1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1004 of 2018 Judgment Reserved on: 26.8.2025 Judgment Delivered on: 10.10.2025 1 - Gopal Traders 5, Civic Centre, Bhilai, Through The Partner. 2 - Satyanarayan Agrawal S/o Late Shri Kalyanmalji Agrawal, Aged About 52 Years Partner-Firm M/s Gopal Traders, 5 Civic Centre, Bhilai, Police Station Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Gopal Agrawal, S/o Late Shri Kalyanmalji Agrawal, Aged About 48 Years Aged About 52 Years, Partner-Firm M/s Gopal Traders, 5 Civic Centre, Bhilai, Police Station Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Smt. Chandrika Bai W/o Late Arjun, Aged About 22 Years (Now 30 Years), Caste Bareth, R/o Village Kotmi Sonar, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh. 2 2 - Abhimanyu S/o Late Arjun, Aged About 8 Years Minor, Through Legal Guardian Mother Smt. Chandrika Bai, W/o Late Arjun, Caste Bareth, R/o Village Kotmi Sonar, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Deleted (Ramaiyya) Honble Court Order Dated 02-01-2023. 4 - Deleted (Sumitra Bai) Honble Court Order Dated 02/01/2023. 5 - Vijay Kumar S/o Fandiram Dhobi, Aged About 27 Years (Now 35 Years), R/o Village Nandini, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh. 6 - The Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Ms. Sharmila Singhai, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Hrishabh Deo Shukla, Advocate. For Respondent(s) No. 1 & 2 : Mr. V.V.S. Murthy, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Rajendra Kumar Patel, Advocate. For Respondent No. 6 : Mr. N.K. Malaviya, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Judgment 1. This appeal has been preferred by the partners of the Gopal Traders under whose control and possession the offending vehicle was found. They have challenged the award dated 3.5.1997 stating that they were ex partie before the tribunal 3 however during execution proceedings when the notices were issued they came to know about the matter and has came to know that the ex partie proceedings award has been passed for a sum of Rs. 1,75,000/- in favour of the claimants. In the first instance they have filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC for setting aside ex partie award passed by tribunal against them, however, the application was rejected by the tribunal vide its order dated 7.2.2005 in MJC No. 1/2004 by the third Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, (FTC), Janjgir Champa. Against the said rejection they have preferred a MAC under order 43 Rule 1 (D) of CPC before this Court which has been objected by the insurance company stating that the same is not maintainable upon which they have withdrawn the same vide order 26.2.2014 with liberty to file a duly constituted writ petition before this Court. A writ petition bearing WP (227) No. 194/2014 challenging order dated 7.2.2005 was filed before this Court however after hearing the parties it has also been dismissed stating that the tribunal has rightly rejected the application which does not call for any interference. 2. Accordingly, the appellants were left with no option except to file a MAC under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act challenging the award dated 3.5.1997 as such this MAC has been filed. 4 3. Since the appeal was barred by limitation as such an application for condonation of delay has been filed stating that they have approached several times before the Court concerned which consumed a lot of time as such the delay in filing the appeal which is about 7579 days is bonafide in nature as such the delay if any is found it requires to be condoned on the ground that the appellants were ex partie before the tribunal and since the date of knowledge they are approaching before the concerned Court including this Court however they have not get any relief and ultimately this appeal was filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act which is beyond the limitation, however, said limitation is not malafide or deliberate one and as such the delay of 7579 days is required to be condoned and case is required to be decided on merits. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Claims Tribunal passed an ex-parte award dated 03.05.1997. She further submits that the appellants challenged this award by filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which was dismissed by order dated 07.02.2005. Aggrieved by this dismissal, the appellants filed an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure before the Hon’ble High Court bearing Miscellaneous Appeal No. 690 of 2005. Initially, the Hon’ble Court stayed the execution of 5 the impugned award on 11.02.2009, however, later, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn on 26.02.2014, with liberty granted to file a writ petition. The appellants then filed a writ petition, which was dismissed on 26.03.2018. She further submits that immediately after becoming aware of the ex-parte award, the appellants continuously approached the proper higher forums for its setting aside. Despite the initial dismissal of the writ petition, the appellants filed the instant appeal and are entitled to the benefits under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court has held in several cases that Section 14 should be read as a whole, meaning that if an applicant diligently prosecutes a prior civil proceeding before a forum lacking jurisdiction or similar defect, the time spent in such proceedings can be excluded while calculating the limitation period. Furthermore, arising from the same accident, one Hariram also died, whose legal representatives filed Claim Case No. 23/1994 before the Claims Tribunal. In that case, the Tribunal passed an award dated 22.01.1999, holding the insurance company liable and confirming that the vehicle was insured and the driver held a valid license at the time of the accident. While deciding the writ petition, the Hon’ble Court noted the existence of two inconsistent awards by the Claims Tribunal, and in such circumstances, the appellants should have been exonerated from 6 any compensation payments. She further submits that the Claims Tribunal failed to appreciate that the insurance company neither adduced evidence nor proved any breach of policy terms, despite the settled legal principle that the insurer must both plead and prove such defenses. She has placed reliance upon judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Purni Devi & Another vs. Babu Ram & Another reported in 2024 SC Online SC 482 and Sesh Nath Singh vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop. Bank Ltd & Another reported in (2021) 7 SCC 313. She further reliance upon the judgment passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmadabad in the matter of Heirs of deceased Akbar Sulemanbhai Miyana, Mumtazben Wd/o & Ors vs. Sureshbhai Karnabhai Ragiya & Another and the judgment passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Archana Kumar & Another vs. Purendu Prakash Mukherjee and Another reported in 2000 SCC Online MP 116. 5. On the other hand learned counsel for insurance company opposes the submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellant stating that they were ex partie before the trial Court meaning thereby they were aware the proceedings however instead of participating in the proceeding they have chosen not to appear before the tribunal. They have neither filed any written statement nor they have adduced evidence as such after lapse of 7 huge delay of 7579 days the petition itself become otiose and the same is required to be dismissed in threshold holding it to be barred by inordinate delay of about 7579 days. 6. Learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 respectfully opposes the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, contending that the arguments put forth lack merit and do not warrant interference by this Hon’ble Court. It is further submitted that the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal was rendered after due consideration of the evidence on record and in strict conformity with the applicable legal principles and statutory provisions. The counsel emphasizes that the award is both reasoned and well-founded, and as such, does not suffer from any illegality or procedural irregularity that would justify its annulment or modification. Accordingly, it is urged that the appeal be dismissed as devoid of substance. 7. The appellants have deliberately chosen not to appear before the Court and as such they are required to pay the amount of compensation the accident occurred on 26.4.1994 in which deceased Arjun and another deceased Hariram traveling on a bicycle which has been hit by the offending vehicle owned and possessed by the appellants herein. 8. Issuance for consideration before this Court is that whether the application filed by the appellants for condonation of delay of a 8 huge period is required to be condoned and whether the appellants have make out a case for condoning of delay 7579 days from the application as well as from the documents appended with this appeal, it appears that the appellants were ex partie before the tribunal meaning thereby they have received notice however they have chosen not to appear before the Tribunal for the reasons best known to them. 9. 9. It seems that they have avoided service of the notice and as such when an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC was preferred the same has been dismissed by the tribunal holding that no reasonable explanation has been put forth by the appellants. They were having knowledge about the case they preferred to be ex partie before the tribunal when the receipt of notice for execution of the award then only they have tried to approach before the Court it seems that it was the faults of the appellant who even after receipt of notice have not appeared before the Tribunal. 10. The application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC has also been filed with a delay and as such it has been dismissed vide order dated 7.2.2005. This order was challenged in an MAC before this Court which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file appropriate proceeding and a writ petition bearing WP (227) No. 194/2014 was filed which was also dismissed vide order dated 9 26.3.2018 holding that there is no merit in the petition as order dated 7.2.2005 has been passed in accordance with law. 11. In the matter of Purni Devi & another vs. Babu Ram & another 2024 SCC Online SC 482 has observed as under:- “25. The relevant portion of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is extracted as under, for ready reference: "Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction……. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it." 35. The judgments in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (Supra) and M.P. Steel (Supra) have been followed consistently by this Court. For Instance in Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphull Coop. Bank Ltd. (2-Judge Bench), while holding Section 14 to be applicable to applications under Section 7 of 10 the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the SARFAESI Act, it was observed: "75. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is to be read as a whole. A conjoint and careful reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 14 makes it clear that an applicant who has prosecuted another civil proceeding with due diligence, before a forum which is unable to entertain the same on account of defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature, is entitled to exclusion of the time during which the applicant had been prosecuting such proceeding, in computing the period of limitation. The substantive provisions of sub -sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 14 do not say that Section 14 can only be invoked on termination of the earlier proceedings, prosecuted in good faith." 12. In the matter of Sesh Nath Singh vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop. Bank Ltd (2021) 7 SCC 313 has observed as under:- “68. Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the petitioner had been prosecuting, with due diligence, another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance, or of appeal or revision, against the 11 same party, for the same relief, shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, is unable to entertain it. The conditions for exclusion are that the earlier proceedings should have been for the same relief, the proceedings should have been prosecuted diligently and in good faith and the proceedings should have been prosecuted in a forum which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain it.” 13. In the matter of M.P. Steel Corporation vs CCE (2015) 7 SCC 58 has observed as under:- “50. Section 14 has been interpreted by this Court extremely liberally inasmuch as it is a provision which furthers the cause of justice. Thus, in Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. 12, this Court held: (SCC p. 464, para 14) 14. "... In the submission of the learned Senior Counsel, filing of civil writ petition claiming money relief cannot be said to be a proceeding instituted in good faith and secondly, dismissal of writ petition on the ground that it was not an appropriate remedy for seeking money relief cannot be said to be 'defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature' within the 12 meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the writ petition was not dismissed by the High Court on the ground of defect of jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide in its application, inasmuch as it is not confined in its applicability only to cases of defect of Jurisdiction but it is applicable also to cases where the prior proceedings have failed on account of other causes of like nature. The expression 'other cause of like nature' came up for the consideration of this Court in Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi and it was held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such cases where the defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstance, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the court of the dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has a right.” 13 14. In the matter of Archana Kumar & Another vs. Purendu Prakash Mukherjee & Another 2000 SCC Online MP 116, Full Bench has observed as under:- “22. Accordingly, we hold that even after dismissal of the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code a regular first appeal under section 96(2) of the Code is maintainable.” 15. The aforementioned case laws are factually distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case and, therefore, hold no persuasive or precedential value in support of the appellant's position. In particular, the factual matrix and legal context underlying those decisions are materially different, rendering them inapplicable to the issues at hand. Furthermore, considering the pecuniary dimensions and specific nuances of the present matter, reliance on those precedents would neither advance the appellant's arguments nor substantively contribute to the adjudication of the present dispute. 16. Now the ex partie proceeding has been confirmed as such the reasons showing delay in filing the appeal cannot be allowed in the teeth of order dated 7.2.2005 passed by the claims Tribunal in MJC No. 1/2004 and writ petition bearing WP (227) No. 194/2004 as no bonafide reasons have been assigned by the appellant to interfere in the order about the inordinate delay. The 14 claimants are seeking compensation and till date they are waiting for compensation since 3.5.1997 as such in the opinion of this Court a such an inordinate delay which has not been explained properly and as such the delay in filing the appeal cannot and could not be condoned and the same is liable to be dismissed. 17. Accordingly, the appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. 18. The concerned tribunal is directed to proceed further in execution proceedings and to satisfy the award dated 3.5.1997 which has been passed against the present appellant. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat