- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 101219 OF 2018 (S-DE) BETWEEN: RAVI D. BAGALKOT, AGE:33 YEARS, OCC:CHIEF OFFICER, TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, LAXMESHWAR - 582 116, DIST: GADAG. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. G. N. NARASAMMANAVAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REP. BY THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION, VIKASA SOUDHA, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGALORE – 01. 2. THE DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION, VIKAS SOUDHA, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU – 01. 3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DHARWAD - 580 001. 4. THE ENQUIRTY OFFICER, ADDITONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, GADAG - 582 101. 5. THE CHIEF OFFICER TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCILM KALAGATAGI 580 114, DIST: DHARWAD. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. KIRTILATA R. PATIL, HCGP FOR R1 TO R4; SRI. S.S.NIRANJAN, ADVOCATE FOR R5) R Digitally signed by VISHAL NINGAPPA PATTIHAL Location: High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, Dharwad - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 20.01.2018 BEARING NO.3014 DMA71 EQBG 2013-2014/6493 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 VIDE ANNEXURE-"A" AND ETC., THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING B GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: ORAL ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA) The petitioner is before this Court seeking the following prayer: “A. Issue writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing the impugned Order dated 20.01.2018 bearing no.3014 DMA71 EQBG 2013-2014/6493 passed by the respondent no.2 vide Annexure-"A". B. Grant any other reliefs and deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 2. Heard the learned counsel Sri.G.N. Narasammanavar appearing for the petitioner and Smt.Kirtilata R. Patil, learned HCGP for respondent Nos.1 to 4 and Sri. S.S. Niranjan, learned counsel for respondent No.5. 3. The petitioner was at the relevant point in time working as Senior Health Inspector, Town Municipal Council and later was transferred to work as Chief Officer of the Pattan - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 Panchayath, Kalaghatagi. On certain allegations or omissions and commissions, the charge sheet comes to be issued against the petitioner and an Inquiry Officer appointed for conduct of inquiry in terms of the charge sheet against the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer is said to have exonerated the petitioner, the exoneration of which was not accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and the Disciplinary Authority directed appointment of a new Inquiry Officer to conduct a de novo inquiry on the same charges. It is then that the petitioner is before this Court in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that there cannot be a de novo inquiry by different Inquiry Officer on the same charges, which is the settled principle of law. He would seek to place reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.R. DEB v. THE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, SHILLONG1. 5. Per contra, the learned HCGP would refute the submission in contending that the Disciplinary Authority was not satisfied with the first report of the Inquiry Officer and therefore, 1 (1971) 2 SCC 102 - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 a de novo inquiry was directed to be conducted and no fault can be found with the direction to conduct a de novo inquiry. She would seek dismissal of the petition. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for parties and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The issue lies in a narrow compass as to whether there could be a de novo inquiry by the hands of a different Inquiry Officer on the same set of allegations. 8. The impugned order dated 20.01.2018 passed by the respondent No.2 reads as follows: ¤zÉÃð±ÀPÀgÀÄ, ¥ËgÁqÀ½vÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£Á®AiÀÄ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄgÀªÀgÀ £ÀqÀªÀ½UÀ¼ÀÄ «µÀAiÀÄ: ²æà gÀ« r.¨ÁUÀ®PÉÆÃn, »A¢£À ªÀÄÄSÁå¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ (ªÀÄÆ® ºÀÄzÉÝ »jAiÀÄ DgÉÆÃUÀå ¤jÃPÀëPÀgÀÄ), ¥ÀlÖt ¥ÀAZÁ¬Äw, PÀ®WÀlV, ºÁ° gÉÆÃt ¥ÀÅgÀ¸À¨sÉ EªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ ²¸ÀÄÛ PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀÄîªÀ §UÉÎ G¯ÉèÃR: 1. AiÉÆÃd£Á ¤zÉÃð±ÀPÀgÀÄ, f¯Áè £ÀUÀgÁ©üªÀÈ¢Þ PÉÆñÀ, zsÁgÀªÁqÀ EªÀgÀ ¥ÀvÀæ ¸ÀASÉårAiÀÄÄr¹/¹§âA¢/2013-14/998, ¢: 26-02-2012 2. F ¤zÉÃð±À£Á®AiÀÄzÀ ¸ÀªÀĸÀASÉå. ¢:05-11-20150 DzÉñÀ. 3. «ZÁgÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ C¥ÀgÀ f¯Áè¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ, UÀzÀUÀ G¥À«¨sÁUÀ, UÀzÀUÀ gÀªÀgÀ «ZÁgÀuÁ ªÀgÀ¢ -(1)/ 2/54/2015-16, ¢:30-10-2017 ¥Àæ¸ÁÛªÀ£É: - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 ²æà gÀ« r.¨ÁUÀ®PÉÆÃngÀªÀgÀÄ F »AzÉ PÀ®WÀlV ¥ÀlÖt ¥ÀAZÁ¬ÄwAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄÄSÁå¢üPÁjAiÀiÁV PÀvÀðªÀå ¤ªÀð»¸ÀÄwÛzÀÝ CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è CªÀåªÀºÁgÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß J¸ÀVgÀĪÀÅzÁV PÀ®WÀlV ¥ÀlÖt ¥ÀAZÁ¬ÄwAiÀÄ ZÀÄ£Á¬ÄvÀ ¥Àæw¤¢üUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 13- 12-2013 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 18-12-2013 gÀAzÀÄ ¤zÉÃð±À£Á®AiÀÄPÉÌ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ zÀÆgÀÄUÀ½UÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ f¯Áè¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ, zsÁgÀªÁqÀ f¯ÉègÀªÀjAzÀ ªÀgÀ¢ PÉÆÃgÀ¯ÁVvÀÄÛ. 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DgÉÆÃ¥À-4PÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ 2013-14£Éà ¸Á°£À 13£Éà ºÀtPÁ¸ÀÄ AiÉÆÃd£ÉAiÀÄrAiÀÄ°è PÉÊUÉÆArgÀĪÀ gÀÆ.4.32 ®PÀëzÀ PÁªÀÄUÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ PÀ®WÀlV ¥ÀlÖt ¥ÀAZÁ¬Äw ªÁå¦ÛAiÀÄ°è PÉÊUÉÆArgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¢: 02-09-2016gÀ zÁR¯É¬ÄAzÀ w½zÀÄ §A¢gÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ DgÉÆÃ¥À ¸Á©ÃvÁV®èªÉAzÀÄ, DzÀgÉ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¦PÀ PÁªÀÄUÁjUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÉÊUÉÆAqÀ ¸ÀܼÀUÀ¼À «ªÀgÀªÀÅ E®è¢gÀĪÀ §UÉÎ w½¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®è ºÁUÀÆ gÀÆ.4.87 ®PÀëzÀ ªÉÆvÀÛzÀ PÁªÀÄUÁjUÀ¼À PÀÄjvÀÄ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¥À ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 DgÉÆÃ¥À-5PÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ DgÉÆÃ¥ÀzÀ°è ªÀåªÀ¸ÁAiÉÄÃvÀgÀ GzÉÝñÀPÉÌ ¨sÀÆ ¥ÀjªÀwð¸À¯ÁzÀ d«Ää£À «£Áå¸ÀzÀ £ÀPÉëAiÀÄÄ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀ¢AzÀ C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£É ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄzÉ, SÁvÉ zÁR°¹, £ÀPÀ®Ä ¤Ãr, PÀvÀðªÀå ¯ÉÆÃ¥À J¸ÀVgÀĪÀ CA±ÀzÀ §UÉÎ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¦gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. DzÀÝjAzÀ, «ZÁgÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À C©ü¥ÁæAiÀĪÀ£ÀÄß M¥ÀÅàªÀAvÀzÁÝVgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. C®èzÉà «ZÁgÀuÁ ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀðzÀ°è ªÀÄAqÀ£Á¢üPÁjAiÀÄÄ ¸ÀºÀ ²¸ÀÄÛ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ ¥ÀgÀªÁV ªÁzÀ ªÀÄAr¸ÀzÉ, D¥Á¢vÀ£À ¥ÀgÀªÁV ªÀÄvÀÄÛ D¥Á¢vÀ¤UÉ C£ÀÄPÀÆ®ªÁUÀĪÀ jÃwAiÀÄ°è ªÁzÀ ªÀÄAr¹gÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¸ÀÆPÀÛªÁVgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. 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CzÉñÀ ¸ÀASÉå: 3014, rJAJ 71 EPÀÆÌ©a 2013-14/6493 ¢£ÁAPÀ 20-01-2018 ¥Àæ¸ÁÛªÀ£ÉAiÀÄ°è «ªÀj¹gÀĪÀAvÉ qÁ: «±Á¯ï.Dgï, ¨sÁ.C.¸ÉÃ., ²¸ÀÄÛ, ¥Áæ¢üPÁj ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¤zÉÃð±ÀPÀgÀÄ, ¥ËgÁqÀ½vÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£Á®AiÀÄ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ DzÀ £Á£ÀÄ PÉ.¹.J¸ï.(¹¹J) ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ 1957gÀ ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 9(2)(¹)gÀ ¥ÀzÀvÀÛªÁzÀ C¢üPÁgÀzÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ ²æÃ.gÀ« r.¨ÁUÀ®PÉÆÃl, »A¢£À ªÀÄÄSÁå¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ (ªÀÄÆ® ºÀÄzÉÝ »jAiÀÄ DgÉÆÃUÀå ¤jÃPÀëPÀgÀÄ), PÀ®WÀlV ¥ÀlÖt ¥ÀAZÁ¬ÄwÀ, ºÁ° gÉÆÃt ¥ÀÅgÀ¸À¨sÉ EªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÞzÀ zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀUÀ¼À ¸ÀvÁåA±À ¥Àj±ÉÆÃzsÀ£ÉUÁV ªÀÄgÀÄ«ZÁgÀuÉ dgÀÄV¸À®Ä PÉ.¹.J¸ï (¹¹J) ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ 1957gÀ ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 11(5)(J)gÀAvÉ G¥À PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ C¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ¤ªÀÈvÀÛ f¯Áè ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÀvÀæ £ÁåAiÀiÁ¢üñÀgÀÄ, ¥ËgÁqÀ½vÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£Á®AiÀÄ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ EªÀgÀ£ÀÄß «ZÁgÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À£ÁßVAiÀÄÄ ºÁUÀÆ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 11(5)(¹)gÀ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ ¥ËgÁqÀ½vÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£Á®AiÀÄzÀ ¯ÉPÀÌ ±ÁSÉAiÀÄ ¯ÉPÀÌ C¢üÃPÀëPÀgÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄAqÀ£Á¢üPÁjAiÀÄ£ÁßV £ÉëĹzÉ. «ZÁgÀuÁ ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀªÀÅ 4 wAUÀ¼ÉƼÀUÁV «ZÁgÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀÇtðUÉƽ¹ «ZÁgÀuÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ¸À°è¸À®Ä ¸ÀÆa¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ¤zÉÃð±ÀPÀgÀÄ ¥ËgÁqsÀ½vÀ ¤zÉÃð±À£Á®AiÀÄ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ (Emphasis added) It is not in dispute that the Inquiry Officer so appointed to conduct a Departmental Inquiry against the petitioner, exonerated the petitioner of all the allegations. The report of such exoneration was forwarded to the Disciplinary Authority. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 The Disciplinary Authority has now appointed a new Inquiry Officer to conduct a de novo inquiry. 9. Once the inquiry proceedings are concluded, the Inquiry Officer would communicate the report of such inquiry to the Disciplinary Authority. The course open to the Disciplinary Authority is twofold, either to accept the report of the Inquiry Officer and close the proceedings against the delinquent employee or to disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. There is no jurisdiction to the Disciplinary Authority to appoint a new Inquiry Officer to direct conduct of a de novo inquiry on the same charges, on the ground that the earlier Inquiry Officer had rendered a report which was not in tune with what the Disciplinary Authority wanted. 10. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of K.R. DEB (supra) and its aftermath. 10.1. The Apex Court in the case of K.R. DEB held as follows: “12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 13. In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but was harassing to the appellant. 14. Before the Judicial Commissioner the point was put slightly differently and it was urged that the proceedings showed that the Disciplinary Authority had made up its mind to dismiss the appellant. The Judicial Commissioner held that on the facts it could not be said that the Disciplinary Authority was prejudiced against the appellant. But it seems to us that on the material on record a suspicion does arise that the Collector was determined to get some Inquiry Officer to report against the appellant.” (Emphasis supplied) 10.2. The Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA v. KD PANDEY2, observed as follows: “4. On remit the inquiry officer made a report finding Respondent 1 guilty of four charges. Based on that report, the Railway Board dismissed Respondent 1, which was challenged in the dispute raised by him. The Tribunal as well as the High Court are of the view 2 (2002) 10 SCC 471 - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 that on the same material a fresh opinion has been furnished and it was not a case of further inquiry. Indeed, it was not noticed by the disciplinary authority that the inquiry held earlier was bad or that the management or the establishment did not have the proper opportunity to lead evidence or the findings were perverse. In the absence of the same, it was held that there was no justification on the part of the disciplinary authority to commence fresh inquiry on the same set of charges. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in this case the Board had examined the material on record and come to the conclusion that four of the six charges could be proved on the available material, which had not been properly examined in the earlier inquiry. In fact from the order made by the Railway Board as well as from that part of the file where the inquiry report made earlier is discussed, it is clear that specific findings have been given in respect of each of the charges after discussing the matter and, if that is so, we fail to understand as to how there could have been a remit to the inquiry authority for further inquiry. Indeed this resulted in second inquiry and not in a further inquiry on the same set of charges and the material on record. If this process is allowed the inquiries can go on perpetually until the view of the inquiry authority is in accord with that of the disciplinary authority and it would be abuse of the process of law. In that view of the matter we think that the order made by the High Court affirming the order of the Tribunal is just and proper and, therefore, we decline to interfere with the same. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.” (Emphasis supplied) 10.3. In the case of KANAILAL BERA v. UNION OF INDIA3, it is observed as follows: 3 (2007) 11 SCC 517 - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 “6. The question as to whether a punishment of confinement to Civil Lines could have been directed or not should not detain us as we agree with the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the purported order dated 5-4-1995 of the disciplinary authority was unsustainable in law. Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, inter alia, lays down the procedure for conducting a departmental inquiry. Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. In a given situation further evidences may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry.” (Emphasis supplied) 10.4. In the case of NAND KUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND,4 it is observed as follows: “26. In our opinion, having accepted the explanations and having communicated the same to the appellant, the High Court could not have proceeded to pass the order of initiating departmental proceedings and reverting the appellant from the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to the post of Munsif. On general principles, there can be only one enquiry in respect of a charge for a particular misconduct and that is also what the rules usually provide. If, for some technical or other good ground, procedural or otherwise, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law, there is no principle that a second enquiry cannot be initiated. Therefore, when a completed enquiry proceedings is set aside by a competent forum on a technical or on the ground of procedural 4 (2012) 3 SCC 580 - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 infirmity, fresh proceedings on the same charges is permissible. 27. In the present case, a charge memo was issued and served on the appellant. A reading of the charge memo does not contain any reference to the proceedings of the Standing Committee at all. It is also not found as to whether the earlier proceedings has been revived in accordance with the procedure prescribed. In fact, after receipt of the charge memo, the appellant, in his reply statement, had brought to the notice of the enquiry officer that on the same set of charges, a notice had been issued earlier and after receipt of his explanation dated 21-12- 1994, the Standing Committee, after accepting his explanation had dropped the entire proceedings and the same had been communicated to him by the Registrar General of the High Court by his letter dated 2-2-1995. In spite of his explanation in the reply statement filed, the enquiry officer has proceeded with the enquiry proceedings and after completion of the same, has submitted his report which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, in these circumstances, there is no justification for conducting a second enquiry on the very charges, which have been dropped earlier. Even though the principle of double jeopardy is not applicable, the law permits only disciplinary proceedings and not harassment. Allowing such practice is not in the interest of public service. In the circumstance, we cannot sustain the impugned order reverting the appellant to the lower post.” (Emphasis supplied) 10.5. In the case of VIJAY SHANKAR PANDEY v. UNION OF INDIA,5 it is observed as follows: “24. Be that as it may, the question is whether the disciplinary authority could have resorted to such a practice of abandoning the enquiry already undertaken and resort to appointment of a fresh enquiring authority (multi- member)? The issue is not really whether the enquiring authority should be a single member or a 5 (2014) 10 SCC 589 - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 multi-member body, but whether a second inquiry such as the one under challenge is permissible. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K.R. Deb v. CCE [K.R. Deb v. CCE, (1971) 2 SCC 102] , examined the question in the context of Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. It was a case where an enquiry was ordered against a Sub-Inspector, Central Excise (the appellant before this Court). The enquiry officer held that the charge was not proved. Thereafter the disciplinary authority appointed another enquiry officer “to conduct a supplementary open inquiry”. Such supplementary inquiry was conducted and a report that there was “no conclusive proof” to “establish the charge” was made. Not satisfied, the disciplinary authority thought it fit that “another enquiry officer should be appointed to inquire afresh into the charge”. 25. The Court in K.R. Deb [K.R. Deb v. CCE, (1971) 2 SCC 102] held that: (SCC p. 105, paras 12-13) “12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the disciplinary authority may ask the enquiry officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the inquiring officer or officers does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 13. In our view the Rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on 13-2-1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the Rules but was harassing to the appellant.” (emphasis supplied) and allowed the appeal of K.R. Deb. - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 26. It can be seen from the above that the normal rule is that there can be only one enquiry. This Court has also recognised the possibility of a further enquiry in certain circumstances enumerated therein. The decision however makes it clear that the fact that the report submitted by the enquiring authority is not acceptable to the disciplinary authority, is not a ground for completely setting aside the enquiry report and ordering a second enquiry. 27. The scheme of Rule 8 of the Discipline Rules and Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 are similar. Therefore, the principle laid down in Deb case [K.R. Deb v. CCE, (1971) 2 SCC 102], in our opinion, would squarely apply to the case on hand. 28. Therefore, it becomes necessary for us to examine the legality of the impugned order in the light of the law laid down in Deb case [K.R. Deb v. CCE, (1971) 2 SCC 102] i.e. whether a further enquiry is really warranted on the facts of the case. We shall proceed for the purpose of this case that such further enquiry need not be by the same officer who initially constituted an enquiring authority and could be by a multi-member board.” (Emphasis supplied) The jurisprudence on the point stands crystallized in the aforesaid judgments beginning from K.R.DEB traversing through K.D.PANDEY, KANAILAL BERA, NANDA KUMAR VERMA, VIJAY SHANKAR PANDEY, all quoted supra. The consistent refrain of the Apex Court has been that, while further enquiry by the same officer is permissible if marred by procedural lapses, the appointment of - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 successive officers, until a desired conclusion is reached, would undoubtedly amount to abuse of the process. 11. The principle that emerges is clear as crystal; the Disciplinary Authority is empowered to reconsider the evidence and record its own findings which would be disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer; it is not empowered to endlessly commission fresh enquiries, until its predisposition is satisfied. Such a course not only contravenes the Rules, but also strikes at the root of fairness, reasonableness and becomes arbitrary. In the present case, the appointment of the new Enquiry Officer to rehear the very charges already adjudicated is wholly without jurisdiction. If permitted, it would reduce the enquiry process into a never ending ordeal, eroding the basic tenets of administrative justice. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Petition is allowed. - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13861 WP No. 101219 of 2018 (ii) The impugned order dated 20.01.2018 bearing No. 3014 DMA71 EQBG 2013-2014 / 6493 passed by the respondent No.2 is quashed. (iii) The petitioner shall become entitled to all consequential benefits that would flow from the quashment of laws. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE RSH & VNP / CT-ASC List No.: 1 Sl No.: 80