1 2025:CGHC:55068-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 213 of 2025 Karan Ratre S/o Remray Ratre Aged About 22 Years R/o Madhuban Police Station Sarangarh District- Sarangarh - Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Sarangarh District - Sarangarh - Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Shivang Dubey, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 12/11/2025 1. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, the BNSS) questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.01.2025 passed in Special Criminal Case under the POCSO Act No. 34/2021 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act) Sarangarh, Sessions Division Raigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, by which the learned trial Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellant as under: 2 Conviction under Section Rigorous imprisonment Fine Default Sentence Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the IPC) 20 years Rs. 2500/- 1 year 376 (2)(n) of the IPC 20 years Rs. 2500/- 1 year 384 of the IPC 3 years Rs. 1000/- 4 months 15 of the Protection of Children From Sexual O>ences Act, 2012 (for short, the POCSO Act) 3 years Rs. 5000/- 4 months 66E of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short, the IT Act) 3 years Rs. 5000/- 4 months 67A of the IT Act. 5 years Rs. 5000/- 6 months 67B of the IT Act. 5 years Rs. 5000/- 6 months All the sentences to run concurrently, however the @ne sentence has been directed to run separately. 2. Today, the matter is listed for hearing on IA No. 1/2025, which is an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellant. However, with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the matter is heard @nally. 3. The appellant/convict was charged for the o>ences under Sections 376 (3), 376 (2)(n), 348 of the IPC, Section 4(2), 5(l)/6 and 15 of the POCSO Act and Section 66M, 67A, 67B of the IT Act alleging that on 16.02.2019 at about 04:00 p.m. and thereafter for a period of one year in the jurisdiction of village XXXX, Police Station-Sarangarh, District- Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, committed rape/aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a minor victim (PW-1) below the age of 16 years, more than once or repeatedly, causing extortion by dishonestly inducing her to deliver Rs. 10,000/- on 24.08.2021 by threatening to make viral the video of child sexual abuse and abuse material of the victim, intentionally publishing or transmitting in possession, without the consent of the 3 victim, the image/video of the private area of her body under circumstances violating the privacy of the victim, storing the video of child sexual abuse and abuse material of the victim in mobile and the further allegation is of publishing or transmitting material containing sexual exploitation of the victim in electronic form. 4. The prosecution's case in brief is that the minor victim (PW-1) submitted a written complaint (Exhibit P-1) to the Sarangarh Police Station on 06.09.2021 stating that she was 17 years old and was studying in Class 11 in High School in the year 2019 and the appellant also studied in the same school and they met during that time. On 16.02.2019, the appellant lured her and took her to his house. At that time, there was no one in the appellant’s house and the appellant forcibly had physical relations with her. Thereafter, the appellant took her to his house in the same manner and had physical relations with her three-four times and the same was video recorded by the appellant. When the victim objected, the appellant stated that he had deleted the video which was believed by her. On 24.08.2021, the appellant came near the village pond and told her that if you she doesn’t give her Rs. 10,000/- then he would make the obscene video viral and started blackmailing her with threats. On 03.09.2021, her father received the said video on his mobile number which had gone viral. On the basis of the above written complaint, Kusum Kaivartya, Assistant Sub Inspector (PW-11) registered FIR bearing Crime No. 527/2021 (Exhibit P/2) for the o>ences under Sections 376, 384 IPC and Section 4, 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 67 of the IT Act against the appellant. The statement of the victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded. After obtaining consent from the victim and her mother, the victim was got examined by lady doctor Dr. Kiran Chauhan (PW-6) and report (Exhibit P-6A) was obtained. 4 5. In the ensuing investigation, Inspector Amit Shukla (PW-15) after examining the victim, on presentation of the victim's vaginal slide, vaginal swab and undergarment in a sealed packet by lady constable Shakuntala Jaiswal, the same were seized as per seizure memo Exhibit P-7. On the victim's indication, spot map of the incident Exhibit P-8 was prepared. Counselling report Exhibit P-10 was obtained after recording the statement of the victim before CWC Raigarh. The date of birth of the victim as 26.12.2003 recorded in the admission/discharge register was obtained from the Assistant Teacher (PW-9) vide Exhibit P/27 and declaration register (Exhibit P-28) were seized as per seizure memo Exhibit P-14. The victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/13) was also recorded. A ‘Realme mobile phone’ with SIM card attached to it was seized from the appellant as per seizure memo Exhibit P-19. The appellant was examined by Dr. Vinesh Nayak (PW-8) regarding his sexual capacity and the test report Exhibit P-20A was obtained. The appellant was duly arrested and information of his arrest was given to his relatives. Exhibit C-1, FSL report dated 04.10.2021 was obtained in respect of the seized vaginal slide, vaginal swab and the undergarment of the victim. The seized mobile was sent to Cyber Cell, Bilaspur on 28.09.2021 vide Exhibit P/23 and its receipt was obtained vide Exhibit P/24 and the examination report Exhibit P/31 and pendrive Article A-1 was received. The statement of other witnesses were also recorded. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was @led by the police against the appellant under sections 376, 384 of the IPC and Sections 4, 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 67 of the IT Act. 6. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the o>ences punishable under Sections376(3), 376(2)(n), 384 of the IPC, Section 4(2), 5(l)/6, 15 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 66E, 67A, 5 67B of the IT Act. The charges were read out and explained to the appellant upon which he denied the charges and prayed for trial. 7. In order to bring home the o>ence, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses namely the victim (PW-1), victim’s mother (PW-2), victim’s father (PW-3), victim’s elder father (PW-4), Dev Narayan Nishad (PW-5), Dr. Kiran Chouhan (PW-6), victim’s elder mother (PW-7), Binesh Nayak (PW-8), Chandrahas Chouhan (PW-9), Durgesh Kumar Ajay (PW-10), Kusum Kaiwart (PW-11), Shakuntala Jaiswal (PW-12), Ghurau Ram Chaturvedi (PW-13), victim’s elder father (PW-15), Amit Shukla (PW-16) and Prabhakar Tiwari (PW-16) and exhibited as many as 33 exhibits and one Article. 8. In defence, the appellant got the statement made by the mother of the victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the photographs, hand written letter, police statement of Anuj Lal Nishad and Devnarayan Nishad, exhibited as Exhibits D/1 to D/15. 9. The statement of the appellant under section 313 Cr.P.C was recorded wherein he expressed his ignorance to the questions and some of them were denied as well. He stated that he was having love a>air with the victim and on the date of incident, she was a major. He further stated that no mobile phone was seized from him and he had been falsely implicated in this case and prayed for acquittal. 10. The learned trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant/accused as detailed in the opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the present appeal by the appellants/convict. 6 11. Mr. Shivang Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/convict submits that it is not a case of forceful sexual intercourse but there was a love a>air between the appellant and the victim which is evident from the letters written by the victim. Further, there is no conclusive proof to establish that the victim was a minor on the date of incident. Even in the mobile examination report (Exhibit P/31) with respect to the mobile phone seized from the appellant, nothing has been found which may suggest that the appellant was involved either in recording, circulating any obscene video of the victim. The Principal/Head Master, who had entered the date of birth in the Dakhil/Kharij Register has not been examined. It has also not been explained as to on what basis the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the said register at the time of admission in the school. Even the FSL and MLC report are also negative and does not support the prosecution case. Since both the victim and the appellant belonged to di>erent castes, a false case has been prepared against the appellant. The relationship between the victim and the appellant were consensual and as such, no case is made out against the appellant. The appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent submits that the victim was a minor on the date of incident and as such, even if any consent was given, it would have no meaning. The appellant has committed a heinous crime of rape against a minor and thereafter prepared obscene video on mobile and also threatened the victim demanding Rs. 10,000/- failing which he would make the said video viral and ultimately, the said obscene video went viral which has ruined the reputation of the victim in the society. The statement of the witnesses clearly makes out a case against the 7 appellant. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is just and proper warranting no interference. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 14. According to the victim, her age at the time of recording of her statement, was 17 years and 8 months and in the written complaint made to the police, she had stated her age to be 17 years which, according to the victim herself, was incorrect. The mother of the victim (PW-2) stated that she could not tell what was the exact date of birth of the victim and on what basis the date of birth was got recorded in the admission/discharge register, was also not known to her as she was illiterate. None of the relatives of the victim have stated about the exact date of birth of the victim and the basis on which the date of birth was recorded in the admission/discharge register of the school. 15. Exhibit P/27C is the copy of the Admission/Discharge register of the school which states that the date of birth of the victim was 26.12.2023. Chandrahas Chouhan (PW-9) is the Assistant Teacher. He stated that when the entries were made in the admission/discharge register, he was not posted in that school and he cannot say as to on what basis the date of birth was recorded. The declaration register (Exhibit P/28C) merely states the declaration made by the father of the victim that the date of birth of the victim was 26.12.2003 but there is no document in support of the same. There is no birth certi@cate or any other document to indicate that the said date is the correct one. 8 16. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Birka Shiva v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1454 has observed as under: "8. The evidentiary value of such an entry made in public or o!cial registers may be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, admissibility is distinct from probative value. While such documents may be admitted into evidence, their evidentiary weight depends on proof of their authenticity and the source of the underlying information. Mere production and marking of a document as exhibited by the Court does not amount to proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by leading substantive evidence, that is, by the ‘evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’ the truth of the facts in issue’. [See: Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal] We may refer to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court in this regard: 8.1. This Court, in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, held that the entries contained in the school register are relevant and admissible but have no probative value unless the person who made the entry or provided the date of birth is examined. It was observed: “14. … If entry regarding date of birth in the scholar's register is made on the information given by parents or someone having special knowledge of the fact, the same would have probative value. … The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or the scholar's register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If the entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value, but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary value. … 15. Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that entry in any public, o!cial book, register, record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his o!cial duty specially enjoined by the law of the country is itself the relevant fact. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satis=ed, =rstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other o!cial book, register or record; secondly, it must be an 9 entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his o!cial duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to the date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act, but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. … The courts have consistently held that the date of birth mentioned in the scholar's register or secondary school certi=cate has no probative value unless either the parents are examined or the person on whose information the entry may have been made is examined…" This decision has been consistently followed by this Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand; Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand; Murugan v. State of T.N.; State of M.P. v. Munna; C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy; and Manak Chand v. State of Haryana. 8.2. A coordinate Bench of this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram, through S.B. Sinha, J., clari=ed that though entries in school registers are admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, their evidentiary value improves only when corroborated by oral testimony of persons who are aware of its content, such as parents or the person who made the entry at the time of admission. It held as under: “12. A register maintained in a school is admissible in evidence to prove date of birth of the person concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Such dates of births are recorded in the school register by the authorities in discharge of their public duty. PW 5, who was an Assistant Teacher in the said school in the year 1977, categorically stated that the mother of the prosecutrix disclosed her date of birth. The father of the prosecutrix also deposed to the said eBect. 13. …The materials on record as regards the age of the prosecutrix were, therefore, required to be considered in the aforementioned backdrop. It may be true that an entry in the school register is not conclusive, but it has evidentiary value. Such evidentiary value of a school register is corroborated by oral evidence as the same was recorded on the basis of the statement of the mother of the prosecutrix." 8.3. Similarly, this Court in Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana, stated that though a document may be admissible, but to determine whether the entry contained therein has any probative value, may still be required to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It held as follows: 10 “26. In Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] while dealing with a similar issue, this Court observed that very often parents furnish incorrect date of birth to the school authorities to make up the age in order to secure admission for their children. For determining the age of the child, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeccable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certi=cate stands belied by the unimpeccable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of the municipal corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded. x x x 28. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised that the entry made in the o!cial record by an o!cial or person authorised in performance of an o!cial duty is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the party may still ask the court/authority to examine its probative value. The authenticity of the entry would depend as to on whose instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what was his source of information. Thus, entry in school register/certi=cate requires to be proved in accordance with law. Standard of proof for the same remains as in any other civil and criminal case.” 8.4. In Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, this Court held that the entries made in the o!cial record may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, but the Court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded. It was held as follows : “20. So far as the entries made in the o!cial record by an o!cial or person authorised in performance of o!cial duties are concerned, they may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the Court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded and what was his source of information. The entries in school register/school leaving certi=cate require to be proved in accordance with law and the standard of proof required in such cases remained the same as in any other civil or criminal cases. 21. … For determining the age of a person, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeachable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certi=cate stands belied by the unimpeachable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth 11 register of the Municipal Corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded. …” 8.5. This Court, in Alamelu v. State, while dealing with a similar factual matrix, held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the girl was a minor at the relevant date since the transfer certi=cate of a Government School showing age was not duly proved by witnesses. It observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certi=cate, Ext. P-16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15-6-1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certi=cate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident i.e. 31- 7-1993. The transfer certi=cate has been issued by a government school and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certi=cate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 41. We may notice here that PW 1 was examined in the Court on 9-8-1999. In his evidence, he made no reference to the transfer certi=cate (Ext. P-16). He did not mention the girl's age or date of birth. PW 2 was also examined on 9-8-1999. She had also made no reference either to her age or to the transfer certi=cate. It appears from the record that a petition was =led by the complainant under Section 311 CrPC seeking permission to produce the transfer certi=cate and to recall PW 2. This petition was allowed. … In her cross- examination, she had merely stated that she had signed on the transfer certi=cate, Ext. P-16 issued by the school and accordingly her date of birth was noticed as 15-6- 1977. She also stated that the certi=cate has been signed by the father as well as the Headmaster. But the Headmaster has not been examined. Therefore, in our opinion, there was no reliable evidence to vouchsafe for the truth of the facts stated in the transfer certi=cate.” 9. In the attending facts, we =nd that the evidentiary value of Ex.P11 is signi=cantly undermined in the absence of corroborating material. We say so for the following reasons: (i) PW-13, who is the Headmaster of Zilla Parishad High School, Chandanapur, Peddapalli District (erstwhile Karimnagar District), stated that the victim studied in