1 2025:CGHC:51267 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 309 of 2024 1 - Maniram Banjare S/o Kheeru Banjare Aged About 60 Years R/o Ghotiya, Police Station And Tahsil Khairagarh, District : Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai, Chhattisgarh 2 - Mukesh Chand S/o Kapur Chand Aged About 31 Years R/o Ghotiya, Police Station And Tahsil Khairagarh, District : Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai, Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Jayakumari W/o Mukesh Aged About 33 Years R/o Ghotiya, Police Station And Tahsil Khairagarh, District : Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Khairagarh- Chhuikhadan-Gandai, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Shivendu Pandya, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Karan Kumar Baharani, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 14/10/2025 1. The present criminal revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “CrPC”) is filed by the petitioners against the order dated 02-01-2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon, in Sessions Case No. 24/2023, whereby the charge under Section 306/34 of IPC have been framed against the petitioners. ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2025.10.16 19:06:07 +0530 2 2. Brief facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings and documents annexed with the petition, are that one Vijay Kumar Banjare set himself ablaze on 20-05-2023 and he died on 26-05-2023, thereby committing suicide. Merg was informed by the doctor from D.K. Super Speciality Hospital, Raipur, to the police, and then the Merg inquiry was started. When the deceased was admitted to the hospital, his dying declaration was recorded by the police on 22-05-2023, in which he alleged that due to harassment by the present petitioners, he committed suicide. The petitioners/accused persons are his father, sister and brother-in-law. It is alleged that due to frequent quarrels with the accused persons for 2-3 days, he committed suicide. The offence has been registered, and after investigation, the charge sheet has been filed for the offence under Section 306, 34 of the IPC. 3. In the proceedings of the case, the charge under Section 306/34 of IPC has been framed against the petitioners/accused persons vide order dated 02-01- 2024, which is under challenge in the present petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the learned trial court has failed to consider that no prima facie case against the petitioners is made out from the material produced by the prosecution along with the charge sheet. He would further submit that even if the uncontroverted allegations made in the charge sheet are taken as it is, no offence of instigation or abetment to commit suicide is prima facie made out to frame the charge against the petitioners and to proceed with the trial of the case. A domestic quarrel between family members does not amount to abetment or instigating him to commit suicide. There is no close proximate link between the suicide of the deceased and the quarrel between the petitioners/accused persons. He would also submit that in his dying declaration itself, he stated that he, on his own will, committed suicide. He would also submit that for the offence under Section 306 of IPC, there should be instigation through goading, 3 urging forward, provoking, incitement, or encouragement to do an act, but all these ingredients are missing in the present case. Therefore, there is no sufficient evidence on record to frame the charge against the petitioners for the offence of Section 306 of IPC, and they are entitled to their discharge. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the state opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and has submitted that at the time of framing of charge, only the prima facie case is to be considered as to whether, from the material annexed with the charge sheet, there is sufficient evidence for framing of the charge and to proceed with the trial or not. The trial court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence at the stage of framing the charge. In the present case, there is an allegation against the petitioners, who are the accused persons in the offence, that they have harassed the deceased, and there was a quarrel that continued for 2-3 days and on the date of the incident itself, immediately before his act of suicide, there was a quarrel between them, and by the behaviour and conduct of the petitioners he was in such state of distress that he committed suicide. The dying declaration of the deceased clearly shows their act and creates a situation for the deceased to commit suicide. He would also submit that there is no straitjacket formula regarding the proximity of the act of the accused with that of the incident, but in the present facts and circumstances of the case, the continuous harassment by the petitioners and surrounding factors would satisfy the proximity test and amount to instigation to commit suicide. He would also submit that the revisional powers under Section 397 and 401 of CrPC should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution, and the court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purposes of finding out whether or not a prima facie case has been made out against the accused persons. Therefore, the petition has no merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 4 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material produced along with the petition. 7. With respect to consideration on the material available in the charge sheet at the stage of framing of charge, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- 14. It is of relevance to refer to certain judgments of this Court. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), the appellant and two other individuals were charged under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. It had been alleged that the appellant and the other accused persons had forcibly compelled the deceased to sign a settlement giving up a part of his share in the profits from the sale of certain land. This led to a dispute and as a result of the mental harassment suffered by the deceased, he committed suicide. The Court affirmed the framing of charges by the trial court. The two-Judge Bench of this Court laid down the ingredients of the offence of abetment of suicide. D.K. Jain, J. held thus: (SCC p. 611, para 19) "19. As observed in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an "instigation" may be inferred. In other words, in order to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be established that: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his 5 deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation." (emphasis supplied) 15. After due consideration of the facts and circumstances, the Court noted that prima facie, the offence of abetment of suicide was made out (Chitresh Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 612, para 22) "22. In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted above, statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation, tend to show that on account of business transactions with the accused, including the appellant herein, the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie, it appears that the conduct of the appellant and his accomplices was such that the deceased was left with no other option except to end his life and therefore. clause Firstly of Section 107 IPC was attracted." (emphasis supplied) 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for "presuming" that the accused had committed the offence: (Chitreth Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 613, para 25) "25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction" 17. