1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1724 of 2025  Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat-Tumgaon, P.S. Tumgaon, Distt. Mahasamund C.G. (Non Applicant No. 2) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Saharam Yadav S/o Samaru Yadav Aged About 36 Years R/o Village- Devri, Present Addres- Village- Kejuwa, P.S.- Saraipali, Distt- Mahasamund C.G.(Applicant No. 1) 2. Gagan Yadav S/o Samaru Yadav Aged About 8 Years Legal Guardian Of Father Saharam Yadav S/o Samaru Yadav, R/o Village- Devri, Present Addres- Village- Kejuwa, P.S.- Saraipali, Distt- Mahasamund C.G.(Applicant No. 2) 3. Kumari Purvika D/o Saharam Yadav Aged About 1 1/2 Years, Legal Guardian Of Father Saharam Yadav S/o Samaru Yadav, R/o Village- Devri, Present Addres- Village- Kejuwa, P.S.- Saraipali, Distt- Mahasamund C.G.(Applicant No. 3) 4. Mohnish Kumar Sahu S/o Jeevan Lal Aged About 29 Years R/o Ward No. 10, Ramsagarpara, Tumgaon, P.S.- Tumgaon, Distt. Mahasamund C.G. (Non-Applicant No. 1) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Adv. along with Ms. Swati Agrawal, Adv. For Respondents No. 1 to 3 : None, though served For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Arun Kumar Shukla, Adv. Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.11.12 13:24:53 +0530 2 12-11-2025 1) Heard on I.A. No. 2/2025, an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 2) The appellant/ owner of the offending vehicle has filed this appeal assailing the award dated 20.9.2024 passed in Claim Case No. 38/2023 by the learned First Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Saraipali, District Mahasamund (C.G.) whereby compensation of Rs. 12,55,200/- has been awarded with interest @ 9% p.a. on account of death of Smt. Rukmani Yadav and learned Claims Tribunal has fastened the liability on the driver and owner of the offending vehicle to deposit the amount within period of 30 days and in default, the amount of compensation shall carry interest @ 12% per annum. 3) Mr. Pankaj Agarwal, counsel for the appellant submits that award was passed on 20.9.2024 but the file of the case was missing from the office of the appellant. He further submits that appellant was informed with regard to passing of award on 15.7.2025 and immediately thereafter, appellant applied for certified copy of the award, which was delivered on 16.7.2025 and this appeal was preferred on 28.7.2025. He prays to condone the delay caused in filing the appeal as same has been explained properly in the application. 4) On the other hand, Mr. Arun Kumar Shukla, counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 would oppose. He submits that appellant has filed this appeal with delay of 219 days and sufficient reasons 3 have been not been explained in the application for condonation of delay, therefore this appeal deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. 5) Heard. 6) Perusal of the award would show that appellant was represented through a counsel. The award was passed on 20.9.2024 and thereafter, no steps were taken by the appellant to prefer the appeal within limitation. 7) In the application for condonation of delay, it is stated that file of the case was missing from the office of the appellant and the authority concerned came to know with regard to passing of award only on 15.7.2025 but source of knowledge has not been disclosed in the application. Further, present is not a case where an ex-parte award was passed, instead appellant was represented through a counsel before the learned Claims Tribunal. Also, appellant has not explained the delay from 20.9.2024 till 14.7.2025. 8) It seems that the appellant remained inactive for period of 219 days, which suggests a lack of diligence in pursuing the case. Given the substantial delay of 219 days, the appellant has not provided sufficient justification for the inaction. 9) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy 4 Collector (LA)1 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein- below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11.Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 10) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh2 and Ors, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of 1. (2024) 4 SCR 241 ; 2024 SCCOnLine SC 513 2. AIR 1935 PC 85 5 Haryana and Ors3, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors4., where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors.5, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer6, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as 3. 2014 4 SCALE 50 4. (2011) 4 SCC 363 5. AIR 2009 SC 1927 6. (2013) 14 SCC 81 6 prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 11) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein- below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice- oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, 7 where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 12) In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimant have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimant have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been 8 rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 13) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 14) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the appellant has not explained the delay properly, therefore the application for condonation of delay [I.A. No. 2/2025] is liable to be and is hereby rejected. 15) Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE A j i n k y a