1 2025:CGHC:48889 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 183 of 2014 1. Bhagwat Prasad Dubey S/o Late Kanhaiya Lal Dubey Aged About 53 Years R/o Village- Kusmuli, Tah. Kota, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant/plaintiff versus 1. Gram Panchayat Kusmuli And Anr. S/o Thru- The Sarpanch, Kusmuli, Tah. Kota, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2. State of Chhattisgarh Thru- The Collector, Bilaspur, Tah. And Distt. Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. D.K. Dubey, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : None For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Kalpesh Ruparel, Panel Lawyer. SB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Judgement on Board 23.9.2025 1. Appellant has preferred this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 6.2.2014 passed in Civil Appeal No.1-A/2013 by which learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur dismissed appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 14.12.2012 passed by learned Civil Judge Class II, Kota, District Bilaspur by which civil suit filed by respondents herein for declaration and permanent injunction. SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI Digitally signed by SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI 2 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that plaintiff filed civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction pleading that the land bearing Khasra No.609 area 1.41 acre situated in village Kusmuli, PH No.10, Tahsil Kota, District Bilaspur (henceforth ‘the suit land’) is their ancestral land and the same is continuously been recorded in the name of plaintiff’s predecessors and as of now plaintiff is in possession, occupation and supervision of the suit land including a pond constructed on it. It was pleaded that said pond is being used by plaintiff and villagers of village. Defendant No.1 published a notice for auction of said pond, to which objection was submitted by plaintiff that he is owner of the pond. Plaintiff has also issued notice under Section 80 of CPC to defendant No.1, which has not been replied. Therefore, the necessity has arisen to file civil suit for declaration of title of plaintiff over the said pond and permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants and employees from interfering with possession of plaintiff over said pond. 3. Defendant No.1 filed written statement to plaint, denying all adverse averments made therein. Defendant No.2 also filed its written statement stating that after death of Nakchhed, plaintiff or his predecessors were never in physical possession of the pond. It was pleaded that as per revenue 3 records of the year 1954-55, the suit land is recorded under the head of ‘pond and water’ and no where in the records of rights name of plaintiff or his predecessors is recorded as owner or in any other capacity. It was also averred that all tanks situated on unoccupied land on or before the date of coming into force of the Act, providing for the abolition of the rights of intermediaries in the areas concerned and over which members of the village community were, immediately before such date, exercising rights of irrigation or Nistar, shall, if not already vested in the State Government, vest absolutely in the State Government with effect from the 6th April 1959. 4. On the basis of pleadings of respective parties, learned trial Court framed as many as three issues. Learned trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence brought on record by respective parties, decided all the issues against plaintiff and in favour of defendants vide judgment dated 14.12.2012, holding that plaintiff failed to prove that he is owner of the pond located on suit land and defendant are illegally interfering its use. The suit land is recorded as government land and used by the villagers as public property. 5. Civil appeal preferred against the judgment of learned trial Court is dismissed by learned first appellate Court by impugned judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to produce any document showing him to be in possession of suit land 4 since long, whereas as per revenue documents filed on behalf of defendant No.2 it is appearing the suit land is recorded in the name of the State. Learned First Appellate Court has further held that plaintiff has not complied with the provisions under Section 57 (2) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short ‘the Code of 1959’), which envisages that where a dispute arises between the State Government and any person in respect of any right under sub-section (1), such dispute shall be considered and decided by the Sub- Divisional Officer. Whereas, plaintiff has directly filed civil suit without complying the provisions of Section 57 (2) of Code of 1959. Learned first appellate Court further recorded that from the documents Ex.P-4 filed by plaintiff it is seen that the water of pond in question is being used by the villagers for drinking, bathing and cattle; the said pond has already been vested in the government as per provisions of Section 251 of the Code of 1959. 6. Learned counsel for appellant would submit that the evidence, documentary as well as oral, produced by appellant in the suit before trial Court, would clearly show that the suit land as well as the pond was personal property of Nakchhed, predecessors of appellant, and in the revenue record also, the suit land was recorded as such. From the year 1968, the entire suit land is in possession of appellant and the pond is 5 being looked after by him and since the appellant is still in possession of the suit land including pond the entries made in khasra for the year 2019-2020 in the name of state government is perse illegal. The villagers are using the water of said pond with the permission of appellant/plaintiff. He next contended that the first appellate Court is absolutely unjustified in holding that the suit filed by plaintiff is without following the procedure as prescribed under Section 57 (2) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. 7. On the other hand, learned State Counsel would submit that appellant is not in possession of the suit land and the land belongs to State Government, therefore, appellant has no vested right over the suit land. The suit was not maintainable in view of Section 257 and Section 57 (2) of the Code of 1959 as the subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. The finding given by both the Courts below are finding of fact and as such, the judgments passed by the Courts below do not call for any interference. Thus, prayed for dismissal of appeal. 8. Heard learned counsel for respective parties and perused record of Courts below. 9. Section 251 of the Code of 1959 states as under: - “251. Vesting of tanks in State Government.-- (1) All tanks situated on unoccupied land on or before the 6 date of coming into force of the Act, providing for the abolition of the rights of intermediaries in the area concerned and over which members of the village community were, immediately before such date, exercising rights of irrigation or nistar, shall, if not already vested in the State Government, vest absolutely in the State Government with effect from the 6th April, 1959: A bare reading of above quoted provisions would show that from 6th April 1959, all tanks situated on unoccupied land and over which village community were exercising rights of irrigation or nistaar, if not already vested in the State Government, shall automatically vest in State Government. 10. From the pleadings in plaint, written statement, oral and documentary evidence led by plaintiffs and defendants, it is seen that plaintiff has come out, with the case that the suit land as also pond was recorded in the name of his predecessor namely Nakchhed and as of now, the plaintiff is in possession of the same. In support thereof, the plaintiff has filed Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4. Ex.P-4, the document of the year 1958-59 titled as “flapkbZ vkSj ikuh ds vkf/kdkj” in which predecessor of plaintiff namely Nakchhed is shown to be owner of the pond. However, in Column No.13 of Ex.P-4 which relates to nistaar rights if any, it is clearly mentioned that pond is used for the purpose of drinking of water, bathing by villagers as well as cattle etc. Apart from aforementioned 7 documents, plaintiff has not produced and proved any other document or record to substantiate his claim regarding ownership of the pond and this fact has been admitted by plaintiff himself in evidence. Plaintiff has also admitted in his evidence that in khasra misal of the year 1928-29 (Ex.P-3) land in question is mentioned to be located beneath water and that he has not submitted any application to any revenue officer nor paid revenue of disputed pond. Witness examined on behalf of plaintiff namely Lakhanlal (PW-1) had deposed that he never seen possession of predecessors of plaintiff over the pond. Thus, there is no clinching evidence in the shape of document or in oral evidence that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land as also pond. On the contrary, from revenue documents filed on behalf of defendant State i.e. records of rights of the year 1954-55 (Ex.D-3), khasra panchsala of 2011-12 (Ex.D-4), the suit land is recorded as government land. 11. Pursuant to direction issued by this Court on 8.4.2025, an affidavit is on behalf of the State mentioning that the suit land is beneath of water, it is not a pond but a paithu and as per online revenue record, it is recorded as government land since 1954-55 and being used for nistari purposes by the villagers. 8 12. When the suit land was not in possession of the plaintiff, it was also not being used by him either for agricultural purposes or for any other purposes, it would automatically stand vested in the Government w.e.f. 6.4.1959, as per provisions of Section 251 of the Code of 1959. Thus, the trial Court has rightly held that the pond in question is the government land. 13. In case of Raghubar Singh vs State of MP and others, reported in AIR 1971 MP 209, High Court of Madhya Pradesh observed thus:- “21. What Section 251 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, aimed at abolishing was rights in tanks situated on unoccupied lands in which villagers had either the right of irrigation or the right of Nistar. The right of Nistar of villagers was not at all relevant under sub-sections (e), (f) and (g) of Section 5 of the Abolition Act, and moreover. Section 251 of the 1959 Code does not affect the tanks situated on occupied lands, but it pertains to tanks situated on unoccupied lands only…..” 25. In this view of the matter, we have no doubt that the tanks recorded as Khasra Nos. 461 and 542, in which the villagers had right of Nistar, namely, bathing and taking water for use, were rightly settled in favour of the petitioner under Section 5(f) of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950. As such, these tanks were saved to him under the Abolition Act. But, they were rightly held to have vested in the 9 State under Section 251 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959.” 14. Section 257 of the Code of 1959 deals with exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities with regard to subject mentioned therein. Relevant portion of Section 257 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 reads as below:- "257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities.-- Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters : (f) any claim against the State Government to have any entry made in any land records or to have any such entry omitted or amended. (y) any decision regarding vesting of tanks in State Government under section 251 and any claim against the State Government arising thereunder.” 15. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any claim against the State Government challenging any entry made in any land records or to have any such entry omitted or amended or any decision regarding vesting of tanks in State 10 Government under Section 251 of the Code and, as such, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit claiming correction of number and entry made in any land records or suit of the plaintiff seeking relief contrary to the existing revenue records would not be maintainable. 