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused of there is ground for "presuming that the offence has been committed. G.P. Mathur. J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10) "9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under: 6 '14. Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquity in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evadentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime." 10. The High Court, did not at all apply the relevant text, namely whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed as offence. If the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that 'as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit and further observing that the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 8. In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgement that:- 12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) "11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to f sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances 7 against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526) '25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22, para 20) "29....... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have the offence on t committed the the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge, though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." 9. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgement that:- 21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms: (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) 8 "12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-42) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which.... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.' 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan wherein it was held as under. (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) 9 '10... ..If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact. It is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter of into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the 9 evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him." 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar, this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) '19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 10 Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face valuc disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal." 10. In the case of N. Sundaram Vs. P.K. Pounraj and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 616, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 13, has held that: “13. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any court and to secure the ends of justice. [See State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal6] The inherent power should 11 not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC. [See MCD Vs. Ram Kishann Rohtagi7] An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance.” [See Vinod Raghuvanshi Vs. Ajay Arora8] 11. The Hon’ble supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgement in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- "12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial." 12. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 13. If the accused persons kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide prima facie appears, and such human behaviour is required to be examined on its own facts, taking note of all the surrounding factors having a bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused persons 12 as well as the deceased. It is relevant to code the contents of the dying declaration here which is as under :- e`R;q dkyhu dFku iz’u& vkidk uke D;k gS \ dgka jgrs gSa \ mRrj& esjk uke fot; catkjs firk euhjke catkjs mez 34 o”kZ lk0 ? kksfB;k Fkkuk [kSjkx<+ ftyk jktukanxkao N0x0 eks0 ua0 7489267816 iz’u& vkids lkFk D;k gqvk gS \ mRrj& 2&3 fnu ls esjs ?kj esa esjs ekrk tequk ckbZ firk euhjke rFkk thtk eqds’k csjoa’kh ls ?kjsyw vkilh fookn gks jgk Fkk ftlds dkj.k eSa tkucw>dj viuh ethZ ls fnukad 19&05&2023 ds izkr% 9-00 cts ?kj esa j[ks rkjihu rsy dks vius mij m<+sydj ekfpl tykdj vkx yxk fy;k ftlls eSa ty x;k gwaA esjh cgu t;dqekjh ls Hkh >xM+k gksrk FkkA esjh iRuh xaxk catkjs us esjs mij dacy Mky dj vkx cq>kbZA rFkk esjh iRuh gh eq>s bykt djkus vLirky ykbZ gSA iz’u& bl ?kVuk ds fy;s vki fdls ftEesnkj ekurs gSa \ mRrj& esjs firk euhjke thtk eqds’k csjoa’kh rFkk cgu t; dqekjh dks ftEesnkj ekurk gwaA esjh eka tequk ckbZ dks fteesnkj ugha ekurkA iz’u& vkidks vkSj dqN dguk gS \ mRrj& ughaA 14. In the dying declaration, the deceased clearly alleged that the accused persons/petitioners are responsible for his death and that due to their act, he committed suicide. From the statement of Smt. Ganga Banjare (wife of the deceased), it also comes that there was a frequent quarrel on the issue of the construction of the house by the deceased and on that particular day, immediately before the incident, there was a quarrel between them, and then he committed suicide. The statement of Chumman Das Khaire, Kheman Kumar are the witnesses before whom the deceased made the dying declaration. 15. In view of the aforesaid judgements passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also under the facts and circumstances of the present case, it appears that there are allegations against the petitioners that, by the continuous course of conduct, create such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an instigation may be inferred. The petitioners/accused persons kept the deceased annoyed and irritated continuously, which forced him to take such an extreme step of committing suicide. In the present case, from the statement of the wife of the deceased, 13 Smt. Ganga Bai, other witnesses Chumman Das and Khaiman Kumar and other witnesses, and also from the dying declaration of the deceased, the prima facie offence of Section 306 of IPC is clearly made out for framing of charge and to proceed with the trial of the case. In the present case, there are allegations about the harassment of the deceased and causing annoyance and irritation. 16. In the present case, after considering the material annexed with the charge sheet and evidence available on record, the trial court rightly comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient grounds for framing the charge and to proceed with the trial and has framed the charge of Section 306/34 of IPC which cannot be said to be either perverse or contrary to the facts of the case calling for an interference invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 and 401 of CrPC conferred upon this court. 17. In the result, the petition does not have any merit. The same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok