2025:JHHC:10995-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Appeal (DB) No.146 of 2025 ------ Kaushal Kumar, aged about 35 years, son of Sitaram Mahto, resident of Village Kirtaniya, P.O. Ammapali, P.S. Pirpainti, District- Bhagalpur (Bihar). …. …. Appellant Versus The State of Jharkhand .... .... Respondent CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ------ For the Appellant : Mr. Ankit Apurva, Advocate For the State : Mrs. Kumari Rashmi, APP ------ 03/Dated: 09.04.2025 1. The instant appeal preferred under Section 21(4) of the NIA, Act, 2008 is directed against the order dated 09.01.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sahibganj in A.B.P. No.490 of 2024, in connection with Mirzachouki P.S. Case No.80 of 2024, registered for the offence under Sections 303(2) and 288 of BNS Section 4/54 of JMMC Rule, Sections 7, 9 and 13 of the Jharkhand Minerals (Prevention of Illegal Mining) Transportation and Storage Rule, 2017 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908 whereby and whereunder, the prayer for pre-arrest bail of the appellant has been rejected. 2. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that it is a case where no attributability is available in the FIR, save and except, one poclain machine which belongs to the appellant since has been recovered from the place of occurrence, basis upon which, his complicity has been shown in the first information report. 2025:JHHC:10995-DB 2 3. It has been submitted that the appellant is valid owner of the said poclain which has been given on hire for its utilization and in course thereof, the poclain was seized from the place of occurrence and hence, it cannot be said that the appellant was in any way involved in the alleged commission of crime as per the penal offence as referred in the FIR. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is a fit case where the impugned order needs to be interfered with. 5. While on the other hand, serious opposition has been made on behalf of the learned State Counsel by showing the culpability of the appellant which is said to be serious in nature. 6. It has been contended that the poclain has been recovered from the place of occurrence and therefore, the offence has been alleged to be committed by the present appellant under the Scheduled Offence and as such, it is not a case for pre-arrest bail. Further, the appellant is not cooperating in the investigation, even though, notice under Section 41A of the Cr.P.C. has been issued which has also been served to the appellant but he has chosen not to appear so as to cooperate in the investigation. 7. Learned State Counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is therefore not a case for grant of pre-arrest bail. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the finding recorded by the learned court in the impugned order as also the case diary. 2025:JHHC:10995-DB 3 9. It is evident from the material available on record particularly in the FIR and the case diary and it is the admitted case as per the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the poclain which is owned by the appellant, has been found at the place of occurrence. No explanation is available in the instant memo of appeal, save and except, that the said poclain was given on hire for the purpose of mining operation. 10. The prosecution has been set at motion, on the basis of seizure of said poclain machine at the place of occurrence. 11. Here this Court, is dealing with the parameter to consider the benefit of pre-arrest bail and as such, the principle which is required to be considered while considering the prayer for pre- arrest bail, has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1 that in the matter of anticipatory bail that courts should be guided by factors like the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case. 12. Further, it has been held that the time-tested principles are that no straitjacket formula can be applied for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. The judicial discretion of the Court shall be guided by various relevant factors and largely it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 13. This Court, considering the aforesaid fact and applying the principle while considering the prayer for pre-arrest bail therefore, is of the view that it is not a case where the impugned 2025:JHHC:10995-DB 4 order requires interference. 14. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Rohit/-