Page No.1 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 2025:CGHC:50831-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 28 of 2013 [Arising out of judgment of acquittal dt. 15.03.2011, passed in Sessions Trial No.50/2008 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Shanti Lal Gond and others) by the Sessions Judge, Korba (CG)] The State of Chhattisgarh, through District Magistrate, Korba (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant Versus 1 - Shanti Lal Gond, S/o Bhaksa Ram Gond, aged about 68 years, R/o Village Salihabhata, O.P. Urga, P.S. Kotwali, Korba, District Korba (Chhattisgarh) 2 - Bhaksa Ram Gond [Died and deleted as per C.O. Dt. 8.5.2018] 3 - Bolo Bai, W/o Baksa Ram Gond, aged about 63 years, R/o Village Salihabhata, O.P. Urga, P.S. Kotwali, Korba, District Korba (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondents [Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Mr. Pankaj Singh, Panel Lawyer & Mr. Sharad Mishra,Panel Lawyer For Respondents : Mr. Sanjay Patel, Advocate ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Division Bench Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board (13.10.2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J (1) This acquittal appeal filed by the appellant-State under SAIFAN KHAN Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Page No.2 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the “CrPC”) is calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of judgment of acquittal dated 15.03.2011, passed in Sessions Trial No.50/2008 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Shanti Lal Gond and others) by the Sessions Judge, Korba (CG), whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted all the accused/respondents No.01 to 03 herein for offence under Section 304-B in alternative 306, 498-A & 506(Part-II) of IPC and also under Section 04 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (2) Before proceeding further it would be appropriate to mention that during the pendency of this appeal, accused-respondent No.02, namely, Bhaksa Ram Gond died and, therefore, this appeal stands abated against him and his namely has also been deleted from the cause-title of this appeal vide C.O. dt. 8.5.2018. Facts of the case, in brief: (3) According to the case of the prosecution, the marriage of Lilavati (herein after referred to as the “deceased”) was solemnized with accused-respondent No.01- Shanti Lal Gond 03 years prior to the date of incident, which took place on 24.04.2008. It is also the case of the prosecution that deceased died on account of extensive burn injuries on 24.04.2008 during the course of treatment at hospital and, upon which, information with regard to sudden and unnatural death was given to the police vide Ex.P/11 and, thereafter, merg intimation vide Ex.P/10 was registered and wheels of Page No.3 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 investigation started running, in which, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/04. Summons under Section 175 of CrPC were issued vide Ex.P/01 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/02. The dead-body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. MP Rathore (PW-07) and, according to PM Report (Ex.P/09), the cause of death has been opined to be shock and suffocation due to extensive burn injuries to the extent of 90- 95%. Thereafter, on 06.06.2008 (i.e. after about 02 months delay), on the basis of written complaint lodged (Ex.P/06) by the brother of the deceased, namely, Santosh Kumar (PW-01), FIR (Ex.P/8) was registered against the accused-persons. The accused persons were arrested vide Ex.P/17 to Ex.P/19. Thereafter, statements of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the accused persons in the competent court of criminal jurisdiction and, ultimately, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. (4) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 19 documents, whereas the accused persons in support of their defence, though not examined any witness, but exhibited 02 documents. Page No.4 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 (5) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record proceeded to acquit all the accused persons for offences under Sections 304-B in alternative 306, 498-A & 506(Part-II) of IPC and also under Section 04 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 vide impugned judgment dated 15.03.2011, against which, this acquittal appeal has been preferred before this Court by the appellant-State. Submissions of parties: (6) Mr. Pankaj Singh and Sharad Mishra, learned Panel Lawyers appearing on behalf of the appellant-State would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused persons by recording finding which are perverse and contrary to the record. There are ample evidence available on record to connect the accused-respondents with the offences in question. All the ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304-B of IPC are clearly established in the present case, as the death of the deceased was within seven years of her marriage and same has occurred otherwise than the normal circumstances and soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry by the accused-respondents herein (i.e. husband and in-laws). As such, it is not a case where the accused persons were entitled for acquittal and the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in acquitting the accused persons. Page No.5 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 Hence, in exercise of appellate power, the acquittal appeal preferred by the appellant-State deserves to be allowed and, further, the accused persons (respondents No.01 & 03) are liable to be punished for offences under Sections 304-B in alternative 306, 498-A & 506(Part-II) of IPC and also under Section 04 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (7) Per-contra, Mr. Mr. Sanjay Patel, learned counsel appearing for the acquitted accused persons (A-1 & A-3) by rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 1 submits that the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal is extremely limited. He further submits that though in the present case though the first two ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304B of IPC are established, but the third and fourth ingredients i.e. soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry by the accused- respondents herein (i.e. husband and in-laws) are completely missing and not established. Even otherwise, there is a delay of about 02 months in lodging the written complainant and FIR in the present case. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in acquitting all the accused persons are well merited and, no interference by this Court is called for in it. Hence, both the 1 2025 INSC 114 Page No.6 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 acquittal appeals are liable to be dismissed. (8) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. Discussion and analysis: (9) At the very outset, we would firstly consider the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, for which, it would be profitable to notice the relevant principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another (supra), whereby in Para-11 & 12 it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal Page No.7 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come Page No.8 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however,must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the Page No.9 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” (10) Thus, in light of the above quote guidelines, we have to Page No.10 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. (11) In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be now appropriate to notice relevant provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC which relates to dowry death:- “304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force w.e.f. 19.11.1986. (12) In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied- Page No.11 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013  The death of a women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances.  Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage.  Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband.  Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. (13) Thus, if the aforesaid ingredients are established by the prosecution by leading appropriate reliable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. (14) Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:- "113B. Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." (15) The aforesaid provision shows that if the women has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may Page No.12 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under:- 2. Definition of "dowry". In this Act," dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- a. by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or b. by the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." (16) To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. (17) In the case at hand, admittedly, the marriage of the deceased was solemnized with the accused-respondent No.01 herein 03 years prior to the date of incident, which took place on 24.04.2008 and, according to the PM report of the deceased vide Ex.P/09, the cause of death is due to shock and suffocation as result of extensive burn injuries to the extent of 90-95%. Hence, the first two ingredients i.e. the death of a women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or Page No.13 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 otherwise than under normal circumstances and such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage, are quite established in the present case. (18) Now the question is whether the remaining two ingredients i.e. soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband and such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry, are established or not ? (19) In this regard, the learned trial Court has considered the statements of Santosh Kumar (PW-01) [brother of the deceased], Sunderiya Bai (PW-03) [mother of the deceased], Sadhuram (PW-10 [father of the deceased] and Ramayan Singh (PW-11) [maternal uncle of the deceased]. However, the learned trial Court has disbelieved the statement of Santosh Kumar (PW-01) on the ground that incident in question took place on 24.04.2008 and Santosh Kumar (PW-01) lodged written complaint (Ex.P/06) and FIR (Ex.P/08) on 06.06.2008 i.e. with a delay of about 02 months and there is no explanation offered at any point of time by the prosecution for such delay. Furthermore, Santosh Kumar (PW-01) is also witness to inquest proceedings conducted vide Ex.P/02, but in the inquest report (Ex.P/02) it has only been recorded that the deceased suffered burn injuries on account of coming in contact with the flames of chimni (i.e. small lamp used to lit with the help of Page No.14 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 kerosene oil) while preparing food. Even otherwise, said inquest proceedings were conducted on 24.04.2008 and Santosh Kumar (PW- 01) did not raise any objection to that effect at that time and only after lapse of about 02 months he lodged written complaint (Ex.P/06), which can be considered to be an afterthought in order to falsely implicate the accused persons. However, the inquest proceeding has been conducted in presence of punch witnesses, in which, it has categorically been mentioned that deceased suffered burn injuries on account of coming in contact with the flames of chimni (i.e. small lamp used to lit with the help of kerosene oil) while preparing food, which the prosecution miserably failed to counter by leading evidenc of clinching nature. As such, it is quite apparent that the deceased suffered burn injuries on account of coming in contact with the flames of chimni (i.e. small lamp used to lit with the help of kerosene oil) while preparing food and, thereafter succumbed to the said injuries and died during the course of treatment in the hospital. (20) Further, Santosh Kumar (PW-01) and Laxman Singh (PW-05) have taken the deceased to the hospital immediately after the incident and, they both have stated before the Court that the deceased had given oral dying declaration to them to the effect that she suffered burn injuries on account of coming in contact with the flames of chimni (i.e. small lamp used to lit with the help of kerosene Page No.15 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 oil) while preparing food. There is no plausible reason to disbelieve the said statement made by Santosh Kumar (PW-01) and Laxman Singh (PW-05). Similarly, Sunderiya Bai (PW-03) and Laxman Singh (PW-5) have also clearly stated that they have not made any specific complaint with regard to cruelty on the deceased and demand of dowry by the accused-respondents herein, which aspect is also missing in their statements recorded under Section 161 of CrPC vide Ex.D/01 & Ex.D/02 respectively. Moreover, in the shav panchnama report (Ex.P/02), which was prepared in presence of Sunderiya Bai (PW-03), Santosh Kumar (PW-01) and other witnesses, by Tehsildar- SK Meriya (PW-09), it has been mentioned that deceased suffered burn injuries on account of coming in contact with the flames of chimni (i.e. small lamp used to lit with the help of kerosene oil) and, at that time, none of the said witnesses have objected the same. (21) Similarly, Ramayan Singh (PW-11), who is maternal uncle of the deceased and used to reside in the same village where the accused person used to stay, has not at all supported the case of the prosecution. Further, Sadhuram (PW-10), father of the deceased, has clearly stated that deceased suffered burn injuries on account of coming in contact with the flames of chimni (i.e. small lamp used to lit with the help of kerosene oil) while preparing food. As such, there is no evidence available on record to prove that soon before the death of the deceased, she have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by Page No.16 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 her husband or any relative of her husband (i.e. accused-respondents herein) and such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. (22) In view of the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that though two primary ingredients, i.e. the death of the deceased was under abnormal circumstance and within seven years from the date of her marriage are duly established, but other two ingredients i.e. soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband (accused persons herein) and said cruelty and harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry, are completely lacking/missing. There is no evidence available on record to show that at any point of time, the acquitted accused had demanded dowry or had committed cruelty and harassment upon the deceased for or in connection with the same soon before her death. Thus, the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in acquitting all the accused persons (respondents No.01 & 03 herein) for offence under Section 304-B in alternative 306, 498-A & 506(Part-II) of IPC and also under Section 04 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Conclusion: (23) Concludingly, we are unable to hold that the accused persons (respondents No.01 & 03 herein) are the authors of the crime and, therefore, they are liable to be convicted for the offences in question. Page No.17 of 17 IN ACQA-28-2013 The learned trial Court has rightly held all the accused persons (respondents No.01 & 03 herein) entitled for acquittal for offences under Section 304-B in alternative 306, 498-A & 506(Part-II) of IPC and also under Section 04 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on the basis of finding recorded in the impugned judgment dated 15.03.2011 and we do not find that the said findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. (24) Accordingly, this acquittal appeal filed by the State is liable to be and are hereby dismissed. No cost. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge s@if