his school from 2007 to 2013, i.e., 6th Class to 10th Class 12 and that the Admission Register records her date of birth as 3rd November 1996. However, in his cross- examination, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge as to the source or basis on which the date of birth was recorded therein or if the recorded date of birth was correct or not. The relevant part of his testimony is extracted hereunder: “…In our school there is not clerk to maintain records. I did not produce any certi=cate pertaining to earlier school I, In which P.W.3 studies up to 5th Class. There must be basis for entering date of birth of a student in our school such as her earlier school record. I do not have personal knowledge as to what record was produced by parents of P.W. 3 as basis to enter her date of birth in our school as I was not Head Master in 2007. I cannot say in which school P.W.3 studied up to 5th Class. In the nominal roll register of our school, the signature of P.W.3 was obtained. I do not have personal knowledge whether the said date of birth of P.W.3 was correct or not and I am giving evidence only on the basis of record.” (ii) The prosecution has failed to examine the person who had made the entry in the Admission Register to ascertain on what basis such an entry was made. More so, the entry in respect of the date of birth of the victim in the primary school register, i.e., 1st Class to 5th Class, has not been produced and proved before the Courts below to verify the age as per its records. It is also not possible to ascertain from the records as to whether the date of birth was provided by the parents or simply entered at the behest of another party, without veri=cation, at the time of admission to Zilla Parishad High School. (iii) The testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 are also telling that none of them mentioned the victim's age with speci=city. There is no reference to Ex.P11, and no attempt was made by the prosecution to adduce corroborative testimony regarding the victim's date of birth from her family members. Thus, while examining the issue at hand, on the anvil of the principles elucidated above, it is essential to notice that the prosecution has failed to toe the line of legal requisites. There is nothing on record to corroborate the date of birth of the victim as recorded in the birth certi=cate (Ex.P11) issued by the school. Therefore, it cannot be relied upon to de=nitely determine the age of the victim and held with certainty that the victim was below sixteen/eighteen years of age. 11. Furthermore, none of the victim's family members, i.e., her mother and brothers have said anything about the age of the victim in their depositions made in the Court. Even the victim is eBectively silent on this aspect, only stating 13 that she and her siblings were born approximately two years apart and thereby making an estimation of their ages as well as her own. Throughout her deposition, the victim has remained silent with regard to her particular date of birth. 12. Well, su!ce it to say that Courts of law cannot make a determination of guilt in thin air, based on estimations. In the present facts and circumstances, the proof submitted by the prosecution in the form of Ex.P11 (birth certi=cate issued by the school) was not su!cient to arrive at a =nding that the prosecutrix was less than sixteen/eighteen years of age, especially when such a document was not su!ciently corroborated. Therefore, it was neither safe nor fair to convict the appellant based on it, particularly in the context where the age of the victim was such a pivotal factor. " 17. In view of the above, it can be observed that the prosecution has failed to prove its case that the victim was a minor on the date of incident. 18. The MLC report (Exhibit P/6A) in respect of the victim does not indicate any injuries either on the body or on the private part of the victim and Dr. Kiran Chouhan (PW-6) has opined that no de@nite opinion could be given with regard to recent sexual assault and she had further opined that the victim could have been habitual of sex. The FSL report (Exhibit C/1) in respect of the vaginal swab and vaginal slides as well as the undergarment of the victim, no semen or human sperms have been found. 19. Further, the mobile phone examination report (Exhibit P/31), the Cyber Cell, Bilaspur, has opined that though the obscene video was found in the said mobile phone, but it could not stated as to whether the said mobile was used for preparing the video. Further, it has been also opined that no obscene video was circulated to other people from the said mobile. As such, it cannot be said with certainty that the appellant was involved either in shooting the video and then circulating it to others. 14 20. There is no doubt that the appellant and the victim were having love a>air which is evident from the photographs annexed as D/1 to D/12 and the hand written letter of the victim, written to the appellant. The victim has admitted in her cross examination that the photographs were of the appellant and the victim and that she herself had written the letter (Exhibit D/13) to the appellant. It is an admitted position that both the victim and the appellant belong to di>erent castes and normally, the love a>air between people of di>erent castes are not considered as a normal practice and is often seen with hatred. Moreover, the FIR was lodged by the victim when the obscene video went viral and before that, no attempt was made either by the victim or her parents to lodge any complaint against the appellant. As such, the possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out and as such, the appellant is entitled to be given the bene@t of doubt. 21. In view of the above, the Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence reIects that the relationship between the appellant and the victim was consensual, and the allegations of abduction and rape and thereafter recording obscene video and circulating it, are not supported by credible material. 22. For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant for committing the aforesaid crime and as such, the appellant is entitled for acquittal by giving him bene@t of doubt. 23. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against 15 him. The appellant, who is reported to be in jail, be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 24. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be e>ective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of @ling of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 25. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action, forthwith. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Amit AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2025.11.17 15:43:57 +0530