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2025 DAILYLAW 52131 (CHH)

ANUSHTHA BUILDERS AND COLONIZERS PRIVATE LIMITED v. J. VENKAT RAO

FA/164/2024 · 2025-10-05

Shri Radhakishan Agrawal, Shri Sanjay K Agrawal

Transfer Petitionbody2025

Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:49546-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 164 of 2024 Anushtha Builders and Colonizers Private Limited, Junwani Khamhariya Road, Junwani, Chhattisgarh (P.K.E.- 04520 C.T. 2005) P.T.C. 17505 Gwalior, Tahsil and District Durg, Chhattisgarh, Through Director, Raghvendra Das Vaishnav, S/o Late Narendra Das Vaishnav, Aged About 58 Years, R/o Anushtha Residency Junwani, Tahsil and District Durg, C.G. ... Appellant/Plaintiff versus 1 - J. Venkat Rao S/o Late J. Veerbhadra Rao, Aged About 44 Years R/o Mauja Village Murra, Kumhari, Tahsil and District Durg, C.G. 2 - J. V. Rajkumar S/o J. Veerbhadra Rao, Aged About 40 Years, R/o 12- 13-588 / H / 3 Sadak No. 4, Tarnaka, Secunderabad (Andhra Pradesh), 3 - G. Venkat Krishna Rao, Aged About 70 Years, R/o Mauja Village Kohka, Tahsil and District Durg, C.G., Through Smt. J. Sheshratnamma, W/o Late J. Veerbhadra Rao, R/o Mauja Village Murra, Kumhari, Tahsil Patan, District Durg, C.G. 4 - G. Sambshivram S/o G. Venkatkrishna Rao, Aged About 45 Years, R/o Kohka, Tahsil Durg, District Durg, C.G., Through Smt. J. Sheshratnamma, W/o Late J. Veerbhadra Rao, R/o Mauja Village Murra, Kumhari, Tahsil Patan, District Durg, C.G. R/o Purushotpatnam Mandal Gannavaram, Gram Panchayat Purushotpatnam, District Krishna (Andhra), 5 - G. Ponchandrarao S/o G. Venkat Krishna Rao, Aged About 46 Years, Mauja Kohka, Tahsil District Durg, C.G., Through Smt. J. Sheshratnamma, W/o Late J. Veerbhadra Rao, R/o Mauja Village Murra, Kumhari, Tahsil Patan, District Durg, C.G. R/o Purushotpatnam Mandal Gannavaram, Gram Panchayat Purushotpatnam, District Krishna (Andhra), 6 - Smt. Padma D/o G. Venkat Krishna Rao, Aged About 40 Years, Mauja Kohka, Tahsil District Durg, C.G., Through Smt. J. Sheshratnamma, W/o Late J. Veerbhadra Rao, R/o Mauja Village Murra, Kumhari, Tahsil Patan, District Durg, C.G. R/o Purushotpatnam Mandal PRAKASH KUMAR Digitally signed by PRAKASH KUMAR Date: 2025.10.07 17:24:32 +0530 2 Gannavaram, Gram Panchayat Purushotpatnam, District Krishna (Andhra), 7 - Smt. J. Sheshratnamma W/o Late J. Veerbhadra Rao Aged About 64 Years, R/o Mauja Village Murra, Kumhari, Tahsil Patan, District Durg, C.G. 8 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Collector / The Then Secretary, District Office Durg, Tahsil and District Durg, C.G. ... Respondents For Appellant/Plaintiff : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Sr. Advocate assisted by Ms. Shivangi Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent No.1 to 7 : Ms. K. Tripti Rao, Advocate For State/Respondent No.8 : Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Additional A.G. Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ. Order on Board (06.10.2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The appellant/plaintiff has preferred this appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), challenging the legality, validity, and correctness of the judgment and order dated 21.06.2018, passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Durg, Chhattisgarh. In that judgment, the Civil Suit No. 00004628-A/2008, filed by the plaintiff seeking specific performance of contract, was dismissed. Along with the appeal, the appellant/plaintiff has also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, praying for condonation of delay of 2140 days in filing the appeal. 2. It is the case of the appellant/plaintiff that the appellant company is a registered company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, situated at Junwani Khamhariya Road, Junwani, Chhattisgarh. After the passing of the impugned decree dated 21.06.2018, the name of the 3 company was struck off by the Registrar of Companies (ROC), Chhattisgarh, vide order dated 29.08.2018, after a period of two months. It is also the case of appellant that between 29.08.2018 and 08.09.2023, both the directors of the company faced significant health challenges due to Covid-19. Further, an objection was also raised in SLP(C) No.64/2015 filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, stating that the SLP is not maintainable as the name of the company has already been struck off. Thereafter, against the order dated 29.08.2018, an application was preferred on 08.09.2023 before the NCLT, Cuttack Bench, which was registered as CP No.42/CB/2023 under Section 252(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, for restoration of the name of the company, which was eventually restored on 30.04.2024. Thereafter, the appellant preferred the present appeal before this Court on 31.07.2024, along with I.A. No.2/2024, an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, showing the above stated causes for condoning the delay. 3. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 7 filed a reply on 14.09.2025 opposing the application for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal, stating that no sufficient cause has been shown in the application and that the delay in filing the appeal is deliberate. It is further submitted that no appeal was filed between 21.06.2018 to 29.08.2018, and even after the company’s name was restored on 30.04.2024, the present appeal was filed only on 31.07.2024. It is not the case of the appellant that an application under Section 252(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 was filed immediately after the name of the company was struck off by the Registrar of Companies (ROC) on 4 29.08.2018. Therefore, no sufficient grounds have been shown for the delay in filing the appeal. Accordingly, the application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay, as well as the appeal, may be rejected. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also heard on application for condonation of delay. 5. It is not in dispute that the impugned judgment and decree was passed on 21.06.2018 dismissing the plaintiff's suit and the name of the company was struck off from the Register by the Registrar of companies only by order dated 29.08.2018. Further, there is no sufficient reason shown as to why appeal could not be filled immediately after 21.06.2018 and prior to 29.08.2018. It is also not case of the appellant that immediately after passing of the impugned order dated 29.09.2018, he immediately filed an application under Section 253 (2) of the Companies Act, 2013 for restoration of the company’s name as the application for restoration under Section 252(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 was filed before the NCLT only on 08.09.2023 with a delay of more than 5 years and there is no explanation as to why application could not be filed earlier. As such, there is nothing on record to show the bonafides of the appellant for taking steps for setting aside the order dated 29.08.2018 striking off the name of the appellant Company from the Register of Company and only after 5 years, the application under Section 252(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 was filed on 08.09.2023 for restoration of the Company’s name. Even thereafter, the company’s name was restored by order dated 30.04.2024, and the present appeal was filed three 5 months later, on 31.07.2024. Thus, it is evident that immediately after the passing of the impugned judgment, the appellant/plaintiff did not take immediate or prompt steps to file the appeal before this Court. 6. In this regard, the concept of sufficient cause has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (dead) by LRs vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., decided in Civil Appeal No. 11794 of 2025, in paragraphs 258 and 259 of the judgment, which read as under:— “258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.” 7. In this case, there is an inordinate delay of 2,140 days in filing the appeal. However, it is nowhere apparent that the appellant/plaintiff took 6 prompt and immediate steps to file the appeal after 21.06.2018 and prior to 29.08.2018. No reason has been explained for the failure to file the appeal within this two-month period. Even after the restoration of the company’s name following the order dated 29.08.2018, the application under Section 252(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 was filed only on 08.09.2023, after a delay of five years, and the name was restored on 30.04.2024. Thereafter, the present appeal was filed on 31.07.2024. As such, it appears that the appellant company was not conscious of its right to file the appeal. No sufficient cause has been shown for the inordinate delay of five years, ten months, and four days in filing the appeal. Accordingly, I.A. No. 02/2024, an application for condonation of delay, stands rejected. 8. Consequently, the present appeal preferred by the plaintiff/appellant is hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Prakash