1 2025:CGHC:47224-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 939 of 2024 Rekhram Thakur S/o Keshram Thakur Aged About 28 Years R/o Tongopanikala, Bastipara, P.S. Baghbahara, District Mahasmaund, Chhattisgarh, Presently R/o Dondekala Aarti Builders Khadaan, P.S. Vidhansabha, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. Police Station Mandir Hasod, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Sudhanshu Kumar Singh, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice . 15.09.2025 1. Heard Mr. Sudhanshu Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Malay Jain, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the respondent/State. 2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.09.19 10:28:13 +0530 2 directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 15.02.2024, passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, First Fast Track Special Court POCSO, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case “POCSO” No. 16 of 2022, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Section 363 of the the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’) for 07 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, 02 months R.I. more. Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 07 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, 02 months R.I. more. Section 376(3) of the IPC & Section 4(2) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default of payment of fine, 06 months R.I. more. Section 5(B)/6 of the POCSO Act R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default of payment of fine, 06 months R.I. more. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 3. The prosecution’s case, in brief, is that on 30.11.2021 at Police Station–Mandir Hasaud, District Raipur, the victim’s father (PW-2) 3 lodged a report stating that on 30.11.2021 at about 03:00 p.m., his daughter had gone to drop her younger sister for tuition in the village, but did not return. Despite searching for her in the nearby village and among relatives, her whereabouts could not be found. Thereafter, based on the report of the victim’s father, a First Information Report (FIR) (Ex.P/16) was registered against an unknown person at Police Station–Mandir Hasaud, District Raipur under Section 363 of the IPC, as Crime No. 506/2021, and investigation commenced. 4. During investigation, a site map of the place of incident was prepared. A requisition was sent to the Tehsildar, Police Station–Mandir Hasaud, District Raipur, for preparation of a spot inspection map. The transfer certificate of the victim was seized from her father in the presence of witnesses. Upon sending a requisition to the Headmaster of the victim’s school, the Headmaster produced the Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/12), which was seized in the presence of witnesses. The Headmaster also provided the Admission-Discharge Certificate (Ex.P/12) relating to the date of birth of the victim. 5. The victim (PW-1) was recovered, and a recovery panchnama (Ex.P/1) was prepared. Her statement was recorded before the Child Welfare Committee, Raipur. The victim was handed over to her father. Her statement was also recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate. Seizure proceedings were carried out, and upon it being found during investigation that the appellant/accused had lured the victim with the 4 promise of marriage and had repeatedly committed rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon her, the appellant/accused was arrested vide Ex.P/24, and information of his arrest was given to his family members vide Ex.P/25. The victim and the appellant/accused were subjected to medical examination. The seized underwear of the victim, the slides, and the underwear of the appellant/accused were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory for FSL examination, and the FSL report (Ex.P/32) was obtained and added to the case file. 6. Statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded by the Police. After completion of the entire investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) against the appellant. 7. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376(3), 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Sections 4(2), 5(B)/6 of the POCSO Act. The charges were read over and explained to the appellant/accused, who abjured his guilt. 8. To prove its case, the prosecution examined 07 witnesses and exhibited 34 documents. The appellant neither examined any witness in his defence nor produced any document. 9. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him and asserted that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated. 5 10. After appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as detailed in paragraph 2 of this judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case, and the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is urged that the prosecution’s case suffers from material contradictions and omissions which cast serious doubt on its credibility. The learned trial Court committed an error in convicting the appellant under the POCSO Act, as the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the age of the victim. As per the Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/12), the age of the victim is recorded as 15 years and 1 month. The Headmaster (PW-3) of the victim’s school, in paragraph 5 of his cross-examination, has categorically stated that the said entry was not made by him, it is not in his handwriting, and that he is not the author of the Admission- Discharge Register. It is further submitted that the father (PW-2) of the victim has also not stated anything specific about the age of the victim, except that she was 15 years old at the time of the incident. The mother of the victim, though cited as a prosecution witness, has not been examined. The prosecution ought to have obtained a radiological report to ascertain the real age of the victim. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant further contends that in her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., the victim admitted that she 6 and the appellant were in a relationship, whereas in her deposition before the Court she has narrated a totally different story. It is also contended that the victim travelled some distance with the appellant and stayed with him for one day, yet she did not raise any alarm, even though they crossed at least 4–5 villages. It is next submitted that in the MLC report (Ex.P/33), the Doctor has opined that there were no injuries on the private parts of the victim, and no definite opinion could be given regarding forceful sexual intercourse. The Doctor has further stated that the secondary sexual characters of the victim were well developed. In these circumstances, it is argued that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant acquitted of all charges. 13. On the other hand, the learned State counsel has opposed the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. He submitted that the offences committed by the appellant are of a heinous nature, and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted him after appreciating the evidence on record. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court had duly considered all the arguments put forth by the appellant, and there exists sufficient evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The learned State counsel also contended that the testimony of the victim, being trustworthy and reliable, does not require corroboration, and a conviction can be sustained solely on the basis of her evidence. Therefore, no illegality or infirmity is found in the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned 7 trial Court, and the same does not warrant any interference. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. 15. The first and foremost question arose for the consideration would be whether the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not ? 16. For the purpose of determining the age of the victim, we have examined the evidence available on record. The prosecution has primarily relied upon the entry in the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/12), the Admission–Discharge Certificate (Ex.P/13), the Transfer Certificate of the victim (Article ‘A1’), and the testimony of the victim (PW-1). According to the Admission–Discharge Register, the Admission–Discharge Certificate, and the Transfer Certificate, the victim’s date of birth is recorded as 24.10.2006. 17. In her deposition, the victim (PW-1) stated that she was 15 years old, and her date of birth is 24.10.2006. She also deposed that she had studied up to Class VIII. The victim’s father (PW-2), in his testimony, deposed that the victim was about 15 years old at the time of the incident. 18. The Headmaster (PW-3), retired from Government High School, Rohra, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.), deposed that the particulars of the victim were recorded at Sl. No. 1172 in the Admission– Discharge Register (Ex.P/12). He stated that the victim was admitted to 8 Class I on 02.07.2012. According to the said register, the victim’s date of birth was recorded as 24.10.2006. In his cross-examination, however, he admitted that all the entries concerning the victim in the Admission– Discharge Register were not made by him. He further stated that he could not say on the basis of which document the victim’s date of birth was recorded. 19. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution has not produced clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold that she was a minor, below 18 years of age, on the date of the incident. Only on the basis of the school Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/12), the Admission–Discharge Certificate (Ex.P/13), and the Transfer Certificate of the victim (Article ‘A1’), it would not be safe to conclude that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. The statements of the prosecution witnesses are contradictory to each other regarding the age of the victim and do not inspire confidence for this Court to hold that the date of birth of the victim is 24.10.2006. 20. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official 9 book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, has observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the 10 entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by 11 admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar 12 offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 22. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:- “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 13 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure 14 that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 23. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paras 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or 15 Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent 16 certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school 17 as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 24. On consideration of the evidences, it emerges that the victim (PW- 1) stated her age to be 15 years and her date of birth as 24.10.2006. PW-2, the father of the victim, also deposed that she was 15 years old. PW-3, the Headmaster, referred to the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/12), the Admission–Discharge Certificate (Ex.P/13), and the Transfer Certificate (Article ‘A1’), in which the victim’s date of birth was recorded as 24.10.2006. However, in cross-examination, PW-3 admitted that the entries concerning the victim were not made by him and that he could not state on the basis of which document the date of birth had been recorded. In view of the above, the prosecution has failed to produce reliable and legally admissible evidence to conclusively establish the age of the victim. Thus, the age of the victim has not been proved in accordance with law, thereby creating a serious doubt in the prosecution case on this aspect. 