1 2025:CGHC:50634 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2060 of 2014 Order Reserved on 18.09.2025 Order Delivered on 10.10.2025 1 - Vinod Kumar Pandey (Died) Through Lrs As Per Honble Court Order Dated 04-11-2024. 1.1 - Nilima Pandey Wd/o Late Shri Vinod Kumar Pandey Aged About 58 Years R/o Village And Post- Churikala, P.S. And Tehsil- Katghora, Revenue And Civil Distt. Raigarh, C.G. 1.2 - Abhinav Toshanshu Pandey S/o Late Shri Vinod Kumar Pandey Aged About 35 Years R/o Village And Post- Churikala, P.S. And Tehsil- Katghora, Revenue And Civil Distt. Raigarh, C.G. 1.3 - Ku. Soumya Pandey D/o Late Shri Vinod Kumar Pandey Aged About 32 Years R/o Village And Post- Churikala, P.S. And Tehsil- Katghora, Revenue And Civil Distt. Raigarh, C.G. 2 - Sunil Kumar Agrawal S/o Late Shri Ghasi Ram Agrawal Aged About 41 Years, R/o Vilalge And Post Churikala, P.S. And Tehsil Katghora Revenue And Civil Distt. Korba C.G. ... Petitioners versus YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2025.10.10 18:54:54 +0530 2 1 - State of Chhattisgarh through Secretary, Department of Industries/ Revenue, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Revenue & Civil District Raipur (C.G.). 2 - Collector Korba, Revenue & Civil District Korba (C.G.). 3 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Katghora, Tahsil Katghora Revenue & Civil District Korba (C.G.). 4 - General Manager N.T.P.C. Limited Korba Revenue And Civil District Korba (C.G.) 5 - Tehsildar Katghora, Tehsil Katghora Revenue & Civil District Korba C.G.. --- Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Vivek Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 3 and 5 : Mr. Ajay Kumar Pandey, Government Advocate For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge CAV Order 1. Heard Mr. Vivek Kumar Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Ajay Kumar Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondents No.1 to 3 and 5 as well as Mr. Anuroop Panda, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4. 2. By filing the present petition, the petitioners have prayed for following relief(s):- 3 “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable writ (s), direction (s), order (s), by directing the respondent authorities to make payment of compensation, permanent employment and other consequential and incidental benefits to the petitioner in lieu of their lands, which have been taken without acquisition or if the lands have been acquired under the land acquisition act and/or if no acquisition is drawn, then the lands (as above-stated) of the petitioners may kindly be returned to the petitioners and restored in its original conditions without any delay. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be please to call all the records pertaining to the entire documents of petitioners lands and land acquisition proceedings, if done from the respondent authorities. 10.3 Any other relief (s) in form of order or orders and/or direction (s) as your lordships may deem fit and proper.” 3. The petitioners are questioning the action and inaction of the respondent authorities, particularly respondent No. 4, i.e., the General Manager, N.T.P.C. Limited, Korba. It is alleged that even after the acquisition of the petitioners’ land without following due process of law, not a single penny has been paid to them towards compensation. The action of the respondent authorities in acquiring the petitioners’ land is wholly indefensible. In fact, the 4 respondents have illegally taken possession of the petitioners’ land on the basis of a so-called acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, though neither any notification was issued nor any statutory procedure was followed. Even after such purported acquisition, no amount of compensation or consequential benefits have been granted to the petitioners till date. 4. It is a clear case of violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court deserves to be invoked to ensure that the petitioners are adequately compensated for their land bearing Khasra No. 207/3 Kha, area 0.25 acres, and Khasra No. 207/3 Ka, area 0.75 acres, belonging to petitioners No. 1 and 2 respectively, situated at Village Chhurikala, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba (C.G.), along with interest and all other consequential benefits. 5. According to the case projected by the petitioners, they are the owners and title-holders of land bearing Khasra No. 207/3 Kha, area 0.25 acres, and Khasra No. 207/3 Ka, area 0.75 acres, belonging to petitioners No. 1 and 2 respectively, situated at Village Chhurikala, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba (C.G.). It is alleged that respondent No. 4 has taken possession of the said land for the establishment of an Ash Dyke at various stages for releasing ash from their power plant situated at Korba. While some portions of land were acquired by respondent No. 4 through the State of Chhattisgarh, certain other portions, including those 5 belonging to the petitioners, were illegally grabbed without any acquisition proceedings. In the year 2010, when the petitioners’ family members went to cultivate the said land, the staff of respondent No. 4 informed them that the land had already been acquired and they were, therefore, restrained from carrying out any agricultural activities thereon. Since 2010, the petitioners have continuously approached the authorities for redressal of their grievances and have submitted several applications and representations. Despite this, no relief has been granted to them. 6. Reports submitted by the Revenue Inspector and Patwari confirmed that the land of the petitioners is in the occupation and possession of respondent No. 4. Furthermore, on 03.10.2013, the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) also confirmed that the petitioners’ land is situated within the limits of respondent No. 4 and is indeed in their possession, although no acquisition proceedings had taken place. These findings clearly establish the illegal occupation of the petitioners’ land by respondent No. 4, thereby violating the right to property guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that this is a clear case of land grabbing by respondent No. 4, who had no authority under law to take away the petitioners’ land without following due procedure. Even if respondent No. 4 required the land for its project, it was bound to follow the procedure prescribed under the 6 Land Acquisition Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that although the right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India is no longer a fundamental right, it continues to be a constitutional and legal right which cannot be infringed except in accordance with law. The Revenue Inspector, Patwari, and Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) have all reported that the petitioners’ land lies within the boundaries of respondent No. 4. Hence, the respondent authorities were duty-bound to initiate acquisition proceedings and to compensate the petitioners adequately for their land, including ancillary benefits. It is contended that no person can be deprived of the enjoyment of their property except in accordance with law, and therefore, the petitioners are entitled to adequate compensation for their lands which have been unlawfully taken. 8. Reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Another v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Others, (2024) 10 SCC 533, and of this Court in Manoj Modi & Another v. State of C.G. & Others, 2012 (3) CGLJ 629, in support of these submissions. 9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 vehemently opposes the submissions advanced by the petitioners’ counsel. It is submitted that considering the dispute involved in this case, the State was specifically directed to file an additional reply. The return filed by the State reveals that, as per the revenue 7 records, the land in question is described as “Bade Jhaad Ka Jangal,” meaning that it could not be private land. It is stated that the land does not belong to the petitioners and appears to be Government leasehold property. Therefore, being Government land, it could not have been transferred to any other person in view of Section 165(7-b) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. It is further submitted that, as per Annexure R-4/2, the petitioners’ land does not fall within the area acquired or occupied by respondent No. 4 and is situated at some distance from it. The said reply has been filed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) under affidavit. From the order dated 25.01.2017 passed by the Tahsildar, Katghora, and the documents annexed thereto, it appears that the land in question cannot be said to have been acquired or occupied by respondent No. 4. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the land belonged to the petitioners, the sale deed dated 03.07.2007 was not executed in accordance with law and is in contravention of Section 167 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. As the land was leasehold, it could not have been sold without prior permission, and it has not been proved that respondent No. 4 is in occupation of the said land. 10. In the present case, respondent No. 4 is the contesting respondent, and the entire allegation of illegal occupation is levelled against it. The petitioners have alleged that respondent No. 4 has unlawfully taken possession of their land, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to property under Article 8 300-A of the Constitution of India. 11. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 has specifically contended that the land of the petitioners has never been occupied by respondent No. 4. The State records indicate that the land in question belongs to the Government. Even if any sale deed was executed in favour of the petitioners or their forefathers, it was not in accordance with law. The dispute involves complicated questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for adjudication of disputed questions of fact. Therefore, the present petition under Article 226 is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon the judgments of this Court in Shiv Shakti Engineering Works, Through its Partner Jaya Kumar Nair v. State of Chhattisgarh Through the Secretary, Public Works Department and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 5905, and Anant Kishore Behra v. State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 9562. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the entire material available on record including the pleadings and documents filed by both sides. 14. From a perusal of the record as well as the pleadings of the parties, it appears that the lands in question, bearing Khasra No. 9 207/3 Kha, area 0.25 acres, and Khasra No. 207/3 Ka, area 0.75 acres, belonging to petitioners No. 1 and 2 respectively, situated at Village Chhruikala, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba (C.G.), are claimed by the petitioners on the basis of a sale deed stated to have been executed by one Dheer Sai in favour of Sunil Kumar Agrawal. It further transpires from the record that these lands were originally recorded as Government lands in the revenue records pertaining to the settlement period. 15. From the return filed by the State, it is evident that the lands in question were leased out to one Veer Sai, son of Parasram, in the year 1974–75, and subsequently, the name of Dheer Sai (brother of Veer Sai) was recorded in the revenue records. Thereafter, Dheer Sai executed sale deeds in favour of Sunil Kumar Agrawal and Vinod Kumar Pandey. Since the lands belonged to the State and were leasehold in nature, their transfer by the lessee or his successor without obtaining prior permission was in contravention of Section 167 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Consequently, such sale transactions are void ab initio, and no valid right, title, or interest could pass to the petitioners on the basis of those sale deeds. 16. Furthermore, from the documents placed on record, it also appears that the exact location of the lands in question has not been established as claimed by the petitioners. The revenue documents indicate that the lands allegedly belonging to the 10 petitioners are situated at some distance and are not contiguous with or within the occupied area of respondent No. 4. 17. Upon a careful perusal of the pleadings, documents appended to the writ petition, as well as the rejoinder filed by the petitioners, it is evident that the entire claim of the petitioners hinges upon disputed questions of fact, such as the validity of title, nature of land, and extent of occupation. It is well settled by catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court that such disputed questions of fact cannot be adjudicated in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. In Shiv Shakti Engineering Works (supra), the Division Bench of this Court while relying upon the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has held as under :- “3. …...“6. It is settled law that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it raises disputed question of facts. 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corpornation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another, (1999) 7 SCC 298 was dealing with the question of whether the High Court had made an error in entertaining a writ petition filed seeking compensation for the death of a person due to electrocution, which had allegedly been caused due to the negligence of the authorities. The Supreme 11 Court in the said case observed as under: "6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the 12 Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995." (emphasis supplied) 8. The aforesaid judgment has been relied/ reiterated by the Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana and others, (2005) 10 SCC 1 wherein it observed as follows: "16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any 13 tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied) 9. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 has held as under: "26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one is acceptable." 10. Subsequently, in Union of India Vs. Puna Hinda, (2021) 10 SCC 690, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: "24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in the field of private law, having no statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is payable or not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the appellants to infer that the amount stands 14 crystallised. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptance of joint survey report by the competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take place but the measurement books of the work executed from time to time would form a reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e. arbitration and not by the writ court as it does not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction of roads." 11. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703, while dealing with the issue of exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Court in matters arising out of a contract, has stated: "82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate 15 the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit." (emphasis supplied) 12. A reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that it is well settled proposition of law that when there are disputed question of facts involved in a case, the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be proper. 13. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as it is admitted position that insertion of Clause 41.1 of the contract is a clerical error it cannot be taken as a privilege by the petitioner firm as the reimbursement of GST will cause huge loss to the public exchequer. The petitioner cannot be allowed to take the undue advantage of clerical error and the authority who floated the tender has every right to correct the clerical error as and when it came to its knowledge. In the instant case, the relief sought by the petitioner is contingent upon the resolution of the disputed question of facts raised, and these questions cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid, it would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain the instant writ petition as there are disputed questions of fact involved. 16 14. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, further considering the disputed questions of law involved in this writ petition, the relief sought by the petitioner and in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), we do not find any good ground to entertain this writ petition. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to other alternate remedies available to him under the law. No cost(s).” 19. In Anant Kishore Behra (supra), while deciding the similar issue, this Court has held as under :- “11. Now so far as the relief for compensation is concerned, I am of the opinion that it is disputed question of fact, which cannot be decided by the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If the petitioner is seeking any relief for compensation stating that he has not been given proper opportunity of hearing and his licence was suspended for a period from 16.06.2012 to 22.06.2012, he has to file a civil suit before the competent Civil Court seeking compensation where disputed question of fact can be adjudicated. 12. In the matter of Sanjay Sitaram Khemka v. State of Maharashtra and Others 17 reported in (2006) 5 SCC 255, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not meant for adjudicating cases, in which the disputed question of fact are involved and the proper course is to file a civil suit before competent Civil Court seeking compensation. Paragraphs 8 & 9 is relevant for the purpose, which are reproduced below for easy reference :- “8. Having regard to the allegations and counter allegations made by the parties before us, we are of the opinion that no releif can be granted to the Petitioner in this petition. The writ petition has rightly been held by the High Court to be involving disputed questions of fact. The petitioner has several causes of action wherefor he is required to pursue specific remedies provided therefor in law. 9. A Writ Petition, as has rightly been pointed out by the High Court, for grant of the said reliefs, was not the remedy. A matter involving a great deal of disputed questions of fact cannot be dealt with by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. As the High Court or this Court cannot, in view of the nature of the controversy as also the disputed questions of fact, go into the merit of the matter; evidently no relief can be granted to the Petitioner at this stage. We are, therefore, 18 of the opinion that the impugned judgment of the High Court does not contain any factual or legal error warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.” 13. Reverting to the case at hand in view of the light of aforesaid dictum rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sanjay Sitaram Khemka (supra), it is quite apparent that no relief can be granted to the petitioner at this belated stage as the instant writ petition was filed way back in the year 2012 and that too for a matter, in which disputed question of facts are involved.” 20. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, the pleadings of the parties, and the materials placed on record, this Court finds that the petitioners have failed to establish any prima facie right or title over the lands in question. The documents produced by them, including the alleged sale deeds, do not confer any enforceable legal right, as the original lands were Government leasehold properties, and the alleged transfer was made without obtaining prior permission as mandated under Section 167 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Such transfer being void ab initio, no right, title, or interest could pass in favour of the petitioners. The State authorities, therefore, cannot be faulted for treating the transaction as invalid in the eye of law. 21. This Court is further of the considered view that the entire 19 controversy raised in the writ petition is essentially factual in nature. The parties have made conflicting claims regarding ownership, possession, and the location of the land, and such issues necessarily require examination of evidence, including revenue records, demarcation reports, and oral testimony, which cannot be undertaken within the limited scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is primarily meant to ensure fairness in administrative or quasi-judicial actions and not to adjudicate complex questions of title or disputed facts. When the title itself is under serious dispute, the appropriate course for the petitioners would be to seek adjudication before the competent civil court or revenue forum, where detailed evidence may be led and tested. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, and having regard to the settled legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove, this Court finds that the present petition, as framed and filed, is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The reliefs sought by the petitioners, being founded upon disputed and unsubstantiated claims of ownership, cannot be granted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 23. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. However, it is made clear that dismissal of this writ 20 petition shall not preclude the petitioners from availing such other remedies as may be available to them under the law before the appropriate forum. 24. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh