1 2025:CGHC:49103 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 1186 of 2025 1 - Rajesh Kumar Gupta S/o Late Laxmi Prasad Gupta Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Baswahi Sonhat, Police Station Sonhat, District- Korea (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Patna District- Korea (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Kusum Lalchandani, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Pandey, Dy. Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 24/09/2025 1. The present criminal revision under Section 438 read with Section 442 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNSS, 2023”) has been filed by the petitioner, against the order dated 19.08.2025, passed by learned Special Judge (NDPS Act), Baikunthpur, District- Korea, in Special Criminal Case 11/2025, whereby the charge under Sections 22(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, has been framed against the petitioner. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is an accused in Crime No. 97/2025, registered at Police Station Patna, District- Korea for the offence under Section 22(b) and 22(c) of the NDPS Act, along with other co-accused ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2025.10.08 10:31:50 +0530 2 persons. From the petitioner, 30 strips (8 capsules per strips) of Pyeevon Spas Plus Capsuls, and one motor cycle have been seized on 26.04.2025 and he has been arrested. Some more quantity of said Pyeevon Spas Plus Capsuls have been seized from other two co-accused persons. Offence has been registered and after investigation charge-sheet has been filed before the learned Special Judge NDPS Act, Baikunthpur for the said offences. The learned trial Court has framed the charge for the offence under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act, against the petitioner vide order dated 19.08.2025, which is under challenge in the present criminal revision. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is falsely been implicated in the offence. With respect to his false implication, the wife of the applicant made representation to the I.G. Police, Surguja Range on 29.05.2025 and 01.09.2025. There is no contraband tablets has been seized from the applicant yet the seizure memo has been prepared by the police showing that certain contraband tablets has been seized from him, which is a false document. In view of the entire material available in the charge-sheet, there would be no prima facie offence appears to be made out against the applicant and no charge can be framed against him, therefore, petition may be allowed and the applicant may be discharged. Learned counsel for the applicant would also submits that there is separate seizure memo framed from the different accused persons by the police and from the present applicant only 240 capsules have been seized. Therefore, looking to the quantity of contraband allegedly seized from the applicant, no charge under Section 22(c) of NDPS Act can be framed. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and has submitted that on being secret information received by the police they conducted raid and during raid total 30 strips (8 capsules per strips) strips of Pyeevon Spas Plus Capsuls, has been seized from the applicant 26.04.2025 and considering the quantity of contraband and its illegal trafficking, the FIR has 3 been registered against the applicant and other two accused persons from whom also certain tablets have been seized and after investigation charge- sheet has been filed. There are sufficient evidence against the applicant in the charge-sheet. He would also submits that from the statement of the witnesses Sagar Singh, Vikas Dewangan, Saksham Kurre, Head constable Rakesh Bhagat, constable Ramayan Singh and constable Ram Singh there is sufficient allegation against the applicant that he involved in the alleged offence. From the FSL report of the tablets the contents of Tramadol was found in the seized tablets from the applicant, therefore, there are sufficient material in the charge-sheet which are sufficient to frame charge and proceed with the trial, therefore, the criminal revision filed by the applicant is liable to be dismissed. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 6. At the stage of framing of charge, the court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence on record nor to conduct a mini-trial. The court would only consider whether prima facie material is there or not to proceed with the trial. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record to find out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- 4 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for "presuming" that the accused had committed the offence: (Chitreth Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 613, para 25) "25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction" 7. In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgement that:- 12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) "11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to f sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 5 11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526) '25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22, para 20) "29....... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have the offence on t committed the the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge, though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." 8. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgement that: 21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms: (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) "12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-42) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no 6 sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which.... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.' 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan wherein it was held as under. (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) '10... ..If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact. It is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter of into a weighing and balancing of 7 evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the 9 evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him." 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar, this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) '19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. 8 (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face valuc disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal." 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- 10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. 11. This Court in State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held: (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) "29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, 9 the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." 12. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression "the record of the case" used in Section 227 CrPC is to be understood as the documents and articles, g if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. 13. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Sonit has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.” 10. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether 10 or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 11. In view of the above principles, on examining the material available in the charge sheet, which is filed along with the petition, it prima facie gives sufficient material that the present petitioner is involved in the offence, and there is sufficient prima facie material to frame the charge and to proceed with the trial of the case. 12. In the present case the allegation against the present applicant is that who is engaged in trafficking of illegal contraband tablets of Pyeevon Spas Plus Capsuls, and from the seizure memo annexed with the petition at page No. 79, it transpires that total 30 strips (8 capsules per strips) strips of Pyeevon Spas Plus Capsuls, seized from him in presence of the witnesses and from the statement of aforesaid witnesses they stated that on being secret information they conducted raid and from the present applicant the said contraband tablets have been seized. From the FSL report also which has been annexed at page No. 101 of the petition, the contents of Tramadol is found positive. 13. Section 22(c) of NDPS Act provides: 22(c) where the contravention involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:” 14. The minimum quantity of Tramadol is provided as 5gm and the commercial quantity provided is 250gm in serial No. 238ZH of the table in the notification issued by the Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue vide notification dated 16.07.1996 under the NDPS Act, 1985 as amended by the notification dated 26.04.2018, specifying small quantity and commercial quantity. 11 15. The charge-sheet has been filed against the three accused persons considering their total quantity of contraband as 369.6gm based on the said charge-sheet the learned trial Court has framed charge for the offence under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act, which is the commercial quantity of the contraband, therefore, there is prima facie evidence available in the charge- sheet against the applicant to frame charge and proceed with the trial. 16. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, evidence available on record against the applicant as well as aforesaid settled law, this Court is of the opinion that there is sufficient material against the applicant to frame charge against him for the offence under 22(c) of the NDPS Act. Since all three accused persons have been found together at the time of search and seizure, therefore, total quantity have been considered by the police as well as by the learned trial Court while framing the charge, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the said charge framed by the learned trial Court. 17. Accordingly, the petition does not have nay merit and liable to be hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok