APHC010520232025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3506] TUESDAY,THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 946/2025 Between: 1. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, PNBS, VIJAYAWADA. (PRIOR TO BIFURCATION KNOWN AS ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, MUSHEERABAD, HYDERABAD). ...APPELLANT AND 1. VIJAYANAGARAM VENKATA NAGULU, S/O PEDDA VENKATAPPA AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, HINDU, CULTIVATION, RESIDING AT DEVAVANDLAPALLI, H/O ZILLELLAMANDA, KAMBHAMVARIPALLI MANDAL, CHITTOR DISTRICT. 2. B RAVI CHANDRA REDDY, S/O CHENGAL REDDY, HINDU, AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS. DRIVER, APSRTC, RESIDING AT SIDDAMPALLI, THAVANAMPALLI MANDAL, CHITTOOR DISTRICT. (R2 IS NOT NECESSARY) (DRIVER DOES NOT CLAIM COMPENSATION. HENCE NOT NECESSARY) ...RESPONDENT(S): Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be pleased toaggrieved by the Order and decree dated 25.11.2022 in M.V.O.P. No 2 of 2015 on the file of on in The Court of the Xl Additional District Judge, Cum - Chairman - Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chittoor, Chittoor District for the following among other IA NO: 1 OF 2025 2 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to condone the delay of 894 days in filing the M.A.C.M.A. and pass IA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings including the execution proceedings pursuant to the order dated 25.11.2022 in M.V.O.P. No 2 of 2015 on the file of in The Court of the X! Additional District Judge, Cum - Chairman - Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chittoor, Chittoor District pending M.A.C.M.A. and pass Counsel for the Appellant: 1. ARAVALA RAMA RAO(SC FOR APSRTC KKAC) Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. The Court made the following: 3 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN I.A.No.1 of 2025 In/and MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 946/2025 COMMON JUDGMENT: I.A. No. 1 of 2025 is filed to condone the delay of 894 days in preferring the Appeal. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal passed orders dated 25.11.2022 in M.V.O.P. No. 2 of 2015, whereby it awarded compensation of Rs. 1,30,400/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum, in view of the injuries sustained by the claimant. 2. The present Appeal is preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, assailing the said order. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner submits that immediately after the passing of the aforesaid order, a copy application was made on 01.12.2022 and the same was ready on 20.01.2023. On the same date, it was received. Thereafter, the counsel appearing for the insurer before the Tribunal forwarded the same to the Head Office at Vijayawada for opinion. Only after securing the opinion, the decision was taken to file the present Appeal. Therefore, in the process, there is a delay of 894 days, which is neither willful nor wanton. Hence, prayer for condonation of delay. 4. Perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the present interlocutory application goes to show that the reasons stated therein do not really explain or indicate sufficient cause for the delay in preferring the Appeal. Except for stating that the learned counsel appearing for the insurer before the Tribunal 4 forwarded the decree and judgment to the Head Office, Vijayawada, for opinion, it does not indicate on what date the same was sent, when the opinion was secured, and when the decision was reached to prefer the Appeal. Even the quantum of compensation awarded under the impugned order is not so substantial as to require an opinion to be secured for the purpose of preferring the Appeal. 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the aspect of condoning delay, recently in the judgment of Pathapati Subba Reddy and Others v. Special Deputy Collector and Others 1held as follows at paragraph No. 26: “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; 1 2024SCCOnLineSC513 5 (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, wherethere is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 6. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary2, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows at paragraph Nos.6 and 7: “6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present 2 2024SCCOnLineSC3612 6 case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal 7 within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v.State of Gujarat,(1981)1SCC495:AIR1981SC733).” 7. In Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaranandan other3, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows at paragraph Nos.31 and 32: “31. It is a well-stated law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bonafides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.” 3 2025SCCOnLineSC1093 8 8. In light of the above legal principles and in view of the above facts and circumstances, since the delay, has not been properly explained and sufficient cause is not demonstrated in occurrence of inordinate delay of 894 days, this Court is not inclined to condone the same. 9. Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2025 is dismissed. Consequently, the M.A.C.M.A.No.946 of 2025 is also dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. ______________________________________ JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN Date: 14.10.2025 MH 9 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN 85 MACMA NO: 946/2025 Date: 14.10.2025 MH