RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK RVWPET No.294 of 2025 Gajendra Nayak and another …. Petitioners -Versus- State of Odisha and others …. Opposite Parties Advocates appeared in this case: For Petitioners : Mr. Amit Prasad Bose, Advocate Mr. L.K. Maharana, Advocate For Opp. Party/State : Mr. K.C. Kar, Government Advocate For Opp. Party/Intervener : Mr. Manoj Kumar Mohanty, Advocate For Balasore Municipality/ Opp. Party : Mr. Karunakar Rath, Advocate CORAM: HON’ BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN J U D G M E N T ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of hearing and Judgment: 11th February, 2026 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARISH TANDON, CJ. 1. The instant review application is filed by a third party to the writ petition, seeking review of a judgment and order dated 9th December, 2025 by which a writ of mandamus was issued to complete the entire exercise as disclosed on the said date in pursuit RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 2 of securing the eviction of encroachers from the Government land and demolition of the structures standing thereupon. 2. After the said judgment and order was passed, the authorities have proceeded to implement the said order with full rigour and force, except the portion encroached by the review petitioners and the structures standing thereupon, as they have approached this Court by filing the instant review application. Further fetter put into the authorities to implement the said judgment and order is the interim order, which was passed in the instant review application. 3. Admittedly, the review petitioners are not a party to the said writ petition, which was filed in the nature of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), raising a serious concern on a rampant encroachment of the Government land and making substantial constructions thereupon. It is a trite law that the persons shall not be allowed to encroach upon the property which is of a public nature and simultaneously a corresponding responsibility is imposed upon the authorities to take prompt and immediate action not only to prevent the encroachment but also to prohibit such encroachment thereupon. RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 3 4. Perceiving the aforesaid aspect in the mind, we disposed of the Public Interest Litigation, reminding the authorities of their solemn duty cast upon them by a statute to take immediate steps. We are not unmindful of the reality prevalent across the country that the illegal constructions are mushrooming in and around the geographical limits of the country and shelter is sought to be taken on the long or uninterrupted possession. Mere long possession does not confer any right, more particularly, when such encroachment leads to such occupation and possession over the Government land. Though certain rights have been created in the statute enacted in the State of Odisha, yet the adjudication is required in a properly instituted proceeding, but the same cannot be said to be an automatic or an inchoate right, which is indefeasible. 5. Be that as it may, we are more concerned on the maintainability and/or entertainability of the instant review application at the behest of a third party. It is no longer res integra that a person affected by a judgment and order has a statutory right of an appeal after obtaining a leave of the Court; equally, it confers a right on the person to apply for a review as well, provided he is an aggrieved person. There is no definition of an „aggrieved person‟ RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 4 assigned in any of the statutory documents but in a catena of decisions rendered by the Courts of the country, any person who is affected and/or whose right is infringed by an order of the Court either being a party or an alien to the said proceeding will be regarded as an „aggrieved person‟. The law in the country does not put a clog into the remedial measures provided in the statute and, therefore, the right to remedy is an integral part of access to justice and its dispensation. 6. We thus do not find any inhibition into the petitioners to approach the Court with an application for review, as we find at the time of passing an interim order that he is likely to be affected or in fact affected by the judgment and order dated 9th December, 2025. 7. Having held so, the next question which boils down in the instant review application is the entertainability thereof within the settled parameters of law. We are not oblivion of somewhat settled proposition of law that the High Court, being a Court of record by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India, has an inherent and/or plenary jurisdiction to review its own order. Being a Court of record, it not only can implement its order or put the person to the RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 5 rigour of law in the event any violation is imminent and evident from the conduct but also can review its order. 8. The moment the review application is filed, the grounds enumerated under Order-47, Rule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) has to be borne in mind and while embarking such journey, if it is found that any of the incidences encompassing the provisions contained under Order-47, Rule-1 of the CPC is satisfactorily proved, there is no brindle on the part of the Court to review its own order. 