosecutrix by conducting ossification test is scientifically proved and, therefore, the opinion of the doctor that the girl was of 18-19 years of age should be accepted We are unable to accept this contention for the reasons that the expert medical evidence is not binding on the ocular evidence The opinion of the Medical Officer is to assist the court as he is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the Medical Officer is really of an advisory character and not binding on the witness of fact.' In the aforementioned situation, this Court in a number of judgments has held that the age determined by the doctors should be given flexibility of two years on either side.” 25. In case of Vinod Katara vs. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 210, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- 64. The bone ossification test is not an exact science that can provide us with the exact age of the person. As discussed above, the individual characteristics such as the growth rate of bones and skeletal structures can affect the accuracy of this method. This Court has 24 observed in Ram Suresh Singh v Prabhat Singh, and Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar. that the ossification test is not conclusive for age determination because it does not reveal the exact age of the person. but the radiological examination leaves a margin of two years on either side of the age range as prescribed by the test irrespective of whether the ossification test of multiple joints is conducted. The courts in India have accepted the fact that after the age of thirty years the ossification test cannot be relied upon for age determination. It is trite that the standard of proof for the determination of age is the degree of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt." 26. When the matter is examined in light of the aforementioned judgments delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it becomes apparent that neither the prosecutrix/victim nor her father and brother have been able to substantiate the basis on which the date of birth has been recorded. The only document presented in support of the date of birth is the High School Certificate issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education, Raipur. However, such a certificate alone cannot be deemed sufficient to conclusively prove the date of birth. For a reliable determination, it is imperative that the individual responsible for admitting the 25 prosecutrix/victim to the school be examined as a witness to verify the authenticity of the date of birth. The mere mention of a date of birth in the school certificate does not meet the evidentiary threshold; instead, there must exist cogent and credible evidence or authoritative documents upon which the date of birth is officially registered and recognized. Since the parties involved have failed to provide any clarifying testimony, and the key person involved in the admission process has not been examined, it follows, in accordance with the guiding principles established by the referenced judgments, that the date of birth of the prosecutrix/victim remains unproven and cannot be established with certainty. 27. Taking into careful consideration the facts presented, along with the testimony of Dr. A. Kachchhap (PW-3), who conducted the medical examination of the prosecutrix/victim and explicitly stated that the secondary sexual characteristics of the prosecutrix were well developed, it is important to note that he observed the presence of 28 teeth in total. Moreover, during cross- examination, Dr. Kachchhap acknowledged that the third molar teeth typically erupt between the ages of 18 and 30 years. Based on these medical findings, it is evident that the prosecutrix cannot be classified as a minor at the time of the incident. Therefore, it is 26 conclusively held that the prosecutrix/victim was not a minor on the date and time when the alleged incident occurred. 28. Now the next question would be whether the prosecutrix/victim would be abducted and whether offence of rape has been committed against her or not ? 29. The testimony of the prosecutrix, who is the victim in this case, holds significant evidentiary value; however, a closer examination of her statements raises serious doubts about her credibility. According to her account, she voluntarily accompanied the appellant, Sharawan Singh, on his motorcycle and traveled to various locations over a span of two days without any resistance. During cross-examination, she admitted to being well acquainted with the appellant, and it emerged that the complaint was filed at the instance of Ram Charita Yadav, the head of the local society, rather than independently by her. Additionally, she acknowledged that Exhibit D-1, the report, failed to mention critical details such as the arrival of her brother and uncle at the place where she was allegedly held and the appellant’s subsequent flight. These inconsistencies and omissions undermine her reliability as a witness. While it is well-established in law that a conviction in a rape case can rest solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, this is contingent on the evidence being of the highest credibility and unwavering quality. In this instance, the prosecutrix’s evidence 27 falls short of such a standard, rendering her testimony insufficiently trustworthy to support a conviction without corroboration. 30. Based on the medical evidence presented by the doctor, it is quite clear that the prosecutrix/victim, exhibited well-developed sexual characteristics and appeared to be habituated to sexual intercourse. This suggests a level of sexual maturity and experience inconsistent with the prosecution’s claim. Furthermore, it appears that the prosecutrix voluntarily accompanied the appellant, which undermines the prosecution's assertion that she was forcibly abducted with the intent of marriage. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that an abduction occurred, and the case as framed does not meet the threshold required for conviction. 31. The appellant, Rup Lal, has been convicted under Sections 342 and 368 of IPC primarily on the basis that the prosecutrix/victim was a minor at the time the alleged offence was committed; however, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove this crucial fact beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence on record does not establish the minor status of the prosecutrix/victim, which is a fundamental element of the offence charged. Consequently, the 28 conviction and sentence imposed on both appellants appear to be erroneous and unsustainable. The sole testimony supporting the charge is that of the prosecutrix/victim, whose evidence, as noted by this Court, lacks credibility and fails to inspire confidence. Moreover, there is a complete absence of any corroborative evidence to substantiate the prosecution’s case, rendering the entire prosecution narrative unconvincing and unreliable. In light of these considerations, the prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof to the requisite standard, and therefore, the conviction and sentence must be set aside. 32. In view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellants are entitled to acquittal of the charges leveled against them. 33. In the result, both the appeals filed by the respective appellants are allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentences is hereby set- aside. The appellants are acquitted of the aforesaid charges leveled against them. 34. The appellants are reported to be on bail. 35. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellants are directed to furnish a personal bond of Rs. 25,000/- each with two sureties of the like amount before the concerned 29 Court. The bond shall be effective for six months and include an undertaking that in case of filing a Special Leave Petition or grant of leave against this judgment, the appellants will appear before the Supreme Court upon receipt of notice. 36. Registry is directed to transmit the lower court record along with a copy of this judgment to the trial court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 24.9.2025 12-11-2025 12-11-2025 14-11-2025 Raghu Jat