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2025 DAILYLAW 5179 (JK)

UT OF JAND K TH COMMISSIONER SECRETARY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT AND ORS v. TEJEINDER SINGH SO MOHAN SINGH

LPA/139/2022 · 2025-03-05

Moksha Khajuria Kazmi, Sanjeev Kumar

body2025

Judgment text

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Sr. No. 17 HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU Case No: LPA No. 139/2022 1. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, through its Commissioner/ Secretary to Govt., PW (R&B) Department, Civil Secretariat, Srinagar. 2. Chief Engineer, PW (R&B) Department, Jammu. 3. Superintending Engineer, PWD (R&B), Jammu Kathua Circle, Jammu. 4. Executive Engineer, PWD (R&B) Construction Division-1, Jammu. 5. Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD (R&B) Sub Division-1, R.S. Pura, Jammu. …. Appellant(s) Through:- Mr. Ravinder Gupta, AAG. V/s Tejeinder Singh, Age 53 years S/o Sh. Mohan Singh R/o Bandhu Rakh, Kunjwani, District Jammu. …..Respondent(s) Through:- Mr. M. K. Bhardwaj, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Gagan Kohli, Advocate. CORAM: HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE HON‟BLE MS. JUSTICE MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, JUDGE ORDER 05.03.2025 (ORAL) 1. This intra court appeal is directed against an order and judgment dated 13.05.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge [“the Writ Court”] in „Tejeinder Singh Vs. UT of J&K and others‟, whereby the writ court has allowed the writ petition of the respondent herein and directed the appellants herein to make a payment of Rs.36.70 lacs along with 2 LPA No. 139/2022 interest @ 6% per annum to the respondent within a period of three months from the date a copy of the order is served upon the appellants. 2. The impugned judgment is assailed by the appellants primarily on the ground that the Writ Court has not appreciated that the writ petition was hit by huge delay and laches. 3. Mr. Ravinder Gupta, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants would argue that the writ petition could have been filed by the respondent within a period of three years to be reckoned from the date the work in question was completed. Reliance is placed upon Article 56 of Schedule appended with The J&K Limitation Act Svt. 1995 (the Act of 1995) which at the relevant point of time was in force. He would further argue that in view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court of India in case of “State of M.P Vs. Bhailal Bhai” reported in AIR 1964 SC, 1006. The writ petition ought to have been filed by the respondent within a period of three years, the period of limitation prescribed under Article 56 of the Schedule appended with the Act of 1995. It is argued that though the Limitation Act per se does not apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by way of a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the claim for recovery of amount on account of the work executed for the appellants was not barred by limitation, in that, the respondents had from time to time acknowledged its liability. Reliance is placed by the learned Senior Counsel on Section 19 of the Act of 1995 which deals with the effect of acknowledgement in writing. 5. Apart from the aforesaid preliminary objections, Mr. Ravinder Gupta, learned Additional Advocate General, could not point out any other defect in the judgment impugned. 3 LPA No. 139/2022 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment passed by the writ court is legally perfect and does not call for any interference by us in this appeal. The liability to make the payment to the respondent on account of the works executed by him for the appellants is not disputed. There is ample documentary evidence on record to demonstrate that the liability towards the respondent for the works executed was never disputed by the appellants. The writ court has elaborately dealt with this aspect of the matter and, therefore, we do not wish to repeat the same. 7. Coming to the objection of Mr. Gupta with regard to the entertaining of the time barred claim of the petitioner by the writ court, suffice it to say, that the law of limitation, in particularly ‘The Limitation Act’, does not in stricto sensu apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, that does not mean that the writ petition can be filed by a person aggrieved at the time of his choosing and even after the considerable delay. The delay and laches is one of the grounds on which this Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction vested by Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true and as is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhailal Bhai (supra), that with a view to determine as to whether there is unreasonable delay on the part of the petitioner to approach the court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the court shall keep in mind as to whether the suit for claiming such relief would be barred by the law of limitation or not. The maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by way of civil suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The Constitutional Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action. In a nut-shell, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary remedy and this Court can refuse to entertain a claim which is not brought before it 4 LPA No. 139/2022 within a reasonable period. What could be reasonable period in a given case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of such case. 8. In the instant case, having regard to the fact that the appellants have acknowledged their liability from time to time, we are of the considered opinion that the writ petition was not hit by any delay and laches. The work was stated to have been completed and handed over to the respondent in September, 2014. The period of limitation as per Article 56 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act would have expired in September, 2017. There is acknowledgement by the appellants dated 10.03.2017 and in view of the provisions of Section 19, the period of limitation prescribed for seeking the recovery of the amount by way of civil action stood extended up to 10.03.2020. There is further acknowledgement of the liability by the appellants on 20.12.2017 which would extend the period of limitation to 19.12.2020. There is another acknowledgement dated 20.10.2020 which takes the limitation period to 21.10.2023. 9. Viewed thus, the writ petition which was filed in the year 2021 by the appellants was otherwise within a period of limitation. 10. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any substance in the objections raised by Mr. Ravinder Gupta, learned Additional Advocate General. No other point was urged. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. (Moksha Khajuria Kazmi) (Sanjeev Kumar) Judge Judge Jammu: 05.03.2025 Pawan Chopra Whether the order is speaking: Yes Whether the order is reportable: Yes Pawan Chopra 2025.03.06 14:11 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document