1 2025:CGHC:51326 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5032 of 2020 Gopal Markam S/o Deva Ram Markam, Aged About 32 Years, R/o Village Rokel, P. S. and Tahsil Chhindgarh, District Sukma Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner. versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of School Education, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2. The Collector/President, Excellent (Utkrisht) School English Medium, Operating Management Committee, Government High School, Pawaras Sukma, District Sukma Chhattisgarh. 3. The District Education Officer, Sukma District Sukma Chhattisgarh 4. The Principal Excellent (Utkrisht) English Medium School, Pawaras Sukma, District Sukma Chhattisgarh 5. Ku. Meena Kashyap D/o Late Shri Bhagtu Ram Kashyap R/o Village Karpawad, Block Bakawad, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh ... Respondents. (Cause title downloaded from CIS Periphery) For Petitioner : Mr. Anil Singh Rajput, Advocate. For Res No.1 to 4/ State : Mr. Rajeev Bharat, Govt. Advocate. For Res No.5 : Mr. Vipin Tiwari, Advocate. Digitally signed by AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI DN: cn=AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, ou=HIGH COURT, o=HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, st=Chhattisgarh, c=IN Date: 2025.10.15 16:07:19 +0530 2 SB : Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Order on Board 15.10.2025 1. The petitioner has filed this Writ Petition challenging the selection list (Annexure-P/6) issued by the respondent/Authority in pursuance of advertisement published for by the Government High School Pawaras Sukma Management Committee, Excellent School English Medium for the various posts vide Adv. Dated 19.06.2020 (Annexure-P/4) and Amended Adv. Dated 06.07.2020 (Annexure- P/5). 2. The petitioner has participated in the aforesaid recruitment for the post of Sanskrit Teacher on contractual basis in the Excellent School, Government Pawaras Sukma. However, as per selection list respondent No.5 has been selected and petitioner could not be selected as he obtained less marks than 45 % despite he belongs to District Sukma. Being aggrieved the said selection, he has preferred this petition. 3. Mr. Anil Singh Rajput, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the advertisement there is specific clause for giving preference to the candidates who are resident of Sukma District and petitioner is resident of District Sukma, whereas respondent No.5 beongs to District Bastar. He submits that the petitioner has been disqualified only on the ground that he has scored less than 45 % marks after the interview though respondent No.5 has been selected in an arbitrary manner, therefore, selection of respondent 3 No.5 is bad in law and petitioner is entitled for selection in the said recruitment. In view of such submission, he prays to allow the petition and to quash the selection list. 4. Mr. Rajeev Bharat, Govt. Advocate for the State and Mr. Vipin Tiwari, learned counsel for respondent No.5 would oppose the aforesaid submission and submits that respondent No.5 is much more meritorious than the petitioner in respect of said recruitment. The petitioner has achieved total 50.56 marks whereas respondent No.5 has achieved 59.60 marks. They also submit that in the advertisement maximum 15 marks are prescribed for giving the candidate on the basis of interview and the Selection Committee has awarded the marks in accordance with the terms prescribed in the advertisement. They also submit that since the petitioner belongs to District Sukma he has been awarded 5 marks on the resident basis though there is no specific rule is mentioned in this regard whereas respondent No.5 who belongs to District Bastar and has been given only 3 marks in this regard and inspite of that she has been selected in the recruitment, therefore, selection of respondent No.5 is just and proper. They also submits that in the advertisement there is no specific term as to in what basis preference has to be given to the person who belongs to District Sukma. They lastly submit that if marks of both candidates are similar then only preference should be given to District Sukma, however, in the present case respondent No.5 is already ahead 4 from the petitioner, therefore, petitioner has no case and this petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Undisputedly, respondent No.5 has achieved more marks than the petitioner in the selection process i.e. 51.60 total marks + 8 marks for interview, in aggregate, she has achieved 59.60 marks, whereas the petitioner has achieved 45.89 total marks + 4.67 marks for interview, in aggregate 50.56 marks. Further, in respect of resident preference, the petitioner who belongs to District Sukma has awarded with 5 marks whereas respondent No.5 who belongs to District Bastar has been awarded only 3 marks. The marks awarded to the candidates were in accordance with the terms prescribed in the advertisement as in the advertisement maximum 15 marks have been prescribed for interview. 7. Further, the petitioner has mainly raised the grievance that he belongs to District Sukma and there is specific clause in advertisement that if any candidate who is resident of District Sukma would be given preference in the selection process. 8. The term "preference" has been extensively discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chairman Tangedco & anr Vs. Priydarshani (Civil Appeal No.6470/2021) vide order dated 27.10.2021 and it has been observed the preference has to be applied only when the claims of all candidates who are eligible are taken for consideration and when any one or more of them are 5 found equally positioned. While applying the aforesaid principle, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has placed reliance in the matter of A.P. Public Service Commission Vs. YVVR Srinivasulu [(2003) 5 SCC 341]. The relevant portion of the this judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “10.…The word “preference” in our view is capable of different shades of meaning taking colour from the context, purpose and object of its use under the scheme of things envisaged. Hence, it is to be construed not in an isolated or detached manner, ascribing a meaning of universal import, for all contingencies capable of an invariable application. The procedure for selection in the case involves a qualifying test, a written examination and an oral test or interview and the final list of selection has to be on the basis of the marks obtained in them. The suitability and all-round merit, if had to be adjudged in that manner only, what justification could there be for overriding all these merely because, a particular candidate is in possession of an additional qualification on the basis of which, a preference has also been envisaged. The Rules do not provide for separate classification of those candidates or apply different norms of selection for them. The “preference” envisaged in the Rules, in our view, under the scheme of things and contextually also cannot mean, an absolute en bloc preference akin to reservation or separate and distinct method of selection for them alone. A mere rule of preference meant to give weightage to the additional 6 qualification cannot be enforced as a rule of reservation or rule of complete precedence. Such a construction would not only undermine the scheme of selection envisaged through the Public Service Commission on the basis of merit performance but also would work great hardship and injustice to those who possess the required minimum educational qualification with which they are entitled to compete with those possessing additional qualification too, and demonstrate their superiority meritwise and their suitability for the post. It is not to be viewed as a preferential right conferred even for taking up their claims for consideration. On the other hand, the preference envisaged has to be given only when the claims of all candidates who are eligible are taken for consideration and when any one or more of them are found equally positioned, by using the additional qualification as a tilting factor, in their favour vis-à-vis others in the matter of actual selection. 11. Whenever, a selection is to be made on the basis of merit performance involving competition, and possession of any additional qualification or factor is also envisaged to accord preference, it cannot be for the purpose of putting them as a whole lot ahead of others, dehors their intrinsic worth or proven inter se merit and suitability, duly assessed by the competent authority. Preference, in the context of all such competitive scheme of selection would only mean that other things being qualitatively and quantitatively equal, those with the additional qualification have to be preferred. There is no question of eliminating all others preventing thereby 7 even an effective and comparative consideration on merits, by according en bloc precedence in favour of those in possession of additional qualification irrespective of the respective merits and demerits of all candidates to be considered.” 9. In light of the aforesaid principles and after examining the facts of the present case, this Court does not find any discrimination or arbitrariness in the selection process and marks of respondent No.5 itself evident that she is more meritorious than the petitioner in the said recruitment. Therefore, no case is made out for interference in the selection list. 10. In view of the above, this petition is bereft of any merits and same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Ajay