1 2025:CGHC:55097 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 996 of 2024 1. Reserve Inspector Reserve Centre, Balod, Police Line Balod, Tah. And Distt. Balod, Chhattisgarh 2. Superintendent Of Police Balod, Tahsil And District - Blaod, Chhattisgarh. 3. Inspector General Of Police Raipur, Tahsil And District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh. (Non- Applicants No. 2 To 4) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Smt. Pratima Singh W/o Late Navneet Pratap Singh Aged About 33 Years R/o House No. 25/d/1, Dhanora Road, Borsi Talab, Near R.K. Fitness, Borsi, Ward No. 52, Police Station Pulgaon, Tahsil And District - Durg, Chhattisgarh. (Applicants) 2. Dhruvik Singh S/o Late Navneet Pratap Singh Aged About 6 Years Through Mother Smt Pratima Singh, R/o House No. 25/d/1, Dhanora Road, Borsi Talab, Near R.K. Fitness, Borsi, Ward No. 52, Police Station Pulgaon, Tahsil And District - Durg, Chhattisgarh. 3. Nitya Singh D/o Late Navneet Pratap Singh Aged About 4 Years Through Mother Smt Pratima Singh, R/o House No. 25/d/1, Dhanora Road, Borsi Talab, Near R.K. Fitness, Borsi, Ward No. 52, Police Station Pulgaon, Tahsil And District - Durg, Chhattisgarh. 4. Smt. Manjulata Singh W/o Bijay Pratap Singh Aged About 50 Years R/o House No. 25/d/1, Dhanora Road, Borsi Talab, Near R.K. Fitness, Borsi, Ward No. 52, Police Station Pulgaon, Tahsil And District - Durg, Chhattisgarh. 5. Indresh Kumar Constable No. 435 S/o Late Alakh Ram Sahu R/o Reserve Centre, Balod, Police Line, Balod, Tah. And Distt. Balod, Chhattisgarh (Non- Applicant No. 1) ... Respondent(s) For State/ Appellants : Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Deputy Government Advocate For Respondents No. 1 to 4 : Mr. Anmol Sharma, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 12.11 .2025 1. Heard on I.A. No. 02/2024, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.11.13 17:36:36 +0530 2 Act for condonation of delay occurred in filing of the instant MAC. 2. The State/appellants have filed this appeal against an award passed by the learned 8th Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) in Claim Case No. 574/2019 dated 27.02.2023, whereby the learned Tribunal has passed an award to the tune of Rs. 69,82,768/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum on account of death of Navneet Pratap Singh. 3. Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State/appellants would argue that award was passed on 27.02.2023, and thereafter, vide memo dated 06.12.2023, the department of Law and Legislative Affairs, Government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur sent a proposal to the Office of Advocate General to file Miscellaneous Appeal. He would further submit that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, AJK, Balod was appointed as Officer in Charge and on his instructions, the case was drafted on 14.05.2024. He would contend that after obtaining certified copy of the impugned award and other documents, the instant appeal was filed on 21.05.2024. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, wherein it is held that the Court adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is further held that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. He would submit that the delay part has properly been explained, and thus, he would pray to condone the delay. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Anmol Sharma, Advocate appearing for the claimants would oppose. He would submit that the appellants failed to explain sufficient reasons for inordinate delay of 353 days. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the 3 matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286. He would submit that application(I.A. No. 02/2024) deserves to be rejected. 5. I have learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the application for condonation of delay. 6. Perusal of application(I.A. No. 02/2024) would reveal that award was passed on 27.02.2023, and immediately thereafter, it was forwarded to the department, whereas, the memo was sent to the Office of Advocate General on 06.12.2023, whereby permission was accorded to prefer an appeal. There is no explanation as to what action was taken between 27.02.2023 till 06.12.2023. Further after receipt of file no action was taken and appeal was filed on 21.05.2024, thus, the appellants failed to explain the delay properly and no explanation has been offered for delay between 27.02.2023 to 06.12.2023 and 06.12.2023 to 21.05.2024. 7. It is a well settled principle of law that the law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon the selected few. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (dead) by Lrs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. 8. In the case cited by Mr. Shrivastava, Chandra Mani (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 11 held as under :- 4 “11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice- oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made 5 personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) while dealing with issue of limitation in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of 6 limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 10. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law,as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to 7 condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and period of delay and further the reasons assigned by the appellants herein, I am not inclined to condone the delay of 353 days, accordingly, I.A. No. 02/2024 is hereby rejected. Consequently, appeal also fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant