1 2025:CGHC:53780 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 90 of 2016 Judgment Reserved on 04.08.2025 Judgment delivered on 04.11.2025 Smt. Uma Bai W/o Manmohan Sahu, Aged About 50 Years R/o Village- Gariyabandh, Tahsil And District- Gariyaband Chhattisgarh, Civil And Revenue District- Gariyaband Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant (s) versus 1. Shri Bharosa Ram Thakur S/o Munshi Thakur, The Then Tahsildar, Gariyaband, District- Gariyaband Chhattisgarh, Present Address- Deputy Collector, Raigarh, District- Raigarh Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh. 2. Shrawan Kumar Gupta The Then Sub- Divisional Officer Revenue, Gariyaband, District- Gariyaband Chhattisgarh, Present Address- Sub- Divisional Officer Revenue, Dallirajhara, District- Balod Chhattisgarh, District : Balod, Chhattisgarh 3. Ramji Sahu S/o Bhuwanlal Sahu, Additional Collector, Gariyaband, District- Gariyaband Chhattisgarh, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh 4. Niranjan Das S/o Laxmi Narayan Das, Collector, Gariyaband, District- Gariyaband Chhattisgarh, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh 5. Ramratan Dhruw Sub-Divisional Officer, Public Works Department, Gariyaband, District- Gariyaband Chhattisgarh, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh SANTOSH KUMAR SHARMA Digitally signed by SANTOSH KUMAR SHARMA Date: 2025.11.04 14:41:26 +0530 2 6. Ram The Then Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Gariyabandh, District- Gariyabandh Chhattisgarh, Present Address- Engineer-In-Chief, Public Works Department, Raipur, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 7. Raghuvansh Chandrakar, S/o Makhan Lal Chandrakar, Civil Contractor, Village- Baherabuda, Tahsil And District- Gariyabandh Chhattisgarh, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh 8. State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Collector, Gariyabandh, District- Gariyabandh Chhattisgarh.........Defendants, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. B.P. Sharma along with Mr. Karunendra Narayan Singh, Advocates For the State : Mr. Ajay Khumrani, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Justice Shri Narendra Kumar Vyas C A V Judgment 1. This is first appeal preferred by the plaintiff under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against judgment / decree dated 11.12.2015 passed by Additional District Judge, Gariyabandh in Civil Suit No. 22-A/2015 by which learned trial Court has allowed the application filed by the State/defendant No.8 under Section 7 Rule 11 CPC and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff as barred by law and not maintainable. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their description in Civil Suit No. 22-A/2015. 3. Brief facts as mentioned in the plaint are that plaintiff has filed a civil suit for declaration of title, injunction, possession of property and damages mainly contending that:- 3 (a) The ancestors of the plaintiff Late Bhagirathi and Late Mahadev, were in possession of land bearing Khasra No. 143 measuring 0.74 hectare situated at Village Dongrigaon, Patwari Halka No. 50, R.N.M. Gariaband (hereinafter referred to as suit property) and prior to 1966 they were cultivating the said land. They have also moved an application for lease of the land before the Revenue Authority. It is also case of the plaintiff that as per revenue record they are in possession of the suit property and after death of ancestors they are in possession of the suit property and doing agricultural work. Accordingly on 02/04/2008, they have moved an application for settlement of the suit land in their name. The Tehsildar Gariaband taking cognizance of the said application issued notice calling objection but no objections were received till date, thereafter, on 16.05.2008 Gram Panchayat Paragaon passed a resolution on 22.07.2008 settling the land in favour of the plaintiff. (b) It is also case of the plaintiff that after obtaining NOC from the concerned department, Sub-Divisional Officer Gariaband forwarded it to the Additional Collector, Gariaband for settling the suit land which is Khasra No. 143 area 0.74 hectare out of which 0.70 hectare is recorded as grass land. The Additional Collector Gariyaband vide its order dated 17.03.2011 has passed the order declaring the plaintiff as Bhoomiswami under the provision of Section 273(2) of the Land Revenue Code and fixed lease rate 2.50 paisa under Section 60 of the Act thereafter directed the Tahsildar for correction of revenue record. (c) It is also case of the plaintiff that he made an application before Tahsildar Gariband for preparation of rin pustika, but without giving an 4 opportunity of hearing the Tahsildar initiating proceeding for allotment of the land for construction of circuit house by issuing advertisement on 16.10.2014 wherein the plaintiff himself has raised an objection which has not been decided. Accordingly, Tahsildar has sent the proposal to Sub Divisional Officer Gariyaband on 24.04.2015 for review of order thereafter the Sub Divisional Officer, sought permission from Collector, Gariyaband on 24.04.2015 to forward the same to the Commissioner (Revenue) Raipur for granting permission to the Tahsildar to review its own order. The Commissioner Revenue has granted permission on 02.05.2015 which has necessitated the plaintiff to file the suit for possession, injunction and loss suffered by him and restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff or to do any construction work there. 4. Defendant No. 8 has not filed written statement but filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC mainly contending that the plaintiff has neither pleaded nor has produced any document to demonstrate that the plaintiff has any title over the suit land to attract provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It has also been contended that the defendant has not granted any title to the plaintiff and the plaintff has filed the suit on the basis of future’s title whereas as per Section 34 of the Act, only on the basis of vested title the suit can be filed. 5. The plaintiff filed reply to the application contending that Additional Collector Gariyaband has declared the suit land as grass land and also granted title to the plaintiff, as such it is empathetically denied for calming title in future the suit has been filed. It is also contended that the plaintiff has 5 filed the suit as per the provisions of Section 80 (2) of the Code after obtaining leave to file a suit without notice thus, it has been prayed for dismissal of the application. 6. Learned trial court dismissed the suit on 11.12.2015 as barred by law and recorded its finding that the suit land belongs to State and recorded as grass land, and no title by way of lease has been granted to the plaintiff, as such the plaintff has no legal right, therefore, as provisions of Section 34 of the Specif Relief Act the suit is not maintainable as barred by law. Being aggrieved with this order, the plaintiff has filed the First Appeal under Section 96 CPC before this Court. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that the impugned order passed by the court below is perverse and not sustainable in law as learned Court below has failed to appreciate Section 34 of the Act, 1963 in proper perspective. He would further submit that learned court below ought to have appreciated Section 34 of the Act, as the word 'any' has to be interpreted as the context requires its interpretation in widest possible by not interpreting in such manner or giving the word 'any' a restrictive meaning, the Court below has acted contrary to law or intention of the legislature, thus the impugned order is bad in law. Learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and record has been maintained in this regard and the plaintiff's settled possession may not be disturbed by the respondent authorities arbitrarily, illegally and such abrupt dispossession by the State authorities is contrary to law, thus he would submit that since his right has been infringed, therefore, the suit is maintainable. To 6 substantiate his submission, he has referred the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Patil Automation Private Limited and others reported in 2022 (10) SCC 1. 8. On the other hand learned counsel for the State/defendant No. 8 would further submit that respondent / defendant No. 8 has not granted any patta though the land was granted Kabil Kaast land, as such plaintiff was encroacher. It has also been contended that defendant No.8 has dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit land as the plaintiff has no right to hold the suit property. He would further submit that learned trial Court after appreciating the law has rightly allowed the application filed by the defendant No. 8 as such no illegality has been committed by the learned trial Court and would pray for dismissal of the appeal. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the Court below with utmost satisfaction. 10. From the above submission made by the parties, the point emerged for determination by this Court is as under:- “Whether the order passed on the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is legal, justified, does not suffer from perversity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court? 11. To appreciate this point, it is expedient for this court to examine provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 as well as provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Section 34 is as under:- Section 34:- Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that 7 he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Explanation.—A trustee of property is a “person interested to deny” a title adverse to the title of some one who is not inexistence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee. Order 7 Rule 11 CPC The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law: Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature form correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff. From perusal of provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) CPC and considering the law on the subject it is well settled legal position of law that while considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) CPC, the Court has to just read the plaint only and has to assume that the averments made in the plaint to be correct and none of the reliefs claimed can be granted in law since the plaintiff is not entitled to claim such relief then only the court should have rejected the plaint as suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. 12. The provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is subject matter of examination which has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rajendra Bajoria and others vs. Hemant Kumar Jalan and others reported in 2022 (12) SCC 641 has considered the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. 8 13 No doubt that, it is rightly contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that, only on the basis of the averments made in the plaint, it could be ascertained as to whether a cause of action is made out or not. It is equally true that for finding out the same, the entire pleadings in the plaint will have to be read and that too, at their face value. At this stage, the defence taken by the defendants cannot be looked into. 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Another 1977m (4) SCC 467 5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentently resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10, CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Cr.XI) and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: “It is dangerous to be too good.” [emphasis supplied] 16. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that reading of the averments made in the plaint should not only be formal but also meaningful. It has been held that if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, and a meaningful reading thereof would show that the pleadings are manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, then the court should exercise its power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. It has been held that such a suit has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing itself. 9 17. It will also be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd. (supra): 10. The question arises as to whether in the background of the facts already stated, such reliefs can be granted to the plaintiff. Unless there is a term to the contrary in the contract of service, a transfer order is a normal incidence of service. Further, it is to be considered that if the plaintiff does not comply with the transfer order, it may ultimately lead to termination of service. Therefore, a declaration that the transfer order is illegal and void, in fact amounts to imposing the plaintiff on the defendant in spite of the fact that the plaintiff allegedly does not obey order of her superiors in the management of the defendant Company. Such a relief cannot be granted. Next relief sought in the plaint is for a declaration that she continues to be in service of the defendant Company. Such a declaration again amounts to enforcing a contract of personal service which is barred under the law. The third relief sought by the plaintiff is a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from holding an enquiry against her. If the management feels that the plaintiff is not complying with its directions it has a right to decide to hold an enquiry against her. The management cannot be restrained from exercising its discretion in this behalf. Ultimately, this relief, if granted, would indirectly mean that the court is assisting the plaintiff in continuing with her employment with the defendant Company, which is nothing but enforcing a contract of personal service. Thus, none of the reliefs sought in the plaint can be granted to the plaintiff under the law. The question then arises as to whether such a suit should be allowed to continue and go for trial. The answer in our view is clear, that is, such a suit should be thrown out at the threshold. Why should a suit which is bound to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction of a court to grant the reliefs prayed for, be tried at all? Accordingly, we hold that the trial court was absolutely right in rejecting the plaint and the lower appellate court rightly affirmed the decision of the trial court in this behalf. The High Court was clearly in error in passing the impugned judgment whereby the suit was restored and remanded to the trial court for being decided on merits. The judgment of the High Court is hereby set aside and the judgments of the courts below, that is, the trial court and the lower appellate court are restored. The plaint in the suit stands rejected.” [emphasis supplied] 10 18. It could thus be seen that the court has to find out as to whether in the background of the facts, the relief, as claimed in the plaint, can be granted to the plaintiff. It has been held that if the court finds that none of the reliefs sought in the plaint can be granted to the plaintiff under the law, the question then arises is as to whether such a suit is to be allowed to continue and go for trial. This Court answered the said question by holding that such a suit should be thrown out at the threshold. This Court, therefore, upheld the order passed by the trial court of rejecting the suit and that of the appellate court, thereby affirming the decision of the trial court. This Court set aside the order passed by the High Court, wherein the High Court had set aside the concurrent orders of the trial court and the appellate court and had restored and remanded the suit for trial to the trial court. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 21. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC are required to be strictly adhered to. However, under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, the duty is cast upon the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. This Court has held that the underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is that when a plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings. It has been held that in such a case, it will be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation so that further judicial time is not wasted. 13. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others vs. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsingh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another decided in Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024 on 20th December, 2024 has held as under:- 24. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not produced any documentary evidence to show that he is entitled for the relief of declaration of ownership of the suit properties except by way of reliance of the resolutions of the government, which has lost its force in view of the decree of the Civil Court and subsequent compromise decrees. The decrees had also attained finality as the neither the plaintiff nor his ancestors have challenged the same in time. It is also evident on the face of record that the Plaintiff is a stranger to the suit properties; on the contrary, the Defendants are the owners of the suit properties. It 11 is a settled principle of law that the owners cannot be restrained from dealing with their own properties at the instance of a stranger. The said relief is again a consequential relief to the claim of title, which has been non-suited on the ground of limitation. Hence, the prayer (c) made in the plaint is not maintainable. 25. Regarding the averments made in the plaint relating to fraud played on the plaintiff by the defendants in relation to the compromise decrees obtained in their favour, we are of the view that they are vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated. Rather, no case can be culled out from the averments made in the plaint in this regard. The plea of fraud is intrinsically connected with the nature of Inam. We have already discussed the plea of fraud in the preceding paragraphs. We are also of the view that the plea has been raised only to overcome the period of limitation. Admittedly the Plaintiff is a stranger to the suits which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view of the direct bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, he cannot seek a declaration ‘that the compromise decrees passed in Spl. Civil Suit Nos.l52/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil Appeal No.787/2001, Pune are void ab initio, null and void and the same are liable to be set aside’. The law on this point is also already settled by this Court in Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh 2020(6) SCC 629. The bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC is applicable to third parties as well and the only remedy available to them would be to approach the same court. In the present case, such an exercise is also not possible in view of the bar of limitation. Hence, we find the suit to be unsustainable. 26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court. We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No.1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC. The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to 12 be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold. 14. From perusal of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, it is quite vivid that for maintaining the suit under Section 34 of the Act, the plaintiff must be a person entitled to any legal character, to any right as to property and the defendant must be a person denying or interested to deny the plaintiff title to such character or right then only the suit under Section 34 of the Act is maintainable. In the present facts of the case the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that no lease has been granted but applications are pending in the meantime the proceedings for reserving the said suit land to the Government for construction of Circuit house which clearly denotes that no legal right has been accrued to the plaintiff, as such he was encroacher of the land. 15. In light of the above stated position of law and pleadings made in the plaint, now this court is examining the legality and propriety of the impugned order. It is quite vivid that plaintiff in paragraph 5 of the plaint has categorically pleaded that the proceedings for grant of lease is pending and the Additional Collector, Gariyaband has declared them Kabil Kaast as per provisions of Section 237(2) of the Land Revenue Code and has forwarded the case and the proceedings are pending for granting of lease to the plaintiff, in the meantime, the Tahsildar on 24.04.2015 has initiated proceeding for cancellation of proposed lease allotment proceedings and accordingly the Commissioner vide order dated 02.05.2015 has initiated review of proceeding as the suit land is required to be construction of new 13 Circuit house which clearly denotes that no indefeasible right or title has been granted by the State in favour of the plaintiff, therefore, learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in allowing the application as no legal right has been accrued in favour of the plaintiff which is sine qua non for filing of the suit. Thus, the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court is legal, justified and does not warrant interference by this Court. 16. Though the trial Court has not taken into consideration further pleading made by the plaintiff in the plaint with regard to review order dated 02.05.2015 passed by Commissioner (Revenue) granting permission to Tahsildar to review its order under the Land Revenue Code, therefore, remedy lies under the Land Revenue Code only by filing revision/appeal before the Board of revenue, as such the suit is also barred by law under Land Revenue Code 1959. 17. Considering the facts and law, it is quite vivid that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by law, as such the impugned order does not suffers from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. Accordingly, the First appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed and it is dismissed. 18. Interim order passed by this Court on 18.03.2016 is vacated. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Santosh