16. In case of Manoharlal Awal vs The State of MP and others reported in AIR 1978 MP 152 (FB), it was observed thus:- “11….. Adverting now to Section 257 of the Code itself Clause (h) bars a civil suit on questions which can be determined by Revenue Authorities under the Land Revenue Code. It follows that the question whether the whole or any part of the land revenue claimed as arrears is really due or not, being within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Officer a civil suit will not lie. Opening words of Section 257 override Clause (h) with the result that a civil suit will be competent under Sub-section (3) provided it satisfies the condition precedent i.e. the compliance of Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2).” 17. Section 57 of the Code declares the ownership in all types of land in the State Government, Section 57,reads thus : "57. State ownership in all lands-- (1) All lands belong to the State Government and it is hereby declared that all such lands, including standing and flowing water, mines, quarries, minerals and forests reserved or not, and all rights in the sub- soil of any land are the property of the State Government. 11 Provided that nothing in this section shall, (save as otherwise provided in this Code) be deemed to affect any rights of any person subsisting at the coming into force of this Code in any such property. (2) Where a dispute arises between the State Government and any person in respect of any right under sub-section (1) such dispute shall be decided by the Sub-Divisional Officer. (3) Any person aggrieved by any order passed under Sub-section (2) may institute a Civil suit to contest the validity of the order within a period of one year from the date of such order. (3-A) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), no civil Court shall, in a civil suit instituted under Sub- section (3) or after 24th October, 1983, by order of temporary injunction disturb the person to whom possession is restored under Section 250 if such person furnishes a reliable surety to recompensate the aggrieved party against any loss in case the Civil Court grants a decree in favour of the aggrieved party: Provided that no surety shall be required to be furnished by a member of a tribe declared to be an aboriginal tribe under Sub-section (6) of Section 165; (b) Where a civil Court by an order of temporary injunction disturbed the person referred to in Clause (a) on or after 24th October, 1983, but before the publication of Revenue Department's Notification No. 1-70- VII-N-2-83, dated 4th January, 1984, such order shall abate on such publication and the Tehsildar shall restore possession to a person who is disturbed by such order. (4) Where a civil suit has been instituted under Sub-section (3) against any order, such order shall not be subject to appeal or revision." 12 18. Thus, from the language of Section 57, it is clear that the State of Chhattisgarh is owner of all types of land declared in sub-section (1); if any person claims any right or raises a dispute of ownership as against the State, the dispute has to be raised first before the Sub-Divisional Officer and thereafter, within a period of one year of the order of the authority, aggrieved party may institute a suit to challenge the validity of the order. 19. The Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Gyasiram and ors., reported in AIR 1993 MP 155 has observed thus:- “15. Applying the guiding principles, from the language of Section 57, it is clear that the State of M.P. is owner of all types of land within its territory, if any person claims any right or raises a dispute of ownership as against the State, the dispute has to be raised before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Thereafter, aggrieved party may institute a suit to challenge the validity of the order, or may prefer an appeal or revision under Section 44 or Section 50 of the Code, as the case may be….” “17.From the scheme of the provision and its intendments, it is clear that the dispute in respect of 'any right' as against the State is barred by Section 57(2) of the Code, and a civil suit can only be instituted Under Section 57(3) of the Code to challenge the validity of the order. The provision thus excludes the jurisdiction of the civil courts and 13 even a case of declaration of rights or title relating to ownership of the land as against the State cannot be instituted. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the provision is enabling and concurrent or alternate.” 20. In instant case, the plaintiff has admitted in categorical terms that he has not submitted any application before the Sub- Divisional Officer. Perusal of relief clause of plaint filed by plaintiff would show that though vesting of tank with the State Government is not challenged, yet relief has been sought for declaration of title, possession and permanent injunction restraining defendants No.2 or its agent, servants and employee from interfering with pond in question, which has already been vested in the State Government by virtue of Section 251 of the Code of 1959 and as such, filing of suit directly is not permissible under the provisions contained in Section 57 (2) of the Code of 1959. Hence, the learned first appellate Court has rightly held that pond in question stood vested in the State Government in terms of Section 251 of the Code of 1959 and the plaintiff has filed civil suit without complying with the provisions of Section 57 (2) of the Code of 1959. 21. For the foregoing discussion, in the considered opinion of this Court, both the Courts below have rightly held that the suit land vests with the government as well as the suit is not 14 maintainable directly before civil Court in view of specific provision under Section 57 of the Code of 1959. Furthermore, in my opinion, no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal which warrants determination by this Court. Hence, I do not find any merit in this second appeal. Consequently, this second appeal falls and the same is dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 22. Decree be drawn-up accordingly. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge roshan/-