1 / 11 2025:CGHC:49073 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 1 of 2016 • Sevaram S/o Parasram Yadav, Aged About 71 Years Caste Yadav, R/o Village Paunsara, Presently at Nutan Colony, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, Tahsil District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant/Plaintiff No. 1 versus 1. Dilip Kumar Yadav S/o late Shri Dayaram, Aged About 42 Years Caste Yadav, Cultivator, R/o Village And Post Paunsara, Uktipara, Police Station Koni, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Presently At Uslapur, Near Over Bridge Naka, Tahsil Takhatpur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 2. Dinesh Kumar Yadav S/o late Shri Dayaram Yadav, Aged About 37 Years Caste Yadav, Cultivator, R/o Village And Post Paunsara, Uktipara, Police Station Koni, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Presently At Uslapur, Near Over Bridge Naka, Tahsil Takhatpur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 3. Gulaba Bai W/o late Shri Dayaram, Aged About 61 Years Caste Yadav, Cultivator, R/o Village And Post Paunsara, Uktipara, Police Station Koni, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Presently At Uslapur, Near Over Bridge Naka, Tahsil Takhatpur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 4. Smt. Umenda Bai W/o Shri Baldau Prasad, Aged About 56 Years Caste Suryawanshi, Occupation Housewife, R/o Village And Post Sakri, P.S. Chakarbhatha, Tahsil Takhatpur District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 5. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh --------Defendants 6. Ramphal Yadav Aged About 66 Years Caste Yadav, R/o Village Paunsara, Presently At Nutan Colony, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, Tahsil District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ..........(Plaintiff No.2) ---Respondents ____________________________________________________________ For Appellant : Mr. Ram Kumar Tiwari, Advocate For Respondents No. 1 to 3 :Mr. Priyank Pandey, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Suresh Pandey, Advocate For Respondent No. 5-State : Mr. Aman Tamboli, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No. 4 & 6 : None. PAWAN KUMAR JHA Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR JHA 2 / 11 Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Judgment on Board 24.09.2025 1. This first appeal under Section 96 CPC has been filed assailing the judgment and decree dated 23.09.2015 passed by learned Fifth Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (CG) in Civil Suit No. 83A/2014, by which the trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs by impugned judgment and decree. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their status shown in Civil Suit No. 83A/2014 before the trial court. 3. Brief facts of the case as projected by the plaintiffs before the Trial Court are as under: (i) The plaintiffs and defendants No.1 to 3 are joint owners and possessors of agricultural land situated at village Paunsara, P.H. No. 15/18, R.N.M. Beltara, Block Bilha, Tehsil and District Bilaspur (C.G.), bearing Khasra No. 240/5, area 0.14 acre, having a kitchen garden and a thatched house. The land was originally purchased in the year 1974 from one Jagannath Prasad in the name of Dayaram, out of the income derived from joint ancestral property. The suit property though recorded in the name of Dayaram, it was asserted to be joint family property, and the plaintiffs claimed joint possession along with defendants No.1 to 3. (ii) It is pleaded that defendants No.1 to 3, without knowledge of the plaintiffs, suppressing material facts, executed a registered sale deed dated 13.03.2013 in favour of defendant No.4 for a consideration of ₹ 4,00,000. According to the plaintiffs, defendant No.4, is a resident of village Sakri and has never taken possession of the suit land. The sale deed is alleged to be sham, void, and executed in collusion between defendants No.1 to 3 and defendant No.4, with intent to harass and deprive the plaintiffs of their rights. 3 / 11 Upon getting knowledge about the said transaction, the plaintiffs obtained certified copy of the sale deed on 15.07.2013 and demanded cancellation of the same, which the defendants refused. Consequently, the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking: (a) Declaration that the sale deed dated 13.03.2013 is null and void and does not confer any title upon defendant No.4; and (b) Permanent injunction restraining defendant No.4 from interfering with or taking possession of the suit property. 4. Defendants No.1 to 3, in their written statement, have denied all material averments made in the plaint. They contended that the suit land was lawfully purchased by late Shri Dayaram (father of defendants No.1 and 2 and husband of defendant No.3) from the original owner Jagannath Prasad through a registered sale deed dated 20.04.1988. After execution of the sale deed, Dayaram’s name was duly mutated in the revenue records, and he remained in peaceful possession of the property during his lifetime. It is further pleaded that upon the death of Dayaram, names of defendants No.1 to 3 were duly entered in the revenue records, they being legal heirs, and they continued to hold ownership, title, and possession of the suit property. Thereafter, defendants No.1 to 3 executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant No.4 on 13.03.2013, delivering actual possession of the property. Name of defendant No.4 was subsequently mutated in the revenue records, B-1 Khasra Panchshala, and Rin Pustika, thereby acquiring valid ownership and possession. Defendants No.1 to 3 asserted that the land was self- acquired property of late Shri Dayaram, purchased from his own income, and never formed part of the joint family estate. The plaintiffs never raised any objection or claim to the property during lifetime of Dayaram, nor at the time of his death, mutation, or subsequent sale. They remained silent even during the partition of ancestral property in 2009. 5. Defendant No.4, adopting a similar defence, pleaded that he is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration under a valid registered sale deed dated 4 / 11 13.03.2013, he is in possession since purchase, and that the plaintiffs have no subsisting right, title, or interest in the suit land. 6. On the basis of pleadings of the parties and evidence, learned Trial Court has framed as many as seven issues for consideration and upon appreciation of the documentary and oral evidence brought on record by the respective parties, dismissed the suit filed by plaintiffs by impugned judgment and decree. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that learned Trial court erred in dismissing the entire suit observing that the plaintiffs failed to prove land bearing Khasra No. 240/5 measuring 0.14 acre and house constructed on it to be the joint family property to be not proved, which is erroneous. He next contended that the witnesses examined have clearly stated that plaintiffs are still residing in the house situated over the subject land which is joint family property of Sevaram, Ramfal Yadav and Dayaram and therefore legal representatives of Dayaram are not having any title to transfer suit property without consent and permission of co-owners. Finding recorded by the Trial Court on the issue no. 1, 2, 3 and 7 are perverse. Trial Court has erroneously recorded that plaintiff failed to prove the case set up in the plaint. The appeal may be allowed and the sale deed executed by defendants No. 1 to 3 be declared to be null and void. 8. Learned counsel for defendants/ Respondents No. 1 to 4 would submit that learned Trial Court upon appreciation of pleadings and evidence brought on record by the respective parties has dismissed the suit by impugned judgment and decree, which does not call for any interference. 9. Learned State counsel submitted that the dispute is between the private parties ie., the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 4. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. 5 / 11 11. The plaintiffs have filed the suit for declaration of sale deed dated 13.03.2013 to be null and void to declare that defendant No. 4 does not get any title on the suit property. Defendant No. 4 be restrain from interfering from the peaceful possession of plaintiffs over the suit property. The pleadings made in the plaint would show that the main thrust of the plaintiff is to the sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 to 3 in favour of defendant No. 4 on the ground that the property, subject matter of the sale deed, was purchased from the joint income of plaintiffs and late Shri Dayaram. To support the plea of the property in dispute to have been purchased from joint income, plaintiffs had not placed on record any document showing income of the plaintiffs and defendants No. 1 to 4 are having immovable property with such income that even after expending for day to day requirement the other property has been purchased by plaintiffs in the name of Dayaram. Plaintiffs in prove of pleadings made had submitted copy of sale deed Ext. P-1 which is executed by defendants No. 1 to 3 in favour of defendant No. 4 dated 13.03.2013. Revenue document enclosed along with sale deed which was obtained by the parties before execution of sale deed in accordance with the guidelines issued by the State Government, it mentions names of Dilip, Dinesh and Gulaba Bai jointly. It is also a case that the entries of name of defendants No. 1 to 3 in revenue records substituting name of Dayaram, as an owner, is not challenged by plaintiffs. Defendants in their written statement have denied the fact of purchase of property in dispute by joint income. The burden to prove the facts as pleaded in the plaint was upon the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in support of their plea have not placed on record any revenue document or any other property on which plaintiffs and the late Shri Dayaram have been working jointly, nor it is proved as to what property was recorded jointly in the name of plaintiffs and late Shri Dayaram. In absence of any prove that the plaintiffs and late Shri Dayaram were having joint property and that was the source of income, the submission of learned counsel for appellant-plaintiff 6 / 11 and the pleadings in the plaint that the property purchased which is subject matter of sale deed Ext. P-1 is joint property is not sustainable. 12. Sevaram, plaintiff No. 1, is examined as PW-1. In paragraph No. 7 it is admitted by him that the property in dispute is recorded only in the name of late Shri Dayaram. However, he tried to make an attempt that he was residing in the house constructed over the property. No evidence is brought on record to prove that all the brothers have jointly purchased the property from Jagannath in the year 1974-75. 13. Rajkumar Yadav is examined as PW-2. In his cross-examination, he stated that he was less educated, he could not able to tell his age but has denied the fact of submission of any affidavit before the Trial Court nor giving any evidence. 14. Rajaram Yadav is examined as PW-3. He contended that about 40 years ago he got knowledge of registry. He supported plea of plaintiffs that the property said to be purchased from Jagannath is a joint family property. He denied the fact of partition proceedings earlier between the parties. 15. Learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment has recorded a finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove joint income of the brothers and from which the property was purchased. It is settled principle of law that plaintiffs cannot take benefit of weakness of defendants, they are required to stand on their own legs. Under Hindu law, mere existence of a joint Hindu family and the fact that one co owner has purchased a property in his name do ‐ not give rise to a presumption that the property is joint family property. The party asserting that the property is joint family property must carry the initial burden of proof. 16. High Court of Madras in C. V. Vythianatha Iyer v. C. V. Varadaraja Iyer (1938) 1 MLJ 216 has held that: “There is no presumption that property found in the possession of any one member is joint family property unless it 7 / 11 is shown that the family as such possessed at least some property with the aid of which the property in question could have been acquired.” 17. The person who asserts that some piece of property is joint family property bears the initial burden of proof to show (a) existence of a joint Hindu family or co-parcenary; (b) that there was a “nucleus” of joint family assets or income from which the property could have been purchased; and (c) that the property in question was indeed acquired from that joint corpus. Once such a nucleus is shown, a presumption may arise that the property is joint family property, and then the onus may shift to the other side to show that the property was instead self-acquired (i.e., out of separate funds). However, this shift only arrives if the first threshold is met — mere existence of the family, or mere mention of “joint family property”, is not enough. 18. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam, reported in (2020) 6 SCC 387 has observed thus: “10. At the outset we may note that a lot of arguments were addressed and judgments were cited on the attributes of HUF and the manner in which it can be constituted. In view of the facts narrated above, in our view, a large number of these arguments and citations need not be considered. The law is well settled that the burden is on the person who alleges that the property is a joint property of an HUF to prove the same. Reference in this behalf may be made to the judgments of this Court in Bhagwan Dayal v. Reoti Devi [Bhagwan Dayal v. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287] . Both the parties have placed reliance on this judgment. In this case, this Court held that the general principle is that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. It was further held that where one of the coparceners separated himself from other members of the joint family there was no presumption that the rest of coparceners continued to constitute a joint family. However, it was also held that at the same time there is no presumption that because one member of the family has separated, the rest of the family is no longer a joint family. However, it is important to note 8 / 11 that this Court in Bhagwati Prasad Sah v. Dulhin Rameshwari Kuer [Bhagwati Prasad Sah v. Dulhin Rameshwari Kuer, 1951 SCC 486 : 1951 SCR 603] , it held as follows : (SCC p. 491, para 10) “10. … Except in the case of reunion, the mere fact that separated coparceners chose to live together or act jointly for purposes of business or trade or in their dealings with properties, would not give them the status of coparceners under the Mitakshara law.” 12. In D.S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam [D.S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam, (2003) 10 SCC 310] this Court held as follows : (D.S. Lakshmaiah case [D.S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam, (2003) 10 SCC 310] , SCC p. 317, para 18) “18. The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available.” Similar view was taken in Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan [Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan, (1960) 2 SCR 253 : AIR 1960 SC 335] and Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade [Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade, (2007) 1 SCC 521] . The law is thus well settled that the burden lies upon the person who alleges the existence of the Hindu Undivided Family to prove the same. 19. In the case at hand, learned trial Court observed that the plaintiffs have not placed any document to show (i) that the parties are having any joint ancestral property/income existed in respect of plaintiffs and late Shri Dayaram from which this suit land was purchased; (ii) that the suit land has 9 / 11 ever been recorded or treated as joint family property; and (iii) that the plaintiff co-owners had contributed to, or were recognised as part of, a joint corpus. 20. The plaintiffs’ witness PW-1 (Sevaram) admitted in his evidence that the land in dispute is in the name of late Dayaram only. Witnesses PW-2 and PW-3 gave testimony which was skeletal, lacked documentary support. In particular, no mutation or revenue record bearing the names of plaintiffs as joint owners or showing a “joint purchase” was placed on record. On the other side, defendants No. 1 to 3 have pleaded and claimed that the land was self-acquired by late Shri Dayaram by way of a sale deed dated 20.04.1988 and that thereafter Dayaram and later defendants No. 1 to 3 held the property, mutated in their names, and that a sale deed dated 13.03.2013 in favour of defendant No. 4 was valid. The plaintiffs have not challenged the mutation in the name of Dayaram or the subsequent mutation in the defendants’ names. 21. Since the plaintiffs have asserted that the property is joint family property they needed to establish the existence of a joint family nucleus from which the property was purchased in which they failed to do so. There is no evidence of any joint income, joint business or assets from which the land was acquired. Having failed to meet the initial burden, the presumption of joint purchase did not arise; accordingly, the property must be presumed to be self-acquired until the contrary is shown. Therefore, the finding recorded by the Trial Court in this regard cannot be said to be perverse. 22. The plaintiffs seek cancellation of sale deed dated 13.03.2013 (Ext. P-1) in favour of defendant No.4, on the ground that the property is joint family property and that defendants No. 1 to 3 could not lawfully transfer it without consent of the joint owners (i.e., plaintiffs). But since plaintiffs have not 10 / 11 proved their own title or joint ownership, their claim fails. In absence of proof of joint ownership they cannot avoid the registered sale deed. 23. Furthermore, the defendants’ case is that of a registered sale deed for consideration, delivery of possession and mutation in purchaser’s name. While the findings of the Trial Court are factual, there is no indication of any manifest error or perversity in the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court. Therefore, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with findings of fact. 24. The argument raised by learned counsel for plaintiffs that they continue to reside in the house on the suit land, and that the land has a thatched house is not sufficient, in absence of title or contribution to purchase, to convert property into joint family asset. Possession alone does not override registered title or the requirement of proof of joint corpus. 25. For the foregoing reasons, conclusion arrived by the Trial Court on Issues 1, 2, 3 and 7, which dealt with joint ownership, source of purchase, and entitlement, cannot be said to be perverse. 26. Taking into consideration another aspect of the case with regard to partition and transferability, it appears from the record that late Shri Dayaram stood on record as owner, subsequent to substitution of his name and name of defendants No. 1 to 3 are recorded, and thereafter a sale to defendant No.4 was effected. 27. In the above facts of the case, the burden to show joint property was not discharged. But as a principle, it is clear that the property standing in Dayaram’s name, and later defendants’ names, could be treated as self- acquired and legitimately sold once the plaintiff’s rights were not demonstrated. Therefore, the registered sale deed dated 13.03.2013 executed in favour of defendant No.4, supported by revenue mutation, appears to be valid and enforceable. In the facts of the case as discussed 11 / 11 above, learned Trial Court has not committed any error of law in holding that the plaintiff is not entitle for the relief of injunction. 28. For the foregoing discussion, reasons and observations made above, this Court finds that the suit filed by the plaintiffs seeking for declaration of the sale deed dated 13.03.2013 to be null and void, and for injunction restraining defendant No. 4, must fail. 29. Accordingly, this First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by plaintiff is dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 23.09.2015 passed in Civil Suit No. 83A/2014 dismissing the suit is affirmed. 30. Parties shall bear their own costs of the appeal. 31. Decree be drawn up accordingly. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge pwn