9. Ordinarily, there are two types of review jurisdictions exercised by the Court. There may be an occasion for a procedural review of the judgment and order and the other aspect of review is the substantive review. The moment the latter jurisdiction is exercised, the review application must be determined and/or adjudicated upon strictly on the parameters set forth in the statute. The review jurisdiction can never be transformed into a discretionary jurisdiction, which is ingrained into the system, subject to the legislative intent. Once the Court is vested with the discretionary powers to do or refrain from doing anything, such discretion if exercised by the Court is to some extent immuned from RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 6 any such interference except such discretion is exercised in a reasonable, rational and on the substratum of the well-defined legal principles of law. The moment the substantive review is squeezed on the grounds specified therein, the question of discretion is completely erased and the Court must travel on the peripheral of those statutory provisions. 10. The petitioners have relied upon a judgment of the apex Court rendered in case of Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120 as a guiding principle in exercising the review jurisdiction if the material facts are not brought to the Court. The said report relates to a writ jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it has been categorically observed that if a person is guilty of suppression of material facts, it is open to the writ Court to dismiss such writ petition by refusing to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction vested upon it. 11. We have no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down in the said judgment that the power of judicial review enshrined under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not only restricted to the prerogative writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, quo- RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 7 warranto, habeas corpus, but such exercise should be done when a person has approached the Court with a clean hand and is not guilty of suppression of the material facts. A distinction should be borne in mind between „suppression of fact‟ and „suppression of material fact‟. Every fact which is not disclosed and does not partake an integral part of the cause of action, if not disclosed, cannot come within the purview of “suppression”. However, such fact, which has a material bearing and has a direct nexus to the cause of action, if not disclosed and/or included in the pleading, the writ Court may, in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction, disentitles such errant litigant as the Court shall not permit any litigant to steal a march through a judicial fiat and secure the order by committing a fraud on the Court. The Courts always frowned upon the litigants who have created an illusory cause of action by suppressing the material facts and the moment such facts which were latent becomes patent, the Court will dismiss such writ petition by imposing certain conditions in the form of cost. 12. Reverting back to the instant matter, we are not concerned with the power exercised by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but we are concerned with the review application taken RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 8 out by the petitioners on the premise that the order/judgment dated 9th December, 2025 was passed on suppression of the material facts that the petitioners had already approached this Court by filing writ petition challenging the action of the authorities in securing the removal and/or demolition of the structure constructed thereupon. It is further contended that in the said writ petition, a protective order was passed, which was operative on the day when the said judgment and order was passed by this Court. Precisely, for such facts being brought to the notice of the Court on the day when the review application was admitted, this Court passed an interim order protecting the right of the review petitioners until the disposal of the instant review application. 13. After the review is directed to be returnable upon effecting the service, it has been brought to our notice, which is also undisputed that the said writ petition, in which the interim order was passed has been dismissed and the interim order merged with the final order of dismissal. It leads to an inescapable inference that the interim order, which was operative, becomes non-existent having merged with the final order passed therein and, therefore, there is no protective umbrella above the head of the petitioners as on this date. RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 9 14. We invited the attention of the counsel whether such facts may lead to either of the grounds incorporated under Order-47, Rule-1 of the CPC, more particularly, in the perspective of the subsequent event relating to the dismissal of the writ petition filed by the review petitioners. It is fervently submitted before us that the petitioner in the writ petition has suppressed the fact that there is a pending writ petition and therefore, the order is bad, illegal and should be recalled. A colour of fraud is sought to be taken in the review application that once the Court finds that the order has been obtained fraudulently, it is an ardent duty of the Court to recall the said order. 15. We are not unmindful of the settled proposition of law that the moment an order is obtained by practicing fraud, not only on the party but also on the Court, such litigant shall not be permitted to reap the benefit of such order. Fraud is always viewed seriously by the Courts of the country and in the event the fraud is projected and substantiated by a convincing material, it is the solemn duty of the Court to put the clock back and the benefits so obtained be reversed. We are conscious that the fraud unravels every solemn act and vitiates every action. Mere using the word or the expression "fraud" RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 10 is not sufficient but there must be explicit and elaborate particulars of fraud to be pleaded. Simply because a fraud, which is well- defined under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, is used in the pleading, it does not ipso facto brings the concept of a fraud unless the particulars thereof is extensively and precisely adumbrated in the petition. What may be perceived as suppression but as on the date of entertaining the petition, such fact, if brought, would not tilt the decision diametrically opposite to what had already been taken by the Court. 16. We are conscious that the Court shall not issue a writ of mandamus upon the authorities to do a thing either forbidden in law or in violation of the prohibitory provisions incorporated in the statute or order of the Court of competent jurisdiction. The law is to be respected and its enforceability to be ensured not only by the litigant or a citizenry but by the Courts of the country. It is incongruous to suggest that the authorities would act contrary to the law or taking a shelter under the order of the Court when there is a complete interdict imposed in the legal proceedings. 17. The authorities, being conscious of such proposition, they did not affect the possession of the review petitioners nor demolished RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 11 the said structure. Even if, there was no reflection and/or disclosure of the pending writ petition in which the interim order was passed but as on the date, there is no subsisting interim order as the writ petition filed by the petitioners stood dismissed by the learned single Judge. There is no fetter on the part of the Court to take into account the subsequent event, which would lead to the same decision and/or conclusion to be arrived at. 18. In case of Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 741, the apex Court held that there is no absolute bar imposed in the Court while exercising its review jurisdiction in taking into consideration a subsequent event in the following: “93. It is also not correct to contend that the Court while exercising its review jurisdiction in any situation whatsoever cannot take into consideration a subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the Court accepts its own mistake in understanding the nature and purport of the undertaking given by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in the AGM of the Board held on 29-9-2004, the subsequent event may be taken into consideration by the Court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake. RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 12 94. In Rajesh D. Darbar v. Narasingrao Krishnaji Kulkarni [(2003) 7 SCC 219: JT (2003) 7 SC 209] this Court noticed: (SCC p. 222, para 4) “4. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its importance to create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson v. State of Alabama [294 US 600: 79 L Ed 1082 (1934)] illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 13 Chaudhuri [AIR 1941 FC 5: 1940 FCR 84] falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs — cannot deny rights — to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately granted, the court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. This Court's judgment in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770: AIR 1975 SC 1409] read in its statutory setting, falls in this category. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine (see V.P.R.V. Chockalingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache [AIR 1927 PC 252: 26 All LJ 371]).”” RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 14 19. The aforesaid principles of law that there is no absolute fetter put into the Court exercising the review jurisdiction to take into account the subsequent event is further fortified by a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Government of NCT of Delhi, through its Secretary, Land and Building Department v. M/s. K.L. Rathi Steels Limited, reported in 2024 INSC 454 in the following: “60. Netaji Cricket Club (supra) was followed in Jagmohan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2008) 7 SCC 38. It was held there that Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC does not preclude the High Court or a court to take into consideration any subsequent event and that if imparting of justice in a given situation is the goal of the judiciary, the court may take into consideration (of course on rare occasions) the subsequent events.” 20. In view of the law enunciated in the above reports and taking into account the subsequent event that as on the day, the writ petition in which the injunction was passed in favour of the petitioners, stood dismissed and there is no interdict having subsisted in implementing the order and removal of the encroachment including the exercise of the allied powers conferred upon the authorities. We, thus, do not find any justification in entertaining the review application nor we find any of the grounds RVWPET No.294 of 2025 p. 15 relatable to exercise of the review jurisdiction by the Court to have been proved by cogent materials. 21. With these observations, the review petition is dismissed but in the circumstances with no order as to costs. (Harish Tandon) Chief Justice (M.S. Raman) Judge Sisira/ S. Behera