25. Except for the above evidence, no other documents such as the Kotwari Register or a birth certificate were produced by the prosecution to establish that the victim was a minor (below 18 years) on the date of the incident. The oral testimonies of PW-1 (the victim) and PW-2 (father of the victim), along with the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P/12), 18 the Admission–Discharge Certificate (Ex.P/13), and the Transfer Certificate (Article ‘A1’), are insufficient to conclusively prove her minority, as the basis for recording her date of birth has not been demonstrated. In the absence of supporting records, it is highly probable that the date of birth was recorded on mere assumptions. If otherwise, the prosecution ought to have produced the foundational documents upon which the school entry was made. In these circumstances, the evidence regarding the victim’s age lacks the requisite sterling quality to definitively establish that she was a minor at the time of the incident. Despite this, the learned trial Court proceeded to hold her as a minor. 26. The next question for consideration would be whether the appellant has committed rape upon her or not ? 27. The victim (PW-1), in her examination-in-chief, deposed that her date of birth is 24.10.2006 and that at the time of the incident she was 15 years and 1 month old. She stated that she had studied up to Class VIII and lived with her parents in a rented house in a colony. She used to accompany her parents for labour work. The appellant/accused, a resident of Daudakala, also used to come for labour work in the mine, where she became acquainted with him. The appellant/accused used to tell her that he wanted to marry her. On 30.11.2021, around 3:00 p.m., she had gone to drop her younger sister at tuition. After dropping her, while returning home, the appellant/accused met her near Rawan Chowk along with his friend. The appellant/accused, saying that he 19 would marry her, enticed her and took her to a field near Daudakala Mathiya Mor, where he had sexual relations with her twice. They stayed in the field overnight, and on the next day the appellant/accused took her to Police Station Mandir Hasaud. The recovery memo is Ex.P/1, bearing her signature. She deposed that she had given the underwear she was wearing at the time of the incident to the Police at Mandir Hasaud Police Station, and the seizure memo is Ex.P/2, bearing her signature. Her statement recorded before the Judicial Magistrate First Class is Ex.P/3, and the order-sheet is Ex.P/4, both bearing her signature. Her statement recorded before the Child Welfare Committee is Ex.P/5, bearing her signature. For her medical examination, she was taken to PHC Mandir Hasaud, and a consent form was obtained from her, which is Ex.P/6, bearing her signature. The Police also recorded her statement regarding the incident. 28. In her cross-examination, she stated that she had been living with her parents at Kaman Pate for several years. A year earlier, her father was working in a stone quarry, where they were allotted a quarter, and they resided there as a family. She admitted that near the quarry the same owner had a banana plantation farmhouse, and at that place, four to five other families were also residing. She admitted that the accused worked as a tractor driver and that he lived with his family in the same quarter where her family was residing. She denied the suggestion that she used to visit the appellant/accused’s house while residing there. She admitted that she, along with her mother, the appellant/accused’s sister, and his mother, used to work in the banana plantation, and that 20 she used to converse with the appellant/accused’s mother and sister. She further admitted that she used to visit the appellant/accused’s sister’s house as she was her friend. She admitted that after shifting from near the appellant/accused’s residence to her present address, she stopped visiting the appellant/accused and his family and had no interaction with them thereafter. She admitted that the accused’s house is about 8–10 kilometers from her present residence, that it is not possible to walk to the appellant/accused’s house from there, and that there are 4–5 villages in between. She further admitted that the road leading to the appellant/accused’s house is busy with significant vehicular movement, and that if any person were to be taken forcibly from her residence, people passing by and the nearby villagers would be able to hear her if she raised an alarm and could come to her aid. 29. The father of the victim (PW-2) corroborated the statements made by the victim, affirming the accuracy and consistency of her account. 30. The victim (PW-1), in her examination-in-chief, deposed that her date of birth is 24.10.2006 and that at the time of the incident she was about 15 years and 1 month old. She stated that she had studied up to Class VIII and lived with her parents in a rented house. She used to accompany her parents for labour work. The appellant/accused, a resident of Daudakala, also worked as a labourer in the mine, where she became acquainted with him. The appellant expressed his desire to marry her. On 30.11.2021, around 3:00 p.m., she had gone to drop her younger sister at tuition. While returning, the appellant, accompanied by 21 his friend, met her near Rawan Chowk. Enticing her with the promise of marriage, the appellant took her to a field near Daudakala Mathiya Mor, where he had sexual relations with her twice. They stayed in the field overnight, and the next day the appellant took her to Police Station Mandir Hasaud. The recovery memo (Ex.P/1) bears her signature. She also handed over the underwear worn at the time of the incident to the police, which was seized under Ex.P/2. Her statements before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (Ex.P/3 & Ex.P/4) and the Child Welfare Committee (Ex.P/5) also bear her signatures. For medical examination at PHC Mandir Hasaud, her consent was obtained (Ex.P/6). She confirmed that her statement was recorded by the police as well. 31. In her cross-examination, the victim admitted that she had resided with her family near the quarry where her father was employed. At that place, four to five other families also resided. She admitted that the appellant worked as a tractor driver and lived with his family in the same quarters. She denied visiting the appellant’s house, but admitted that she, along with her mother, the appellant’s mother, and his sister, used to work together in the banana plantation, and she would converse with them. She admitted that the appellant’s sister was her friend and that she visited her house. However, after shifting to her present residence, she stopped visiting the appellant’s family and had no further interaction with them. She further admitted that the appellant’s house was about 8– 10 kilometers from her present residence, separated by 4–5 villages. She agreed that the road was busy with vehicular movement, and if anyone were taken forcibly, raising an alarm would have attracted public 22 attention. 32. The father of the victim (PW-2) corroborated her version and affirmed the consistency of her account. 33. Dr. Akanksha Sonwani (PW-7), who examined the victim on 02.12.2021, deposed that the victim, aged about 15 years, was examined with written consent of her mother. On general examination, the victim was normal, conscious, and her secondary sexual characters were well developed. No external injuries were noted. On internal examination, pubic hair was fully developed, vulva and vagina appeared normal, and the hymen was old and torn. No fresh injury marks were seen. Two vaginal smear slides were prepared and sent for chemical examination. The doctor opined that no definite conclusion could be drawn about recent sexual intercourse, subject to chemical analysis (Ex.P/33). A sealed packet containing a stained undergarment was also received, resealed, and forwarded for examination (Ex.P/34). 34. Dr. Doman Lal (PW-5), who examined the appellant on 02.12.2021, deposed that the appellant, aged 25 years, was conscious, oriented, with normal secondary sexual characteristics. His genitals were healthy, with absence of smegma and no injuries. He was found capable of sexual intercourse (Ex.P/14). On the same day, a sealed packet containing a stained blue underwear of the appellant was produced, resealed, and sent for chemical analysis (Ex.P/15). 35. As per the chemical analysis report (Ex.P/32), no spermatozoa were detected on the underwear of either the victim or the appellant. 23 However, human spermatozoa were found on the vaginal slide of the victim. Dr. Doman Lal noted the absence of smegma, which indicated sexual intercourse within the preceding 36 hours. The medical and chemical reports thus corroborate the victim’s testimony that sexual intercourse took place. 36. On careful consideration of the testimony of the victim (PW-1), certain material inconsistencies and improbabilities emerge which cast serious doubt on the prosecution case. Firstly, although the victim alleged that she was enticed by the appellant/accused on the pretext of marriage and taken to a field where sexual intercourse was committed, her own cross-examination reveals that she and her family were well acquainted with the appellant/accused and his family for a long period of time. She admitted that she used to visit the house of the appellant/accused’s sister, who was her friend, and that both families worked together in the banana plantation. Such prior familiarity indicates that the alleged incident was not the result of sudden inducement or force, but rather of a pre-existing acquaintance. 37. Secondly, the victim admitted in cross-examination that the house of the appellant/accused was about 8–10 kilometers away from her own residence, with 4–5 villages and a busy public road in between. She also admitted that if a person were forcibly taken from her residence, the people passing by and nearby villagers would hear the alarm and come for help. In spite of this, the victim did not raise any alarm during the alleged incident, even though she claims to have stayed with the 24 appellant/accused overnight in an open field. This conduct is inconsistent with the normal course of human behavior if the act was against her will. 38. Thirdly, the victim herself deposed that on the following day, it was the appellant/accused who took her to the Police Station. Such conduct on the part of the appellant/accused is wholly inconsistent with the guilt attributed to him and supports the defence contention that the relationship, if any, was consensual. Lastly, the victim was around 15 years of age as per the disputed school records, but the prosecution failed to establish her age conclusively in accordance with law. The Headmaster (PW-3) himself admitted that the entries in the Admission- Discharge Register (Ex.P/12) were not made by him and that he could not state on what basis the date of birth was recorded. In the absence of reliable and admissible evidence, the prosecution failed to prove that the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged incident. 39. The law is well settled that, in cases of rape, a conviction can be sustained even on the sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat: the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Although the victim’s statement does not require corroboration, if it is not credible, the appellant/accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution must prove the charges against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, which it has failed to do in the present case. 40. For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt 25 against the appellant and the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. 41. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 15.02.2024 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. The appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 42. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 43. The learned trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan